area handbook series 

Romania 

country study 



Romania 

a country study 




On the cover: Thirteenth-century gate tower in the pic- 
turesque town of Sighi§oara 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Romania: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Ronald D. Bachman. — 2d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-160) 
"Supersedes the 1979 edition of Area handbook for Romania, 
coauthored by Eugene K. Keefe, et al." — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed July 1989." 

Includes bibiliographical references (pp. 317-335) and index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-160/991 

1. Romania. I. Bachman, Ronald D., 1947- . II. Keefe, 
Eugene K. Area handbook for Romania. III. Library of Congress. 
Federal Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam : 550-160. 
DR205.R613 1990 90-6449 
949.8— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-160 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



A number of persons in the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress are to be thanked for bringing this undertak- 
ing to fruition. Richard F. Nyrop provided guidance through the 
planning and chapter-drafting stages, and Sandra W. Meditz and 
Raymond E. Zickel reviewed the study. Martha E. Hopkins 
managed editing; Marilyn L. Majeska supervised production; and 
editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson helped pre- 
pare the manuscript. 

Individual chapters were edited by Deanna K. D'Errico, Patricia 
Mollela, and Ruth Nieland. Catherine Schwartzstein performed 
the final prepublication editorial review, and Shirley Kessel com- 
piled the index. Linda Peterson of the Library of Congress Print- 
ing and Processing Section performed phototypesetting, under the 
supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

The editor gratefully acknowledges the graphics support provided 
by David Cabitto, who was assisted by Harriett R. Blood, Sandra 
K. Ferrell, and Kimberly E. Lord. David Cabitto executed the art- 
work on the cover and the title page of each chapter as well as the 
military rank charts. Special thanks go to Helen R. Fedor for ob- 
taining photographs from individuals who had recently travelled 
in Romania. The editor also expresses his gratitude to Stanley M. 
Sciora for the detailed description of military uniforms and insig- 
nia and to Olena Z. Thorne for her help with Romanian spelling 
and orthography. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Charles Sudetic 

EARLY HISTORY FROM PREHISTORY TO THE 

ELEVENTH CENTURY 4 

The Getae 4 

Roman Dacia 7 

The Age of the Great Migrations 8 

TRANSYLVANIA, WALACHIA, AND MOLDAVIA FROM 
THE ELEVENTH CENTURY TO THE SEVENTEENTH 

CENTURY 9 

The Magyars' Arrival in Transylvania 9 

Origins of Walachia and Moldavia 10 

The Ottoman Invasions 12 

TRANSYLVANIA UNDER THE HABSBURGS, 

1688-1867 18 

The Uniate Church 18 

The Reign of Joseph II 19 

The Revolution of 1848 21 

Unification of Transylvania and Hungary 21 

WALACHIA AND MOLDAVIA UNDER THE RUSSIAN PRO- 
TECTORATE, 1711-1859 22 

The Phanariot Princes 22 

The Russian Protectorate 23 

The Crimean War and Unification 25 

ROMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA TO THE END OF 

WORLD WAR I, 1861-1919 26 

Romania under Charles of Hohenzollern- 

Sigmaringen 27 

The Balkan Wars and World War I 30 

Greater Romania and the Occupation of Budapest ... 35 



vii 



GREATER ROMANIA TO THE END OF WORLD 

WAR II, 1920-45 36 

The Agrarian Crisis and the Rise of the 

Iron Guard 38 

World War II 40 

Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation 42 

POSTWAR ROMANIA, 1944-85 44 

Petru Groza's Premiership 46 

Elimination of Opposition Parties 49 

The Romanian People's Republic 50 

The Post-Stalin Era 52 

Gheorghiu-Dej's Defiance of Khrushchev 54 

The Ceau§escu Succession 56 

Dynastic Socialism and the Economic Downturn .... 58 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 61 

Sherri Poradzisz 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 64 

Boundaries and Geographical Position 64 

Topography 65 

Climate 70 

POPULATION 70 

Demographic History 70 

Demographic Policy 72 

Settlement Structure 75 

Systematization: A Settlement Strategy 78 

ETHNIC STRUCTURE 80 

Historical and Geographical Distribution 81 

National Minorities under Communist Rule 85 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 93 

The End of the Ancien Regime 93 

The New Social Order 95 

Social Mobility 107 

INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANS OF SOCIETY 108 

Family 108 

Women and Women's Organizations 112 

The Education System 114 

Religion 120 

SOCIAL CONDITIONS 126 

Housing 126 

Public Health 126 

State Welfare Assistance 130 



viii 



Chapter 3. The Economy 133 

Ronald D. Bachman 

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 137 

Evolution 137 

Administration and Control 139 

Banking 147 

NATURAL RESOURCES 151 

Land 151 

Water 152 

Forests 153 

Fossil Fuels 154 

Other Minerals 155 

LABOR 156 

Distribution by Economic Sector 156 

Unpaid Labor 156 

Demographics 157 

Productivity 158 

FOREIGN TRADE 162 

Goals and Policy 162 

Trading Partners 162 

Structure of Exports and Imports 164 

Retirement of the Foreign Debt 165 

INDUSTRY 165 

Geographic Distribution 165 

Energy 166 

Machine Building 170 

Metallurgy 173 

Chemicals 175 

Light Industry 176 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNI- 
CATIONS 176 

Railroads 176 

Highways 177 

Inland Waterways 177 

Maritime Navigation 179 

Air Transport 179 

Telecommunications 180 

AGRICULTURE 180 

Agricultural Regions 180 

Major Crops 182 

Livestock 182 

Fishing 183 

Farming Practices 183 



ix 



Farm Organization 184 

Administration 187 

Procurement and Distribution 187 

Consumption 189 

GOALS FOR THE 1990s 190 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 193 

Sergiu Verona 

GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 196 

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING 

OF THE GOVERNMENT 199 

Central Government 199 

Joint Party-State Organizations 207 

Local Government 208 

Electoral System 210 

ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 211 

Membership 211 

Organizational Structure 213 

Ideology and Party Program 217 

Party Training 218 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS 219 

Union of Communist Youth 220 

General Union of Trade Unions 221 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING 

THE CEAU§ESCU ERA 222 

Period from 1965 to 1970 222 

1967 Party Congress 223 

Rehabilitation and De-Stalinization 224 

Tenth Party Congress 224 

Eleventh Party Congress 225 

Twelfth Party Congress 226 

Thirteenth Party Congress 227 

Cult of Personality 227 

Emergence of an Organized Opposition 228 

MASS MEDIA 231 

FOREIGN POLICY 235 

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST STATES 237 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 237 

Hungary 241 

RELATIONS WITH NONCOMMUNIST 

STATES 243 

West Germany 243 

United States 244 

Other Western Countries 245 



x 



Middle East 246 

Africa 247 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe . . 247 

Chapter 5. National Security 249 

Karl Wheeler Soper 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 252 

Defense of Romanian Lands in Ancient 

Times and the Middle Ages 252 

Ottoman Domination and the Struggle 

for National Unity and Independence 252 

The Romanian Army in World War I 254 

Security During the Interwar Years 

and World War II 255 

Development of the Romanian Armed Forces 

after World War II 257 

MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY 258 

Evolution of Military Doctrine 258 

Military Strategy 260 

Arms Control 261 

ARMED FORCES 262 

Command and Control of the Armed Forces 262 

Armed Services 268 

Military Personnel 276 

The Military and the National Economy 283 

Foreign Military Relations 289 

LAW AND ORDER 294 

Judicial System 294 

Crime 297 

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 298 

Ministry of Interior and Security Forces 299 

Dissidence 304 

Department of External Information 305 

Appendix. Tables 309 

Bibliography 317 

Glossary 337 

Index 341 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Romania, 1989 xx 

2 Boundaries of Romania from the Congress of Berlin, 

1878, to the Treaty of Trianon, 1920 30 



xi 



3 Topography and Drainage 68 

4 Ethnic Hungarian Minority in Romania in the 1980s 84 

5 Transportation System, 1982 178 

6 Government and Party Organization for Defense, 

1988 264 

7 Major Military Installations, 1989 270 

8 Organization of a Motorized Rifle Division, 1987 272 

9 Organization of a Romanian Air Force Division, 1987 .... 274 

10 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1989 284 

11 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989 285 

12 Organization of the Ministry of Interior, 1980s 300 

13 Organization of the Romanian Intelligence Service, 

1980s 306 



xii 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a com- 
pact and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, 
and military aspects of contemporary Romania. Unfortunately, dur- 
ing the intervening months between the completion of research (July 
1 989) and publication of this work, Romania experienced the most 
profound political, economic, and social upheaval of its post-World 
War II history. The introduction briefly chronicles the tumultu- 
ous events that transpired between late December 1989 and De- 
cember 1990. Although the text proper does not address the changes 
wrought by these events, it provides information that will enable 
the reader to understand why Romania's move away from com- 
munism was simultaneously more turbulent and inconclusive than 
was the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The study provides 
the context for Romania's "revolution," the violent demise of 
the detested Nicolae and Elena Ceau§escu, the displacement of the 
Romanian Communist Party by the National Salvation Front, the 
reemergence of long-dormant political parties, and the escalation 
of interethnic tensions inside the country and with Hungary and 
the Soviet Union. 

Sources of information included the most authoritative English 
and foreign-language literature, including books, anthologies, 
scholarly journals, newspapers, and United States and Romanian 
government publications. An objective description of Romanian 
society in the late 1980s, however, presented special challenges 
because of the paucity of reliable statistical data in official Romanian 
sources and because of the propagandizing mission of the state- 
controlled press. Each chapter closes with a brief annotated bib- 
liography listing several works for additional reading. Complete 
bibliographic citations for these and other sources consulted by the 
authors appear at the end of the book. 

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion ta- 
ble is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with that system (see 
table 1, Appendix). Diacritical marks appear on Romanian place 
names and other words as rendered by the United States Board 
on Geographic Names. Recurring special terms appear in the glos- 
sary at the end of the book. 



Xlll 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Socialist Republic of Romania. 

Short Form: Romania. 

Term for Citizens: Romanians. 

Capital: Bucharest. 

Geography 

Area: 237,499 square kilometers. 

Topography: Almost evenly divided among hills, mountains, and 
plains; mountains dominate center and northwest; plains cover 
south and east. Highest point, 2,544 meters. 



xv 



Climate: Transitional from temperate in southwest to continental 
in northeast. Average annual precipitation, 637 millimeters. 

Society 

Population: 23,153,475 (July 1989); average annual growth rate 
0.44 percent. 

Ethnic Groups: 89. 1 percent Romanian, 7.8 percent Hungarian, 
1.5 percent German, 1.6 percent Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, Russi- 
an, Turk, and Gypsy. 

Language: Romanian spoken in all regions; Hungarian and Ger- 
man commonly used in Transylvania and Banat. Systematic dis- 
crimination against minority languages. 

Education: Mandatory attendance, ten years; literacy, 98 percent. 
Highly centralized. Marxist ideology and nationalistic values 
stressed at all levels. In 1980s technical and vocational education 
emphasized. 

Religion: About 70 percent Romanian Orthodox, 6 percent Uni- 
ate, 6 percent Roman Catholic, 6 percent Protestant, 12 percent 
unaffiliated or other. 

Health and Welfare: Free health care provided by state. Most seri- 
ous health threats cancer, cardiovascular disease, alcoholism. Infant 
mortality rate, 25 per 1,000 live births (1989). In 1989 life expec- 
tancy for men 67.0 and for women 72.6 years. Pensions inadequate; 
health care for elderly generally poor. Rural areas neglected. 

Economy 

Gross National Product: US$151.3 billion (1988), US$6,570 per 
capita, with 2.1 percent growth rate. Industry accounts for 52.7 
percent, agriculture 14.9 percent, other sectors 32.4 percent (1987). 

Administration: Extremely centralized, directed by communist party. 
Detailed economic planning. State ownership of most fixed assets. 

Fuels and Energy: Once extensive oil and gas reserves nearing 
depletion. Increasing dependence on imported fuels. Coal reserves 
large but of poor quality. Coking coal reserves inadequate. Sig- 
nificant hydroelectric potential under development. Nuclear pow- 
er program lagging badly. 

Minerals: Deposits of ferrous and nonferrous ores, salt, gypsum. 
Increasingly dependent on imported iron ore. 



xvi 



Foreign Trade: Split almost evenly between socialist and non- 
socialist countries. Large surpluses run during 1980s to repay for- 
eign debt. Major exports metallurgical products, machinery, refined 
oil products, chemical fertilizers, processed wood products, agricul- 
tural commodities. Major imports crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, 
machinery and equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs. 

Industry: Fuels production and processing, metallurgy, chemicals, 
machine building, forestry, food processing, textiles. 

Agriculture: About 91 percent collectivized. Primary crops: corn, 
wheat, barley, oilseeds, potatoes, sugarbeets, fruits and vegetables. 
Cattle, sheep, hogs, and poultry widely raised. 

Exchange Rate: 14.5 lei per US$1 in January 1989. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: 11,221 kilometers in 1986, of which 10,755 kilometers 
standard gauge, 421 kilometers narrow gauge, 45 kilometers broad 
gauge; about 3,060 kilometers double-tracked; 3,328 kilometers 
electrified. 

Highways: 72,799 kilometers in 1985, of which 15,762 kilome- 
ters concrete, asphalt, stone block; 20,208 kilometers asphalt treated; 
27,729 kilometers gravel, crushed stone; and 9,100 kilometers earth. 

Inland Waterways: 1,724 kilometers in 1984. 

Pipelines: In 1984 2,800 kilometers for crude oil; for refined 
products, 1,429 kilometers; for natural gas, 6,400 kilometers. 

Ports: Constan$a, Galaji, Braila, Mangalia accommodate sea-going 
vessels; Giurgiu, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Or§ova principal river- 
ine ports. 

Airports: 160 airfields, 15 with runways longer than 2,500 meters. 
International airports: Bucharest, Constanta, Timi§oara, Suceava. 

Telecommunications: In 1989, 39 AM, 30 FM radio stations, 38 
TV stations; 1 satellite ground station; 3.9 million TV sets, 3.2 
million radio receivers. Late 1985, 1,962,681 telephone subscribers. 

Government and Politics 

Government: 1965 Constitution amended in 1974. Highly centra- 
lized and controlled by President Nicolae Ceau§escu and his inner 
circle. Primary branches Grand National Assembly, State Coun- 
cil, Council of Ministers, judicial system. 



xvn 



Politics: Monopolized by Romanian Communist Party headed by 
General Secretary Ceau§escu. Power concentrated in Political Ex- 
ecutive Committee and its Permanent Bureau and in unique joint 
party-state agencies. Communists head all central government bod- 
ies and local people's councils. 

Foreign Relations: Diplomatic relations with 125 countries and 
Palestine Liberation Organization. Most independent member of 
Warsaw Treaty Organization. Neutral throughout Sino- Soviet dis- 
pute. Relations with West deteriorated in 1980s because of human 
rights record. Relationship with Hungary extremely tense. 

International Agreements: Frequently uncooperative member of 
Warsaw Treaty Organization and Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance; member of United Nations, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World 
Health Organization, Group of 77. Signatory to Helsinki Accords; 
refused to abide by final document of Vienna Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, January 1989. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Three military districts: Cluj, Bacau, Bucharest. 
Active-duty forces small (1 soldier per 128 citizens). Large reserve 
and paramilitary formations. All services controlled by Ministry 
of National Defense. 

Ground Forces: In 1989 numbered 140,000 (two- thirds conscripts). 
Eight motorized rifle divisions, two tank divisions, four mountain 
infantry brigades, four airborne regiments. 

Air Force: 32,000 personnel in 1989 (less than one-third conscripts). 
Divided into three tactical divisions, each with two regiments. Air 
force controls ground-based air defense network of surface-to-air 
missiles. 

Naval Forces: More than 7,500 personnel in 1989, organized into 
Black Sea Fleet, Danube Squadron, shore-based Coastal Defense. 
Major naval bases and shipyards Mangalia and Constanta; Danube 
anchorages at Braila, Giurgiu, Sulina, Galaji, Tulcea. 

Border Guards: In 1989 force of 20,000, organized into twelve 
brigades, equipped as motorized infantry troops. 

Equipment: Traditionally supplied by Soviet Union. In 1985 
government claimed more than two-thirds produced domestically. 

Reserves: In 1989 about 4.5 million men eighteen to fifty years old. 



xviii 



Paramilitary: In 1989 Patriotic Guards (combined national guard 
and civil defense organization) numbered about 700,000 men and 
women. Subordinate to Romanian Communist Party and Union 
of Communist Youth. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Member of Warsaw Treaty Organi- 
zation; no troop maneuvers on Romanian soil after invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Bilateral treaties with Soviet Union, Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary. 

Internal Security: Ministry of Interior controls municipal and 
traffic police, fire fighters, largest secret police in Eastern Europe 
on per capita basis, and 20,000-member special security force guard- 
ing communications centers and party offices. 



xix 



• Piatra 
Neaml \- 



^/jDradea 

■ * 6 

. - \Cluj-Napoca 

'L. - / • ^' ' U ~'~ a 

""N • * ^ ~\ . — ^ r/rau Mures ' Miercurea- C. 

sr. ^ - « 



48 



r 



Saiu /Ware\ * " . .. ; • * ' " ^~ 
• ' Baia Mare " ^ Suceavd \ • 

HUNGARY ^ 1 / /- 2 ^ — ^ 4 "\ 

>a U/ -7 e , sf „ fa j_^ ^ * 12 

11 



3& | 

4a 



\Cluj-Napoca . 9 1 V 



SOVIET 
UNION 



13 



Timisoara 



Vaslui § 

\ 14 ? 



23 , 

7 



r 

22 ' 

j) BrailaJ 



17 

4/ba /u/ia. 

( P /"sir / 19 '.j-gi 21 # \ l 

-fles „a • . Vr '^"\ 31 

24 >T^« 28 - OQ \30^ e ° Z - U 

• j 27 / I 2 . 9 1. P ** e5 "'< / I 33 

' V . • —■ -y. „ j ^Alexandria ( / 3S 



32 



YUGOSLAVIA > 

S 



BULGARIA 




International boundary 
Judet boundary 
National capital 
Administrative center 

100 Kilometers 



26 u - 



Judete, Bucharest Municipality, 
and llfov Agricultural District 



Alba (17) 


Constanta (42) 


Mures (9) 


Arad (15) 


Covasna (20) 


Neamt (11) 


Arges (28) 


Dim bo vita (29) 


Olt (35) 


Bacau (13) 


Dolj (34) 


P rah ova (30) 


Bihor (6) 


Galatj (22) 


Salaj (7) 


Bistrifa-Nasaud (3) 


Giurgiu (37) 


Satu Mare (1) 


Botosani (5) 


Gorj (26) 


Sibiu (18) 


Braila (32) 


Harghita (10) 


Suceava (4) 


Brasov (19) 


Hunedoara (16) 


Teleorman (36) 


Bucharest 


lalomita (40) 


Tim is (23) 


Municipality (39) 


lasi (12) 


Tulcea (33) 


Buzau (31) 


llfov Agricultural 


Vaslui (14) 


Cmrasi (41) 


District (38) 


Vilcea (27) 


Caras-Severin (24) 


Maramures (2) 


Vrancea (21) 


Cluj (8) 


Mehedinti (25) 





Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Romania, 1989. 



xx 



Introduction 



UNTIL LATE DECEMBER 1989, it appeared that the Socialist 
Republic of Romania would enter the final decade of the century 
as one of the few remaining orthodox communist states. Revelling 
in his recent political triumphs at the Fourteenth Congress of the 
Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Roman — PCR), 
President Nicolae Ceau§escu adamantly refused to bow to inter- 
national pressure to relax his iron- fisted rule. Ceau§escu cast him- 
self as the last true defender of socialism and rejected the liberalizing 
reforms adopted by other Eastern European states and the 
Soviet Union. Instead, his regime unflinchingly continued its Stalinist 
policies of repression of individual liberties, forced Romanianiza- 
tion of ethnic minorities, destruction of the nation's architectural 
heritage, and adherence to failed economic policies that had reduced 
Romania's standard of living to Third World levels. 

Despite Ceau§escu's growing international isolation, Romania's 
state-controlled media continued to lionize the "genius of the Car- 
pathians." The period after 1965 was termed the "golden age of 
Ceau§escu," an era when Romania purportedly had taken great 
strides toward its goal of becoming a multilaterally developed so- 
cialist state (see Glossary) by the year 2000. The international com- 
munity regarded the regime's depiction of its achievements as 
self-serving distortions of reality. But no one could deny that 
Ceau§escu's long rule had radically changed Romania. 

When he came to power in 1965, Ceausescu inherited a politi- 
cal model that differed little from the Stalinist prototype imposed 
in 1948. Under his shrewd direction, however, new control mechan- 
isms evolved, giving Romania the most highly centralized power 
structure in Eastern Europe. After his election to the newly creat- 
ed office of president of the republic in 1974, Ceau§escu officially 
assumed the duties of head of state while remaining leader of the 
Romanian Communist Party and supreme commander of the 
armed forces. Also in 1974, Ceau§escu engineered the abolition 
of the Central Committee's Standing Presidium, among whose 
members were some of the most influential individuals in the party. 
Thereafter, policy-making powers would increasingly reside in the 
Political Executive Committee and its Permanent Bureau, which 
were staffed with Ceau§escu's most trusted allies. 

Ceau§escu tightened his control of policy making and adminis- 
tration through the mechanism of joint party-state councils, which 
had no precise counterpart in other communist regimes. The 



xxi 



councils went a step beyond the typical Stalinist pattern of inter- 
locking party and state directorates, in which state institutions 
preserved at least the appearance of autonomy. The fusion of party 
and state bodies enabled Ceau§escu to exercise immediate control 
over many of the functions the Constitution had granted to the 
Grand National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council of 
Ministers, the State Planning Committee and other government 
entities. Five of the nine joint party-state councils that had emerged 
by 1989 were chaired by Ceau§escu himself or by his wife, Elena. 

The appointment of close family members to critical party and 
government positions was a tactic of power consolidation that 
Ceausescu employed throughout his tenure. Indeed, the extent of 
nepotism in his regime was unparalleled in Eastern Europe. In 1989 
at least twenty-seven Ceau§escu relatives held influential positions 
in the party and state apparatus. Elena Ceau§escu was elected to 
the Central Committee in 1972 and immediately began amassing 
power in her own right. From her position as chief of the Party 
and State Cadres Commission, she was able to dictate organiza- 
tional and personnel changes throughout the party and the govern- 
ment. And as head of the National Council of Science and 
Technology, she played a central role in setting economic goals 
and policy. Ceau§escu's brother, Hie, became deputy minister of 
national defense and chief of the Higher Political Council of the 
Army after an alleged military coup attempt in 1983. Ceau§escu's 
son, Nicu, despite a playboy reputation, headed the Union of Com- 
munist Youth and was a candidate member of the Political Execu- 
tive Committee. Western observers coined the term "dynastic 
socialism" to describe the Romanian polity. 

Another control mechanism perfected by Ceausescu was "rota- 
tion," a policy applied after 1971 to bolster his personal power at 
the expense of political institutions. Rotation shunted officials be- 
tween party and state bureaucracies and between national and lo- 
cal posts, thereby removing Ceausescu 's potential rivals before they 
were able to develop their own power bases. Although rotation was 
clearly counterproductive to administrative efficiency and was par- 
ticularly damaging to the economy, Ceausescu continued the policy 
with vigor. In one month in 1987, for example, he dismissed eight- 
een ministers from the Council of Ministers — about one-third of 
the government body established by the Constitution to administer 
all national and local agencies. 

In the Stalinist tradition, Ceau§escu exploited a ruthlessly effi- 
cient secret police, the Department of State Security (Departamentul 
Securitajii Statului — Securitate) and intelligence service to abort 
challenges to his authority. Relative to the country's population, 



xxn 



these services were the largest in Eastern Europe. And they were 
perhaps the most effective, judging by the relatively few documented 
acts of public dissent in Romania as compared with other com- 
munist states. Ceau§escu generously funded the secret services and 
gave them carte blanche to preempt threats to his regime. In direct 
violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, Securitate agents 
maintained surveillance on private citizens, monitoring their con- 
tacts with foreigners, screening their mail, tapping their telephones, 
breaking into their homes and offices, and arresting and interrogat- 
ing those suspected of disloyalty to the regime. Prominent dissi- 
dents suffered more severe forms of harassment, including physical 
violence and imprisonment. 

In addition to the feared Securitate, Ceausescu directly controlled 
a force of some 20,000 special security troops, whose primary mis- 
sion was to defend party installations and communications facili- 
ties. Heavily indoctrinated in Ceau§escu's version of Marxism, these 
soldiers, in effect, served as a "palace guard." Moreover, as chair- 
man of the Defense Council from its inception in 1969, Ceau§escu 
could rein in the regular armed forces and minimize the threat of 
a military coup. Further diminishing the military as a potential 
rival to his authority, Ceau§escu developed a unique military doc- 
trine that deprofessionalized the regular armed forces and stressed 
mass participation in a "War of the Entire People." 

As Ceau§escu consolidated his power, he was able to pursue his 
own agenda in economic and foreign policy. For the most part, 
he continued the classic Stalinist development strategy of his 
predecessor and mentor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej . The goal of 
that strategy was economic autarky, which was to be attained 
through the socialization of assets, the rapid development of heavy 
industry, the transfer of underemployed rural labor to new manufac- 
turing jobs in urban centers, and the development and exploita- 
tion of the nation's extensive natural resources. 

Romania's progress along the path of "socialist construction" 
was acknowledged in 1965 when the country's name was changed 
from the Romanian People's Republic to the Socialist Republic 
of Romania. The nationalization of industrial, financial, and trans- 
portation assets had been largely accomplished by 1950, and some 
90 percent of the farmland had been collectivized by 1962. Whereas 
industry had produced only about one-third of national income on 
the eve of World War II, it accounted for almost three-fifths in 
1965. Industrial output had risen by 650 percent since 1950. This 
dramatic growth had been achieved by channeling the lion's share 
of investment capital to heavy industry while neglecting light in- 
dustry and agriculture. Industrialization had unleashed a massive 



xxm 



migration from the countryside to the cities, creating the urban 
proletariat that, according to Marxist theory, was essential for at- 
taining socialism and, ultimately, communism. 

During the first twelve years of Ceau§escu's rule, exceptionally 
high levels of capital accumulation and investment produced one 
of the most dynamic economic growth rates in the world. The metal- 
lurgical, machine-building, and petrochemical industries, which 
Ceau§escu believed were essential for securing economic indepen- 
dence, showed the most dramatic development. Ceau§escu mobi- 
lized the necessary human and material resources to undertake 
massive public works projects across the country. He resumed con- 
struction of the Danube-Black Sea Canal, abandoned by Gheorghiu- 
Dej in the mid-1950s. Finally opened to traffic in 1984, the canal 
was the costliest civil-engineering project in Romanian history. 
Meanwhile, agriculture continued to receive fewer resources than 
its importance to the economy warranted. The exodus of peasants 
from the countryside to better-paying urban jobs continued un- 
abated, leaving an aged and increasingly poorly qualified labor force 
to produce the nation's food. 

After 1976 the economy began to falter as Romania failed to 
make the difficult transition from extensive to intensive develop- 
ment. Although the highly centralized command system had served 
the country well in the bootstrap industrialization effort, it was poor- 
ly suited for managing an increasingly complex and diversified econ- 
omy. The regime's Stalinist gigantomania had produced sprawling 
steel and petrochemical plants with capacities far exceeding domestic 
supplies of raw materials and energy. To repay the West for the 
technological and financial assistance it had provided in building 
the plants, Ceaugescu had counted on increased export revenues. 
But even as the facilities were being built, world market prices for 
steel and refined oil products collapsed, making repayment of the 
loans difficult and painful. A combination of negative factors (a 
devastating earthquake in 1977, a prolonged and severe drought, 
high interest rates charged by Western creditors, and rising prices 
for imported crude oil) plunged Romania into a financial crisis. 

During the 1980s, Romania's economic problems multiplied. 
A worsening labor shortage hindered growth, and worker dissatis- 
faction reached unprecedented levels. A persistent shortage of con- 
sumer goods made monetary incentives increasingly meaningless. 
Wage reforms penalizing individual workers for the failure of their 
factories to meet production targets proved counterproductive and 
in fact spurred the traditionally docile labor force to stage strikes 
and demonstrations. Largely because of labor's demoralization, 
Romania ranked last among the European members of the Council 



xxiv 



for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in per capita gross 
national product, and its agriculture ranked twentieth in Europe 
in terms of output per hectare. 

During the 1980s, Ceau§escu's top economic priority was the 
quickest possible repayment of the foreign debt. His regime took 
draconian measures to reduce imports and maximize export earn- 
ings. Food rationing was reimposed for the first time since the early 
postwar years, so that agricultural products could be exported for 
foreign currency. Electricity, heat, gasoline, and numerous other 
consumer products also were stricdy rationed. The Western media 
began publishing reports of widespread malnutrition and suffering 
caused by these measures. But the regime's commitment to its poli- 
cies remained unshaken, and in early 1989 Ceau§escu announced 
that the debt burden had finally been eliminated. Blaming "usu- 
rious" Western financial institutions, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and the World Bank (see 
Glossary), for many of his country's economic difficulties, Ceau§es- 
cu proposed, and the Grand National Assembly enacted, legisla- 
tion banning any agency of the Romanian government from seeking 
or obtaining foreign credits. 

Ceau§escu's obsessive drive to retire the foreign debt at virtual- 
ly any cost was consistent with a centuries-old theme of Romani- 
an history — a longing for national independence and economic 
self-sufficiency. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the 
Romanian lands from earliest history were vulnerable to maraud- 
ing tribes. Over the centuries, the region was dominated by power- 
ful neighbors, including the Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, 
and Russian empires. These and other foreign powers plundered 
the natural wealth of the Romanian lands and held the native popu- 
lation in abject poverty. Although a Walachian prince, Michael 
the Brave, fought a war of national liberation against the Otto- 
man Empire in the late sixteenth century and, for a short time, 
united the three Romanian states of Walachia, Moldavia, and Tran- 
sylvania, it was not until the late nineteenth century that an in- 
dependent, unified Romania finally emerged. But for decades after 
gaining independence, Romanians remained second-class citizens 
in their own country. Outside interests continued to control much 
of the nation's industry and agriculture, and non-Romanian eth- 
nic groups dominated commerce. 

Throughout the twentieth century, Romania's leaders repeat- 
edly exploited the nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments that the 
long history of foreign domination had instilled in their country- 
men. During the 1930s, these sentiments gave rise to the violently 
anti-Semitic and anticommunist Iron Guard, the largest fascist 



xxv 



movement in the Balkans. The Guard promoted the establishment 
of a pro-German military dictatorship led by General Ion Antones- 
cu, who brought Romania into World War II on the side of the 
Axis Powers. But his dream of regaining the territories of Bukovi- 
na and Bessarabia, annexed by the Soviet Union in the first year 
of the war, was not to be realized. Indeed, by joining Hitler's forces 
and attacking the Soviet Union, Antonescu sealed Romania's tragic 
postwar fate. Occupied by the victorious Red Army, Romania in 
1948 suffered a communist takeover and was forced to pay heavy 
reparations to the Soviet Union. 

During the first decade of communist rule, Romania quietly com- 
plied with Moscow's foreign policy requirements and joined the 
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) and 
Comecon. Bucharest curried favor with Moscow by strongly en- 
dorsing the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 
1956, hoping to be rewarded with the removal of Soviet forces from 
Romanian territory. After Moscow withdrew its troops in 1958, 
however, Gheorghiu-Dej was emboldened to set an increasingly 
independent foreign policy. Tensions over Romania's economic 
development strategy and relationship to Comecon soon emerged. 
Gheorghiu-Dej 's determination to industrialize his country outraged 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who had intended to relegate 
Romania to the role of supplier of agricultural products and raw 
materials to the industrialized members of Comecon. To lessen 
dependence on Comecon, Gheorghiu-Dej established economic re- 
lations with noncommunist states and contracted with Western firms 
to build industrial plants in Romania. During the Sino-Soviet dis- 
pute, he supported the Chinese position on the equality of com- 
munist states and audaciously offered to mediate the disagreement. 
And in the famous ''April Declaration" of 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej 
asserted the right of all nations to develop policies in accordance 
with their own interests and domestic requirements. 

Accepting the April Declaration as the guiding principle of his 
foreign policy, Ceau§escu further distanced Romania from the 
Soviet bloc. He defied Moscow by establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1967 
and by maintaining relations with Israel after the June 1967 War. 
He denounced the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and thereafter refused to permit Warsaw Pact military maneuvers 
on Romanian territory. And he brought Romania into such inter- 
national organizations as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, the IMF, and the World Bank. In the early 1970s, Roma- 
nia claimed the status of a developing nation, thereby gaining trade 
concessions from the West and fostering relations with the Third 



xxvi 



World. Championing the "new economic order," Romania gained 
observer status at the conferences of the Nonaligned Movement. 

The West enthusiastically welcomed Romania's emergence as 
the maverick of the Warsaw Pact and rewarded Ceau§escu's in- 
dependent course with the credits and technology needed to mod- 
ernize the country's economy. Prominent Western political figures, 
including Richard Nixon and Charles de Gaulle, made symbolic 
trips to Bucharest and paid homage to Ceau§escu as an interna- 
tional statesman. When the United States granted most-favored- 
nation trading status in 1975, the noncommunist world accounted 
for well over half of Romania's foreign trade. To enhance his grow- 
ing international status, Ceau§escu made highly publicized visits 
to China, Western Europe, the United States, and numerous Third 
World nations. By 1976 he had visited more than thirty less- 
developed countries to promote Romanian exports and to secure 
new sources of raw materials. As a result of these efforts, in 1980 
less-developed countries accounted for one-quarter of Romania's 
foreign trade. 

In the late 1970s, with the onset of Romania's economic difficul- 
ties, particularly its foreign-debt crisis, relations with the West be- 
gan to deteriorate rapidly. Throughout the following decade, 
Ceau§escu's trade policies and domestic programs exhausted the 
reserves of good will he had built through his defiance of Moscow. 
Accusing the West of economic imperialism, he slashed imports 
from the advanced capitalist countries, while selling Romanian 
goods on their markets at dumping prices. 

It was the regime's human rights record, however, that most 
damaged relations with the West. As early as the mid-1970s, the 
United States, West Germany, and Israel protested Romania's in- 
creasingly restrictive emigration policies. The regime attempted 
to stem the outflow of productive citizens through various forms 
of intimidation. Applicants were routinely demoted to menial jobs 
or fired; some were called to active military duty or assigned to 
public works details; others were interrogated and subjected to sur- 
veillance by the Securitate. Concerned for the fate of the large num- 
ber of ethnic Germans who wanted to leave Romania, West 
German chancellor Helmut Schmidt travelled to Bucharest and 
negotiated a program to purchase emigration papers for them. Over 
the 1978-88 period, West Germany "repatriated" some 11,000 per- 
sons annually, paying the equivalent of several thousand United 
States dollars for each exit visa. 

Ceau§escu's restrictive emigration policies seemingly conflicted 
with another of his primary goals — assimilation of ethnic groups 
into a homogeneous, Romanianized population. The tactics used 



xxvii 



to achieve that goal grew progressively harsher during the 1980s 
and further tarnished Romania's international image. The regime's 
attempts to assimilate the Transylvanian Hungarian community — 
with nearly 2 million members, the largest national minority in 
non- Soviet Europe — were particularly controversial and inflamed 
relations with Budapest. The "Hymn to Romania" propaganda 
campaign, launched in 1976, glorified the historical contributions 
of ethnic Romanians in unifying and liberating the nation. Hun- 
garian and German place-names were Romanianized, and histo- 
ry books were revised to ignore key minority figures or to portray 
them as Romanians. Publishing in minority languages was severely 
curtailed, and television and radio broadcasts in Hungarian and 
German were suspended. Educational opportunities for minority 
students desiring instruction in their native languages were reduced, 
and Hungarians seeking employment in their ancestral communi- 
ties encountered hiring discrimination that forced them to leave 
those communities and settle among ethnic Romanians. 

Potentially the greatest threat to the Hungarian community, 
however, was Ceau§escu's program to "systematize" the coun- 
tryside. Conceived in the early 1970s — ostensibly to gain produc- 
tive farmland by eliminating "nonviable" villages — systematization 
threatened to destroy half of the country's 13,000 villages, includ- 
ing many ancient ethnic Hungarian and German settlements. 

Ceausescu's assimilation campaign forced large numbers of ethnic 
Hungarians to flee their homeland, triggering large anti-Ceau§escu 
demonstrations in Budapest. In retaliation, Ceau§escu closed the 
Hungarian consulate in Cluj-Napoca, the cultural center of the 
Hungarian community in Transylvania. In early 1989, Hungary 
filed an official complaint with the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva, accusing Romania of gross violations of 
basic human rights. The Swedish representative to the commis- 
sion cosponsored a resolution with five other Western nations calling 
for an investigation of Hungary's allegations against the Ceau§es- 
cu regime. Earlier in the year, Romania's international reputa- 
tion had been badly damaged by its conduct at the Vienna 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Failing in its 
attempt to delete human rights provisions from the conference's 
final document, the Romanian delegation declared it was not bound 
by the agreement. This action was condemned not only by Western 
delegations but also by delegations from some Warsaw Pact states. 

Treatment of ethnic minorities was only one of numerous sources 
of friction between Romania and the rest of the Warsaw Pact dur- 
ing the late 1980s. Despite his country's growing economic vul- 
nerability, Ceau§escu continued to defy Soviet-backed Comecon 



xxviii 



initiatives to integrate further the economies of the member states. 
He rejected the efforts of President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet 
Union to create supranational manufacturing enterprises and 
research and development centers, and he opposed mutual con- 
vertibility of the national currencies of the member states. Adamant- 
ly rejecting economic decentralization and privatization, Ceausescu 
became Comecon's most outspoken critic of Gorbachev's perestroi- 
ka campaign. Despite Ceau§escu's polemics, however, Romania's 
economy became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, 
which provided all the natural gas, more than half the crude oil, 
and much of the electricity, iron ore, coking coal, and other raw 
materials that Romania imported after the mid-1980s. The Roma- 
nians gained access to these materials by participating in numer- 
ous ventures to develop Soviet natural resources. Moreover, 
Moscow transferred an ever larger volume of manufacturing tech- 
nology and know-how to Romanian industry, including state-of- 
the-art steel-casting and aircraft-manufacturing technologies. 

In the late 1980s, Romania's growing reliance on the Soviet Un- 
ion as a source of raw materials and technology, as well as a mar- 
ket for noncompetitive manufactured goods, placed Ceau§escu in 
a delicate position. Estranged from the West, Romania could ill 
afford to antagonize its most important trading partner. Neverthe- 
less, the defiant Ceau§escu did not moderate his criticism of Gor- 
bachev's dramatic reforms. Indeed, the Romanian president had 
cause for concern, as the peoples of Eastern Europe responded to 
Gorbachev's cues and demanded liberalization. From the Baltic 
to the Balkans, in 1989 hardline communist regimes gave way to 
a new generation of politicians willing to accommodate their popu- 
lations' desires for democracy and market economies. 

Ceau§escu would not willingly yield to the forces of historic 
change sweeping Eastern Europe. His faith in the massive control 
structure so carefully erected over the previous quarter century 
remained unshaken. Indeed, the regime had stifled the scattered 
voices of dissent and had prevented the emergence of a grass-roots 
political movement analogous to Poland's Solidarity or Czecho- 
slovakia's Civic Forum. Following his November 1989 reelection 
for another five-year term as general secretary of the Romanian 
Communist Party, there appeared to be no serious internal threat 
to Ceaugescu's continued totalitarian rule. 

The agent who would galvanize the nation's discontent and 
hatred for the Ceau§escu regime suddenly appeared in December 
1989, in the person of Laszlo Tokes, a young Hungarian pastor 
in Timi§oara. Tokes had been persecuted for months by the Secu- 
ritate for his sermons criticizing the lack of freedom in Romania. 



xxix 



When his congregation physically intervened to prevent the govern- 
ment from evicting the popular pastor, hundreds of other Timisoara 
residents took to the streets to express their solidarity with the con- 
gregation. Inspired by the democratic changes that had occurred 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the swelling crowds defied govern- 
ment orders to disperse and began calling for the end of the Ceauses- 
cu regime. 

Believing he could abort the Timi§oara rebellion, Ceau§escu or- 
dered the use of deadly force. At a December 17 meeting of the 
Political Executive Committee, he furiously charged that the up- 
rising had been instigated by Hungarian agents supported by the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Repeating his order to fire 
on the demonstrators, Ceau§escu departed for a scheduled three- 
day visit to Tehran. During his absence, the protest in Timi§oara 
exploded in violence. Although Minister of National Defense Va- 
sile Milea had not obeyed the initial order to use deadly force, by 
the afternoon of December 17, Securitate forces opened fire, kill- 
ing and wounding scores of demonstrators. But the rebellion could 
not be contained by intimidation, and the protestors' bravery won 
increasing numbers of soldiers to their side. 

Word of the Timi§oara uprising spread to the rest of the coun- 
try, thanks in large part to foreign radio broadcasts. When Ceau§es- 
cu returned from Iran on December 20, accounts of heavy loss of 
life in Timi§oara had already incited protests in Bucharest. At a 
televised proregime rally the next day, Ceau§escu addressed a large 
crowd of supporters assembled in front of the Central Committee 
headquarters building. As he spoke, a few brave students began 
unfurling anti-Ceau§escu banners and chanting revolutionary slo- 
gans. Dumbfounded by the crowd's rumblings, the aged ruler yield- 
ed the microphone to his wife as the television broadcast was 
interrupted. The once unassailable Ceau§escu regime suddenly 
appeared vulnerable. As the crowd sang "Romanians Awake," 
shots rang out. The revolt had claimed its first martyrs in Bucharest. 

On the morning of December 22, Ceau§escu again appeared on 
the balcony of the Central Committee headquarters and tried to 
address the crowds milling below. Seeing that the situation was 
now out of his control and that the army was joining the protesters, 
Ceau§escu and his wife boarded a helicopter and fled the capital, 
never to return. They were captured several hours later at Cim- 
pulung, about 100 kilometers northwest of Bucharest (see fig. 1). 
The desperate fugitives' attempts to bribe their captors failed, and 
for three days they were hauled about in an armored personnel 
carrier. Meanwhile, confused battles among various military and 
Securitate factions raged in the streets. Fighting was especially heavy 



xxx 



near the Bucharest television station, which had become the nerve 
center of the revolt. The media's grossly exaggerated casualty figures 
(some reports indicated as many as 70,000 deaths; the actual toll 
was slighdy more than 1 ,000 killed) convinced citizens that Romania 
faced a protracted, bloody civil war, the outcome of which could 
not be predicted. Against this ominous backdrop, a hastily con- 
vened military tribunal tried Nicolae and Elena Ceau§escu for 
" crimes against the people" and sentenced them to death by fir- 
ing squad. On Christmas Day, a jubilant Romania celebrated news 
of the Ceau§escus' executions and sang long-banned traditional 
carols. 

In the tumultuous hours following the Ceausescus' flight from 
Bucharest, the power vacuum was filled by one Ion Iliescu, a former 
Central Committee secretary and deputy member of the Political 
Executive Committee who had fallen into disfavor with Ceau§es- 
cu. Iliescu took charge of organizing a provisional ruling group, 
which called itself the National Salvation Front (NSF). 

As the fighting subsided after Ceau§escu's death, the NSF 
proceeded to garner public support through several astute policy 
decisions. Food exports were suspended, and warehouses of prime 
meats and other foodstuffs were opened to the long-deprived citizen- 
ry. Ceau§escu's energy restrictions on households were lifted, 
whereas wasteful industrial users were subjected to mandatory con- 
servation. The despised systematization program was halted. Abor- 
tions were legalized. And the feared Securitate was placed under 
military control. 

Despite the early popular decisions taken by the NSF, in mid- 
January, thousands of protesters again took to the streets of 
Bucharest, demanding that Securitate criminals and Ceau§escu's 
associates be brought to justice. President Iliescu and his desig- 
nated prime minister, Petre Roman, placated the crowds with the 
promise (subsequently revoked) that the PCR would be outlawed. 
To defuse charges that the NSF had " stolen the revolution" from 
the people, a Provisional Council of National Unity was formed, 
ostensibly to give voice to a broader spectrum of political views. 
The council pledged that free and open elections would be held in 
April (subsequendy postponed until May) and that the NSF would 
not participate. By late January, however, the NSF announced that 
it would form a party and would field a slate of candidates. 

During the following weeks, the NSF consolidated its control 
of the political infrastructure it had inherited largely intact from 
the deposed regime. Supported by entrenched apparatchiks in 
the media, the postal service, municipal administrations, police 



xxxi 



departments, and industrial and farm managements, the NSF was 
assured of a landslide victory. 

More than eighty political parties (many of them single-issue ex- 
tremist groups) competed in the spring elections. The NSF- 
dominated media accorded these exotic groups the same limited 
coverage as the reemergent "historical" parties (the National 
Peasant Party, the National Liberal Party, and the Social Democrat- 
ic Party). The historical parties, which had been banned for some 
four decades, lacked the resources and political savvy to wage 
effective campaigns. The parties failed to harness the public frus- 
tration manifested in frequent spontaneous anti-NSF rallies, some 
of which involved tens of thousands of disgruntled citizens. The 
NSF ensured that the opposition parties would not be able to deliver 
their message to the voters. Opposition candidates were prevent- 
ed from campaigning in the workplace; the postal system inter- 
cepted opposition literature; and NSF propagandists in the media 
grossly misrepresented the platforms and personal backgrounds of 
opposition candidates. 

The May elections gave the NSF a resounding victory. Presiden- 
tial candidate Iliescu won more than 85 percent of the popular vote. 
NSF candidates for the new bicameral legislature collected 92 of 
119 seats in the Senate and 263 of 396 seats in the Assembly of 
Deputies. International observers generally agreed that despite some 
tampering and intimidation by the NSF, the outcome of the elec- 
tions reflected the majority will. The abuses of the electoral process, 
however, had been committed long before the ballots were cast. 
The National Peasant Party alone reported that during the cam- 
paign police had stood by as thugs assaulted party members, kill- 
ing at least two persons and sending 113 others to hospitals. 

The NSF campaign had successfully submerged the communist 
roots of its leadership while extolling Romanian nationhood and 
the Romanian Orthodox Church. The NSF had exploited long- 
simmering interethnic tensions to gain votes. In March these ten- 
sions had led to violence in the town of Tirgu Mure§, the capital 
of the former Hungarian Autonomous Region. The celebration 
of the Hungarian national holiday by the town's Hungarian resi- 
dents enraged a radical Romanian nationalist organization known 
as Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Cradle). Reminiscent of the fas- 
cist Iron Guard, Vatra Romaneasca orchestrated brutal assaults 
on innocent Hungarians. For hours, the police ignored the vio- 
lence, which caused eight deaths and more than 300 severe inju- 
ries. The NSF sided with Vatra Romaneasca in blaming the 
violence on Hungarian revanchists. When National Liberal and 
Social Democratic politicians condemned the attacks, Vatra 



xxxn 



Romaneasca thugs ransacked the headquarters of these opposition 
parties. 

The NSF's reaction to the clashes in Tirgu Mures, was an 
ominous sign that the Ceau§escu policy of forced Romanianiza- 
tion had survived the "revolution." In subsequent months, the 
number of ethnic Hungarian refugees fleeing Transylvania reached 
unprecedented levels. But Hungarians were not the only ethnic 
group seeking to emigrate; reportedly, half of the approximately 
200,000 ethnic Germans residing in Romania at the beginning of 
1990 had already departed by September, as had untold thousands 
of Gypsies. 

Soon after his lopsided election victory, President Iliescu ordered 
the removal of several hundred anti-NSF demonstrators who had 
occupied Bucharest's Victory Square since April 22. On June 13, 
a force of about 1,500 policemen and soldiers moved against the 
peaceful demonstrators, arresting many of them. But as the ar- 
rests proceeded, the ranks of the protesters were replenished, and 
outraged mobs attacked the Bucharest police inspectorate, the 
Ministry of Interior, the television station, and the offices of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service (the successor of the Securitate). 

Perhaps recalling the army's role in deposing his predecessor, 
Iliescu did not rely on the military to contain the demonstrations. 
His national defense minister, Victor Stanculescu, had made it clear 
that he wanted to keep politics out of the army and the army out 
of politics. Iliescu appealed to the coal miners of the Jiu Valley 
to come to Bucharest, as they had done in January, to restore order 
and save the democratically elected government from "neofascist" 
elements. Within one day of his appeal, some 10,000 club- wielding 
miners arrived in Bucharest aboard 27 specially commissioned rail- 
road cars. During a two-day binge of violence, the vigilantes killed 
an estimated 21 persons and severely injured 650 others. Immedi- 
ately upon arriving in Bucharest, the miners headed for the offices 
of the two main opposition parties, which they ransacked. They 
also attacked the homes of opposition party leaders and assaulted 
anyone they suspected of being sympathetic to the opposition. Hav- 
ing dispersed the demonstrators, the miners received Iliescu' s warm 
thanks and returned to the Jiu Valley. 

The international community universally condemned the Iliescu 
government's use of violence to suppress dissent. The European 
Community postponed signing a trade and economic cooperation 
agreement with Romania. The United States government with- 
held all nonhumanitarian aid and boycotted the June 25 inaugu- 
ration of President Iliescu. Bucharest somewhat rehabilitated its 
international standing by supporting the boycott against Iraq 



xxxm 



following that country's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The 
European Community heads of state, meeting in Rome in Decem- 
ber 1990, voted to extend emergency food and medical aid to Roma- 
nia and to consider compensating Bucharest for the economic 
hardship caused by its support of sanctions against Iraq. The United 
States government supported this assistance but continued to with- 
hold most-favored-nation trading status in light of Bucharest's 
unsatisfactory pace of democratization and suspect human rights 
record. 

The international community and many Romanian citizens 
believed that the chief perpetrator of human rights abuses during 
the Ceau§escu era, the infamous Securitate, continued to operate, 
even though it officially had been disbanded in early 1990. In Febru- 
ary, some 3,000 army officers, cadets, and conscripts demonstrat- 
ed in Bucharest to protest the presence of more than 6,000 Securitate 
officers in their midst. But the government responded to such pro- 
tests with only token prosecution of former Securitate agents known 
to have committed crimes before and during the revolt. As of late 
December 1990, no independent commissions had investigated secu- 
ritate abuses. Moreover, the NSF had established the Romanian 
Intelligence Service, which employed many former Securitate mem- 
bers. And following the June demonstrations, when Iliescu found 
he could not rely on the army to rescue his government, a gendar- 
merie reminiscent of Ceau§escu's Patriotic Guards was created. 

The NSF's unwillingness to purge former Securitate agents and 
other close associates of Ceau§escu confirmed many Romanians' 
suspicions that their revolution had been highjacked by a neocom- 
munist cabal. By October, the growing perception that the NSF 
had exploited the spontaneous uprising in Timi§oara to disguise 
a palace coup gave rise to an umbrella opposition group demand- 
ing the government's resignation. Known as Civic Alliance, the 
loose coalition of intellectuals, monarchists, labor activists, and var- 
ious other interest groups claimed a membership of nearly one 
million. In mid-November, Civic Alliance organized the largest 
nationwide demonstrations since Ceau§escu's overthrow. Some 
100,000 persons in Bucharest and tens of thousands in Bra§ov 
marched to protest the continued presence of communists in the 
government and to express outrage over sharp price increases for 
consumer goods. The demonstrations forced the government to 
postpone the second phase of its price-adjustment program (initiated 
largely to satisfy IMF requirements for economic assistance). 

Despite the government's concessions on price hikes, how- 
ever, Civic Alliance, student groups, and labor union leaders con- 
tinued to organize antigovernment demonstrations and strikes 



xxxiv 



throughout the country. Teamsters, airline workers, teachers, med- 
ical personnel, and factory workers joined student-led protests, 
which became increasingly disruptive. Civic Alliance and the major 
opposition parties in parliament called for a government of national 
unity, new elections, and a referendum on the country's future form 
of government. Some members of Civic Alliance called for the resto- 
ration of King Michael to the throne that he had been forced to 
abdicate in 1947. Living in exile near Geneva, Michael declared 
himself willing and able to serve Romania as a stabilizing force 
during its transition to democracy. 

The political ferment threatening to bring down the Iliescu 
government in late 1990 was fired by Romania's unmitigated eco- 
nomic misery and a pervasive sense that life would only get worse. 
The NSF government had inherited a decrepit economy struggling 
with an obsolete capital stock, underdeveloped transport system, 
severe energy and raw materials shortages, demoralized labor force, 
declining exports, and a desperate need for Western financial and 
technical assistance. 

The economic decline accelerated during 1990, and as winter 
approached, Romanians faced many of the same hardships they 
had known during the worst years of the Ceau§escu regime. Prelimi- 
nary estimates indicated a decrease in GNP of between 15 percent 
and 20 percent, a 20-percent decline in labor productivity, and a 
43 -percent reduction in exports. Declining fuel and electricity 
production was particularly worrisome because of reductions in 
Soviet deliveries and the shortage of hard currency needed to pur- 
chase energy elsewhere. Furthermore, Romania's support of United 
Nations sanctions against Baghdad during the Persian Gulf crisis 
cut off that important source of crude oil. Before the sanctions were 
imposed, Iraq had been delivering oil to repay its US$ 1.5 billion 
debt to Bucharest. 

The NSF's early attempts to win support by raising personal 
consumption levels resulted in the rapid depletion of inventories 
and generated a large trade deficit. Its decision to raise wages and 
shorten the work week caused severe inflation and lowered labor 
discipline. The rise in personal incomes badly outstripped the avail- 
ability of consumer goods, so that anything of potential barter or 
resale value was instantly bought up as soon as it appeared on the 
store shelves. 

The government addressed Romania's daunting economic 
problems with a tentative and ineffective reform program, fearing 
that citizens would not tolerate the sacrifices that a "shock- therapy" 
approach would require. Peasants on cooperative and state farms 
were granted slightly larger plots, and prices at farmers' markets 



xxxv 



were officially decontrolled. To encourage creation of small busi- 
nesses, especially in the service sector, private individuals were given 
the legal right to employ as many as twenty persons. In addition, 
an agency was set up to administer the privatization of state assets. 

As Romania's economic deterioration accelerated, Prime 
Minister Roman assumed greater personal control of reform ef- 
forts. In October he addressed a special session of parliament and 
requested exceptional powers to implement a more radical reform 
program. In addition to the aforementioned price hikes on vari- 
ous consumer goods and services, which were supposed to be 
cushioned by compensatory payments to the nonworking popula- 
tion, Roman's plan called for replacing the leu (for value of the 
leu — see Glossary) in 1991 with a new monetary unit at the rate 
of ten to one to absorb some of the surplus lei in circulation. The 
new currency gradually would be made convertible, thereby at- 
tracting foreign investment. Roman indicated that the government 
would also remove surplus money from circulation by allowing pri- 
vate citizens to buy land, state-owned housing, and stocks and 
bonds. 

In late 1990, Roman's reform program appeared to have almost 
no chance of succeeding. Public outrage had thwarted the attempt 
to establish more realistic prices. The government had failed to 
overcome bureaucratic inertia on the part of anti-reform officials 
and managers fearful of losing their special privileges. More impor- 
tantly, the government's loss of legitimacy with the people and the 
threat of a potentially violent "second revolution" left Romania's 
future course in grave doubt. 



December 26, 1990 Ronald D. Bachman 



XXXVI 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Alexandru loan Cuza, prince of the United Principalities of Moldavia 
and Walachia (1859-66) 



THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, later renamed the 
Socialist Republic of Romania, came into being in 1948 when the 
country's communist party, under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej , con- 
solidated its power and promulgated a Soviet-style constitution. 
Romania, in spite of its fierce prewar anticommunism and long 
antipathy toward tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, became one 
of the first East European states to suffer a Soviet-sponsored com- 
munist takeover after World War II. For nearly a decade after the 
war, Romania obediently followed Moscow's lead, but in the late 
1950s Gheorghiu-Dej defied a Soviet attempt to make his country 
a "breadbasket" for the East bloc and insisted on continuing his 
country's rapid industrial expansion. The Romanian leader also 
developed an independent foreign policy and launched a campaign 
promoting Romanian nationalism. Nicolae Ceau§escu succeeded 
Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965 and continued his mentor's policies. 
Ceau§escu, however, appended to them an extravagant cult of per- 
sonality that once promoted him as Romania's "secular god" and 
heir to the wisdom of Romanian rulers from ages past. 

Romanians descend from the Dacians, an ancient people who 
fell under Rome's dominance in the first century A.D., intermar- 
ried with Roman colonists, and adopted elements of Roman cul- 
ture, including a Vulgar Latin that evolved into today's Romanian. 
Barbarian tribes forced the Romans out of Dacia in 271. In the 
eleventh century the Magyars, the ancestors of today's Hungari- 
ans, settled the mountainous heart of ancient Dacia, Transylva- 
nia. Hungarian historians claim that Transylvania was almost 
uninhabited when the Magyars arrived; Romanians, however, as- 
sert that their ancestors remained in Transylvania after Rome's 
exodus and that Romanians constitute the region's aboriginal in- 
habitants. This disagreement was the germ of a conflict that poi- 
soned relations between Romanians and Hungarians throughout 
the twentieth century. 

For thousands of years, Romania suffered from an unfortunate 
location astride the invasion routes of migrating hordes and the 
frontiers of ambitious empires that plundered its wealth and en- 
slaved its people. For centuries Transylvania, with its repressed 
Romanian majority, was a semi-autonomous part of Hungary. 
Romanians fleeing Transylvania founded the independent princi- 
palities of Walachia and Moldavia in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. The Ottoman Empire dominated all three regions from 



3 



Romania: A Country Study 

the sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, when Austria's Habs- 
burgs gained full control of Transylvania. Walachia and Molda- 
via came under Russian protection soon afterward and remained 
under Russian influence until the Crimean War (1853-56) ended 
the protectorate. In 1859 Walachia and Moldavia merged to form 
Romania, and in 1881 its prince renounced Turkish suzerainty and 
Romania became a kingdom. Austria reunited Transylvania and 
Hungary in 1867, but the union lasted only until the end of World 
War I, when Romania acquired Transylvania. World War II 
brought dismemberment of Greater Romania, and the country sid- 
ed with Germany hoping to regain its lost territories. In 1943 the 
Red Army crushed Romanian forces before Stalingrad, and in 1944 
Romania's King Michael overthrew the country's radical right- 
wing premier and signed an armistice with the Soviet Union. 
Moscow forced Michael to appoint a communist sympathizer to 
lead the government in 1 945 , and three years later Romania found 
itself under strict communist control. 

Early History from Prehistory to the Eleventh Century 

Man first appeared in the lands that now constitute Romania 
during the Pleistocene Epoch, a period of advancing and receding 
glacial ice that began about 600,000 years ago. Once the glaciers 
had withdrawn completely, a humid climate prevailed in the area 
and thick forests covered the terrain. During the Neolithic Age, 
beginning about 5500 B.C., Indo-European people lived in the 
region. The Indo-Europeans gave way to Thracian tribes, who in 
later centuries inhabited the lands extending from the Carpathian 
Mountains southward to the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. Today's 
Romanians are in part descended from the Getae, a Thracian tribe 
that lived north of the Danube River. 

The Getae 

During the Bronze Age (roughly 2200 to 1200 B.C.), Thraco- 
Getian tribesmen engaged in agriculture and stock raising and trad- 
ed with peoples who lived along the Aegean Seacoast. Early in the 
Iron Age, about 1200 B.C., pastoral activities began to dominate 
their economic life. Thraco-Getian villages, which consisted of up 
to 100 small, rectangular dwellings constructed from wood or reeds 
and earthen mortar with straw roofs, multiplied and became more 
crowded. Before the seventh century B.C., Greeks founded trad- 
ing colonies on the coast of the Black Sea at Istria, near the mouth 
of the Danube at Callatis (present-day Mangalia), and at Tomi 
(present-day Constanta). Greek culture also made a deep impres- 
sion on the seacoast and riverbank Thraco-Getian villages, where 



4 




Greek ruins at I stria 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 



the way of life developed more rapidly than in less accessible areas. 
Toward the end of the seventh century B.C., wheel-formed pot- 
tery began replacing crude hand-modeled ware in the coastal region. 
The use of Greek and Macedonian coins spread through the area, 
and the Thraco-Getae exchanged grain, cattle, fish, honey, and 
slaves with the Greeks for oils, wines, precious materials, jewelry, 
and high-quality pottery. By the sixth century B.C., this trade was 
affording the Thraco-Getian ruling class many luxuries. 

Originally polytheistic nature- worshippers, the Thraco-Getae 
developed a sun cult and decorated their artwork with sun sym- 
bols. Herodotus, a Greek historian, reports that the Getae wor- 
shipped a god named Zalmoxis, a healing thunder god who was 
master of the cloudy sky; however they did not depict Zalmoxis 
in any plastic form. The people offered agricultural products and 
animals as sacrifices and also cremated their dead, sealed the ashes 
in urns, and buried them. 

The Getae had commercial contact as well as military conflicts 
with many peoples besides the Greeks. The Roman poet, Ovid, 
who was exiled to Tomi, writes that for many years Getian tribes- 
men would steer their plows with one hand and hold a sword in 
the other to protect themselves against attacks by Scythian horse- 
men from the broad steppe lands east of the Dniester River. In 
513 B.C. Darius the Great marched his Persian army through 



5 



Romania: A Country Study 

Getian territory before invading Scythia. Legend holds that when 
Philip of Macedonia attacked the Getae in the fourth century B.C. , 
they sent out against him priests robed in white and playing lyres. 
Philip's son, Alexander the Great, led an expedition northward 
across the Danube in 335 B.C., and from about 300 B.C. Hellenic 
culture heavily influenced the Getae, especially the ruling class. 
Bands of Celtic warriors penetrated Transylvania after 300 B.C., 
and a cultural symbiosis arose where the Celts and Getae lived in 
close proximity. 

By about 300 B.C., the Lower Danube Getae had forged a state 
under the leadership of Basileus Dromichaites, who repulsed an 
attack by Lysimachus, one of Alexander the Great's successors. 
Thereafter, native Getian leaders protected the coastal urban 
centers, which had developed from Greek colonies. From 112 to 
109 B.C. the Getae joined the Celts to invade Roman possessions 
in the western Balkans. Then in 72 B.C., the Romans launched 
a retaliatory strike across the Danube but withdrew because, one 
account reports, the soldiers were 4 'frightened by the darkness of 
the forests." During the third and second centuries B.C., the Getae 
began mining local iron-ore deposits and iron metallurgy spread 
throughout the region. The ensuing development of iron plowshares 
and other implements led to expanded crop cultivation. 

As decades passed, Rome exercised stronger influence on the 
Getae. Roman merchants arrived to exchange goods, and the Getae 
began counterfeiting Roman coins. In the middle of the first cen- 
tury B.C., the Romans allied with the Getae to defend Moesia, 
an imperial province roughly corresponding to present-day north- 
ern Bulgaria, against the Sarmatians, a group of nomadic Central 
Asian tribes. Roman engineers and architects helped the Getae con- 
struct fortresses until the Romans discovered that the Getae were 
preparing to turn against them. Burebista, a Getian king who 
amassed formidable military power, routed the Celts, forced them 
westward into Pannonia, and led large armies to raid Roman lands 
south of the Danube, including Thrace, Macedonia, and Illyria. 
Burebista offered the Roman general, Pompey, support in his strug- 
gle against Julius Caesar. Caesar apparendy planned to invade 
Getian territory before his assassination in 44 B.C.; in the same 
year Getian conspirators murdered Burebista and divided up his 
kingdom. For a time Getian power waned, and Emperor Octavius 
expelled the Getae from the lands south of the Danube. The Getae 
continued, however, to interfere in Roman affairs, and the Romans 
in turn periodically launched punitive campaigns against them. 

By 87 A.D. Decebalus had established a new Getian state, 
constructed a system of fortresses, and outfitted an army. When 



6 



Statue of Romulus and Remus 
Cluj-Napoca 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 




Trajan became Roman emperor in 98 A.D., he was determined 
to stamp out the Getian menace and take over the Getae's gold 
and silver mines. The Romans laid down a road along the Danube 
and bridged the river near today's Drobeta-Turnu Severin. In 101 
A.D. Trajan launched his first campaign and forced Decebalus to 
sue for peace. Within a few years, however, Decebalus broke the 
treaty, and in 105 A.D. Trajan began a second campaign. This 
time, the Roman legions penetrated to the heart of Transylvania 
and stormed the Getian capital, Sarmizegetusa (present-day 
Gradi§tea Muncelului); Decebalus and his officers committed sui- 
cide by drinking hemlock before the Romans could capture them. 
Rome memorialized the victory by raising Trajan's Column, whose 
bas-reliefs show scenes of the triumph. 

Roman Dacia 

From the newly conquered land, Trajan organized the Roman 
province of Dacia, whose capital, Ulpia Trajana, stood on the site 
of Sarmizegetusa. Many Getae resisted Roman authority and some 
fled northward, away from the centers of Roman rule. Trajan coun- 
tered local insurrection and foreign threat by stationing two legions 
and a number of auxiliary troops in Dacia and by colonizing the 
province with legionnaires, peasants, merchants, artisans, and offi- 
cials from lands as far off as Gaul, Spain, and Syria. Agriculture 



7 



Romania: A Country Study 

and commerce flourished, and the Romans built cities, fortresses, 
and roads that stretched eastward into Scythia. 

In the next 200 years, a Dacian ethnic group arose as Roman 
colonists commingled with the Getae and the coastal Greeks. Liter- 
acy spread, and Getae who enlisted in the Roman army learned 
Latin. Gradually a Vulgar Latin tongue superseded the Thracian 
language in commerce and administration and became the foun- 
dation of modern Romanian. A religious fusion also occurred. Even 
before the Roman invasion, some Getae worshiped Mithras, the 
ancient Persian god of light popular in the Roman legions. As 
Roman colonization progressed, worshipers faithful to Jupiter, 
Diana, Venus, and other gods and goddesses of the Roman pan- 
theon multiplied. The Dacians, however, retained the Getian cus- 
tom of cremation, though now, amid the ashes they sometimes left 
a coin for Charon, the mythological ferryman of the dead. 

The Age of the Great Migrations 

During the two centuries of Roman rule, Getian insurgents, 
Goths, and Sarmatians harassed Dacia, and by the middle of the 
third century A.D. major migrations of barbarian tribes had begun. 
In 271 A.D. Emperor Aurelian concluded that Dacia was overex- 
posed to invasion and ordered his army and colonists to withdraw 
across the Danube. Virtually all the soldiers, imperial officials, and 
merchants departed; scholars, however, presume that many 
peasants remained. Those Dacians who departed spread over the 
Balkans as far as the Peloponnese, where their descendants, the 
Kutzovlachs, still live. 

Without Rome's protection, Dacia became a conduit for invad- 
ing tribes who, targeting richer lands further west and south, plun- 
dered Dacian setdements in passing. Dacian towns were abandoned, 
highwaymen menaced travelers along crumbling Roman roads, and 
rural life decayed. The Visigoths, Huns, Ostrogoths, Gepids, and 
Lombards swept over the land from the third to the fifth centur- 
ies, and the Avars arrived in the sixth, along with a steady inflow 
of Slavic peasants. Unlike other tribes, the Slavs settled the land 
and intermarried with the Dacians. In 676 the Bulgar Empire ab- 
sorbed a large portion of ancient Dacia. 

The migration period brought Dacia linguistic and religious 
change. The Dacians assimilated many Slavic words into their lex- 
icon and, although modern Romanian is a Romance language, 
some linguists estimate that half of its words have Slavic roots. Bap- 
tism of the Dacians began around 350 A.D. when Bishop Ulfilas 
preached the Arian heresy north of the Danube. Soon after saints 
Cyril and Methodius converted the Bulgars to Christianity in 864, 



8 



Historical Setting 



Dacia's Christians adopted the Slavonic rite and became subject 
to the Bulgarian metropolitan at Ohrid. The Slavonic rite would 
be maintained until the seventeenth century, when Romanian be- 
came the liturgical language. 

Transylvania, Walachia, and Moldavia from the 
Eleventh Century to the Seventeenth Century 

No written or architectural evidence bears witness to the presence 
of "proto-Romanians" in the lands north of the Danube during 
the millennium after Rome's withdrawal from Dacia. This fact has 
fueled a centuries-long feud between Romanian and Hungarian 
historians over Transylvania. The Romanians assert that they are 
the descendants of Latin- speaking Dacian peasants who remained 
in Transylvania after the Roman exodus, and of Slavs who lived 
in Transylvania's secluded valleys, forests, and mountains, and 
survived there during the tumult of the Dark Ages. Romanian 
historians explain the absence of hard evidence for their claims by 
pointing out that the region lacked organized administration until 
the twelfth century and by positing that the Mongols destroyed any 
existing records when they plundered the area in 1241 . Hungarians 
assert, among other things, that the Roman population quit Dacia 
completely in 271 , that the Romans could not have made a lasting 
impression on Transylvania's aboriginal population in only two 
centuries, and that Transylvania's Romanians descended from 
Balkan nomads who crossed northward over the Danube in the 
thirteenth century and flowed into Transylvania in any significant 
numbers only after Hungary opened its borders to foreigners. 

The Magyars' Arrival in Transylvania 

In 896 the Magyars, the last of the migrating tribes to establish 
a state in Europe, settled in the Carpathian Basin. A century later 
their king, Stephen I, integrated Transylvania into his Hungarian 
kingdom. The Hungarians constructed fortresses, founded a Roman 
Catholic bishopric, and began proselytizing Transylvania's indigen- 
ous people. There is little doubt that these included some Roma- 
nians who remained faithful to the Eastern Orthodox Church after 
the East-West Schism. Stephen and his successors recruited foreign- 
ers to join the Magyars in settling the region. The foreign settlers 
included people from as far off as Flanders; Szeklers, a Magyar 
ethnic group; and even Teutonic Knights returned from Palestine, 
who founded the town of Bra§ov before a conflict with the king 
prompted their departure for the Baltic region in 1225 (see Historical 
and Geographic Distribution, ch. 2). Hungary's kings reinforced 
the foreigners' loyalty by granting them land, commercial privileges, 



9 



Romania: A Country Study 

and considerable autonomy. Nobility was restricted to Roman 
Catholics and, while some Romanian noblemen converted to the 
Roman rite to preserve their privileges, most of the Orthodox 
Romanians became serfs. 

In 1241 the Mongols invaded Transylvania from the north and 
east over the Carpathians. They routed King Bela IV s forces, laid 
waste Transylvania and central Hungary, and slew much of the 
populace. When the Mongols withdrew suddenly in 1242, Bela 
launched a vigorous reconstruction program. He invited more 
foreigners to settle Transylvania and other devastated regions of 
the kingdom, granted loyal noblemen lands, and ordered them to 
build stone fortresses. Bela's reconstruction effort and the fall of 
the Arpad Dynasty in 1301 shifted the locus of power in Hungary 
significantly. The royal fortunes declined, and rival magnates carved 
out petty kingdoms, expropriated peasant land, and stiffened feu- 
dal obligations. Transylvania became virtually autonomous. As ear- 
ly as 1288 Transylvania's noblemen convoked their own assembly, 
or Diet. Under increasing economic pressure from unrestrained 
feudal lords and religious pressure from zealous Catholics, many 
Romanians emigrated from Transylvania eastward and southward 
over the Carpathians. 

Origins of Walachia and Moldavia 

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Transylvanian emigres 
founded two principalities, Walachia (see Glossary) and Moldavia 
(see Glossary). Legend says that in 1290 Negru-Voda, a leading 
Romanian nobleman (voivode, see Glossary), left Fagaras. in south- 
ern Transylvania with a group of nobles and founded "$ara 
Romaneasca" on the lands between the southern Carpathians and 
the Danube. (The name "$ara Romaneasca" means "Romanian 
land," here, actually "Walachia"; the word "Walachia" is de- 
rived from the Slavic word vlach, which is related to the Germanic 
walk, meaning "foreigner.") A second legend holds that a Roma- 
nian voivode named Drago§ crossed the Carpathians and settled 
with other Romanians on the plain between the mountains and 
the Black Sea. They were joined in 1349 by a Transylvanian voi- 
vode named Bogdan, who revolted against his feudal overlord and 
settled on the Moldova River, from which Moldavia derives 
its name. Bogdan declared Moldavia's independence from Hun- 
gary a decade later. The remaining Romanian nobles in Transyl- 
vania eventually adopted the Hungarian language and culture; 
Transylvania's Romanian serfs continued to speak Romanian and 
clung to Orthodoxy but were powerless to resist Hungarian domi- 
nation. 



10 



Historical Setting 



Walachia and Moldavia steadily gained strength in the fourteenth 
century, a peaceful and prosperous time throughout southeastern 
Europe. Prince Basarab I of Walachia (ca. 1330-52), despite defeat- 
ing King Charles Robert in 1330, had to acknowledge Hungary's 
sovereignty. The Eastern Orthodox patriarch in Constantinople, 
however, established an ecclesiastical seat in Walachia and appoint- 
ed a metropolitan. The church's recognition confirmed Walachia' s 
status as a principality, and Walachia freed itself from Hungarian 
sovereignty in 1380. 

The princes of both Walachia and Moldavia held almost abso- 
lute power; only the prince had the power to grant land and con- 
fer noble rank. Assemblies of nobles, or boyars, and higher clergy 
elected princes for life, and the absence of a succession law created 
a fertile environment for intrigue. From the fourteenth century to 
the seventeenth century, the principalities' histories are replete with 
overthrows of princes by rival factions often supported by foreign- 
ers. The boyars were exempt from taxation except for levies on 
the main sources of agricultural wealth. Although the peasants had 
to pay a portion of their output in kind to the local nobles, they 
were never, despite their inferior position, deprived of the right 
to own property or resettle. 

Walachia and Moldavia remained isolated and primitive for 
many years after their founding. Education, for example, was 
nonexistent, and religion was poorly organized. Except for a rare 
market center, there were no significant towns and little circula- 
tion of money. In time, however, commerce developed between 
the lands of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. Mer- 
chants from Genoa and Venice founded trading centers along the 
coast of the Black Sea where Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Poles, 
Ragusans, and Armenians exchanged goods. Walachians and Mol- 
davians, however, remained mainly agricultural people. 

In Transylvania economic life rebounded quickly after the Mon- 
gol invasion. New farming methods boosted crop yields. Crafts- 
men formed guilds as artisanry flourished; gold, silver, and salt 
mining expanded; and money-based transactions replaced barter. 
Though townspeople were exempt from feudal obligations, feudal- 
ism expanded and the nobles stiffened the serfs' obligations. The 
serfs resented the higher payments; some fled the country, while 
others became outlaws. In 1437 Romanian and Hungarian peasants 
rebelled against their feudal masters. The uprising gathered momen- 
tum before the Magyar, German, and Szekler nobles in Transyl- 
vania united forces and, with great effort, successfully quelled the 
revolt. Afterwards, the nobles formed the Union of Three Nations, 
jointiy pledging to defend their privileges against any power except 



11 



Romania: A Country Study 

that of Hungary's king. The document declared the Magyars, Ger- 
mans, and Szeklers the only recognized nationalities in Transyl- 
vania; henceforth, all other nationalities there, including the 
Romanians, were merely ''tolerated." The nobles gradually im- 
posed even tougher terms on their serfs. In 1437, for example, each 
serf had to work for his lord one day per year at harvest time without 
compensation; by 1514 serfs had to work for their lord one day 
per week using their own animals and tools. 

The Ottoman Invasions 

In the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks expanded their 
empire from Anatolia to the Balkans. They crossed the Bosporus 
in 1352 and crushed the Serbs at Kosovo Polje, in the south of 
modern-day Yugoslavia, in 1389. Tradition holds that Walachia' s 
Prince Mircea the Old (1386-1418) sent his forces to Kosovo to 
fight beside the Serbs; soon after the battle Sultan Bayezid marched 
on Walachia and imprisoned Mircea until he pledged to pay trib- 
ute. After a failed attempt to break the sultan's grip, Mircea fled 
to Transylvania and enlisted his forces in a crusade called by Hun- 
gary's King Sigismund. The campaign ended miserably: the Turks 
routed Sigismund' s forces in 1396 at Nicopolis in present-day Bul- 
garia, and Mircea and his men were lucky to escape across the 
Danube. In 1402 Walachia gained a respite from Ottoman pres- 
sure as the Mongol leader Tamerlane attacked the Ottomans from 
the east, killed the sultan, and sparked a civil war. When peace 
returned, the Ottomans renewed their assault on the Balkans. In 
1417 Mircea capitulated to Sultan Mehmed I and agreed to pay 
an annual tribute and surrender territory; in return the sultan 
allowed Walachia to remain a principality and to retain the Eastern 
Orthodox faith. 

After Mircea' s death in 1418, Walachia and Moldavia slid into 
decline. Succession struggles, Polish and Hungarian intrigues, and 
corruption produced a parade of eleven princes in twenty-five years 
and weakened the principalities as the Ottoman threat waxed. In 
1444 the Ottomans routed European forces at Varna in contem- 
porary Bulgaria. When Constantinople succumbed in 1453, the 
Ottomans cut off Genoese and Venetian galleys from Black Sea 
ports, trade ceased, and the Romanian principalities' isolation deep- 
ened. At this time of near-desperation, a Magyarized Romanian 
from Transylvania, Janos Hunyadi, became regent of Hungary. 
Hunyadi, a hero of the Ottoman wars, mobilized Hungary against 
the Turks, equipping a mercenary army funded by the first tax 
ever levied on Hungary's nobles. He scored a resounding victory 



12 



Historical Setting 



over the Turks before Belgrade in 1456, but died of plague soon 
after the battle. 

In one of his final acts, Hunyadi installed Vlad T e P e § (1456-62) 
on Walachia's throne. Vlad took abnormal pleasure in inflicting tor- 
ture and watching his victims writhe in agony. He also hated the 
Turks and defied the sultan by refusing to pay tribute. In 1461 Ham- 
sa Pasha tried to lure Vlad into a trap, but the Walachian prince 
discovered the deception, captured Hamsa and his men, impaled 
them on wooden stakes, and abandoned them. Sultan Mohammed 
later invaded Walachia and drove Vlad into exile in Hungary. 
Although Vlad eventually returned to Walachia, he died shortly 
thereafter, and Walachia's resistance to the Ottomans softened. 

Moldavia and its prince, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), were 
the principalities' last hope of repelling the Ottoman threat. Stephen 
drew on Moldavia's peasantry to raise a 55,000-man army and 
repelled the invading forces of Hungary's King Matyas Corvinus 
in a daring night attack. Stephen's army invaded Walachia in 1471 
and defeated the Turks when they retaliated in 1473 and 1474. 
After these victories, Stephen implored Pope Sixtus IV to forge 
a Christian alliance against the Turks. The pope replied with a 
letter naming Stephen an "Athlete of Christ, ' ' but he did not heed 
Stephen's calls for Christian unity. During the last decades of 
Stephen's reign, the Turks increased the pressure on Moldavia. 
They captured key Black Sea ports in 1484 and burned Molda- 
via's capital, Suceava, in 1485. Stephen rebounded with a victory 
in 1486 but thereafter confined his efforts to secure Moldavia's 
independence to the diplomatic arena. Frustrated by vain attempts 
to unite the West against the Turks, Stephen, on his deathbed, 
reportedly told his son to submit to the Turks if they offered an 
honorable suzerainty. Succession struggles weakened Moldavia after 
his death. 

In 1514 greedy nobles and an ill-planned crusade sparked a 
widespread peasant revolt in Hungary and Transylvania. Well- 
armed peasants under Gyorgy Dozsa sacked estates across the coun- 
try. Despite strength of numbers, however, the peasants were 
disorganized and suffered a decisive defeat at Timi§oara. Dozsa 
and the other rebel leaders were tortured and executed. After the 
revolt, the Hungarian nobles enacted laws that condemned the serfs 
to eternal bondage and increased their work obligations. With the 
serfs and nobles deeply alienated from each other and jealous mag- 
nates challenging the king's power, Hungary was vulnerable to out- 
side aggression. The Ottomans stormed Belgrade in 1521, routed 
a feeble Hungarian army at Mohacs in 1526, and conquered Buda 
in 1541. They installed a pasha to rule over central Hungary; 



13 



Romania: A Country Study 

Transylvania became an autonomous principality under Ottoman 
suzerainty; and the Habsburgs assumed control over fragments of 
northern and western Hungary. 

After Buda's fall, Transylvania, though a vassal state of the Sub- 
lime Porte (as the Ottoman government was called, see Glossary), 
entered a period of broad autonomy. As a vassal, Transylvania 
paid the Porte an annual tribute and provided military assistance; 
in return, the Ottomans pledged to protect Transylvania from 
external threat. Native princes governed Transylvania from 1540 
to 1690. Transylvania's powerful, mostly Hungarian, ruling fam- 
ilies, whose position ironically strengthened with Hungary's fall, 
normally chose the prince, subject to the Porte's confirmation; in 
some cases, however, the Turks appointed the prince outright. The 
Transylvanian Diet became a parliament, and the nobles revived 
the Union of Three Nations, which still excluded the Romanians 
from political power. Princes took pains to separate Transylvania's 
Romanians from those in Walachia and Moldavia and forbade 
Eastern Orthodox priests to enter Transylvania from Walachia. 

The Protestant Reformation spread rapidly in Transylvania 
after Hungary's collapse, and the region became one of Europe's 
Protestant strongholds. Transylvania's Germans adopted Luther- 
anism, and many Hungarians converted to Calvinism. However, 
the Protestants, who printed and distributed catechisms in the 
Romanian language, failed to lure many Romanians from Ortho- 
doxy. In 1571 the Transylvanian Diet approved a law guarantee- 
ing freedom of worship and equal rights for Transylvania's four 
"received" religions: Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and 
Unitarian. The law was one of the first of its kind in Europe, but 
the religious equality it proclaimed was limited. Orthodox Roma- 
nians, for example, were free to worship, but their church was not 
recognized as a received religion. 

Once the Ottomans conquered Buda, Walachia and Moldavia 
lost all but the veneer of independence and the Porte exacted heavy 
tribute. The Turks chose Walachian and Moldavian princes from 
among the sons of noble hostages or refugees at Constantinople. 
Few princes died a natural death, but they lived enthroned amid 
great luxury. Although the Porte forbade Turks to own land or 
build mosques in the principalities, the princes allowed Greek and 
Turkish merchants and usurers to exploit the principalities' riches. 
The Greeks, jealously protecting their privileges, smothered the 
developing Romanian middle class. 

The Romanians' final hero before the Turks and Greeks closed 
their stranglehold on the principalities was Walachia' s Michael the 



14 




Clock tower in Sighisoara, birthplace of Vlad Tepes and one of the 

most picturesque Romanian towns 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 



15 



Romania: A Country Study 

Brave (1593-1601). Michael bribed his way at the Porte to become 
prince. Once enthroned, however, he rounded up extortionist Turk- 
ish lenders, locked them in a building, and burned it to the ground. 
His forces then overran several key Turkish fortresses. Michael's 
ultimate goal was complete independence, but in 1598 he pledged 
fealty to Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II. A year later, Michael 
captured Transylvania, and his victory incited Transylvania's 
Romanian peasants to rebel. Michael, however, more interested 
in endearing himself to Transylvania's nobles than in supporting 
defiant serfs, suppressed the rebels and swore to uphold the Union 
of Three Nations. Despite the prince's pledge, the nobles still dis- 
trusted him. Then in 1600 Michael conquered Moldavia. For the 
first time a single Romanian prince ruled over all Romanians, and 
the Romanian people sensed the first stirring of a national identity. 
Michael's success startled Rudolf. The emperor incited Transyl- 
vania's nobles to revolt against the prince, and Poland simultane- 
ously overran Moldavia. Michael consolidated his forces in 
Walachia, apologized to Rudolf, and agreed to join Rudolfs gen- 
eral, Giorgio Basta, in a campaign to regain Transylvania from 
recalcitrant Hungarian nobles. After their victory, however, Basta 
executed Michael for alleged treachery. Michael the Brave grew 
more impressive in legend than in life, and his short-lived unifica- 
tion of the Romanian lands later inspired the Romanians to struggle 
for cultural and political unity. 

In Transylvania Basta' s army persecuted Protestants and illegally 
expropriated their estates until Stephen Bocskay (1605-07), a former 
Habsburg supporter, mustered an army that expelled the imperial 
forces. In 1606 Bocskay concluded treaties with the Habsburgs and 
the Turks that secured his position as prince of Transylvania, 
guaranteed religious freedom, and broadened Transylvania's inde- 
pendence. After Bocskay' s death and the reign of the tyrant Gabriel 
Bathory (1607-13), the Porte compelled the Transylvanians to ac- 
cept Gabor Bethlen (1613-29) as prince. Transylvania experienced 
a golden age under Bethlen 's enlightened despotism. He promot- 
ed agriculture, trade, and industry, sank new mines, sent students 
abroad to Protestant universities, and prohibited landlords from 
denying an education to children of serfs. After Bethlen died, 
however, the Transylvanian Diet abolished most of his reforms. 
Soon Gyorgy Rakoczi I (1630-40) became prince. Rakoczi, like 
Bethlen, sent Transylvanian forces to fight with the Protestants 
in the Thirty Years' War; and Transylvania gained mention as 
a sovereign state in the Peace of Westphalia. Transylvania's gold- 
en age ended after Gyorgy Rakoczi II (1648-60) launched an ill- 
fated attack on Poland without the prior approval of the Porte or 



16 



St. Michael's Church and 
statue of Mdtyds Corvinus, 
Cluj-Napoca 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 




Transylvania's Diet. A Turkish and Tatar army routed Rakoczi's 
forces and seized Transylvania. For the remainder of its inde- 
pendence, Transylvania suffered a series of feckless and distracted 
leaders, and throughout the seventeenth century Transylvania's 
Romanian peasants lingered in poverty and ignorance. 

During Michael the Brave's brief tenure and the early years of 
Turkish suzerainty, the distribution of land in Walachia and Mol- 
davia changed dramatically. Over the years, Walachian and Mol- 
davian princes made land grants to loyal boyars in exchange for 
military service so that by the seventeenth century hardly any land 
was left. Boyars in search of wealth began encroaching on peasant 
land and their military allegiance to the prince weakened. As a 
result, serfdom spread, successful boyars became more courtiers 
than warriors, and an intermediary class of impoverished lesser 
nobles developed. Would-be princes were forced to raise enormous 
sums to bribe their way to power, and peasant life grew more mis- 
erable as taxes and exactions increased. Any prince wishing to 
improve the peasants' lot risked a financial shortfall that could en- 
able rivals to out-bribe him at the Porte and usurp his position. 

In 1632 Matei Basarab (1632-54) became the last of Walachia's 
predominant family to take the throne; two years later, Vasile Lupu 
(1634-53), a man of Albanian descent, became prince of Molda- 
via. The jealousies and ambitions of Matei and Vasile sapped the 
strength of both principalities at a time when the Porte's power 



17 



Romania: A Country Study 

began to wane. Coveting the richer Walachian throne, Vasile at- 
tacked Matei, but the latter's forces routed the Moldavians, and 
a group of Moldavian boyars ousted Vasile. Both Matei and Vasile 
were enlightened rulers, who provided liberal endowments to 
religion and the arts, established printing presses, and published 
religious books and legal codes. 

Transylvania under the Habshurgs, 1688-1867 

In 1683 Jan Sobieski's Polish army crushed an Ottoman army 
besieging Vienna, and Christian forces soon began the slow process 
of driving the Turks from Europe. In 1688 the Transylvanian Diet 
renounced Ottoman suzerainty and accepted Austrian protection. 
Eleven years later, the Porte officially recognized Austria's sover- 
eignty over the region. Although an imperial decree reaffirmed the 
privileges of Transylvania's nobles and the status of its four 1 'rec- 
ognized" religions, Vienna assumed direct control of the region 
and the emperor planned annexation. The Romanian majority re- 
mained segregated from Transylvania's political life and almost 
totally enserfed; Romanians were forbidden to marry, relocate, or 
practice a trade without the permission of their landlords. Besides 
oppressive feudal exactions, the Orthodox Romanians had to pay 
tithes to the Roman Catholic or Protestant church, depending on 
their landlords' faith. Barred from collecting tithes, Orthodox 
priests lived in penury, and many labored as peasants to survive. 

The Uniate Church 

Under Habsburg rule, Roman Catholics dominated Transyl- 
vania's more numerous Protestants, and Vienna mounted a cam- 
paign to convert the region to Catholicism. The imperial army 
delivered many Protestant churches to Catholic hands, and any- 
one who broke from the Catholic church was liable to receive a 
public flogging. The Habsburgs also attempted to persuade Ortho- 
dox clergymen to join the Uniate Church, which retained Ortho- 
dox rituals and customs but accepted four key points of Catholic 
doctrine and acknowledged papal authority. Jesuits dispatched to 
Transylvania promised Orthodox clergymen heightened social sta- 
tus, exemption from serfdom, and material benefits. In 1699 and 
1701 , Emperor Leopold I decreed Transylvania's Orthodox Church 
to be one with the Roman Catholic Church; the Habsburgs, 
however, never intended to make the Uniate Church a "received" 
religion and did not enforce portions of Leopold's decrees that gave 
Uniate clergymen the same rights as Catholic priests. Despite an 
Orthodox synod's acceptance of union, many Orthodox clergy and 
faithful rejected it. 



18 



Historical Setting 



In 1711, having suppressed an eight-year rebellion of Hungarian 
nobles and serfs, the empire consolidated its hold on Transylva- 
nia, and within several decades the Uniate Church proved a semi- 
nal force in the rise of Romanian nationalism. Uniate clergymen 
had influence in Vienna; and Uniate priests schooled in Rome and 
Vienna acquainted the Romanians with Western ideas, wrote his- 
tories tracing their Daco-Roman origins, adapted the Latin alphabet 
to the Romanian language, and published Romanian grammars 
and prayer books. The Uniate Church's seat at Blaj, in southern 
Transylvania, became a center of Romanian culture. 

The Romanians' struggle for equality in Transylvania found its 
first formidable advocate in a Uniate bishop, Inocen{iu Micu Klein, 
who, with imperial backing, became a baron and a member of the 
Transylvanian Diet. From 1729 to 1744 Klein submitted petitions 
to Vienna on the Romanians' behalf and stubbornly took the floor 
of Transylvania's Diet to declare that Romanians were the inferi- 
ors of no other Transylvanian people, that they contributed more 
taxes and soldiers to the state than any of Transylvania's "nations," 
and that only enmity and outdated privileges caused their politi- 
cal exclusion and economic exploitation. Klein fought to gain Uniate 
clergymen the same rights as Catholic priests, reduce feudal obli- 
gations, restore expropriated land to Romanian peasants, and bar 
feudal lords from depriving Romanian children of an education. 
The bishop's words fell on deaf ears in Vienna; and Hungarian, 
German, and Szekler deputies, jealously clinging to their noble 
privileges, openly mocked the bishop and snarled that the Roma- 
nians were to the Transylvanian body politic what "moths are to 
clothing." Klein eventually fled to Rome where his appeals to the 
pope proved fruitless. He died in a Roman monastery in 1768. 
Klein's struggle, however, stirred both Uniate and Orthodox Roma- 
nians to demand equal standing. In 1762 an imperial decree 
established an organization for Transylvania's Orthodox commu- 
nity, but the empire still denied Orthodoxy equality even with the 
Uniate Church. 

The Reign of Joseph II 

Emperor Joseph II (1780-90), before his accession, witnessed 
the serfs' wretched existence during three tours of Transylvania. 
As emperor he launched an energetic reform program. Steeped in 
the teachings of the French Enlightenment, he practiced "enlight- 
ened despotism," or reform from above designed to preempt revo- 
lution from below. He brought the empire under strict central 
control, launched an education program, and instituted religious 
tolerance, including full civil rights for Orthodox Christians. In 



19 



Romania: A Country Study 

1784 Transylvanian serfs under Ion Ursu, convinced they had the 
emperor's support, rebelled against their feudal masters, sacked 
castles and manor houses, and murdered about 100 nobles. Joseph 
ordered the revolt repressed but granted amnesty to all participants 
except Ursu and other leaders, whom the nobles tortured and put 
to death before peasants brought to witness the execution. Joseph, 
aiming to strike at the rebellion's root causes, emancipated the serfs, 
annulled Transylvania's constitution, dissolved the Union of Three 
Nations, and decreed German the official language of the empire. 
Hungary's nobles and Catholic clergy resisted Joseph's reforms, 
and the peasants soon grew dissatisfied with taxes, conscription, 
and forced requisition of military supplies. Faced with broad dis- 
content, Joseph rescinded many of his initiatives toward the end 
of his life. 

Joseph II's Germanization decree triggered a chain reaction of 
national movements throughout the empire. Hungarians appealed 
for unification of Hungary and Transylvania and Magyarization 
of minority peoples. Threatened by both Germanization and 
Magyarization, the Romanians and other minority nations ex- 
perienced a cultural awakening. In 1791 two Romanian bishops — 
one Orthodox, the other Uniate — petitioned Emperor Leopold II 
(1790-92) to grant Romanians political and civil rights, to place 
Orthodox and Uniate clergy on an equal footing, and to appor- 
tion a share of government posts for Romanian appointees; the 
bishops supported their petition by arguing that Romanians were 
descendants of the Romans and the aboriginal inhabitants of Tran- 
sylvania. The emperor restored Transylvania as a territorial enti- 
ty and ordered the Transylvanian Diet to consider the petition. 
The Diet, however, decided only to allow Orthodox believers to 
practice their faith; the deputies denied the Orthodox Church recog- 
nition and refused to give Romanians equal political standing beside 
the other Transylvanian nations. 

Leopold's successor, Francis I (1792-1835), whose almost ab- 
normal aversion to change and fear of revolution brought his em- 
pire four decades of political stagnation, virtually ignored 
Transylvania's constitution and refused to convoke the Transyl- 
vanian Diet for twenty-three years. When the Diet finally recon- 
vened in 1834, the language issue reemerged as Hungarian deputies 
proposed making Magyar the official language of Transylvania. 
In 1843 the Hungarian Diet passed a law making Magyar Hun- 
gary's official language, and in 1847 the Transylvanian Diet enacted 
a law requiring the government to use Magyar. Transylvania's 
Romanians protested futilely. 



20 



Historical Setting 



The Revolution of 1848 

In early 1848, revolution erupted in Europe, and by March it 
had ignited both Austria and Hungary. Hungary's Diet seized the 
opportunity to enact a comprehensive legislative program that, in 
effect, extricated the country from the Middle Ages. The Diet 
abolished serfdom and feudal privileges and proclaimed freedom 
of the press and religion. The Diet's reform legislation also provided 
for the union of Transylvania and Hungary. In April Emperor Fer- 
dinand V (1835-48) swore to uphold the reforms, and on May 29, 
with a crowd in the street shouting "Union or Death!" the Tran- 
sylvanian Diet voted for unification. Romanians had no voice in 
the decision. 

Unification galvanized Romanian opposition. Thousands of 
peasants and miners gathered in Blaj to denounce union with Hun- 
gary and call for proportionate representation of Romanians in 
Transylvania's Diet and an end to ethnic oppression. Warfare be- 
gan in September between Hungarian troops and imperial forces, 
and a month later Romanian troops under Austrian command bat- 
tled the Hungarians in Transylvania. The Romanians sided with 
the Austrians, believing that the emperor would grant them equal 
rights in reward for their loyalty. Both sides committed atrocities, 
and for several months the Hungarians were victorious. In June 
1849, however, the tsar heeded an appeal from Emperor Franz 
Joseph (1848-1916) and sent in Russian troops, who extinguished 
the revolution. 

After quashing the revolution, Austria imposed a repressive re- 
gime on Hungary and ruled Transylvania directly through a mili- 
tary governor. German again became the official language, but 
the Austrians reinstated neither serfdom nor the nobles' monopo- 
ly on land ownership or tax-exempt status. Austria also abolished 
the Union of Three Nations and granted the Romanians citizen- 
ship. Former feudal lords hesitated to give up their land, however, 
and most of the newly freed serfs became sharecroppers on inferi- 
or land that barely yielded subsistence. These dismal conditions 
uprooted many Romanian families, who crossed into Walachia and 
Moldavia searching for better lives. 

Unification of Transylvania and Hungary 

In 1863 Franz Joseph convened the Transylvanian Diet. Hun- 
garian deputies boycotted the session because Franz Joseph had 
not convened it in accordance with the 1848 laws, and Romanian 
and German deputies held the majority. The rump Diet passed 
laws that underscored Transylvania's autonomy and equal status 



21 



Romania: A Country Study 

for the Romanian, Hungarian, and German languages. Transyl- 
vania's Romanians at last joined the Magyars, Szeklers, and Ger- 
mans as the fourth Transylvanian ' 'nation," and the Romanian 
Orthodox Church became a received religion. Franz Joseph later 
permitted Transylvania's Orthodox Church to separate from the 
Serbian Patriarchate. Romanian literary figures soon founded the 
Association for the Cultivation of Romanian Language and Liter- 
ature, which became a focal point of Romanian cultural life in Tran- 
sylvania. 

Romanians enjoyed equal status in Transylvania for only a short 
time. The need to shore up the weakening empire pressed Vienna 
toward compromise with Budapest. In 1865 Franz Joseph convened 
a second Transylvanian Diet, this time with a Hungarian majori- 
ty, which abrogated the 1863 legislation and endorsed unification 
of Hungary and Transylvania. Defeat at the hands of Prussia in 
1866 further revealed Austria's weakness, and in 1867 Franz Joseph 
agreed to the Ausgleich, a compromise whereby Austria and Hun- 
gary joined to form the Dual Monarchy — two sovereign states with 
a unified foreign policy. 

Walachia and Moldavia under the Russian 
Protectorate, 1711-1859 
The Phanariot Princes 

At the turn of the eighteenth century, Peter the Great's Russia 
supplanted Poland as the predominant power in eastern Europe 
and began exerting its influence over Walachia and Moldavia. The 
Orthodox tsar announced a policy of support for his coreligionists 
within the Ottoman Empire, and Romanian princes in Walachia 
and Moldavia began looking to Russia to break the Turkish yoke. 
Peter's ill-fated attempt to seize Moldavia in 1711 had the support 
of both Romanian princes. After the Turks expelled the Russian 
forces, the sultan moved to strengthen his hold on the princi- 
palities by appointing Greeks from Constantinople's Phanar, or 
"Lighthouse," district as princes. These "Phanariot" princes, who 
purchased their positions and usually held them briefly until a higher 
bidder usurped them, were entirely dependent upon their Otto- 
man overlords. Within the principalities, however, their rule was 
absolute and the Porte expected them to leech out as much wealth 
from their territories as possible in the least time. 

Exploitation, corruption, and the Porte's policy of rapidly replac- 
ing Phanariot princes wreaked havoc on the principalities' social 
and economic conditions. The boyars became sycophants; severe 
exactions and heavy labor obligations forced the peasantry to the 



22 



Historical Setting 



brink of starvation; and foreigners monopolized trade. The only 
benevolent Phanariot prince was Constantine Mavrocordato, who 
ruled as prince of Walachia six times and of Moldavia four times 
between 1739 and 1768. Mavrocordato attempted drastic reforms 
to staunch peasant emigration. He abolished several taxes on the 
boyars and clergy, freed certain classes of serfs, and provided the 
peasants sufficient land, pasturage, and wood for fuel. Mavrocor- 
dato also published books, founded schools, and required priests 
to be literate. These reforms, however, proved ephemeral; discom- 
fited boyars undermined Mavrocordato 's support at the Porte, and 
he was locked away in a Constantinople prison. 

The Russian Protectorate 

Russia's influence waxed in Walachia and Moldavia as Otto- 
man power waned. In 1739 and 1769 the Russians briefly occupied 
the principalities. Then in 1774, Catherine the Great agreed to 
return Moldavia, Walachia, and Bessarabia (see Glossary) to the 
Turks, but she obtained the right to represent Orthodox Chris- 
tians within the Ottoman Empire and oversee the principalities' 
internal affairs; Austria complained that the agreement rewarded 
Russia too favorably and annexed northern Bukovina (see Glos- 
sary), part of Moldavia. In 1787 the Russian army again marched 
into the principalities, but a stalemate gripped forces on all fronts 
and in 1792 the empress and sultan agreed to reaffirm existing 
treaties. In 1802 the Porte agreed to halt the rapid turnover of 
Phanariot princes; henceforth, the princes would reign for seven- 
year terms and could not be dethroned without Russian approval. 

In 1806 forces of Tsar Alexander I reoccupied the principali- 
ties, and the Romanian peasants were subjected to forced requisi- 
tions, heavy labor obligations, and real threats of exile to Siberia. 
As a result, the Romanians, who once had looked to the tsar for 
liberation, developed an abiding mistrust of the Russians that would 
deepen in the next century. In 1812 Russia and the Porte signed 
the Peace of Bucharest, which returned the principalities to the 
Ottomans and secured Russia's southern flank during Napoleon's 
invasion; Russia, however, annexed Bessarabia and retained its 
right to interfere in the principalities' affairs. Despite Russia's con- 
cessions, the treaty so displeased the sultan that he had his negoti- 
ators beheaded. 

In 1821 Greek nationalists headquartered in Odessa took con- 
trol of Moldavia as the first step in a plan to extricate Greece from 
Ottoman domination. Phanariot rule in Walachia and Moldavia 
led the Greek nationalists to view the principalities as possible com- 
ponents of a renascent Byzantine Empire. The insurgency's leader, 



23 



Romania: A Country Study 

Alexander Ypsilanti, a general in the Russian army and son of a 
Phanariot prince, enjoyed the support of some Greek and Romanian 
boyars in the principalities; after more than a century of extor- 
tion, however, most Romanians resented the Phanariots and craved 
the end of Greek control. Tudor Vladimirescu, a peasant-born Ro- 
manian whose wits and military skill had elevated him to boyar rank, 
assumed power in Walachia in an anti-Phanariot national uprising 
directed at establishing a Romanian government under Ottoman 
suzerainty. Russia denounced both Ypsilanti and Vladimirescu. The 
two rebel leaders argued in Bucharest; afterwards, Greek officers 
shot the Romanian, mutilated his body, and dumped it into a pond, 
an act that also ended Romanian resistance, which evaporated 
after Vladimirescu 's death. Then the Turks, with Russia's approval, 
attacked the principalities, scattered the Greek forces, and chased 
Ypsilanti into Transylvania. The Greek rebellion shocked the Porte, 
which no longer appointed Phanariot princes to the Walachian and 
Moldavian thrones and chose instead native Romanians. 

Later, in 1826, an internal crisis forced the sultan to accede to 
Russia's demand for greater influence in the principalities. The 
Porte gave Russia the right of consultation regarding changes on 
the two thrones; this concession assured Russia predominant influ- 
ence at Bucharest and Ia§i. Russia again invaded the principali- 
ties during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, which resulted in the 
1829 Treaty of Adrianople. The treaty provided for Russian occu- 
pation of the principalities until the Ottomans had fully paid an 
indemnity, the election of native Romanian princes for life, and 
an independent national administration and freedom of worship 
and commerce under Russian protection. Despite the fact that the 
Porte remained the principalities' suzerain and could exact a fixed 
tribute and direct certain aspects of foreign policy, the sultan could 
neither reject nor remove a prince without Russian consent. 

During Russia's occupation, a capable administrator, Count 
Pavel Kiselev, improved health conditions, organized a well- 
disciplined police force, built up grain reserves, and oversaw the 
drafting and ratification of the principalities' first fundamental laws, 
the Reglement Organique. Russia used these charters to co-opt 
Romanian boyars by protecting their privileges, including their 
tax-exempt status and oligarchic control of the government. 
However flawed, the charters gave Romanians their first taste of 
government by law. The Reglement provided for elected assem- 
blies of boyars to choose each prince, reformed the principalities' 
judicial systems, and established public education. At the same time, 
the documents' economic provisions enabled the boyars to stiffen 
peasant obligations and reduced the peasants' freedom of mobility. 



24 



Historical Setting 



After Russia's withdrawal in 1834, Walachia and Moldavia 
entered a period of self-government during which Russia guaran- 
teed the privileges that the Ottomans had granted. During this peri- 
od, the principalities' economic condition was bleak. For example 
a traveler to Walachia in 1835 reported seeing no manor houses, 
bridges, windmills, or inns and no furniture or utensils in peasant 
huts. In the mid-nineteenth century, Jews from Galicia began 
dominating trade, crafts, and money lending in the principalities. 
A native-Romanian bourgeoisie was virtually nonexistent. The 
boyars grew rich through the Black Sea wheat trade, using Jews 
as middlemen, but the peasants reaped few benefits. Beginning in 
the 1840s, construction of the first major roadways linked the prin- 
cipalities, and in 1846 Gheorghe Bibescu (1842-48), the Paris- 
educated prince of Walachia, agreed with Moldavia's Prince Mihai 
Sturdza (1834-49) to dismantle customs barriers between the prin- 
cipalities, marking the first concrete move toward unification. 

The uprising of Transylvania's Romanian peasants during the 
1848 European revolutions ignited Romanian national movements 
in Walachia and Moldavia. In Moldavia, Sturdza quashed the revo- 
lution overnight by arresting its leaders. In Walachia, however, 
a majority of the younger generation was averse to Russian and 
boyar dominance. Revolutionary platforms called for universal 
suffrage, equal rights, unification of the two principalities, and 
freedom of speech, association, and assembly. Although he sym- 
pathized with the revolutionary movement, Bibescu lacked the 
courage to lead it. After naming a revolutionary cabinet and sign- 
ing a new constitution, he fled into Transylvania. The new govern- 
ment of Walachia quickly affirmed its loyalty to the Porte and 
appealed to Austria, France, and Britain for support, hoping to 
avert a Russian invasion. The government also formed a commit- 
tee composed equally of boyars and peasants to discuss land re- 
form. Shocked by the revolution's success in Europe and fearful 
that it might spread into Russia, the tsar invaded Moldavia and 
pressured the Porte to crush the rebels in Bucharest. Dissatisfied 
with Turkey's weak resolve, Russia invaded Walachia and restored 
the Reglement. After 1849 the two empires suppressed the boyar 
assemblies in Walachia and Moldavia and limited the tenure of 
their princes to seven years. 

The Crimean War and Unification 

Russia withdrew from Walachia and Moldavia in 1851 but 
returned yet again in the summer of 1853, thus precipitating the 
Crimean War. In 1854 Franz Joseph and the sultan forced Tsar 
Nicholas I to withdraw his troops from the principalities, and 



25 



Romania: A Country Study 

imperial and Ottoman soldiers soon occupied them. Russia's defeat 
in the Crimea forced the tsar to seek peace, affirmed in 1856 by 
the Treaty of Paris. De jure Ottoman suzerainty over the princi- 
palities continued after the treaty, which abolished the Russian pro- 
tectorate and replaced it with a joint European guarantee. The 
treaty also freed navigation on the Danube and forced Russia to 
cede part of southern Bessarabia, which included control of the 
river's mouth, to Moldavia. 

The year 1856 began the active campaign for union of Walachia 
and Moldavia. The movement had the support of France, because 
many Romanian revolutionaries took refuge there after 1848 and 
lobbied Napoleon III to press for unification; Austria, Britain, and 
the Ottomans, however, opposed the unification effort, while Russia 
opted to let the Romanians decide. In 1857 the Porte manipulated 
an election of delegates to special assemblies charged with discuss- 
ing unification; the few voters casting ballots elected representa- 
tives opposing union. An international crisis followed, and Napoleon 
III, with Russian and British support, finally pressured the Otto- 
mans to nullify the results and hold new, untainted elections, which 
returned a huge majority of delegates in favor of unification. These 
delegates immediately called for autonomy, a constitutional govern- 
ment, and a foreign prince to rule the unified principalities. Despite 
the election results, an international conference in Paris in 1858 
reaffirmed separation of Walachia and Moldavia under Ottoman 
sovereignty, but it allowed for a common coinage and uniform laws 
and titled the two states the "United Principalities." The Roma- 
nians themselves overcame the imposed separation in 1859 when 
the separate assemblies at Bucharest and Ia§i unanimously elected 
the same man, Alexandru loan Cuza, governor of both principal- 
ities. Distracted by war in Italy, the leading European nations yield- 
ed to a fait accompli and accepted unification, and Cuza (1859-66) 
became prince. 

Romania and Transylvania to the End of World War I, 
1861-1919 

After discussions in Paris, the European powers and the Otto- 
man Empire ratified Cuza's election, and the United Principali- 
ties officially became Romania in 1861 . Almost immediately Cuza 
initiated a reform program. Encountering resistance from oligar- 
chic boyars, the prince appealed to the masses and held a referen- 
dum that approved constitutional provisions giving him broad 
powers to implement his program. The government improved 
roads, founded the universities of Bucharest and Ia§i, banned the 



26 



Historical Setting 



use of Greek in churches and monasteries, and secularized monastic 
property. Cuza also signed an agrarian law that eliminated serf- 
dom, tithes, and forced labor and allowed peasants to acquire land. 
Unfortunately, the new holdings were often too expensive for the 
peasants and too small to provide self-sufficiency; consequently the 
peasantry's lot deteriorated. 

Cuza's reforms alienated both the boyars and Romania's mosdy 
Greek clergy, and government corruption and the prince's own 
moral turpitude soon eroded his popularity. In 1865 an uprising 
broke out in Bucharest. Afterward, animosity toward the prince 
united the leaders of Romania's two political parties, the pro- 
German Conservatives, backed by the boyars and clergy, and the 
pro-French Liberals, who found support in the growing middle class 
and favored agrarian reform. On February 23, 1866, army officers 
loyal to the country's leading boyars awoke Cuza and his mistress, 
forced the prince to abdicate, and escorted him from the capital. 
The next morning street placards in Bucharest announced the 
prince's departure and rule by a regency pending the election of 
a foreign prince. 

Romania under Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 

With the tacit support of Napoleon III, Ion Bratianu, the lead- 
er of Romania's Liberals, nominated Prince Charles of southern 
Germany's Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family as the new prince. 
Over objections from the other European powers, the Romanians 
elected the twenty-seven-year-old prince, who, disguised as a sales- 
man, traveled through Austria by second-class rail and steamboat 
to accept the throne. 

Charles (1866-1914) worked to provide Romania with efficient 
administration. In July 1866, the principality gained a new con- 
stitution that established a bicameral legislature, gave the prince 
power to veto legislation, proclaimed equality before the law, and 
contained guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, and assem- 
bly. Most of the constitution's civil-rights provisions, however, were 
not enforced, and it extended voting rights only to the landed 
aristocracy and clergy. The document also limited naturalization 
to Christians, a measure aimed at denying civil rights to Jews liv- 
ing in or migrating to the principality. The Romanian Orthodox 
Church became the official state religion. Charles, a Roman Cath- 
olic, pledged to raise his successor in the Romanian Orthodox 
Church. 

The Franco-Prussian War in 1870 precipitated a political crisis 
as Francophile Liberal Party members denounced Romania's Ger- 
man prince. In August, pro-French activists led an abortive revolt 



27 



Romania: A Country Study 

against Charles at Ploie§ti. Although the government quickly sup- 
pressed the uprising, a jury acquitted the leaders. A scandal erupted 
when a Prussian-Jewish contractor bungled construction of key 
Romanian rail links and defaulted on interest payments to Prus- 
sian bondholders; the Liberals denounced Charles for pledging to 
back the bonds. In March 1871 the Bucharest police looked on as 
an angry crowd attacked a hall in which Germans had gathered 
to celebrate Prussian war victories. A day later, Charles handed 
his abdication to the regents who had installed him. They convinced 
the prince to remain on the throne, however, and mustered con- 
servative forces to support him. 

Charles backed Russia during the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-78. He allowed Russian troops to transit Romania and per- 
sonally led the Romanian army to aid Russian forces bogged down 
before Plevna, in the north of present-day Bulgaria. Finally, after 
the Ottomans' defeat, Charles proclaimed Romania's indepen- 
dence, ending five centuries of vassalage. Despite the Romanian 
army's heroism at Plevna, Russia refused to allow Romania to par- 
ticipate in peace negotiations or in the 1878 Congress of Berlin. 
At Berlin, Russia gained southern Bessarabia from Romania and 
as recompense offered northern Dobruja (see Glossary), a barren 
land between the Danube and the Black Sea south of the river's 
delta then inhabited mostly by Turks, Bulgars, and gypsies (see 
fig. 2). The Congress agreed to recognize Romania's declared in- 
dependence, but only if Romania acceded to Russia's annexation 
of Bessarabia and repealed laws that discriminated against Jews. 
Romania agreed, and, though its amendments to the discrimina- 
tory laws left many loopholes, the European powers in 1880 recog- 
nized Romania's independence. The tsar later denied Romania 
the fortress of Silistra, the strategic key to Dobruja on the south 
bank of the Danube, thereby deepening Romania's distrust of 
Russia. 

In 1881 the parliament proclaimed Romania a kingdom, and 
Charles was crowned in Bucharest's cathedral with a crown 
fashioned from an Ottoman cannon seized at Plevna. Romania 
enjoyed relative peace and prosperity for the next three decades, 
and the policies of successive Conservative and Liberal governments 
varied little. Walachian wells began pumping oil; a bridge was built 
across the Danube at Cernavoda (in Dobruja); and new docks rose 
at Constanta. Foreign trade more than tripled between 1870 and 
1898, and by 1900 the new kingdom had 14,000 kilometers of road- 
way and 3,100 kilometers of railroad. Charles equipped a respec- 
table army, and peasant children filled newly constructed rural 
schoolrooms. Romania borrowed heavily to finance development, 



28 



Historical Setting 



however, and most of the population continued to live in penury 
and ignorance. 

Mistreatment of the Jewish minority and inequitable land dis- 
tribution also were persistently troublesome issues. Jews had begun 
immigrating into Romania in numbers after the 1829 Treaty of 
Adrianople, crowding into northern Moldavia and making Ia§i a 
predominantly Jewish city. In 1859 about 118,000 Jews lived in 
Moldavia and 9,200 in Walachia; by 1899 Moldavia's Jewish popu- 
lation had grown to 201,000 and Walachia's to 68,000. Economic 
rivalry precipitated riots and attacks on synagogues and Jews. The 
Liberal Party, supported by the increasing numbers of middle-class 
Romanians, strove to eliminate Jewish competition. Many rural 
Jews fled to the cities or abroad, and legal restrictions prevented 
all but a few Jews from gaining Romanian citizenship. 

Bloody confrontations over inequitable land distribution brought 
partial agrarian reform. In the late nineteenth century about 2,000 
landowners controlled over half of Romania's land; peasants held 
only one-third of the acreage. Beside limited ownership, peasants 
also had little representation in government. Their discontent ex- 
ploded in 1888 and prompted an ineffective land reform. In 1907 
peasants revolted even more violently in Moldavia, where they 
attacked Jewish middlemen, pillaged large estates, battied the army, 
and attempted to march on Bucharest. The government called out 
the army to quell the disorder, in which at least 10,000 peasants 
died. After the revolt, the government dispersed some 4 million 
hectares of land to the peasants in parcels of 1 to 61 hectares; large 
landowners retained about 3 million hectares. 

An almost obsessive distrust of Russia prompted Charles to sign 
a secret treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, Germany, and 
Italy in 1883. Thus Charles' kingdom became one of the Central 
Powers. Romania openly fortified military defenses along its Rus- 
sian border and left unprotected the Transylvanian mountain passes 
into Hungary. However, Charles withheld knowledge of the pact 
even from successive premiers and foreign ministers until 1914. 
For years the king kept Romania's only copy of the treaty locked 
in his personal safe at the royal summer retreat. 

Romania's alliance with Austria-Hungary did little to ease the 
strain in relations between the two countries that Hungary was 
creating with its efforts to Magyarize Transylvania's Romanian 
majority. Romanian nationalism smoldered in Transylvania dur- 
ing the period of the Dual Monarchy. The National Party advo- 
cated restoration of Transylvania's historic autonomy; Hungary, 
however, opposed both autonomy and any expanded voting rights 
that would give Romanians the region's dominant voice. By the 



29 



Romania: A Country Study 




1 - Foundation of the Romanian state, 1878. 

2- Annexation of Dobruja from Bulgaria, 1913. 

3- Annexation of Bessarabia from the Soviet Union, 1918. 

4- Annexation of Bukovina from the Soviet Union, 1919. 

5- Annexation of Transylvania from Hungary, 1920. 



Source: Based on information from Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the Ruma- 
nians, Astor, Florida, 1976. 

Figure 2. Boundaries of Romania from the Congress of Berlin, 1878, to 
the Treaty of Trianon, 1920 

turn of the century, Bucharest's calls for unification of Romani- 
ans in Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia grew stronger. 

The Balkan Wars and World War I 

After the 1907 peasant uprising, foreign events shaped Roma- 
nia's political agenda. In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia, a clear 
indication that Vienna sought to destroy Serbia. A year later Io- 
nel Bratianu, son of the former Liberal Party leader, became Roma- 
nia's prime minister. Bratianu feared that Bulgarian expansion 
might upset the Balkan balance of power and sought compen- 
sation for any potential Bulgarian gains at the Ottomans' ex- 
pense. 



30 



Historical Setting 



Then in October 1912, the First Balkan War erupted. Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Greece scored quick victories over Ottoman 
forces, and Bulgarian forces drove to within thirty-three kilome- 
ters of Constantinople. Romania called on Sofia to hand over the 
fortress of Silistra; Bulgaria's foreign minister, however, offered 
only minor border changes, which excluded Silistra, and assurances 
for the rights of the Kutzovlachs in Macedonia and northern Greece. 
After the war, Romania threatened to occupy Bulgarian territory, 
but a British proposal for arbitration prevented hostilities. The 
resulting May 1913 Protocol of St. Petersburg awarded Romania 
control of Silistra; the protocol did not satisfy Bucharest's appetite 
for territory, however, and Sofia considered the award excessive. 

On June 28, 1913, the Second Balkan War broke out when Bul- 
garia launched an unsuccessful surprise attack on Serbia and 
Greece. The Ottomans joined in the fighting against Bulgaria, and 
Romania's army marched into southern Dobruja before turning 
toward Sofia. The warring states signed an armistice on July 30, 
1913, and in the subsequent Treaty of Bucharest, Romania retained 
Silistra and other strategic areas of Dobruja. During the invasion 
of Bulgaria, large numbers of Romanian soldiers saw firsthand Bul- 
garia' s abundant peasant holdings and more advanced farming 
methods and noted the absence of wealthy landowners and rapa- 
cious middlemen. Bratianu's Liberal Party tapped the resulting 
impatience of Romania's peasantry by making land and franchise 
reform the thrust of its new program; they proved an unstoppable 
combination against the Conservatives. In January 1914, the Liber- 
als rose to power and convoked a constituent assembly to elaborate 
agrarian and electoral reform programs. 

When Bratianu became premier, he learned that Charles had 
renewed the secret treaty with the other Central Powers in 1913 
despite the fact that the king knew the treaty would enjoy no popular 
support because of Hungary's continuing efforts to Magyarize 
Transylvania's Romanians. On June 28, 1914, a Bosnian Serb 
assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian 
throne and the Dual Monarchy's most ardent supporter of the rights 
of Transylvania's Romanians. Within days Austria presented Serbia 
with an ultimatum that made war inevitable. At first, King Charles 
felt the secret treaty did not bind Romania to declare war on Ser- 
bia for a quarrel that Austria-Hungary had provoked with its ul- 
timatum. The Central Powers, eager to have Charles mobilize 
Romania's forces against Russia, evoked the king's German an- 
cestry and tempted him with a promise to restore Bessarabia; at 
the same time, Russia offered Transylvania to Romania if it would 
join the Triple Entente, the military alliance of Great Britain, 



31 



Romania: A Country Study 

France, and Russia set up to counter the Central Powers. At a meet- 
ing of government and opposition-party leaders deciding Roma- 
nia's course of action, Charles advocated joining the Central 
Powers. But upon hearing about Charles' secret, unconstitutional 
treaty, virtually all the government leaders rejected the king's 
proposal and opted for a wait-and-see policy. Romanian public 
opinion adamantly backed the French, and Bucharest crowds 
cheered after the French checked the German advance at the Marne 
River. 

King Charles, infirm and disconsolate that Romania did not 
honor his secret treaty, died in October 1914. If it had not been 
for the war, Romanians would have grieved for the end of a forty- 
eight-year reign that had brought them the most prosperous and 
peaceful period in their entire history. Charles's successor, Ferdi- 
nand (1914-27), and Bratianu chose to conserve Romania's 
resources and continue playing a waiting game until they could 
discern the outcome of the war. In November Hungary tried to 
dissipate Romania's animosity by announcing a number of reforms 
benefiting Transylvania's ethnic Romanians, but even Germany 
termed the measures inadequate. In October 1915, Romania's rival, 
Bulgaria, joined the Central Powers and, in unison with Germany, 
attacked Serbia. Russian victories in Galicia in 1916, Allied prom- 
ises of territory, and fear of Germany finally convinced Romania 
to join the war on the side of Britain, Russia, France, and Italy. 
On August 27, 1916, Romania declared war on Austria- Hungary. 
Confident of victory, Romanian troops crossed into Transylvania. 
Their campaign stalled, however, and German and Austrian forces 
counterattacked, drove the Romanian army and thousands of refu- 
gees back over the Carpathian passes, and in December occupied 
Bucharest. Bulgarian forces also invaded from across the Danube, 
and Russian reinforcements sent to Romania's aid proved feck- 
less. Meanwhile, Ferdinand and his ministers fled to Ia§i, where 
the Romanian army regrouped under a French military mission, 
achieved several victories over Central Powers forces, and held a 
line along the Siret River. 

In February 1917, revolution erupted in Russia's capital, 
Petrograd. In an effort to preempt the appeal of Bolshevik propa- 
ganda, the Romanian government in July 1917 enacted a land 
reform program and an election law providing for universal 
suffrage, proportional representation, and obligatory participation 
in elections. By late summer, Russia's defenses had collapsed, and 
its soldiers were openly fraternizing with the enemy. In Novem- 
ber the Bolsheviks staged a coup d'etat that overthrew Russia's 
provisional government. Romania's leaders refused to participate 



32 




Bas relief celebrating Romanian independence from the Turks, outside 

Casa Armatei in Bucharest 
Courtesy Karen Friedel 
Statue of Michael the Brave, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 



33 



Romania: A Country Study 

in the subsequent German-Soviet armistice negotiations; once the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, however, Romania had little 
choice but to agree to a preliminary armistice. In December Roma- 
nian nationalists in Bessarabia convened a representative national 
assembly that proclaimed the creation of the Democratic Federa- 
tive Moldavian Republic and appealed to the Ia§i government and 
Entente countries for help in repulsing Bolshevik forces. In April 
1918, the Bessarabian assembly requested annexation to Roma- 
nia, and Romanian troops entered the province. 

A new Romanian premier, the pro-German Alexandru Mar- 
ghiloman, signed the Treaty of Bucharest with the Central Pow- 
ers on May 7, 1918. Under the treaty, Romania lost all of Dobruja 
to Bulgaria and a joint administration of the Central Powers; Hun- 
gary gained territory in the Carpathians; Romania had to com- 
pensate the Central Powers for debts and damages; and the Central 
Powers claimed a nine-year monopoly on Romania's agricultural 
output and assumed control of the Danube and Romania's oilfields, 
railroads, wharves, and other economic assets. The Central Pow- 
ers intended to ruin Romania's economy, and Hungary launched 
an all-out effort to create a wholly Magyarized zone along Tran- 
sylvania's Romanian border and undermine the Orthodox and Uni- 
ate churches. 

By mid- 191 8 the tide of the war had turned and engulfed the 
Central Powers. Bulgaria soon capitulated, Austria- Hungary was 
disintegrating, and Germany was retreating on the Western Front. 
The leaders of Transylvania's National Party met and drafted a 
resolution invoking the right of self-determination, and a move- 
ment began for the unification of Transylvania with Romania. In 
November near- anarchy gripped Hungary, and the Romanian Na- 
tional Central Council, which represented all the Romanians of 
Transylvania, notified the Budapest government that it had 
assumed control of twenty-three Transylvanian counties and parts 
of three others. A similar Romanian national council in northern 
Bukovina announced its union with Romania, and Bessarabia's 
government also voted for unification. In Romania itself, King Fer- 
dinand appointed a new government that repealed all laws enact- 
ed under Marghiloman's administration. On November 8, 
Romania declared war on Germany and forced enemy troops from 
Walachia. The king returned to Bucharest on November 30, and 
Romanian units occupied most of Transylvania by December 1 . 
A mass assembly later that month in Alba Iulia (southern Tran- 
sylvania), passed a resolution calling for unification of all Roma- 
nians in a single state. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Greater Romania and the Occupation of Budapest 

In late 1918 Romanian leaders traveled to Paris to forward the 
kingdom's broad territorial claims at the upcoming peace confer- 
ence, which opened on January 18, 1919. At the conference, Roma- 
nia insisted that the Allies respect the principle of national 
self-determination and fulfill the territorial promises made in 1916 
that had brought Romania into the war on the side of the Allies. 
The Allies had promised Romania the Banat (see Glossary), a fer- 
tile agricultural region bounded by the Tisza, Mure§, and Danube 
rivers, which Serbia also claimed because of the region's large Slavic 
population. The conference participants supported almost all of 
Romania's claims, including those to Transylvania, Bessarabia, 
and northern Bukovina, but arbiters finally partitioned the Banat 
between Romania and Serbia. 

In March 1919, the French head of the Entente mission in 
Budapest handed Mihaly Karolyi, the fledgling Hungarian repub- 
lic's leftist president, a diplomatic note dictating the last in a se- 
ries of border rectifications that stripped Hungary of large swaths 
of its traditional lands. Karolyi resigned in disgust and turned power 
over to a coalition of social democrats and communists, who 
promised that the Soviet Union would help Hungary restore its 
prewar borders. The communists, under Bela Kun, immediately 
seized control and announced the founding of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. In late May, Kun backed his promises to restore Hun- 
gary's lost territories with military action against Czechoslovakia. 
When the French threatened to retaliate, Kun turned his army on 
Romania. Romanian units, however, penetrated Hungarian lines 
on July 30, occupied and looted Budapest, and scattered the mem- 
bers of Kun's government. When the Romanian troops finally 
departed Budapest at the beginning of 1920, they took extensive 
booty, including food, trucks, locomotives and railroad cars, and 
factory equipment, in revenge for the Central Powers' plundering 
of Romania during the war. 

Romania's occupation of Budapest deepened ongoing Hungar- 
ian bitterness at the Paris conference against Bratianu, who stub- 
bornly opposed the partition of the Banat and provisions of the 
treaties guaranteeing rights of minority ethnic groups. When Bra- 
tianu resigned rather than accept the treaty with Austria, King Fer- 
dinand appointed a nonpartisan government and called for 
elections. In 1919 Romanians voted in the country's first free elec- 
tions and swept away the Liberals' artificial parliamentary majority. 
Victory went to Iuliu Maniu's National Party, the major prewar 
Romanian party in Transylvania, which quickly carved out a niche 



35 



Romania: A Country Study 

in the political life of Greater Romania (see Glossary) by attracting 
peasant support in the Old Kingdom, the territories of pre-World 
War I Romania. Maniu's colleague, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, 
became premier and rapidly signed the treaties. Vaida-Voevod ran 
the government until 1920, when the king named General Alex- 
andru Averescu premier. 

Greater Romania to the End of World War II, 
1920-45 

Two postwar agreements that Romania signed, the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain with Austria and the Treaty of Trianon with Hun- 
gary, more than doubled Romania's size, adding Transylvania, 
Dobruja, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and part of the Banat 
to the Old Kingdom. The treaties also fulfilled the centuries-long 
Romanian dream of uniting all Romanians in a single country. 
Although the newly acquired regions brought added wealth and 
doubled the country's population to 16 million, they also introduced 
foreign nationalities, cultures, and social and political institutions 
that proved difficult to integrate with those of the Old Kingdom. 
These differences aroused chauvinism, exacerbated anti-Semitism, 
and fueled discrimination against Hungarians and other minori- 
ties. In the foreign arena, Romania faced Hungarian, Soviet, and 
Bulgarian demands for restoration of territories lost under the 
treaties; Romania geared its interwar network of alliances toward 
maintaining its territorial integrity. 

King Ferdinand's fear of revolution and wartime promises of 
land reform prompted the enactment of agrarian reform laws 
between 1917 and 1921 that provided for the expropriation and 
distribution of large estates in the Old Kingdom and new territo- 
ries. The reform radically altered the country's land-distribution 
profile as the government redistributed arable land belonging to 
the crown, boyars, church institutions, and foreign and domestic 
absentee landlords. When the reform measures were completed, 
the government had distributed 5.8 million hectares to about 1.4 
million peasants; and peasants with ten hectares or less controlled 
60 percent of Romania's tilled land. Former owners of the expropri- 
ated lands received reimbursement in long-term bonds; peasants 
were to repay the government 65 percent of the expropriation costs 
over twenty years. The land reforms suffered from corruption and 
protracted lawsuits and did not give rise to a modern, productive 
agricultural sector. Rather, ignorance, overpopulation, lack of farm 
implements and draft animals, too few rural credit institutions, and 
excessive division of land kept many of the rural areas mired 



36 



Historical Setting 



in poverty. Expropriation of Hungarian-owned property in Tran- 
sylvania and the Banat created social tensions and further embit- 
tered relations with Hungary. 

In October 1922, Ferdinand became king of Greater Romania, 
and in 1923 Romania adopted a new constitution providing for 
a highly centralized state. A chamber of deputies and a senate made 
up the national legislature, and the king held the power to appoint 
prime ministers. The constitution granted males suffrage and equal 
political rights, eliminated the Romanian Orthodox Church's legal 
supremacy, gave Jews citizenship rights, prohibited foreigners from 
owning rural land, and provided for expropriation of rural property 
and nationalization of the country's oil and mineral wealth. The 
constitution's liberal civil rights guarantees carried dubious force, 
however, and election laws allowed political bosses to manipulate 
vote tallies easily. The constitution enabled Bucharest to dominate 
Transylvania's affairs, which further fueled resentment in the 
region. 

The war and the land reform obliterated Romania's pro-German, 
boyar-dominated Conservative Party. Bratianu's Liberal Party, 
which represented the country's industrial, financial, and commer- 
cial interests, controlled the government through rigged elections 
from 1922 to 1928. The Liberal government's corruption and 
Bratianu's hard-handed measures eroded the party's popularity. 
In 1926 Maniu's National Party and the Peasant Party, one of the 
political remnants of the Old Kingdom, merged to form the 
National Peasant Party. Taking full advantage of a broadened fran- 
chise, the new party soon rivaled the Liberals. The Social Demo- 
cratic Party was Romania's strongest working-class party, but the 
country's labor movement was weak and Social Democratic can- 
didates never collected enough votes to win the party more than 
a few seats in parliament. Despite this meager showing, a faction 
of Social Democrats in 1921 founded the Communist Party. Com- 
munist agitators worked among Romania's industrial workers, 
especially ethnic minorities in the newly acquired territories, before 
the government banned the party in 1924. Communism was un- 
popular in Romania between the wars, partly because Romani- 
ans feared the Soviet Union's threat to reclaim Bessarabia; Moscow 
even directed Romania's communists to advocate detachment of 
Romania's newly won territories. 

Complicating an already unstable situation, the royal family in 
the mid- 1920s suffered a scandal when Crown Prince Carol, ex- 
hibiting a Phanariot's love of pleasure, married a Greek princess 
but continued a long-term liaison with a stenographer. Rather than 
obey Ferdinand's command to break off his love affair, in 1927 



37 



Romania: A Country Study 

Carol abdicated his right to the throne in favor of his six-year-old 
son Michael and went to Paris in exile. Ferdinand died within sever- 
al months, and a regency ruled for Michael. The Liberal Party 
lost control of the government to the National Peasant Party in 
fair elections after Bratianu's death in 1927, and Maniu soon in- 
vited Prince Carol to return to his homeland. In 1930 Carol 
returned, and Romania's parliament proclaimed him king. King 
Carol (1930-40) proved an ambitious leader, but he surrounded 
himself with corrupt favorites and, to Maniu' s dismay, continued 
his extramarital affair. Maniu soon lost faith in the monarch he 
had brought out of exile and resigned the premiership. In 1931 
Carol ousted the National Peasant Party and named a coalition 
government under Nicolae Iorga, a noted historian. The Nation- 
al Peasant Party regained power in 1932, only to lose it again to 
the Liberals a year later. 

The Agrarian Crisis and the Rise of the Iron Guard 

Romania's economy boomed during the interwar period. The 
government raised revenue by heavy taxation of the agricultural 
sector and, after years of Liberal Party hesitation, began admit- 
ting foreign capital to finance new electric plants, mines, textile 
mills, foundries, oil wells, roads, and rail lines. Despite the indus- 
trial boom, however, Romania remained primarily an agricultur- 
al country. In 1929, when the New York Stock Exchange crashed, 
world grain prices collapsed, and Romania plunged into an agricul- 
tural crisis. Thousands of peasant landholders fell into arrears, and 
the government enacted price supports and voted a moratorium 
on agricultural debts to ease their plight. In 1931 Europe suffered 
a financial crisis, and the flow of foreign capital into Romania dried 
up. Worse yet, the new industries could not absorb all the peasants 
who left their villages in search of work resulting in high unem- 
ployment. When recovery began in 1934, the government used 
domestic capital to fund new industries, including arms manufac- 
turing, to pull out of the agricultural slump. The depression slowed 
capacity growth, but industrial production actually increased 26 
percent between 1931 and 1938, a period when practically all the 
world's developed countries were suffering declines. 

In the early 1930s the Iron Guard, a macabre political cult con- 
sisting of malcontents, unemployed university graduates, thugs, 
and anti-Semites, began attracting followers with calls for war 
against Jews and communists. Peasants flocked to the Iron Guard's 
ranks, seeking scapegoats for their misery during the agrarian cri- 
sis, and the Iron Guard soon became the Balkans' largest fascist 
party. Corneilu Zelea Codreanu, the Iron Guard's leader who once 



38 



Historical Setting 



used his bare hands to kill Ia§i's police chief, dubbed himself 
Capitanul, a title analogous to Adolf Hitler's Der Fiihrer and 
Benito Mussolini's II Duce. Codreanu's henchmen marched 
through Romania's streets in boots and green shirts with small bags 
of Romanian soil dangling from their necks. Codreanu goaded the 
Iron Guards to kill his political opponents, and during "purifica- 
tion" ceremonies Guard members drew lots to choose assas- 
sins. 

After an Iron Guard assassinated Premier Ion Duca of the Na- 
tional Liberal Party in 1933, Romania's governments turned over 
in rapid succession, exacerbating general discontent. Iron Guards 
battled their opponents in the streets, and railroad workers went 
on strike. The government violently suppressed the strikers and 
imprisoned Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and other Communists who 
would later rise to the country's most powerful offices. 

In December 1937, when the National Liberals were voted out 
of office, King Carol handed the government to a far-right coali- 
tion that soon barred Jews from the civil service and army and for- 
bade them to buy property and practice certain professions. 
Continuing turmoil and foreign condemnation of the government's 
virulent anti-Semitism drove Carol in April 1938 to suspend the 
1923 constitution, proclaim a royal dictatorship, and impose rigid 
censorship and tight police surveillance. Carol's tolerance for the 
Iron Guard's violence wore thin, and on April 19 the police arrested 
and imprisoned Codreanu and other Iron Guard leaders and 
cracked down on the rank and file. In November police gunned 
down Codreanu and thirteen Iron Guards, alleging that they were 
attempting to escape custody. 

Codreanu's violent activities were endorsed and funded by Nazi 
Germany, which by the late 1930s was able to apply enormous mili- 
tary and economic leverage on Bucharest. Throughout the 1920s 
and early 1930s, however, Romania's foreign policy had been decid- 
edly anti-German. In 1920 and 1921, Romania had joined with 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to form the Little Entente, agree- 
ing to work against a possible Habsburg restoration and oppose 
German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian efforts to seek treaty revisions. 
France had backed the agreement because it hemmed in Germa- 
ny along its eastern frontiers, and the three Little Entente nations 
had signed bilateral treaties with France between 1924 and 1927. 
In February 1934, Romania had joined Yugoslavia, Turkey, and 
Greece to form the Balkan Entente, a mutual-defense arrangement 
intended to contain Bulgaria's territorial ambitions. By the mid- 
19308, however, support for Romania's traditional pro-French 
policy waned, and right-wing forces clamored for closer relations 



39 



Romania: A Country Study 

with Nazi Germany; at the same time League of Nations-imposed 
trade sanctions against Italy were costing the Balkan countries dear- 
ly. Germany seized the opportunity to strengthen its economic in- 
fluence in the region; it paid a premium for agricultural products 
and soon accounted for about half of Romania's total imports and 
exports. The Little Entente weakened in 1937, when Yugoslavia 
signed a bilateral pact with Bulgaria, and Hitler gutted it altogether 
in September 1938, when he duped Britain and France into sign- 
ing the Munich Agreement, which allowed Germany to annex 
Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland. After Munich, Romania and Yu- 
goslavia had no choice but appease Hitler. On March 23, 1939, 
Romania and Germany signed a ten-year scheme for Romanian 
economic development that allowed Germany to exploit the coun- 
try's natural resources. 

World War II 

On April 13, 1939, France and Britain pledged to ensure the 
independence of Romania, but negotiations on a similar Soviet 
guarantee collapsed when Romania refused to allow the Red Army 
to cross its frontiers. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union and 
Nazi Germany signed a nonaggression pact containing a secret pro- 
tocol giving the Soviet Union the Balkans as its sphere of influence. 
Freed of any Soviet threat, Germany invaded Poland on Septem- 
ber 1 and ignited World War II. The Nazi-Soviet pact and Ger- 
many's three-week blitzkrieg against Poland panicked Romania, 
which granted refuge to members of Poland's fleeing government. 
Romania's premier, Armand Calinescu, proclaimed neutrality, but 
Iron Guards assassinated him on September 21. King Carol tried 
to maintain neutrality for several months more, but France's sur- 
render and Britain's retreat from Europe rendered meaningless their 
assurances to Romania, and therefore Carol needed to strike a deal 
with Hitler. 

Romania suffered three radical dismemberments in the first year 
of the war that tore away some 100,000 square kilometers of terri- 
tory and 4 million people. On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union 
gave Romania a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to return Bessara- 
bia and cede northern Bukovina, which had never been a part of 
Russia; after Germany's ambassador in Bucharest advised Carol 
to submit, the king had no other option. In August Bulgaria 
reclaimed southern Dobruja with German and Soviet backing. In 
the same month, the German and Italian foreign ministers met 
with Romanian diplomats in Vienna and presented them with an 
ultimatum to accept the retrocession of northern Transylvania to 
Hungary; Carol again conceded. These territorial losses shattered 



40 



Historical Setting 



the underpinnings of Carol's power. On September 6, 1940, the 
Iron Guard, with the support of Germany and renegade military 
officers led by the premier, General Ion Antonescu, forced the king 
to abdicate. Carol and his mistress again went into exile, leaving 
the king's nineteen-year-old son, Michael V (1940-47), to succeed 
him. 

Antonescu soon usurped Michael's authority and brought Roma- 
nia squarely into the German camp. His new government quickly 
enacted stricter anti-Semitic laws and restrictions on Jewish, Greek, 
and Armenian businessmen; widespread bribery of poor and cor- 
rupt Romanian officials, however, somewhat mitigated their harsh- 
ness. With Antonescu' s blessing, the Iron Guard unleashed a reign 
of terror. In November 1940, Iron Guards thirsty for vengeance 
broke into the Jilava prison and butchered sixty-four prominent 
associates of King Carol on the same spot where Codreanu had 
been shot. They also massacred Jews and tortured and murdered 
Nicolae Iorga. Nazi troops, who began crossing into Romania on 
October 8, soon numbered over 500,000; and on November 23 
Romania joined the Axis Powers. Hitler now cast Romania in the 
role of regular supplier of fuel and food to the Nazi armies. Because 
the Iron Guard's disruptive violence no longer served Hitler's ends, 
German and Romanian soldiers began rounding up and disarm- 
ing ill-disciplined members. In January 1941, however, the Iron 
Guard rebelled and street batdes erupted. During this fighting, Iron 
Guards murdered 120 helpless Jews and mutilated their bodies. 
German and Romanian troops finally crushed the Iron Guard after 
several weeks. 

On June 22, 1941, German armies with Romanian support 
attacked the Soviet Union. German and Romanian units conquered 
Bessarabia, Odessa, and Sevastopol, then marched eastward across 
the Russian steppes toward Stalingrad. Romania welcomed the war. 
In a morbid competition with Hungary to curry Hitler's favor and 
hoping to regain northern Transylvania, Romania mustered more 
combat troops for the Nazi war effort than all of Germany's other 
allies combined. Hitler rewarded Romania's loyalty by returning 
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and by allowing Romania to 
annex Soviet lands immediately east of the Dniester, including 
Odessa. Romanian jingoes in Odessa even distributed a geogra- 
phy showing that the Dacians had inhabited most of southern 
Russia. 

During the war, Antonescu 's regime severely oppressed the 
Jews in Romania and the conquered territories. In Moldavia, Buko- 
vina, and Bessarabia, Romanian soldiers carried out brutal po- 
groms. Troops herded at least 200,000 Jews from Bukovina and 



41 



Romania: A Country Study 

Bessarabia — who were considered Soviet traitors — across the 
Dniester and into miserable concentration camps where many 
starved or died of disease or brutality. During the war, about 
260,000 Jews were killed in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and in the camps 
across the Dniester; Hungary's Nazi government killed or deported 
about 120,000 of Transylvania's 150,000 Jews in 1944. Despite 
rampant anti-Semitism, most Romanian Jews survived the war. 
Germany planned mass deportations of Jews from Romania, but 
Antonescu balked. Jews acted as key managers in Romania's econ- 
omy, and Antonescu feared that deporting them en masse would 
lead to chaos; in addition, the unceasing personal appeals of Wil- 
helm Filderman, a Jewish leader and former classmate of Antones- 
cu, may have made a crucial difference. 

Romania supplied the Nazi war effort with oil, grain, and in- 
dustrial products, but Germany was reluctant to pay for the deliv- 
eries either in goods or gold. As a result, inflation skyrocketed in 
Romania, and even government officials began grumbling about 
German exploitation. Romanian- Hungarian animosities also un- 
dermined the alliance with Germany. Antonescu 's government con- 
sidered war with Hungary over Transylvania an inevitability after 
the expected final victory over the Soviet Union. In February 1943, 
however, the Red Army decimated Romania's forces in the great 
counteroffensive at Stalingrad, and the German and Romanian 
armies began their retreat westward. Allied bombardment slowed 
Romania's industries in 1943 and 1944 before Soviet occupation 
disrupted transportation flows and curtailed economic activity al- 
together. 

Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation 

By mid- 1943 the leaders of Romania's semi-legal political op- 
position were in secret contact with the Western Allies and attempt- 
ing to negotiate the country's surrender to Anglo-American forces 
in order to avoid Soviet occupation. Mihai Antonescu, Romania's 
foreign minister, also contacted the Allies at about the same time. 
Western diplomats, however, refused to negotiate a separate peace 
without Soviet participation, and the Soviet Union delayed an 
armistice until the Red Army had crossed into the country in April 
1944. 

In June 1943 the National Peasants, National Liberals, Com- 
munists, and Social Democrats, responding to a Communist Party 
proposal, formed the Blocul National Democrat (National Demo- 
cratic Bloc — BND), whose aim was to extricate Romania from 
the Nazi war effort. On August 23 King Michael, a number of 
army officers, and armed Communist-led civilians supported 



42 



Memorial to Jews massacred at Sarmas in 1944 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

by the BND locked Ion Antonescu into a safe and seized control 
of the government. The king then restored the 1923 constitution 
and issued a cease-fire just as the Red Army was penetrating the 
Moldavian front. The coup speeded the Red Army's advance, and 
the Soviet Union later awarded Michael the Order of Victory for 
his personal courage in overthrowing Antonescu and putting an 
end to Romania's war against the Allies. Western historians uni- 
formly point out that the Communists played only a supporting 
role in the coup; postwar Romanian historians, however, ascribe 
to the Communists the decisive role in Antonescu 's overthrow. 

Michael named General Constantin Sanatescu to head the new 
government, which was dominated by the National Peasant Party 
and National Liberal Party. Sanatescu appointed Lucrejiu Patra§- 
canu, a Communist Party Central Committee member, minister 
of justice. Patra§canu thus became the first Romanian communist 
to hold high government office. 

The Red Army occupied Bucharest on August 31, 1944. In 
Moscow on September 12, Romania and the Soviet Union signed 
an armistice on terms Moscow virtually dictated. Romania agreed 
to pay reparations, repeal anti-Jewish laws, ban fascist groups, and 
retrocede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. 
Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Brit- 
ain established an Allied Control Commission in Bucharest, but 



43 



Romania: A Country Study 

the Soviet military command exercised predominant authority. By 
the time hostilities between Romania and the Soviet Union end- 
ed, Romania's military losses had totaled about 1 10,000 killed and 
180,000 missing or captured; the Red Army also transported about 
130,000 Romanian soldiers to the Soviet Union, where many 
perished in prison camps. After its surrender, Romania commit- 
ted about fifteen divisions to the Allied cause under Soviet com- 
mand. Before the end of hostilities against Germany, about 120,000 
Romanian troops perished helping the Red Army liberate Czecho- 
slovakia and Hungary. 

The armistice obligated Romania to pay the Soviet Union 
US$300 million in reparations. Moscow, however, valued the goods 
transferred as reparations at low 1938 prices, which enabled the 
Soviet Union to squeeze two to three times more goods from Roma- 
nia than it would have been entitled to at 1944 prices. The Soviet 
Union also reappropriated property that the Romanians had con- 
fiscated during the war, requisitioned food and other goods to supply 
the Red Army during transit and occupation of the country, and 
expropriated all German assets in the country. Estimates of the 
total booty reach the equivalent of US$2 billion. 

Postwar Romania, 1944-85 

On October 9, 1944, British prime minister Winston Churchill 
and Joseph Stalin met in Moscow. Without President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's knowledge, Churchill offered Stalin a list of Balkan and 
Central European countries with percentages expressing the "in- 
terest" the Soviet Union and other Allies would share in each — 
including a 90 percent Soviet preponderance in Romania. Stalin, 
ticking the list with a blue pencil, accepted the deal. In early Febru- 
ary 1945, however, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed at Yalta 
to a declaration condemning "spheres of influence" and calling 
for free elections as soon as possible in Europe's liberated coun- 
tries. The Soviet leader considered the percentage agreement key 
to the region's postwar order and gave greater weight to it than 
to the Yalta declarations; the United States and Britain considered 
the Yalta accord paramount. The rapid communist takeover in 
Romania provided one of the earliest examples of the significance 
of this disagreement and contributed to the postwar enmity between 
the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. 

In late 1944, the political parties belonging to the BND organized 
openly for the first time since King Carol had banned political 
activity in 1938. The key political forces were: Maniu's National 
Peasants, who enjoyed strong support in the villages and had the 
backing of democratic members of the middle class, rightists, 



44 



Historical Setting 



nationalists, and intellectuals; the Social Democrats, who were 
backed by workers and leftist intellectuals; and the Communists, 
who had reemerged after two decades underground. The National 
Liberals still campaigned, but their leaders' close association with 
King Carol and quiet support for Antonescu compromised the party 
and it never recovered its prewar influence. 

Romania's Communist Party at first attracted scant popular sup- 
port, and its rolls listed fewer than 1,000 members at the war's 
end. Recruitment campaigns soon began netting large numbers 
of workers, intellectuals, and others disillusioned by the breakdown 
of the country's democratic experiment and hungry for radical re- 
forms; many opportunists, including former Iron Guards, also 
crowded the ranks. Two rival factions competed for party leader- 
ship: the Romanian faction, which had operated underground dur- 
ing the war years; and the ' 'Muscovites," primarily intellectuals 
and nonethnic Romanians who had lived out the war in Moscow 
and arrived in Romania on the Red Army's heels. The leaders of 
the Romanian faction were Patra§canu, the intellectual prewar 
defense lawyer who became the minister of justice, and Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu, an activist railway worker who added Dej to his sur- 
name in memory of the Transylvanian town where he had been 
long imprisoned. The Muscovite leaders included Ana Pauker, the 
daughter of a Moldavian rabbi, who reportedly had denounced her 
own husband as a Trotskyite, and Vasile Luca, a Transylvanian 
Szekler who had become a Red Army major. Neither faction was 
a disciplined, coherent organization; in fact, immediately after the 
war the Romanian Communist Party resembled more a confeder- 
ation of fiefdoms run by individual leaders than the tempered, well- 
sharpened political weapon Lenin had envisioned. The party prob- 
ably would not have survived without Soviet backing. 

Soviet control handicapped the Romanian government's efforts 
to administer the country. The National Peasants called for im- 
mediate elections, but the Communists and Soviet administrators, 
fearful of embarrassment at the polls, checked the effort. In Oc- 
tober 1944, the Communists, Social Democrats, and the Plowmen's 
Front and other Communist front organizations formed the Fron- 
tul National Democrat (National Democratic Front — FND) and 
launched a campaign to overthrow Sanatescu 's government and 
gain power. The Communists demanded that the government 
appoint more pro-Communist officials, and the left-wing press 
inveighed against Sanatescu, charging that hidden reactionary for- 
ces supported him. Sanatescu succumbed to the pressure and 
resigned in November 1944; King Michael persuaded him to form 
a second government, but it too collapsed in a matter of weeks. 



45 



Romania: A Country Study 

After Sanatescu's fall, the king summoned General Nicolae Radescu 
to form a new government. Radescu appointed a Communist, Teo- 
hari Georgescu, undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior; Geor- 
gescu in turn began introducing Communists into the police and 
security forces. 

Chaos erupted in Romania, and civil war seemed imminent just 
days after the Yalta conference had adjourned. Communist lead- 
ers, with Soviet backing, launched a vehement anti-Radescu cam- 
paign that included halting publication of National Peasant and 
National Liberal newspapers. On February 13, 1945, Communists 
demonstrated outside the royal palace. Six days later Communist 
Party and National Peasant loyalists battled in Bucharest, and 
demonstrations degenerated to street brawls. The Soviet authori- 
ties demanded that Radescu restore calm but barred him from us- 
ing force. On February 24, Communist thugs shot and killed several 
pro-FND demonstrators; Communist leaders, branding Radescu 
a murderer, charged that government troops carried out the shoot- 
ings. On February 26 Radescu, citing the Yalta declarations, 
retaliated by scheduling elections. The next day, the Soviet deputy 
foreign minister, Andrei Vyshinsky, rushed to Bucharest to en- 
gineer a final FND takeover. After a heated exchange, Vyshinsky 
presented King Michael an ultimatum — either to appoint Petru 
Groza, a Communist sympathizer, to Radescu 's post or to risk 
Romania's continued existence as an independent nation. Vyshin- 
sky sugared the medicine by offering Romania sovereignty over 
Transylvania if the king agreed. Portents of a takeover appeared 
in Bucharest: Red Army tanks surrounded Michael's palace, and 
Soviet soldiers disarmed Romanian troops and occupied telephone 
and broadcasting centers. The king, lacking Western support, yield- 
ed. Radescu, who lashed out at Communist leaders as "hyenas" 
and " foreigners ' without God or country," fled to the British 
mission. Meanwhile, Western diplomats feared that the Soviet 
Union would annex Romania outright. 

Petru Groza's Premiership 

Groza' s appointment amounted to a de facto Communist 
takeover. Groza named Communists to head the army and the 
ministries of interior, justice, propaganda, and economic affairs. 
The government included no legitimate members of the National 
Peasant Party or National Liberal Party; rather, the Communists 
drafted opportunistic dissidents from these parties, heralded them 
as the parties' legitimate representatives, and ignored or harassed 
genuine party leaders. On March 9, 1945, Groza announced that 
Romania had regained sovereignty over northern Transylvania, 



46 



Historical Setting 



and in May and June the government prosecuted and executed 
Ion Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, and two generals as war 
criminals. 

At the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945, the Unit- 
ed States delegation protested that the Soviet Union was improperly 
implementing the Yalta declarations in Romania and called for elec- 
tions to choose a new government. The Soviet Union, however, 
refused even to discuss the question, labeling it interference in 
Romania's internal affairs. The Soviet Union instead called for 
the United States, Britain, and France to recognize Groza's govern- 
ment immediately, but they refused. The Potsdam agreement on 
Southeastern Europe provided for a council of foreign ministers 
to negotiate a peace treaty to be concluded with a recognized, 
democratic Romanian government. The agreement prompted King 
Michael to call for Groza to resign because his government was 
neither recognized nor democratic. When Groza refused to step 
down, the king retaliated by retiring to his summer home and with- 
holding his signature from all legislative acts or government decrees. 

In October 1945, Romania's Communist Party held its first an- 
nual conference, at which the two factions settled on a joint leader- 
ship. Though the Soviet Union favored the Muscovites, Stalin 
backed Gheorghiu-Dej's appointment as party secretary. Pauker, 
Luca, and Georgescu emerged as the party's other dominant lead- 
ers. The party's rolls swelled to 717,490 members by mid- 1946, 
and membership exceeded 800,000 by 1947. 

At a December 1945 meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow, 
the United States denounced Romania's regime as authoritarian 
and nonrepresentative and called for Groza to name legitimate 
members of the opposition parties to cabinet posts. Stalin agreed 
to make limited concessions, but the West received no guarantees. 
Groza named one National Peasant and one National Liberal 
minister, but he denied them portfolios and FND ministers hope- 
lessly outnumbered them in the cabinet. Assured by Groza's oral 
promises that his government would improve its human- and 
political- rights record and schedule elections, the United States and 
Britain granted Romania diplomatic recognition in February 1946, 
before elections took place. 

The Communists did all in their power to fabricate an election 
rout. Communist-controlled unions impeded distribution of 
opposition-party newspapers, and Communist hatchet men attacked 
opposition political workers at campaign gatherings. In March the 
Communists engineered a split in the Social Democratic Party and 
began discrediting prominent figures in the National Peasant and 
National Liberal Parties, labeling them reactionary, profascist, and 



47 



Romania: A Country Study 

anti-Soviet and charging them with undermining Romania's econ- 
omy and national unity. On November 19, 1946, Romanians cast 
ballots in an obviously rigged election. Groza's government claimed 
the support of almost 90 percent of the voters. The Communists, 
Social Democrats, and other leftist parties claimed 379 of the as- 
sembly's 414 seats; the National Peasant Party took 32; the Na- 
tional Liberals, 3. Minority-party legislators soon abandoned the 
new parliament or faced a ban on their participation. The regime 
turned a deaf ear to United States and British objections and pro- 
tested against their "meddling" in Romania's internal affairs. 

During its first weeks in power, Groza's government undertook 
an extensive land reform that limited private holdings to 50 hect- 
ares, expropriated 1 . 1 million hectares, and distributed most of the 
land to about 800,000 peasants. In May 1945, Romania and the 
Soviet Union signed a long-term economic agreement that provided 
for the creation of joint-stock companies, or Sovroms, through which 
the Soviet Union controlled Romania's major sources of income, 
including the oil and uranium industries. The Sovroms were tax 
exempt and Soviets held key management posts. 

Allied aerial bombardment and ground fighting during the war 
had inflicted serious damage to Romania's productive capacity, 
particularly to the most developed sector — oil production and refin- 
ing. Furthermore, the excessive post-war reparations to the Soviet 
Union and Soviet exploitation of the Sovroms overburdened the 
country's economy. In 1946 Romanian industries produced less 
than half of their prewar output, inflation and drought exacted a 
heavy toll, and for the first time in 100 years Moldavia suffered 
a famine. By mid- 1947 Romania faced economic chaos. Foreign 
aid, including United States relief, helped feed the population. The 
government printed money to repay the public debt, bought up 
the nation's cereal crop, confiscated store and factory inventories, 
and laid off workers. Romania, like the other East European coun- 
tries under Soviet domination, refused to participate in the Mar- 
shall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe, complaining 
that it would constitute interference in internal affairs. 

In February 1947, the Allies and Romania signed the final peace 
treaty in Paris. The treaty, which did not include Romania as a 
co-belligerent country, reset Romania's boundaries. Transylvania, 
with its Hungarian enclaves, returned to Romania; Bessarabia and 
northern Bukovina, with their Romanian majorities, again fell to 
the Soviet Union; and Bulgaria kept southern Dobruja. The treaty 
bound Romania to honor human and political rights, including 
freedom of speech, worship, and assembly, but from the first, the 
Romanian government treated these commitments as dead letters. 



48 



Historical Setting 



The treaty also set a ceiling on the size of Romania's military and 
called for withdrawal of all Soviet troops except those needed to 
maintain communication links with the Soviet forces then occupying 
Austria. 

Elimination of Opposition Parties 

Announcement of the Marshall Plan, expulsion of communists 
from the French and Italian governments in 1947, and consolida- 
tion of the Western bloc unnerved Stalin. Anticommunist forces, 
though in disarray, still lurked in Eastern Europe; most of the 
region's communist governments and parties enjoyed meager 
popular support; and the Polish, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and Yu- 
goslav communist parties began pursuing independent lines regard- 
ing acceptance of Marshall Plan aid and formation of a Balkan 
confederation. Fearing the Soviet Union might lose its grasp on 
Eastern Europe, Stalin abandoned his advocacy of "national roads 
to socialism" and pushed for establishment of full communist con- 
trol in Eastern Europe with strict adherence to Moscow's line. To 
further this goal, in September 1947 the Soviet Union and its satel- 
lites founded the Cominform, an organization linking the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the communist 
parties of Eastern Europe, Italy, and France. 

In the second half of 1947, the Romanian Communists unleashed 
full fury against the country's other political parties, arresting 
numerous opposition politicians and driving others into exile. The 
government dissolved the National Peasant Party and National 
Liberal Party, and in October prosecutors brought Iuliu Maniu, 
his deputy, Ion Mihalache, and other political figures to trial for 
allegedly conspiring to overthrow the government. Maniu and Mi- 
halache received life sentences; in 1956 the government reported 
that Maniu had died in prison four years earlier. In late 1947, the 
Communists struck against their fellow travelers, ousting the op- 
portunistic members of the main opposition parties who had cooper- 
ated in the Communists' takeover. A terror campaign claimed many 
lives and filled prisons and work camps. After ridding themselves 
of all active political opponents, Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej met with 
King Michael in December 1947 and threatened him with a govern- 
ment strike and possible civil war unless he abdicated. After several 
refusals, the king submitted. 

The Romanian Communist Party and one wing of the Social 
Democratic Party merged in early 1948 to form the Romanian Wor- 
kers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Roman — PMR). Communists 
held the party's key leadership posts and used the principle of 
democratic centralism to silence former Social Democrats. The 



49 



Romania: A Country Study 

PMR's First Party Congress, in February 1948, chose the trium- 
virate of Gheorghiu-Dej , Luca, and Pauker to head the Central 
Committee; Gheorghiu-Dej remained general secretary but still 
lacked the power to dominate the others. The Congress also trans- 
formed the National Democratic Front into the Popular Democratic 
Front, the party's umbrella front organization. In the same month, 
the Soviet Union and Romania signed a treaty of friendship, cooper- 
ation, and mutual assistance. 

The Romanian People's Republic 

In March 1948 the government held elections that for the final 
time included the facade of opposition-party participation; the Popu- 
lar Democratic Front took 405 of the 414 seats. On April 13, 1948, 
the new National Assembly proclaimed the creation of the Roma- 
nian People's Republic and adopted a Stalinist constitution. The 
assembly ostensibly became the supreme organ of state authority; 
in reality, however, the Communist Party's Politburo and the state 
Council of Ministers held the reins of power. The constitution also 
listed civil and political rights and recognized private property, but 
the authorities soon renounced the separation of the judiciary and 
executive and established the Department of State Security (Depar- 
tamentul Securitajii Statului), commonly known as the Securitate, 
Romania's secret police (see Security and Intelligence Services, 
ch. 5). In 1949 acts considered dangerous to society became punish- 
able even if the acts were not specifically defined by law as crimes, 
and economic crimes became punishable by death. The central 
government also created and staffed local " people's councils" to 
further tighten its hold on the country (see Local Government, 
ch. 4). 

In June 1948, the national assembly enacted legislation to com- 
plete the nationalization of the country's banks and most of its 
industrial, mining, transportation, and insurance companies. Wi- 
thin three years the state controlled 90 percent of Romania's indus- 
try. The nationalization law provided reimbursement for business 
owners, but repayments never materialized. In July 1948, the gov- 
ernment created a state planning commission to control the econ- 
omy, and in January 1949 Romania joined the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary), an organization 
designed to further economic cooperation among the Soviet satel- 
lites. 

Romania launched an ambitious program of forced industrial 
development at the expense of agriculture and consumer- goods 
production. In the First Five- Year Plan (1951-55), planners ear- 
marked 57 percent of all investment for industry, allotted 87 percent 



50 



Historical Setting 



of industrial investment to heavy industry, and promised the work- 
ers an 80 percent improvement in their standard of living by 1955. 
The government began construction of the Danube-Black Sea 
Canal, a project of monumental proportions and questionable 
utility. 

In 1949 the government initiated forced agricultural collectivi- 
zation to feed the growing urban population and generate capital. 
The state appropriated land, prodded peasants to join collective 
farms, and equipped machine stations (see Farm Organization, ch. 
3) to do mechanized work for the collective farms. Government 
forces besieged rural areas and arrested about 80,000 peasants for 
being private farmers or siding with private farmers, who were 
reviled as "class enemies"; about 30,000 people eventually faced 
public trial. Forced collectivization brought Romania food short- 
ages and reduced exports, and by late 1951 the government real- 
ized it lacked the tractors, equipment, and trained personnel for 
successful rapid collectivization. The forced collectivization cam- 
paign produced only about 1 7 percent state ownership of Roma- 
nia' s land. The authorities shifted to a policy of slow collectivization 
and cooperativization, allowing peasants to retain their land but 
requiring delivery to the state of a portion of their output. Large 
compulsory-delivery quotas drove many peasants from the land 
to higher-paying jobs in industry. 

Industrialization proceeded quickly and soon began reshaping 
the country's social fabric. Although Romania remained a 
predominandy agricultural country, the percentage of industrial 
workers increased as peasants left the fields and villages for facto- 
ry jobs and overcrowded city apartments. Trade school and univer- 
sity graduates also flocked to the cities. By 1953 government decrees 
had made most professionals state employees, eliminated private 
commerce, and bankrupted the commercial bourgeoisie. 

In 1948 the regime determined to reform the social structure and 
inculcate "socialist" values. The authorities tackled illiteracy, but 
they also severed links with Western culture, jailed teachers and 
intellectuals, introduced compulsory Russian-language instruction, 
rewrote Romania's history to highlight Russia's contributions, and 
redefined the nation's identity by glossing over its Western roots 
and stressing Slavic influences. Party leaders ordered writers and 
artists to embrace socialist realism and commanded teachers to train 
children for communal life. The state transformed the Romanian 
Orthodox Church into a government-controlled organization, su- 
pervised Roman Catholic schools, jailed Catholic clergy, merged 
the Uniate and Orthodox churches, and seized Uniate church 
property. After 1948 Stalin encouraged anti-Semitism and the 



51 



Romania: A Country Study 

Romanian regime restricted Jewish religious observances and 
harassed and imprisoned Jews who wished to emigrate to Israel. 
Despite this pressure, however, a third of Romania's Jews had 
emigrated by 1951. 

On June 28, 1948, the Yugoslav-Soviet rift broke into the open 
when the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia. Gheorghiu-Dej en- 
thusiastically joined in the attack on Yugoslavia's defiant leader, 
Josip Broz Tito, and the Cominform transferred its headquarters 
from Belgrade to Bucharest. Romania sheltered fleeing anti-Tito 
Yugoslavs, beamed propaganda broadcasts into Yugoslavia 
denouncing Tito, and called on Yugoslav communists to revolt. 
Tito's successful defiance of Stalin triggered a purge of East Euro- 
pean communists who had approved Titoist or "national" ap- 
proaches to communism. 

Romania's purge of Titoists provided cover for a major inter- 
nal power struggle. The authorities imprisoned Patra§canu as a 
"national deviationist" and friend to war criminals. In 1949 the 
party purged its rolls of 192,000 members. The Muscovite party 
leaders fell next. In 1951 Pauker and Luca celebrated Gheorghiu- 
Dej as the party's sole leader, but in May 1952 Pauker, Luca, and 
Georgescu lost their party and government positions. A month later, 
Gheorghiu-Dej shunted Groza into a ceremonial position and as- 
sumed both the state and party leadership. The government soon 
promulgated a new constitution that incorporated complete para- 
graphs of the Soviet constitution and designated for the PMR a 
role analogous to that of the CPSU in the Soviet Union — the "lead- 
ing political force" in the state and society. In 1954 the military 
tried and shot several "deviationists" and "spies," including Pat - 
ra§canu. 

Through the purge, Gheorghiu-Dej established a unified party 
leadership of Romanian nationals and forged a loyal internal ap- 
paratus to implement his policies. Gheorghiu-Dej elevated young 
proteges, including Nicolae Ceau§escu, a former shoemaker's ap- 
prentice who had joined the party at age fourteen and had met 
Gheorghiu-Dej in prison during the war, and Alexandru Draghi- 
ci, who later became interior minister. The PMR's unity allowed 
it successfully to assert its interests over Moscow's in the next 
decade. 

The Post-Stalin Era 

After Stalin died in March 1953, Gheorghiu-Dej forged a "New 
Course" for Romania's economy. He slowed industrialization, 
increased consumer- goods production, closed Romania's largest 
labor camps, abandoned the Danube-Black Sea Canal project, 



52 



Historical Setting 



halted rationing, and hiked workers' wages. Romania and the Soviet 
Union also dissolved the Sovroms. 

Soon after Stalin's death, Gheorghiu-Dej also set Romania on 
its so-called "independent" course within the East bloc. Gheorghiu- 
Dej identified with Stalinism, and the more liberal Soviet regime 
threatened to undermine his authority. In an effort to reinforce 
his position, Gheorghiu-Dej pledged cooperation with any state, 
regardless of political-economic system, as long as it recognized 
international equality and did not interfere in other nations' domes- 
tic affairs. This policy led to a tightening of Romania's bonds with 
China, which also advocated national self-determination. 

In 1954 Gheorghiu-Dej resigned as the party's general secre- 
tary but retained the premiership; a four-member collective 
secretariat, including Ceau§escu, controlled the party for a year 
before Gheorghiu-Dej again took up the reins. Despite its new policy 
of international cooperation, Romania joined the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (Warsaw Pact) in 1955, which entailed subordinat- 
ing and integrating a portion of its military into the Soviet mili- 
tary machine. Romania later refused to allow Warsaw Pact 
maneuvers on its soil and limited its participation in military maneu- 
vers elsewhere within the alliance. 

In 1956 the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced Stalin 
in a secret speech before the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. 
Gheorghiu-Dej and the PMR leadership were fully braced to 
weather de-Stalinization. Gheorghiu-Dej made Pauker, Luca, and 
Georgescu scapegoats for the Romanian communists' past excess- 
es and claimed that the Romanian party had purged its Stalinist 
elements even before Stalin had died. 

In October 1956, Poland's communist leaders refused to suc- 
cumb to Soviet military threats to intervene in domestic political 
affairs and install a more obedient politburo. A few weeks later, 
the communist party in Hungary virtually disintegrated during a 
popular revolution. Poland's defiance and Hungary's popular up- 
rising inspired Romanian students and workers to demonstrate in 
university and industrial towns calling for liberty, better living con- 
ditions, and an end to Soviet domination. Fearing the Hungarian 
uprising might incite his nation's own Hungarian population to 
revolt, Gheorghiu-Dej advocated swift Soviet intervention, and the 
Soviet Union reinforced its military presence in Romania, partic- 
ularly along the Hungarian border. Although Romania's unrest 
proved fragmentary and controllable, Hungary's was not, so in 
November Moscow mounted a bloody invasion of Hungary. 

After the Revolution of 1956, Gheorghiu-Dej worked closely with 
Hungary's new leader, Janos Kadar. Although Romania initially 



53 



Romania: A Country Study 

took in Imre Nagy, the exiled former Hungarian premier, it 
returned him to Budapest for trial and execution. In turn, Kadar 
renounced Hungary's claims to Transylvania and denounced Hun- 
garians there who had supported the revolution as chauvinists, na- 
tionalists, and irredentists. In Transylvania, for their part, the 
Romanian authorities merged Hungarian and Romanian univer- 
sities at Cluj and consolidated middle schools. Romania's govern- 
ment also took measures to allay domestic discontent by reducing 
investments in heavy industry, boosting output of consumer goods, 
decentralizing economic management, hiking wages and incentives, 
and instituting elements of worker management. The authorities 
eliminated compulsory deliveries for private farmers but reacceler- 
ated the collectivization program in the mid-1950s, albeit less bru- 
tally than earlier. The government declared collectivization complete 
in 1962, when collective and state farms controlled 77 percent of 
the arable land. 

Despite Gheorghiu-Dej's claim that he had purged the Roma- 
nian party of Stalinists, he remained susceptible to attack for his 
obvious complicity in the party's activities from 1944 to 1953. At 
a plenary PMR meeting in March 1956, Miron Constantinescu 
and Iosif Chi§inevschi, both Politburo members and deputy pre- 
miers, criticized Gheorghiu-Dej . Constantinescu, who advocated 
a Khrushchev- style liberalization, posed a particular threat to 
Gheorghiu-Dej because he enjoyed good connections with the 
Moscow leadership. The PMR purged Constantinescu and 
Chi§inevschi in 1957, denouncing both as Stalinists and charging 
them with complicity with Pauker. Afterwards, Gheorghiu-Dej 
faced no serious challenge to his leadership. Ceau§escu replaced 
Constantinescu as head of PMR cadres. 

Gheorghiu-Dej's Defiance of Khrushchev 

Khrushchev consolidated his power in the Soviet Union by oust- 
ing the so-called "anti-party" group in July 1957. A year later 
Gheorghiu-Dej, with Chinese support, coaxed the Soviet Union 
into removing its forces from Romanian soil. Khrushchev's con- 
solidation freed his hands to revive Comecon and advocate speciali- 
zation of its member countries. Part of his plan was to relegate 
Romania to the role of supplying agricultural products and raw 
materials to the more industrially advanced Comecon countries. 
Gheorghiu-Dej, a long-time disciple of rapid industrialization and, 
since 1954, a supporter of "national" communism, opposed Khru- 
shchev's plan vehemently. Romanian- Soviet trade soon slowed to 
a trickle. With no Soviet troops in Romania to intimidate him, 
Gheorghiu-Dej's defiance stiffened, and his negotiators began 



54 



Historical Setting 



bringing home Western credits to finance purchases of technology 
for Romania's expanding industries. Khrushchev apparendy sought 
to undermine Gheorghiu-Dej within the PMR and considered mili- 
tary intervention to unseat him. The Romanian leader countered 
by attacking anyone opposed to his industrialization plans and by 
removing Moscow-trained officials and appointing loyal bureaucrats 
in their place. The November 1958 PMR plenum asserted that 
Romania had to strengthen its economy to withstand external pres- 
sures. Industrialization, collectivization, improved living standards, 
and trade with the West became the focal points of the party's eco- 
nomic policy. 

The Sino- Soviet split, which Khrushchev announced at the 
PMR's 1960 congress, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis increased 
Gheorghiu-Dej 's room to maneuver without risking a complete rup- 
ture with Moscow. At a Comecon meeting in February 1963, 
Romania revealed its independent stance by stating publicly that 
it would not modify its industrialization program for regional 
integration. In subsequent months, the Romanian and Albanian 
media were the only official voices in Eastern Europe to report 
China's attack on Soviet policy. Also Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito 
established a rapprochement and broke ground for a joint Yugo- 
slav-Romanian hydroelectric project. In 1964 the PMR issued the 
"April Declaration," rejecting the Soviet Union's hegemony in 
the communist bloc and proclaiming Romania's autonomy. After 
the April Declaration, Romanian diplomats set out to construct 
loose alliances with countries of the international communist move- 
ment, Third World, and the West. China and Yugoslavia became 
its closest partners in the communist world; Hungary and the Soviet 
Union were its main communist opponents. 

At home, the PMR maintained a firm grip on authority but 
granted amnesties to former ''class enemies" and "chauvinists" 
and admitted to its ranks a broader range of individuals. Gheorghiu- 
Dej ordered "de-Russification" and nationalistic "Romanianiza- 
tion" measures to drum up mass support for his defiance of Moscow 
and deflect criticism of his own harsh domestic economic policies. 
Bucharest's Institute for Russian Studies metamorphosed into a 
foreign-languages institute, and Russian-language instruction dis- 
appeared from Romanian curricula. To promote Romanian cul- 
ture, official historians resurrected Romanian heroes; the PMR 
published an anti-Russian anthology of Karl Marx's articles 
denouncing tsarist Russia's encroachments on Romania and back- 
ing Romania's claim to Bessarabia; workmen stripped Russian 
names from street signs and buildings. Cultural exchanges with 
the West multiplied; jamming of foreign radio broadcasts ceased; 



55 



Romania: A Country Study 

and Romania began siding against the Soviet Union in United Na- 
tions (UN) votes. The Romanianization campaign also ended po- 
litical and cultural concessions granted to the Hungarian minority 
during early communist rule; subsequently Hungarians suffered 
extensive discrimination. 

The Ceausescu Succession 

In March 1965 Gheorghiu-Dej died. A triumvirate succeeded 
him: Ceau§escu, the party's first secretary; Chivu Stoica, the state 
council president; and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, premier. Ceau§es- 
cu wasted little time consolidating power and eliminating rivals. 
Alexandru Draghici, his main rival, lost his interior ministry post 
in 1965 and PMR membership in 1968. After Draghici' s removal, 
Ceau§escu began accumulating various party and government po- 
sitions, including state council president and supreme military com- 
mander, so that by the Tenth Party Congress in 1969, Ceau§escu 
controlled the Central Committee and had surrounded himself with 
loyal subordinates. 

Ceau§escu, like Gheorghiu-Dej, preached national communism, 
and he redoubled the Romanianization effort. In 1965 the PMR 
was renamed the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist 
Roman — PCR) in conjunction with the leadership's elevation of 
Romania from the status of a people's democracy to a socialist 
republic, a distinction ostensibly marking a leap forward along the 
path toward true communism. The leadership also added a strong 
statement of national sovereignty to the preamble of the new Con- 
stitution. By 1966 Ceau§escu had ceased extolling the Soviet Un- 
ion's "liberation" of Romania and recharacterized the Red Army's 
wartime action there as "weakening fascism" and "animating" 
the Romanians to liberate the country from fascist dominance. 
Romanians heeded the nationalist appeal, but Ceau§escu so exag- 
gerated the effort that a cult of personality developed. Propagan- 
dists, striving to cast Ceau§escu as the embodiment of all ancestral 
courage and wisdom, even staged meetings between Ceausescu and 
actors portraying Michael the Brave, Stephen the Great, and other 
national heroes. 

Romania's divergence from Soviet policies widened under 
Ceau§escu. In 1967 Romania recognized the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany) and maintained diplomatic relations 
with Israel after the June 1967 War. In August 1968, Ceau§escu 
visited Prague to lend support to Alexander Dubcek's government. 
Romania denounced the Soviet Union for ordering the Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Ceau§escu met Tito twice 
after the invasion to discuss a common defense against a possible 



56 



Historical Setting 



Bulgarian- Soviet military action and reassert their insistence on 
full autonomy, equal national rights, and noninterference. Popu- 
lar acceptance of Ceau§escu's regime peaked during his defiance 
of the Soviet Union following the invasion of Czechoslovakia; most 
Romanians believed his actions had averted Soviet reoccupation 
of their country. 

In the 1960s and early 1970s, thanks mostly to ample domestic 
energy and raw-material production, easily tapped labor reserves, 
forced savings, Western trade concessions, and large foreign credits, 
Romania enjoyed perhaps its most prosperous economic years since 
World War II. Although industrial production had tripled in the 
decade up to 1965, the inefficiencies of central planning and in- 
adequate worker incentives signalled future problems. In 1969 the 
regime launched an ephemeral economic reform that promised to 
increase efficiency and boost incentives by decentralizing economic 
control, allowing private enterprise greater freedom, and increas- 
ing supplies of consumer goods. Ceau§escu soon halted decentrali- 
zation, however, and renewed the effort to develop heavy industry. 

During his early years in power, Ceau§escu sought to present 
himself as a reformer and populist champion of the common man. 
Purge victims began returning home; contacts with the West mul- 
tiplied; and artists, writers, and scholars found new freedoms. In 
1968 Ceau§escu openly denounced Gheorghiu-Dej for deviating 
from party ideals during Stalin's lifetime. After consolidating power, 
however, Ceau§escu regressed. The government again disciplined 
journalists and demanded the allegiance of writers and artists to 
socialist realism. As a result of his China visit in 1971, Ceau§escu 
launched his own version of the Cultural Revolution, spawning 
volumes of sycophantic, pseudohistorical literature and suppress- 
ing dissidents. 

In the early 1970s, Ceau§escu painstakingly concentrated pow- 
er at the apex of the political pyramid. The arrest, and probable 
execution, of the Bucharest garrison's commanding officer in 1971 , 
possibly for planning to oust Ceau§escu, prompted an overhaul of 
the military and security forces. After his China trip, Ceau§escu 
removed Premier Maurer and thousands of managers and officials 
who advocated or implemented the earlier economic reform, and 
he replaced them with his proteges. In 1972 the government adopted 
the principle of cadre rotation, making the creation of power bases 
opposed to Ceau§escu impossible. In accordance with the PCR's 
claim that it had ceased being an organization of a few committed 
operatives and become a mass party "organically implanted in all 
cells of life," Ceaugescu began blending party and state structures 
and named individuals to hold dual party and state posts. In 1973 



57 



Romania: A Country Study 

Ceau§escu's wife, Elena, became a member of the Politburo, and 
in 1974 voters * 'elected" Ceausescu president of the republic. 

Dynastic Socialism and the Economic Downturn 

The Eleventh Party Congress in 1974 signaled the beginning of 
a regime based on "dynastic socialism." Ceau§escu placed mem- 
bers of his immediate family — including his wife, three brothers, 
a son, and a brother-in-law — in control of defense, internal affairs, 
planning, science and technology, youth, and party cadres. 
Hagiographers began portraying Ceau§escu as the greatest genius 
of the age and Elena as a world-renowned thinker. 

Having assumed a cloak of infallibility, Ceausescu was unchecked 
by debate on his economic initiatives. He launched monumental, 
high-risk ventures, including huge steel and petrochemical plants, 
and restarted work on the Danube-Black Sea Canal. The govern- 
ment boosted investment and redeployed laborers from agricul- 
ture to industry. Central economic controls tightened, and imports 
of foreign technology skyrocketed. 

In 1971 Romania joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, and in 1972 it became the first Comecon country to join the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and World Bank 
(see Glossary), which broadened its access to hard-currency credit 
markets. Romania also supplied doctored statistics to the UN, thereby 
gaining the status of an undeveloped country, and, after 1973, receiv- 
ing preferential treatment in trade with developed countries. 

Halfway through the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976-80), the eco- 
nomy faltered. All manpower reserves had been tapped; shortages 
of consumer goods sapped worker enthusiasm; and low labor 
productivity dulled the effectiveness of relatively modern industri- 
al facilities. After decades of growth, oil output began to decline; 
the downturn forced Romania to import oil at prices too high to 
allow its huge new petrochemical plants to operate profitably. Coal, 
electricity, and natural- gas production also fell short of plan tar- 
gets, creating chaos throughout the economy. A devastating earth- 
quake, drought, higher world interest rates, soft foreign demand 
for Romanian goods, and higher prices for petroleum imports 
pushed Romania into a balance-of-payments crisis. In 1981 Roma- 
nia followed Poland in becoming the second Comecon country to 
request rescheduling of its hard-currency debts, notifying bankers 
in a telex from Bucharest that it would make no payments on its 
arrears or on the next year's obligations without a rescheduling 
agreement. 

Ceau§escu imposed a crash program to pay off the foreign debt. 
The government cut imports, slashed domestic electricity usage, 



58 



Historical Setting 



enacted stiff penalties against hoarding, and squeezed its farms, 
factories, and refineries for exports. Ceausescu's debt-reduction 
policies caused average Romanians terrible hardship. The regime's 
demand for foodstuff exports resulted in severe shortages of bread, 
meat, fruits, and vegetables — Ceau§escu even touted a "scientif- 
ic" diet designed to benefit the populace through reduced meat 
consumption. The authorities limited families to one forty- watt bulb 
per apartment, set temperature restrictions for apartments, and 
enforced these restrictions through control squads. Slowly, however, 
Romania chipped away at its debt (see Retirement of the Foreign 
Debt, ch.3). 

Romania's foreign policy in the 1970s and early 1980s consist- 
ed of propagating its message of autonomy and noninterference 
and explicidy rejecting the "Brezhnev Doctrine," named after 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who asserted the Soviet Union's 
right to intervene in satellite countries if it perceived a threat to 
communist control or fulfillment of Warsaw Pact commitments. 
In 1972 Romania redirected its military defenses to counter possi- 
ble aggression by the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Soviet 
Union. Romania continued to express resentment for the loss of 
Bessarabia, condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
and ignored the Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olym- 
pic Games. Soviet leaders used proxy countries, especially Hun- 
gary, to criticize Romania's foreign and domestic policies, especially 
its nationalism. Romania's intensified persecution of Transylva- 
nia's Hungarians further aggravated relations with Hungary, and 
Ceau§escu's bleak human rights record eroded much of the credi- 
bility Romania had won in the late 1960s through its defiance of 
Moscow. 

Despite the population's extreme privation, at the Thirteenth 
Party Congress in November 1984 the PCR leadership again em- 
phasized order, discipline, political and cultural centralism, cen- 
tral planning, and Ceau§escu's cult of personality. By then the cult 
had gained epic dimensions. Ceau§escu had assumed the status of 
Stephen the Great's spiritual descendant and protector of Western 
civilization. In the severe winter of 1984-85, however, Bucharest's 
unlit streets were covered with deep, rutty ice and carried only a 
few trucks and buses. The authorities banned automobile traffic, 
imposed military discipline on workers in the energy field, and shut 
off heat and hot water, even in hotels and foreign embassies. Shop- 
pers queued before food stores, and restaurant patrons huddled 
in heavy coats to sip lukewarm coffee and chew fatty cold cuts. 
Although the Romanian people endured these hardships with 
traditional stoicism, a pall of hopelessness had descended on the 



59 



Romania: A Country Study 

country, and official proclamations of Romania's achievements dur- 
ing the ''golden age of Ceau§escu" had a hollow ring. 

* * * 

Still the most comprehensive history of Romania is R. W. Seton- 
Watson's History of the Roumanians, which provides detailed descrip- 
tions of the international forces shaping Romania's development 
to the end of World War I . Poignant details enhance Robert Lee 
Wolffs The Balkans in Our Time, concentrating on Romania's his- 
tory, especially from unification to the late 1940s; Rene Ristel- 
hueber's A History of the Balkan Peoples also scans the main points 
in Romania's contribution to Balkan history. The Romanian- 
Hungarian conflict over Transylvania has spawned numerous 
studies, including Keith Hitchins's clearly written The Rumanian 
National Movement in Transylvania and, from a Romanian point of 
view, Stefan Pascu's^4 History of Transylvania. Much of Vasile Par- 
van's classic Dacia is now dated, but Dumitru Berciu's Romania 
describes the pre-Roman culture of the region. Ghita Ionescu's Com- 
munism in Rumania details the communist takeover in Romania. 
William E. Crowther's The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism 
and Michael Shafir's Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society track 
postwar Romanian economic policy, Gheorghiu-Dej's defiance of 
Khrushchev, and Ceau§escu's rise to power. Trond Gilberg's ar- 
ticle "Romania's Growing Difficulties" depicts Ceau§escu's cult 
of personality and the human cost of Romania's economic poli- 
cies of the 1970s and 1980s. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



60 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Typical Romanians 



ROMANIAN SOCIETY at the close of the 1980s was the product 
of more than forty years of communist rule that had two primary 
objectives — the industrialization of the economy at all costs and 
the establishment of socialism (see Glossary). Both of these objec- 
tives forced far-reaching changes in popular values, changes 
wrought by a highly centralized government that concentrated pow- 
er in the hands of a very small political elite. This ruling elite 
brooked no opposition to its program for economic development 
and the simultaneous destruction of national values and institu- 
tions in favor of those dictated by Marxist ideology. Socialism's 
tighter political control made for more effective mobilization of the 
country's resources and, at the same time, initiated massive social 
mobility. Education, as the chief vehicle of upward mobility, was 
made widely available, and rapid economic growth created a 
tremendous expansion of opportunities. The result was a new social 
order that gave preeminence to the working class and to manual 
labor over nonmanual. 

To be sure, the monopoly of power by an elite few was in large 
part responsible for the swift modernization that took place in the 
first decades under socialism. But such political centralism was 
accompanied by cultural centralism that severely curtailed the liber- 
ties of individuals and social groups. This restriction became par- 
ticularly evident under the cult of personality that developed around 
Nicolae Ceau§escu, who dominated politics after the late 1960s. 
Later years under Ceau§escu marked Romanian society with a 
Stalinesque oppression that meant government regulation of the 
most minute aspects of daily life and growing police repression. 
In addition, largely because economic reality had been subordi- 
nated to Ceau§escu's personal political goals, the promising degree 
of modernization achieved in the early years of socialism gave way 
to an almost bizarre process of demodernization that impoverished 
the nation. This process was accompanied by increased terror and 
repression, resulting in an atomized society in which people strug- 
gled to survive by turning inward to themselves and their families. 

The regime's program of enforced austerity and resulting 
demodernization flew in the face of the greater equality and material 
wealth promised by socialism. Egalitarian values had indeed gained 
widespread popular acceptance. But even if claims of equal distri- 
bution of material benefits were true, they fell flat in light of the 
fact that there was very little to distribute. Moreover, evidence of 



63 



Romania: A Country Study 

unequal distribution abounded, as the political elite took greater 
rewards and were least affected by the deprivation their policies 
caused. Corruption was rampant, and only those who "knew some- 
one' ' and had the wherewithal to bribe the appropriate person could 
obtain even the most basic goods and services. Claims of equali- 
zation of status also were suspect. Social ranking, as developed in 
the minds of individual citizens as opposed to the hierarchy 
proclaimed and directed by the regime, decidedly preferred non- 
manual labor over manual and urban over rural occupations. In 
the late 1980s, the massive upward mobility experienced earlier 
appeared unlikely to be repeated, and society showed signs of a 
hardening stratification. Egalitarian values inculcated under socialist 
rule had created aspirations that the regime failed to meet, and 
discontent at every level of society was evidence of the growing frus- 
tration associated with that failure. 

Physical Environment 
Boundaries and Geographical Position 

With an area of 237,499 square kilometers, Romania is slightly 
smaller than the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
and is the twelfth largest country in Europe. Situated in the north- 
eastern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, the country is halfway 
between the equator and the North Pole and equidistant from the 
westernmost part of Europe — the Atlantic Coast — and the most 
easterly — the Ural Mountains. Of its 3,195 kilometers of border, 
Romania shares 1 ,332 kilometers with the Soviet Union to the east 
and north. Bulgaria lies to the south, Yugoslavia to the southwest, 
and Hungary to the west. In the southeast, 245 kilometers of Black 
Sea coastiine provide an important outlet to the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Adantic Ocean. 

Traditionally Romania is divided into several historic regions 
that no longer perform any administrative function. Dobruja (see 
Glossary) is the easternmost region, extending from the northward 
course of the Danube to the shores of the Black Sea. Moldavia (see 
Glossary) stretches from the Eastern Carpathians to the Prut River 
on the Soviet border. Walachia (see Glossary) reaches south from 
the Transylvanian Alps to the Bulgarian border and is divided by 
the Olt River into Oltenia on the west and Muntenia on the east. 
The Danube forms a natural border between Muntenia and Dobru- 
ja. The west-central region, known as Transylvania (see Glossary), 
is delimited by the arc of the Carpathians, which separates it from 
the Maramures. region in the northwest; by the Cri§ana area, which 
borders Hungary in the west; and by the Banat (see Glossary) 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



region of the southwest, which adjoins both Hungary and Yugo- 
slavia. It is these areas west of the Carpathians that contain the 
highest concentrations of the nation's largest ethnic minorities — 
Hungarians, Germans, and Serbs. 

Romania's exterior boundaries are a result of relatively recent 
events (see fig. 2). At the outbreak of World War I, the country's 
territory included only the provinces of Walachia, Moldavia, and 
Dobruja. This area, known as the Regat or the Old Kingdom, came 
into being with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 
mid-nineteenth century. At the end of World War I, Romania ac- 
quired Transylvania and the Banat. Some of this territory was lost 
during World War II, but negotiations returned it to Romania. 
Although this acquisition united some 85 percent of the Romanian- 
speaking population of Eastern Europe into one nation, it left a 
considerable number of ethnic Hungarians under Romanian rule. 
Disputes between Hungary and Romania regarding this territory 
would surface regularly, as both considered the region part of their 
national heritage. Questions were also periodically raised as to the 
historical validity of the Soviet-Romanian border. Bukovina (see 
Glossary) and Bessarabia (see Glossary), former Romanian prov- 
inces where significant percentages of the population are Romanian- 
speaking, have been part of the Soviet Union since the end of World 
War II. Despite ongoing and potential disputes, however, it was 
unlikely in 1989 that Romania's borders would be redrawn in the 
foreseeable future. 

Topography 

Romania's natural landscape (see fig. 3) is almost evenly divid- 
ed among mountains (31 percent), hills (33 percent), and plains 
(36 percent). These varied relief forms spread rather symmetri- 
cally from the Carpathian Mountains, which reach elevations of 
more than 2,400 meters, to the Danube Delta, which is just a few 
meters above sea level. 

The arc of the Carpathians extends over 1 ,000 kilometers through 
the center of the country, covering an area of 70,000 square kilo- 
meters. These mountains are of low to medium altitude and are 
no wider than 100 kilometers. They are deeply fragmented by lon- 
gitudinal and transverse valleys and crossed by several major rivers. 
These features and the fact that there are many summit passes — 
some at altitudes up to 2,256 meters — have made the Carpathians 
less of a barrier to movement than have other European ranges. 
Another distinguishing feature is the many eroded platforms that 
provide tableland at relatively high altitudes. There are permanent 
settlements here at above 1,200 meters. 



65 



Romania: A Country Study 

Romania's Carpathians are differentiated into three ranges: the 
Eastern Carpathians, the Southern Carpathians or Transylvanian 
Alps, and the Western Carpathians. Each of these ranges has im- 
portant distinguishing features. The Eastern Carpathians are com- 
posed of three parallel ridges that run from northwest to southeast. 
The westernmost ridge is an extinct volcanic range with many 
preserved cones and craters. The range has many large depressions, 
in the largest of which the city of Brasov is situated. Important mining 
and industrial centers as well as agricultural areas are found with- 
in these depressions. The Eastern Carpathians are covered with 
forests — some 32 percent of the country's woodlands are there. They 
also contain important ore deposits, including gold and silver, and 
their mineral water springs feed numerous health resorts. 

The Southern Carpathians offer the highest peaks at Moldov- 
eanu (2,544 meters) and Negoiu (2,535 meters) and more than 150 
glacial lakes. They have large grassland areas and some woodlands 
but few large depressions and subsoil resources. The region was 
crisscrossed by an ancient network of trans-Carpathian roads, and 
vestiges of the old Roman Way are still visible. Numerous passes 
and the valleys of the Olt, Jiu, and Danube rivers provide routes 
for roads and railways through the mountains. The Western Car- 
pathians are the lowest of the three ranges and are fragmented by 
many deep structural depressions. They have historically functioned 
as ' 'gates," which allow easy passage but can be readily defend- 
ed. The most famous of these is the Iron Gate on the Danube. The 
Western Carpathians are the most densely settled, and it is in the 
northernmost area of this range, the Apuseni Mountains, that per- 
manent settlements can be found at the highest altitudes. 

Enclosed within the great arc of the Carpathians lie the undulat- 
ing plains and low hills of the Transylvanian Plateau — the largest 
tableland in the country and the center of Romania. This impor- 
tant agricultural region also contains large deposits of methane gas 
and salt. To the south and east of the Carpathians, the Sub- 
Carpathians form a fringe of rolling terrain ranging from 396 to 
1,006 meters in elevation. This terrain is matched in the west 
by the slighdy lower Western Hills. The symmetry of Romania's 
relief continues with the Getic Tableland to the south of the Sub- 
Carpathians, the Moldavian Tableland in the east between the Sub- 
Carpathians and the Prut River, and the Dobrujan Tableland in 
the southeast between the Danube and the Black Sea. The Sub- 
Carpathians and the tableland areas provide good conditions for 
human setdement and are important areas for fruit growing, viti- 
culture, and other agricultural activity. They also contain large 
deposits of brown coal and natural gas. 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Beyond the Carpathian foothills and tablelands, the plains spread 
south and west. In the southern parts of the country, the lower 
Danube Plain is divided by the Olt River; east of the river lies the 
Romanian Plain, and to the west is the Oltenian or Western Plain. 
The land here is rich with chernozemic soils and forms Romania's 
most important farming region. Irrigation is widely used, and 
marshlands in the Danube's floodplain have been diked and drained 
to provide additional tillable land. 

Romania's lowest land is found on the northern edge of the 
Dobruja region in the Danube Delta. The delta is a triangular 
swampy area of marshes, floating reed islands, and sandbanks, 
where the Danube ends its trek of almost 3,000 kilometers and di- 
vides into three frayed branches before emptying into the Black 
Sea. The Danube Delta provides a large part of the country's fish 
production, and its reeds are used to manufacture cellulose. The 
region also serves as a nature preserve for rare species of plant and 
animal life including migratory birds. 

After entering the country in the southwest at Bazia§, the Danube 
travels some 1 ,000 kilometers through or along Romanian territo- 
ry, forming the southern frontier with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
Virtually all of the country's rivers are tributaries of the Danube, 
either directly or indirectly, and by the time the Danube's course 
ends in the Black Sea, they account for nearly 40 percent of the 
total discharge. The most important of these rivers are the Mure§, 
the Olt, the Prut, the Siret, the Ialomija, the Some§, and the Arge§. 
Romania's rivers primarily flow east, west, and south from the cen- 
tral crown of the Carpathians. They are fed by rainfall and melt- 
ing snow, which causes considerable fluctuation in discharge and 
occasionally catastrophic flooding. In the east, river waters are col- 
lected by the Siret and the Prut. In the south, the rivers flow directly 
into the Danube, and in the west, waters are collected by the Tis- 
za on Hungarian territory. 

The Danube is by far Romania's most important river, not only 
for transportation, but also for the production of hydroelectric pow- 
er. One of Europe's largest hydroelectric stations is located at the 
Iron Gate, where the Danube surges through the Carpathian 
gorges. The Danube is an important water route for domestic ship- 
ping, as well as international trade. It is navigable for river vessels 
along its entire Romanian course and for seagoing ships as far as 
the port of Braila. An obvious problem with the use of the Danube 
for inland transportation is its remoteness from most of the major 
industrial centers. Moreover, marshy banks and perennial flood- 
ing impede navigation in some areas. 



69 



Romania: A Country Study 
Climate 

Because of its position on the southeastern portion of the Euro- 
pean continent, Romania has a climate that is transitional between 
temperate and continental. Climatic conditions are somewhat modi- 
fied by the country's varied relief. The Carpathians serve as a bar- 
rier to Atlantic air masses, restricting their oceanic influences to 
the west and center of the country, where they make for milder 
winters and heavier rainfall. The mountains also block the continen- 
tal influences of the vast plain to the north in the Soviet Union, 
which bring frosty winters and less rain to the south and southeast. 
In the extreme southeast, Mediterranean influences offer a milder, 
maritime climate. The average annual temperature is 11°C in the 
south and 8°C in the north. In Bucharest, the temperature ranges 
from - 29°C in January to 29°C in July, with average tempera- 
tures of -3°C in January and 23°C in July. Rainfall, although 
adequate throughout the country, decreases from west to east and 
from mountains to plains. Some mountainous areas receive more 
than 1 ,010 millimeters of precipitation each year. Annual precipi- 
tation averages about 635 millimeters in central Transylvania, 521 
millimeters at Ia§i in Moldavia, and only 381 millimeters at Con- 
stanta on the Black Sea. 

Population 

Demographic History 

Romania's Carpathian-dominated relief, geographic position at 
the crossroads of major continental migration routes, and the tur- 
bulent history associated with that position adversely affected popu- 
lation development. The region had 8.9 million inhabitants in 1869, 
11.1 million in 1900, 14.3 million in 1930, 15.8 million in 1948, 
and 23.2 million in 1989. 

Annual birthrates remained as high as 40 per 1,000 well into 
the 1920s, whereas mortality rates, although declining, were still 
well above 20 per 1,000. Children under five accounted for half 
of all deaths. During the interwar years, death rates remained high, 
primarily because of infant mortality rates of 18-20 percent. In 
fact, throughout the 1930s, Romania had the highest birth, death, 
and infant mortality rates in Europe. The annual natural popula- 
tion increase fell from 14.8 per 1,000 in 1930 to 10.1 per 1,000 
in 1939. These figures conceal considerable regional variation. Bir- 
thrates in the Old Kingdom regions of Walachia and Moldavia were 
much higher than in the former Hungarian territories, which had 
already begun to decline in the nineteenth century. 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



Demographic development in the immediate postwar period con- 
tinued to show a drop in the annual growth rates. Population loss- 
es occurred through excessive mortality, reduced natality, and 
migration, not only because of World War II but also because of 
subsequent Soviet occupation. Extensive pillage by the Red Army 
and exorbitant demands for restitution by the Soviets squeezed the 
peasants, resulting in harvest failures in 1945 and 1946 and severe 
famine in 1947. In that year, 349,300 deaths were reported, com- 
pared with 248,200 the following year. A birthrate of 23.4 per 1 ,000 
and a death rate of 22 per 1 ,000 resulted in a very low natural in- 
crease of 1.4 per 1,000, the lowest ever recorded in Romania's 
tumultuous history. In the 1950s, recovery from the war brought 
the birthrate up to 25.6 per 1 ,000 and the death rate down sharply 
to 9.9 per 1,000. In 1955 the annual natural rate of increase was 
15.9 per 1,000. Again, there were significant regional variations, 
with Moldavia, Dobruja, and parts of Transylvania showing a 
higher increase, whereas the Cri§ana and Banat regions showed 
very little growth and in some cases even declined. 

From a peak of 15.9 per 1,000 in 1955, the rate of natural in- 
crease declined rapidly to 6.1 per 1,000 in 1966. Several factors 
combined to produce this slump, not least of all a law introduced 
in 1957 that provided abortion on demand. Access to free abor- 
tion, coupled with the scarcity of contraceptives and the fact that 
society did not generally condemn it, made abortion the primary 
means of fertility control. After the 1957 law was enacted, abor- 
tions soon outnumbered live births by a wide margin, with the ratio 
of abortions to live births reaching four to one by 1965. It was not 
unusual for a woman to terminate as many as twenty or more preg- 
nancies by abortion. 

It was not the easy access to abortion, however, but the reasons 
behind the decision not to bear children that contributed most to 
falling birthrates. During this period, a virtual transformation of 
society was under way. Education levels rose dramatically, and ur- 
banization and industrialization proceeded at a breakneck pace. 
As they had in other countries, these developments brought lower 
fertility rates. Women were staying in school longer and putting 
off having children. Urban areas, where the decline in birthrates 
was most pronounced, provided cramped and overcrowded hous- 
ing conditions that were not conducive to the large families of the 
past. Moreover, communist ideology emphasized the equal par- 
ticipation of women in socialist production as the only road to full 
equality. Industrialization brought more and more women into the 
work force, not only for ideological reasons, but also to ease rising 



71 



Romania: A Country Study 

labor shortages. Fewer and fewer women made the decision to take 
on the double burden of a full work week and raising children. 

Demographic Policy 

With a political system in place that made long-range planning 
the cornerstone of economic growth, demographic trends took on 
particular significance. As development proceeded, so did disturbing 
demographic consequences. It soon became apparent that the coun- 
try was approaching zero population growth, which carried alarm- 
ing implications for future labor supplies for further industrialization. 
The government responded in 1966 with a decree that prohibited 
abortion on demand and introduced other pronatalist policies to 
increase birthrates. The decree stipulated that abortion would be 
allowed only when pregnancy endangered the life of a woman or 
was the result of rape or incest, or if the child was likely to have 
a congenital disease or deformity. Also an abortion could be per- 
formed if the woman was over forty-five years of age or had given 
birth to at least four children who remained under her care. Any 
abortion performed for any other reason became a criminal offense, 
and the penal code was revised to provide penalties for those who 
sought or performed illegal abortions. 

Other punitive policies were introduced. Men and women who re- 
mained childless after the age of twenty-five, whether married or 
single, were liable for a special tax amounting to between 10 and 
20 percent of their income. The government also targeted the ris- 
ing divorce rates and made divorce much more difficult. By gov- 
ernment decree, a marriage could be dissolved only in exceptional 
cases. The ruling was rigidly enforced, as only 28 divorces were al- 
lowed nationwide in 1967, compared with 26,000 the preceding year. 

Some pronatalist policies were introduced that held out the car- 
rot instead of the stick. Family allowances paid by the state were 
raised, with each child bringing a small increase. Monetary awards 
were granted to mothers beginning with the birth of the third child. 
In addition, the income tax rate for parents of three or more chil- 
dren was reduced by 30 percent. 

Because contraceptives were not manufactured in Romania, and 
all legal importation of them had stopped, the sudden unavailabil- 
ity of abortion made birth control extremely difficult. Sex had tradi- 
tionally been a taboo subject, and sex education, even in the 1980s, 
was practically nonexistent. Consequently the pronatalist policies 
had an immediate impact, with the number of live births rising 
from 273,687 in 1966 to 527,764 in 1967— an increase of 92.8 per- 
cent. Legal abortions fell just as dramatically with only 52,000 per- 
formed in 1967 as compared to more than 1 million in 1965. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



This success was due in part to the presence of police in hospi- 
tals to ensure that no illegal abortions would be performed. But 
the policy's initial success was marred by rising maternal and in- 
fant mortality rates closely associated with the restrictions on abor- 
tion. 

The increase in live births was short-lived. After the police 
returned to more normal duties, the number of abortions catego- 
rized as legal rose dramatically, as did the number of spontaneous 
abortions. The material incentives provided by the state, even when 
coupled with draconian regulation and coercion, were not enough 
to sustain an increase in birthrates, which again began to decline. 
As the rate of population growth declined, the government con- 
tinued efforts to increase birthrates. In 1974 revisions in the labor 
code attempted to address the problem by granting special al- 
lowances for pregnant women and nursing mothers, giving them 
a lighter work load that excluded overtime and hazardous work 
and allowed time off to care for children without loss of benefits. 

The Ceau§escu regime took more aggressive steps in the 1980s. 
By 1983 the birthrate had fallen to 14.3 per 1,000, the rate of an- 
nual increase in population had dipped to 3.7 per 1,000, and the 
number of abortions (421,386) again exceeded the number of live 
births (321,489). Ceau§escu complained that only some 9 percent 
of the abortions performed had the necessary medical justification. 
In 1 984 the legal age for marriage was lowered to fifteen years for 
women, and additional taxes were levied on childless individuals 
over twenty-five years of age. Monthly gynecological examinations 
for all women of childbearing age were instituted, even for pubes- 
cent girls, to identify pregnancies in the earliest stages and to mo- 
nitor pregnant women to ensure that their pregnancies came to 
term. Miscarriages were to be investigated and illegal abortions 
prosecuted, resulting in prison terms of one year for the women 
concerned and up to five years for doctors and other medical per- 
sonnel performing the procedure. Doctors and nurses involved in 
gynecology came under increasing pressure, especially after 1985, 
when ' 'demographic command units" were set up to ensure that 
all women were gynecologically examined at their place of work. 
These units not only monitored pregnancies and ensured deliver- 
ies but also investigated childless women and couples, asked detailed 
questions about their sex lives and the general health of their 
reproductive systems, and recommended treatment for infertility. 

Furthermore, by 1985 a woman had to have had five children, 
with all five still under her care, or be more than forty-five years 
old to qualify for an abortion. Even when an abortion was legally 
justified, after 1985 a party representative had to be present to 



73 



Romania: A Country Study 

authorize and supervise the procedure. Other steps to increase 
material incentives to have children included raising taxes for child- 
less individuals, increasing monthly allowances to families with chil- 
dren by 27 percent, and giving bonuses for the birth of the second 
and third child. 

Although government expenditures on material incentives rose 
by 470 percent between 1967 and 1983, the birthrate actually 
decreased during that time by 40 percent. After 1983, despite the 
extreme measures taken by the regime to combat the decline, there 
was only a slight increase, from 14.3 to 15.5 per 1,000 in 1984 
and 16 per 1,000 in 1985. After more than two decades of draco- 
nian anti-abortion regulation and expenditures for material incen- 
tives that by 1985 equalled half the amount budgeted for defense, 
Romanian birthrates were only a fraction higher than those rates 
in countries permitting abortion on demand. 

Romanian demographic policies continued to be unsuccess- 
ful largely because they ignored the relationship of socioeconomic 
development and demographics. The development of heavy indus- 
try captured most of the country's investment capital and left little 
for the consumer goods sector. Thus the woman's double bur- 
den of child care and full-time work was not eased by consumer 
durables that save time and labor in the home. The debt crisis of 
the 1980s reduced the standard of living to that of a Third World 
country, as Romanians endured rationing of basic food items and 
shortages of other essential household goods, including diapers. 
Apartments were not only overcrowded and cramped, but often 
unheated. In the face of such bleak conditions, increased material 
incentives that in 1985 amounted to approximately 3.61 lei (for 
value of the leu — see Glossary) per child per day — enough to buy 
43 grams of preserved milk — were not enough to overcome the 
reluctance of Romanian women to bear children. 

In 1989 abortion remained the only means of fertility control 
available to an increasingly desperate population. The number of 
quasi-legal abortions continued to rise, as women resorted to 
whatever means necessary to secure permission for the procedure. 
Women who failed to get official approval were forced to seek ille- 
gal abortions, which could be had for a carton of Kent cigarettes. 

Despite the obvious reluctance of women to bear children because 
of socioeconomic conditions, the Ceau§escu regime continued its 
crusade to raise birthrates, using a somewhat more subliminal ap- 
proach. In 1986 mass media campaigns were launched, extolling 
the virtues of the large families of the past and of family life in gener- 
al. Less subtle were the pronouncements that procreation was the 
patriotic duty and moral obligation of all citizens. The campaign 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



called for competition among judeje (counties, see Glossary) for the 
highest birthrates and even encouraged single women to have chil- 
dren despite the fact that illegitimacy carried a considerable social 
stigma. 

The new approach, like previous attempts, met with little suc- 
cess. In early 1988, demographic policies were again on the politi- 
cal drawing board, as the Political Executive Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party (PCR, see Glossary) ordered the 
Ministry of Health to produce a "concrete program" for increas- 
ing the birthrate. The regime's drastic and even obsessive response 
to the low birthrates appears to have been unwarranted. Death rates 
steadily declined during this period, and in 1965, when the cru- 
sade began, there was little evidence of an impending demographic 
crisis. Romania's rate of natural population increase of 6 per 1 ,000 
was considerably higher than that of the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany) at 3 per 1,000 and Hungary's 2.4 per 
1,000. In 1984 Romania compared even more favorably with a 
rate of natural increase of 3.9 per 1,000 as opposed to East Ger- 
many's 0.4 and Hungary's -2 per 1,000. 

Settlement Structure 

Romania's population, which reached 23 million in 1987, was 
distributed quite unevenly across the country. In 1985 some 56 
percent of the population lived on the plains, where population den- 
sity exceeded 150 inhabitants per square kilometer. The national 
average was about 92 inhabitants per square kilometer. Some 38 
percent lived in the hilly regions, mostly in the foothills of the Car- 
pathians. The mountainous regions had the lowest density, although 
many of the country's earliest settiements were built in the higher 
elevations of the Sub-Carpathian depressions adjoining the moun- 
tains, which offered protection from invaders. Until relatively re- 
centiy, population densities were higher in the Carpathian foothills 
of Walachia than on the plains themselves. In addition to the thin- 
ly populated mountains, the waterlogged region of Dobruja con- 
tinued to have a low population density, with fewer than fifty 
inhabitants per square kilometer. 

Traditional Settlement Patterns 

Romania remained a predominandy rural country until well after 
World War II, with most of the population living in villages and 
working in agriculture. Just before the war, more than 15,000 vil- 
lages were spread out over the territory between the Danube Del- 
ta and the Carpathians, where more than three-quarters of the 
population resided. Many of the villages were little changed by 



75 



Romania: A Country Study 

contemporary events, at least in appearance, and continued to be 
categorized into three types, depending on the terrain they occupied. 
Village settlements on the plains tended to be large and concen- 
trated; most were involved in agriculture, primarily in cultivating 
cereals and raising livestock. In the hilly regions, settlements were 
more scattered. Here the main activities were fruit and wine produc- 
tion, and homesteads were generally surrounded by vineyards and 
orchards. At higher altitudes, settiements were mainly involved in 
raising livestock and in lumbering, and the villages were even more 
dispersed. 

Romania's first urban settlements were founded by the Greeks 
on the Black Sea Coast at Tomi (now Constanta) and Kallatis (now 
Mangalia). Roman occupation brought urban settlements to the 
plains and mountains, and many towns were founded on ancient 
Dacian setdement sites. These towns were situated at strategic and 
commercial vantage points, and their importance endured long after 
the Romans had departed. Cluj-Napoca, Alba-Iulia, and Drobeta- 
Turnu Severin are among the major cities with Dacian roots and 
Roman development. During the Middle Ages, as trade between 
the Black Sea and Central Europe developed, a number of settle- 
ments grew into important trade centers, including Bra§ov, Sibiu, 
and Bucharest. 

Despite some ancient urban roots, most of Romania's urban de- 
velopment came late. In 1948 only three cities had more than 
100,000 inhabitants, and the total urban population was only 3.7 
million. By 1970 thirteen cities had populations of more than 
100,000, the population of Bucharest alone had increased by some 
507,000, and the total urban population had reached 8.2 million. 
The urban population increased from 23.4 percent of the total popu- 
lation in 1948 to 41 percent in 1970. 

This increased urbanization was not simply a consequence of 
the development of nonagricultural activities; for the most part it 
was centrally directed by the PCR under the guiding influence of 
Marxist concepts. According to Marxism, urbanization has im- 
portant intrinsic value that aids in the creation of a socialist socie- 
ty, and urban areas are economically, socially, and culturally 
superior. Urbanization based on the development of industry ena- 
bles the state to transform society and eradicate the differences be- 
tween rural and urban life. 

Romanian urbanization did not result in a large number of new 
cities spread evenly throughout the country. Although the num- 
ber of cities rose from 183 in 1956 to 236 in 1977, and the propor- 
tion of the population living in urban areas increased to 47 percent, 
most of this growth came in the old towns, some of which doubled, 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



tripled, and even quadrupled their prewar populations. Bucharest 
far exceeded all other cities in growth and by 1975 was approach- 
ing 2 million inhabitants — 19.9 percent of the total urban popula- 
tion. Meanwhile the number of cities with populations of more than 
100,000 had grown to eighteen, accounting for another 35.7 per- 
cent of the urban population. Thus by 1978 more than half of the 
country's total urban population lived in just 19 of Romania's 236 
urban areas. 

Rural-Urban Migration 

Romania's cities swelled not from natural increase but from 
migration. Already by 1966, almost one-third of the population 
resided in places where they had not been born, and fully 60 per- 
cent of the residents of the seven largest cities had been born else- 
where. Collectivization cut ties to the land, forcing the young and 
able-bodied to factories in the major cities (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 
Industrialization proceeded apace, focusing on rapid accumula- 
tion and quick return on investment, thus favoring towns with plants 
and infrastructure already in place. During the period from 1968 
to 1973, nearly 2 million people migrated from one location to 
another, with rural-urban migrants a clear two-thirds majority. 

Although the rate of natural increase in urban places continued 
to be largely insignificant, migrant-based urban growth was sus- 
tained, and rural areas lost population. Net population loss in the 
countryside grew from 6.3 per 1,000 in 1968 to 9.8 per 1,000 in 
1973. Most of the movement was intraregional, drawing people 
away from small villages in the mountains and agricultural areas 
in the southern and western plains. Migration losses were particu- 
larly heavy in Moldavia, Muntenia, and Maramure§. 

Attempts to control migration to major cities were made as ear- 
ly as the early 1950s. With the advent of communist power, all 
Romanians fourteen years of age or older were issued identity cards, 
which indicated place of residence. Subsequently, restrictions were 
placed on establishing legal residence in the larger towns. To take 
up residence in any new place, it became necessary to obtain a visa 
from the local police. Only a few reasons could justify the issuance 
of the necessary visa. Work could suffice as a reason to move to 
a "closed city" only if the applicant's commuting distance exceeded 
thirty kilometers — and then only if a legal resident of that city could 
not be found to fill the position. A few family- associated reasons 
were considered valid. Newly married couples could obtain visas 
if one of the spouses had been a legal resident before marriage. 
Dependent children were permitted to join their parents, and 



77 



Romania: A Country Study 

until the 1980s, pensioners could move in with their children. Later, 
the elderly were prevented from joining their children. 

Government restrictions, however, were not effective in control- 
ling migration to the large closed cities. On the contrary, official 
estimates of population growth in those cities during the 1966-77 
period, as compared to growth actually realized, suggest an amazing 
lack of awareness, much less direct control of population move- 
ments. Predictions for 1977 populations in those cities, based on 
1966 census data adjusted for births, deaths, and registered migra- 
tion, were in every case underestimated — on the average by 14 per- 
cent. The population of Bucharest, where one might expect the 
most effective control, was underestimated by some 200,000 in- 
habitants. 

Systematization: A Settlement Strategy 

Romania's extremely uneven development became increasing- 
ly problematic. From an ideological standpoint, the growing dis- 
parity between rural and urban life was unacceptable. And 
uncontrolled rural-urban migration placed considerable strain on 
the cities, and left the countryside with an agricultural work force 
composed increasingly of women, the elderly, and children. 

The government responded in 1972 with a program for rural 
resettlement aimed at stemming the tide to the cities by extending 
modern facilities into the countryside, where a network of new in- 
dustrial enterprises was to be established. With the ultimate goal 
of a "multilaterally developed socialist society," this ambitious pro- 
gram, called "systematization," was to dramatically change the face 
of rural Romania. Officially initiated in 1974, the program called 
for doubling the number of cities by 1990. Some 550 villages were 
selected to receive money and materials necessary for their conver- 
sion to urban industrial centers. The program called for investments 
in schools, medical clinics, new housing, and new industry. 

At the same time, plans were made for the remainder of the coun- 
try's 13,000 villages. Here the traditional setdement pattern present- 
ed obstacles to plans for modernization. The majority of these 
villages had fewer than 1 ,000 inhabitants, and many had fewer than 
500, while plans for rural resettlement set the optimal village popu- 
lation at 3,000 — the number of inhabitants necessary to warrant 
expenditures for housing and services. Accordingly, villages with 
few prospects for growth were labeled "irrational" and "nonvia- 
ble." In the 1970s, some 3,000 villages in this category were 
to be minimally serviced and gradually phased out, and others were 
scheduled to be forcibly dissolved and relocated. The rural popu- 
lation would then be concentrated in the "viable" villages, where 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



plans for modernization and industrialization could be more 
effectively implemented and investments in infrastructure more 
profitably used. 

Although systematization plans were drawn up for virtually every 
locality, implementation proceeded slowly, presumably because of 
lack of funds. The determination of the Ceau§escu regime to pay 
off the foreign debt deprived the country of investment capital. Even 
before the debt crisis, little money had been allocated for the sys- 
tematization program. Construction in rural areas declined sharply 
after peaking in 1960. In 1979 only 10 percent of all new housing 
was built in the countryside, and in the 1980s even less progress 
was made. Official projections had predicted that by 1985 Roma- 
nia's population would have reached 25 million, of which 65 per- 
cent would live in urban places, with the increase in urbanization 
a result of the systematization program. In fact population had 
grown to only 23 million by 1987, and of that number only 51 per- 
cent lived in urban places. Thus, despite predictions that 365 new 
towns would be created by 1980 and another 500 by 1985, no new 
towns were declared during that time. 

The mid-1980s brought renewed commitment to systematiza- 
tion. Some villages on the outskirts of Bucharest were destroyed, 
ostensibly to make way for projects such as the Bucharest-Danube 
Canal and airport expansion. Meanwhile about eight square kilo- 
meters in the heart of Bucharest were destroyed, leveling some of 
the nation's finest architectural heritage. Monasteries, ancient 
churches, and historic buildings were razed, and some 40,000 people 
were forced to leave their homes with only a twenty-four-hour no- 
tice. This was done to clear a path for the Victory of Socialism 
Boulevard, which would include a public square where half a mil- 
lion people could assemble and a mammoth Palace of Government 
glorifying Ceau§escu's rule. 

Although lack of capital appeared to limit the renewed interest 
in systematization primarily to the Bucharest area, plans for na- 
tionwide rural resettlement were merely postponed and not can- 
celed. The number of villages scheduled to be destroyed, whether 
gradually by forced depopulation or more abrupdy by razing, rose 
from the 3,000 initially proposed in 1974 to between 7,000 and 
8,000 in 1988. The citizens resented the rural resettlement pro- 
gram for its drastic social and cultural consequences and for the 
huge financial burden that even its limited implementation had al- 
ready imposed. 

An especially controversial aspect of systematization was the the- 
ory that concentrating the rural population would promote more 
efficient use of agricultural land. New housing in rural areas after 



79 



Romania: A Country Study 

1974 was subject to strict regulations. Villages were to be struc- 
tured like towns, with construction of housing concentrated within 
specified perimeters. The buildings had to be at least two stories 
high, and surrounding lots were restricted to 250 meters. Private 
lots for agriculture were to be moved outside the settlement 
perimeter, diminishing the ability of the village populations to 
produce their own food, as they were required by law to do after 
1981. Moreover, because private plots produced much of the na- 
tion's fruits, vegetables, and meat, full implementation of systemati- 
zation would have jeopardized the food supply for the entire 
country. 

The international community, particularly Hungary and West 
Germany, criticized systematization as a blatant attempt to forci- 
bly assimilate national minorities. Each village escaping systemati- 
zation was to have a civic center, often referred to as a "Song to 
Romania House of Culture." These institutions promised to be 
useful tools for indoctrination and mobilization and were appar- 
ently intended to replace churches as the focal point of communi- 
ty life. By 1989 many churches had already been destroyed, and 
no plans for rebuilding were evident. The destruction of churches 
and villages not only severed cultural and historic links to the past, 
but also threatened community bonds and group autonomy. Much 
of the international criticism of systematization deplored the in- 
vestment in such a grandiose scheme amidst rapidly deteriorating 
living conditions, which had been on a downward spiral since the 
1970s. The Victory of Socialism Boulevard was replete with irony 
as the 1980s witnessed serious food shortages and an energy crisis 
that prolonged the disparity between urban and rural Romania. 

Ethnic Structure 

Romania derives much of its ethnic diversity from its geographic 
position astride major continental migration routes. According to 
1987 data, 89.1 percent of the population is Romanian, and more 
than twenty separate ethnic minorities account for the remaining 
10.9 percent. Although many of these minorities are small groups, 
the Hungarian minority of about 1 . 7 million — estimated by some 
Western experts at 2-2.5 million — represents 7.8 percent of the 
total population and is the largest national minority in Europe. The 
next largest component of the population is the ethnic Germans, 
who constitute up to 1.5 percent of the total population. There are 
also significant numbers of Ukrainians, Serbs, and Croats, as well 
as a Jewish minority estimated by Western observers at between 
20,000 and 25,000. Although not officially recognized as a distinct 
ethnic minority, there is a sizable Gypsy population. The 1977 



80 



IIP 

Rechanneled and deepened Dimbovifa River, one of many 1980s 
projects transforming the landscape of central Bucharest 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 

census documented only 230,000, but some Western estimates put 
the Gypsy element at between 1 million and 2 million, suggesting 
that Gypsies might be actually the second largest minority after 
the Hungarians. 

Historical and Geographical Distribution 

In the region of the Old Kingdom, the population has tradition- 
ally been fairly homogeneous, with many areas 100 percent Roma- 
nian. The notable exceptions are Dobruja and the major towns 
in northern Moldavia, as well as Bucharest. Dobruja was an eth- 
nic melting pot, where in the 1980s the Romanian component was 
estimated at less than 50 percent; it also had large representations 
of Bulgarians, Tatars, Russians, and Turks. Most of the Jewish 
population settled in Moldavia, first arriving from Poland and 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century. By 1912 
there were some 240,000 Jews in the Old Kingdom region alone. 
At that time they constituted a majority in the ten northernmost 
towns of Moldavia. Some of the dwindling Jewish population con- 
tinued to live in that region in the late 1980s — scattered in small 
communities of less than 2,000, including some as small as 30-40 
members. The largest segment of the Jewish population — some 
17,000 people — lived in Bucharest, as did approximately 200,000 



81 



Romania: A Country Study 

Hungarians and a large number of Gypsies, who had given up their 
nomadic lifestyle. 

Historically the most ethnically diverse regions were the former 
Hungarian territories in the northwest, which encompass more than 
one-third of Romania's total area, stretching from the deep curve 
of the Carpathians to the borders of Hungary and Yugoslavia (see 
fig. 4). This part of Romania, most often referred to simply as Tran- 
sylvania, in fact also includes the Maramure§, Cri§ana, and Banat 
regions. These areas were settled by two distinct Hungarian groups — 
the Magyars and the Szeklers. The Magyars arrived in 896, and short- 
ly thereafter the Szeklers were settled in southeastern Transylva- 
nia. Although they were of peasant origins, Szeklers were never 
serfs and in fact enjoyed a fair amount of feudal autonomy. Many 
were granted nobility by the Hungarian king as a reward for mili- 
tary service. Awareness of a separate status for the Szeklers still 
exists among other Hungarians and Szeklers alike. The Szeklers 
are regarded as the best of the Hungarian nation; the form of Hun- 
garian they speak is considered to be the purest and most pleasant. 
These two groups are further differentiated by their religion, as most 
Szeklers are Calvinist or Unitarian, whereas the majority of Hun- 
garians are Roman Catholic. Despite cultural distinctions, Szek- 
lers, numbering between 600,000 and 700,000, consider themselves 
to be of purely Hungarian nationality. 

The ethnic German component of the population is also con- 
centrated in Transylvania and is divided into two distinct groups — 
the Saxons and the Swabians. The Saxons arrived in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries at the invitation of the Hungarian kings. 
They came primarily from the Rhineland (and so were actually 
not Saxons but Franks) and setded in fairly compact areas in the 
south and east of Transylvania. Like the Szeklers, the Saxons were 
frontier people tasked with defending the region against Turks and 
Tatars. They were granted a fair degree of political autonomy and 
control over their internal affairs. In addition, they were given a 
land base over which they had complete administrative authority. 
The area, known as Sachsenboden (Saxon Land), was a sort of 
national preserve, which was protected from political encroachment 
by other groups. This circumstance, coupled with their early 
predominance in small-scale trade and commerce, established the 
Saxons in a superordinate position, which helped to ensure their 
ethnic survival in a poly ethnic environment. 

Although there were no large exclusively German enclaves to 
sustain group solidarity, they were the dominant group in many 
areas, and cities founded on Saxon trade emerged with a distinc- 
tively German character. By far the most important factor in the 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



preservation of their ethnic identity was their adoption of the Luther- 
an religion in the mid-sixteenth century. Subsequendy, Saxon com- 
munity life was dominated by the Lutheran Church, which 
controlled education through parochial schools in the villages. Few 
Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania converted to Luther- 
anism. The church became a cultural link to Germany and re- 
mained so until after World War II. Thus for centuries the Saxons 
of Transylvania were fairly well insulated both politically and cul- 
turally from their Hungarian and Romanian neighbors. 

The Swabians, who are the German population in the Banat 
region, contrast sharply with the Saxons. They arrived in Roma- 
nia much later — in the eighteenth century — from the Wiirttem- 
berg area. They were settled in the Banat by the Austrians and 
have traditionally been involved in agriculture. Unlike the Sax- 
ons, they did not convert to Lutheranism but remained Catholic. 

The Magyars politically dominated Transylvania until the 
nineteenth century, despite the fact that Romanians constituted 
the majority. Although the Saxons and Szeklers were permitted 
local administrative autonomy, the Hungarian nobility filled the 
main political and administrative positions. In contrast, the Roma- 
nian majority formed a distinct underclass. They were much less 
urbanized than the Hungarians or Germans. Most were peasants, 
and the majority of those were enserfed and had little or no formal 
education. Furthermore, whereas most of Transylvania's Hungar- 
ians and Germans are Roman Catholic or Protestant and are there- 
by more Western-oriented, the great majority of Romanians belong 
to the Eastern Orthodox Church. 

The ethnic Gordian knot of Transylvania, intricately bound with 
several religious affiliations and complicated by separate social and 
economic niches, was made even more complex by the desire of 
both Hungary and Romania to control and claim the region. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, while Romanians in the Old 
Kingdom continued to strive for unification of the three Romani- 
an lands — Moldavia, Walachia, and Transylvania — their brethren 
across the Carpathians were the primary target of a Magyariza- 
tion policy that aspired to integrate Transylvania into Hungary. 

The unification of Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania 
in 1918 deeply affected the region's ethnic structure. Approximately 
one-fifth of the Magyar population departed immediately for Hun- 
gary, and those ethnic Hungarians who remained had their land 
expropriated and redistributed to Romanian peasants. Hungari- 
an administrative and political dominance was swept aside, and 
a Romanian bureaucracy was installed. At the same time — and 



83 



Romania: A Country Study 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




A 



j 




Hungarian Share of Total Population 
^0-10% [1 25-50% | J| 75-1 00% 

□ 



10-25% 



50-75% 



— International boundary 

— Transylvania boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 

50 100 Kilometers 



Figure 4. Ethnic Hungarian Minority in Romania in the 1980s 



perhaps the most shattering blow — Romanian replaced Hungari- 
an as the official language of the region. 

The position of the German population in Transylvania was 
much less immediately damaged. Although the Saxons did even- 
tually lose their communal land holdings, their private property 
was not confiscated. In Saxon enclaves, they retained control over 
education and internal affairs as well as cultural associations and 
still held economic advantages. The ability of the Germans to main- 
tain their ethnic identity was not seriously hampered until after 
World War II, when all Germans were retroactively declared mem- 
bers of the Nazi Party. On that basis, they were initially excluded 
from the National Minorities Statute of 1945, which guaranteed 
equal rights to Hungarians and other ethnic minorities. A consider- 
able portion of the German population — about 100,000 — fled 
to Germany or Austria as the German forces retreated in 1944. 
Some 75,000 Romanian Germans were subsequently deported to 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



war- reparations labor camps in the Soviet Union. Many died there 
and many, rather than return to Romania after their release, chose 
Germany or Austria instead. By 1950 the ethnic German element 
was half its prewar level, and those German Romanians who did 
stay suffered the immediate expropriation of their lands and busi- 
ness enterprises. Some 30,000 Swabians from the Banat region were 
resettled to the remote eastern Danube Plain. Moreover, the re- 
maining German population, like all other national minorities, 
began the struggle for ethnic survival against a new force, as com- 
munist power was consolidated. 

National Minorities under Communist Rule 

Although shifts in Romania's ethnic structure can be attributed 
to several factors, the most far-reaching changes occurred at the 
behest of the PCR, which subscribed to the Marxist belief in the 
primacy of class over nation. Marxist theory claims not only that 
national identity is subordinate to class identity, but also that as 
class consciousness rises, nationalism and nations will disappear. 
The practical problem of how to deal with nationalities in a mul- 
tinational state until the class consciousness of socialism eradicates 
them was addressed not by Karl Marx but by Vladimir Lenin. A 
pragmatic response to the reality of national minorities in the Soviet 
Union, Lenin's nationalities policy is often summarized in the 
phrase "national in form, socialist in content." The policy essen- 
tially permitted national minorities to be separate in terms of lan- 
guage, education, and culture as long as they adhered to the principles 
of socialism and did not pose a political threat. Romania's national 
minorities at the outset of communist rule were seemingly well served 
by the Leninist approach. The Constitution provided them equal rights 
in "all fields of economic, political, juridical, social, and cultural life" 
and specifically guaranteed free use of their native language and the 
right to education at all levels in their mother tongue. 

The large Hungarian minority received special attention with the 
establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in 1952. Like 
many other generous provisions for nationalities, however, this con- 
cession turned out to be essentially an empty gesture and masked 
the true nature of relations between the state and minorities. The 
region was never home to more than one-quarter of Romania's Hun- 
garian population, and it had no more autonomy than did other 
administrative provinces. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Hun- 
garian Revolution of 1956, even this autonomy was curtailed. In 
1960 directives from Bucharest reorganized and renamed the prov- 
ince so that its Hungarian nature was even further reduced. The 
territorial reorganization, by adding purely Romanian inhabited 



85 



Romania: A Country Study 

areas and excluding Hungarian enclaves, increased the Romani- 
an element in the province from 20 to 35 percent and reduced the 
Hungarian presence from 77 to 62 percent. The name was changed 
to Mures. Autonomous Hungarian Region and thereafter was most 
often referred to simply as the Mures. Region. 

In 1965, concomitant with Ceau§escu's rise to first secretary 
of the Partidul Muncitoresc Roman (PMR — Romanian Work- 
ers' Party), a new Constitution proclaimed Romania a socialist uni- 
tary state. Thereafter, the country's multinational character was 
largely ignored, and the problem of cohabiting nationalities of- 
ficially was considered resolved. In 1968 the regime eliminated 
the Autonomous Hungarian Region outright. The regime main- 
tained the appearance of minority representation at all levels of 
government, and official statistics showed that the proportion of 
people from ethnic minority communities employed in government 
duly reflected their numbers. In reality, minorities had little real 
power or influence. At the local level, minority representatives, 
who were generally quite Romanianized, were mistrusted by their 
constituents. Ironically, although these spokespersons were rou- 
tinely handpicked by the PCR, their loyalty to the regime was often 
suspected. The ethnic composition of the party itself was a more 
accurate reflection of minority participation and representation. 

From the start of communist rule, large numbers of ethnic Roma- 
nians joined the party, and their share of total membership rose 
steadily over the years, increasing from 79 percent in 1955 to almost 
90 percent in the early 1980s. Although the regime claimed that 
minority membership and representation in the people's councils 
and the Grand National Assembly were commensurate with their 
size, minorities were largely excluded from policy-making bodies 
on both the local and national levels (see Central Government, ch. 
4). Even in areas where Hungarians represented a sizable portion 
of the population — Timi§, Arad, and MaramuresjW^ — few were 
found in local PCR bureaus. At the national level, the most powerful 
positions in the critical foreign affairs, defense, and interior minis- 
tries were reserved for ethnic Romanians, and minorities were con- 
signed to rubber-stamp institutions. 

Ostensibly representing minority interests, workers' councils were 
established for Hungarian, German, Serbian, and Ukrainian 
citizens. These bodies operated within the framework of the Front 
of Socialist Unity and Democracy and were under the constant su- 
pervision of the PCR Central Committee Secretariat, which funded 
their budgets. The councils had neither headquarters nor office 
hours, and their sole function appeared to be praising the regime's 



86 



Countryside in Saxon German region of Transylvania 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 

treatment of national minorities. Significantly, when the councils 
did meet, business was conducted in Romanian. 

Nation-Building and National Minorities 

Even before Ceau§escu came to power, PCR leaders had taken 
a nationalistic, anti- Soviet stance, which was important for main- 
taining the legitimacy of the regime. During the first decade of 
Soviet-imposed communist rule, the population suffered the mis- 
ery of expropriations, the disruptions of rapid industrialization and 
forced collectivization, and the Sovietization of society. The result 
was an increasing bitterness toward the Soviet Union and the PCR 
itself, which was directly controlled by Moscow. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, as de-Stalinization and a more liberal atmosphere 
prevailed in Moscow, PCR leaders asserted their independence by 
ousting pro-Soviet members and refusing to accept Soviet plans 
to make Romania the "breadbasket" for the more industrialized 
Comecon (see Glossary) countries (see Historical Setting, ch. 1). 

As Ceausescu assumed power, the campaign for self-determina- 
tion and de- Sovietization was accompanied by increasing Romani- 
an nationalism in domestic policy. Fervent emphasis on Romanian 
language, history, and culture, designed to enhance Ceaugescu's 
popularity among the Romanian majority, continued unabated in- 
to the 1980s. In 1976 the PCR launched a nationwide campaign 



87 



Romania: A Country Study 

dedicated to the glorification of the Romanian homeland — the 
"Hymn to Romania." All nationalities were expected to join the 
fete, which placed the Hungarian and German minorities of Tran- 
sylvania in a grievous predicament. The campaign aimed to re- 
move all traces of German and Hungarian territorial identification. 
In cities that had already been Romanianized, monuments and 
artifacts representing links to the Hungarian or Saxon past were 
all but eliminated, bilingual inscriptions were removed, and 
streets — and in some cases, cities themselves — were renamed to 
emphasize Romanian roots. Thus Turnu Severin became Drobeta- 
Turnu Severin, and Cluj — Transylvania's most important Hun- 
garian city — was renamed Cluj-Napoca. 

Given the socioeconomic structure of precommunist Transyl- 
vania, when Hungarians and Germans were much more urbanized 
and economically advanced than the mostly peasant Romanian 
majority, the changes wrought by the modernization program 
negatively affected the position of the minorities. As the needs of 
industrialization brought more and more peasants from the coun- 
tryside to the factories, the ethnic composition of Transylvania's 
urban places shifted. Romanians became the growing majority in 
cities that had long been Hungarian and German enclaves. These 
changes were not solely the result of natural migration, but were 
carefully engineered by the state. Secret internal regulations or- 
dered major minority centers such as Cluj, Oradea, and Arad to 
be virtually sealed off to the largest ethnic minorities and encouraged 
their outmigration while directing an influx of ethnic Romanians. 

Population shifts were engendered under the guise of multilateral 
development, the party's byword for building socialism. The stat- 
ed goal was equalization of regional development, and statistical 
data were often cited to show that investments in underdeveloped 
minority-inhabited areas were made in an effort to bring them up 
to the national average. Minorities — particularly the Hungarians — 
claimed, however, that economic growth did not provide training 
and jobs for them but served as a pretext for the massive influx 
of ethnic Romanian workers. Thus, whereas ethnic Hungarians 
had to leave their homeland to find employment in the Old King- 
dom region, ethnic Romanians were offered incentives to relocate 
to Transylvania. 

The dispute between Hungary and Romania over the history 
of Transylvania complicated interethnic relations in the region. The 
histories of both countries claim Transylvania as the safe haven 
that ensured the survival of each nation. The Romanians contend 
that they are descendants of Geto-Dacians — the indigenous inhabi- 
tants of Transylvania. Although earlier Romanian historiography 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



emphasized the Latin origins of Romanian language and culture, 
later pronouncements by Ceau§escu and Romanian historians 
stressed cultural ties to this pre-Roman civilization. The regime set 
out to prove the so-called Daco-Roman continuity theory to bolster 
Romania's claims over Transylvania. Despite furious archaeologi- 
cal activity to discover Dacian roots, however, just as many traces 
of Celts, Huns, Avars, Goths, and Romans were uncovered. 
Nevertheless, the country's museums and history books presented 
the theory as indisputable fact. 

Even as early as 1948, the process of rewriting the history of Tran- 
sylvania to favor the Romanian version was under way. Revised text- 
books gave ample coverage of the great Romanian heroes of the past, 
but they provided litde or no information about key minority figures, 
and those who were mentioned were given Romanian names. The 
books emphasized that the struggle for unification of the Romanian 
fatherland had been opposed by the Hungarians and Germans, who 
were labeled "latecomers" and "colonists." 

Amidst the controversy, the Hungarian minority of Transylva- 
nia was considered an instrument of the Hungarian government, 
further ensuring their second-class citizenship status. Expressions 
of concern for the treatment of this minority, whether originating 
inside or outside Romania, were branded "chauvinistic, revanch- 
ist, and irredentist." The regime increasingly limited contacts and 
cultural links between Hungary and Romanian Hungarians. After 
1974, regulations forbade all foreign travelers except close family 
members to stay overnight in private homes. Violators placed their 
hosts at risk of fines amounting to as much as one year's salary. 
Romanian Hungarians found it difficult to obtain newspapers and 
journals from Hungary, and the Department of State Secu- 
rity (Departamentul Securita$ii Statului — Securitate), the secret 
police, monitored the reception of Hungarian radio and television 
broadcasts and the placement of long-distance calls to Hungary. 
Significantiy, the pervasive Securitate employed few minority 
citizens. 

As the economy ground to a halt in the 1980s and living condi- 
tions deteriorated for both the majority and the minorities, thou- 
sands of citizens fled to Hungary. In 1987 alone, some 40,000 
sought refuge there, and from June until August of 1988, at least 
187 Romanians were shot dead by the Securitate while attempt- 
ing to escape to Hungary. 

Language, Education, and Cultural Heritage 

Arguably the changes under communism that most grievously 
affected ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarians and to a lesser 



89 



Romania: A Country Study 

extent the Germans, were those that limited education in their na- 
tive languages. In the first decade of communist rule, students could 
acquire an education at Hungarian-language schools from preschool 
to university and at German-language schools from preschool to 
high school. These schools had their own administration and a long 
tradition of humanistic education; many were 300 to 500 years old. 
But already in 1948 some of the policies of the new regime had 
begun to weaken national minority education. A purge and "reedu- 
cation" of faculty in all educational institutions was carried out. 
From that time forward, important teaching positions were filled 
only by teachers deemed politically reliable. At the same time, 
nationalization of all ecclesiastical and private schools destroyed 
the traditionally important role of the church in the Hungarian and 
German educational systems. 

Schools in some communities were merged so that ethnic Roma- 
nians constituted the majority of the student body. The regime man- 
dated the teaching of Romanian in all educational institutions to 
"prevent national isolation." Beginning in 1957, amalgamation 
of minority (particularly Hungarian) and Romanian schools became 
the rule rather than the exception. Most of the directors for the 
newly merged schools were ethnic Romanians, whereas Hungari- 
ans or Germans filled vice-principal or vice-director positions. 

The merger of the Hungarian Bolyai University at Cluj with 
the Romanian Babez University in 1959 dealt a major blow to the 
Hungarian-language educational network. Such mergers meant a 
larger enrollment of ethnic Romanians and reduced availability 
of Hungarian-language instruction. The party determined what 
courses would be taught in Hungarian; many were of an ideologi- 
cal bent, and the more technical courses were taught in Romani- 
an only. It became nearly impossible to study any of the applied 
sciences in Hungarian, restricting career opportunities for the Hun- 
garian minority. The result was a predictable drop in the number 
of Hungarian undergraduates — from 10.75 percent of all under- 
graduates in 1957 to only 5.7 percent in 1974. 

Meanwhile education laws introduced in 1973 continued the as- 
similation that had begun with the amalgamation of minority and 
Romanian schools. In keeping with the economic program of rapid 
industrialization, the laws emphasized technical studies over hu- 
manities. The ratio established was two-thirds technical to one-third 
humanities, making it even more difficult for minorities to acquire 
an education in their native language. In 1974 only 1.4 percent 
of the instruction in technical schools was in Hungarian. Techni- 
cal textbooks were rarely translated into minority languages. Thus 
a technical education, the premier vehicle of upward mobility, 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



became possible only for those who had mastered Romanian. This 
requirement and the fact that university entrance exams were given 
only in Romanian increased the pressure on parents to enroll their 
children in Romanian-language schools. 

Instruction in Hungarian was further hampered by an acute 
shortage of Hungarian-language teachers and language experts; 
" internal regulations" assigned Hungarian university graduates 
to work outside their communities — usually out of Transylvania. 
The use of minority languages was restricted in the cultural arena 
as well. Local libraries persistently lacked literature in minority 
languages. After 1973, Hungarian-language newspaper publish- 
ing was sharply curtailed, and in 1985 television broadcasts in Hun- 
garian and German were discontinued. 

Romanian leaders claimed that the amalgamation of minority 
and Romanian schools and the 1973 educational reforms were 
necessary for administrative and economic efficiency and were not 
intended to ensure the assimilation of ethnic minorities. Although 
that claim appeared to be plausible, other actions that diminished 
the ability of minorities to maintain their ethnic identity were not 
so readily explained. The assimilation of national minorities into 
a ''harmonious whole" continued, and over the decades the gap 
between theory and practice in the treatment of minorities widened. 
The state's discriminatory policies steadily diminished minority con- 
stitutional, political, linguistic, and educational rights. 

Emigration: Problem or Solution? 

Although the goal of the Ceausescu regime was national homog- 
enization and an ethnically pure Romania, the regime opposed the 
emigration of ethnic minorities. Beginning in the late 1970s, a media 
campaign was launched that followed two basic tacks. Spokesper- 
sons for ethnic minorities in the workers' councils praised the re- 
gime's treatment of minorities and declared their devotion to 
socialist Romania. By contrast, those who desired to emigrate were 
depicted as weaklings with underdeveloped "patriotic and political 
consciousness," would-be traitors abandoning their fatherland and 
the struggle to build socialism. Stories abounded of Romanians 
emigrating only to find life more difficult in their new environ- 
ment and happily returning to their homeland. Accounts of those 
who had emigrated to West Germany were particularly bleak. 

Attempts to discourage emigration were not left entirely to the 
media. The official policy allowed emigration only on an individual 
basis, and only in specific cases — usually for family reunification. 
In later years, the PCR ironically suggested that families could be 
reunited by immigration into Romania. Obtaining permission to 



91 



Romania: A Country Study 

leave the country was a lengthy, expensive, and exhausting process. 
Prospective emigrants were likely to be fired from their jobs or 
demoted to positions of lower prestige and pay. They were often 
evicted from their homes and publicly castigated. At the same time, 
they were denied medical care and other social benefits, and their 
children were not permitted to enroll in schools. 

In 1972, amid claims that emigration was purposefully en- 
couraged by the West and was becoming a "brain drain" for the 
nation, the regime proposed a heavy tax requiring would-be 
emigrants to reimburse the state for the cost of their education. 
Although Romanian citizens could not legally possess foreign 
money, sums of up to $US20,000 in hard currency were to be paid 
before emigrants would be allowed to leave. Under pressure from 
the United States, which threatened to revoke Romania's most- 
favored-nation trade status, and West Germany and Israel, the tax 
officially was not imposed. But money was collected in the form 
of bribes, with government officials reportedly demanding thou- 
sands of dollars before granting permission to emigrate. A failed 
attempt to emigrate illegally was punishable by up to three years 
in jail. 

Despite Ceausescu's opposition to emigration, the ethnic Ger- 
man population declined sharply. In 1967, when diplomatic rela- 
tions with West Germany were established, roughly 60,000 ethnic 
Germans requested permission to emigrate. By 1978, some 80,000 
had departed for West Germany. In 1978 the two countries negotiat- 
ed an agreement concerning the remaining German population, 
which had decreased from 2 percent of the total population in 1 966 
to 1.6 percent in 1977. Romania agreed to allow 11,000 to 13,000 
ethnic Germans to emigrate each year in return for hard currency 
and a payment of DM5,000 per person to reimburse the state for 
educational expenses. In 1982 that figure rose to DM 7, 000-8, 000 
per person. In the decade between 1978 and 1988, approximately 
120,000 Germans emigrated, leaving behind a population of only 
about 200,000, between 80 and 90 percent of whom wanted to emi- 
grate. As their numbers declined, the Germans feared they would 
be less able to resist assimilation. In 1987 an entire village of some 
200 ethnic Germans applied en masse for emigration permits. 

The Jewish minority also markedly declined as a result of large- 
scale emigration. Suffering under state-fostered anti-Semitism and 
financially ruined by expropriations during nationalization, much 
of the Jewish population applied for permission to leave in 1948. 
Between 1948 and 1951, 117,950 Jews emigrated to Israel, and 
from 1958 to 1964, 90,000 more followed, leaving a total Jewish 
population of only 43,000 in 1966. Permission to emigrate was 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



freely granted to Jews, and by 1988 the population numbered 
between 20,000 and 25,000, half of whom were more than sixty- 
five years of age. Furthermore, over one- third of those Jews still 
in the country held exit visas. 

In the late 1980s, ethnic Hungarians clung to their ancient roots 
in Transylvania and, unlike the Germans and Jews, the majority 
were reluctant to consider emigration. Although neither Hungary 
nor Romania wanted the minority decreased by emigration, thou- 
sands of refugees crossed into Hungary during the 1980s, espe- 
cially after 1986. This development prompted Budapest to launch 
an unprecedented all-out publicity campaign against Romania's 
treatment of minorities. Inside Romania, ethnic protest against the 
regime was quite restrained. A notable exception in the late 1980s 
was Karoly Kiraly, an important leader in the Hungarian com- 
munity who openly denounced the regime's nationalities policy as 
assimilationist. The regime, which readily discounted such pro- 
tests, labeled Kiraly "a dangerously unstable relic of Stalinism 
dressed up in Romanian national garb." 

Social Structure 

The End of the Ancien Regime 

Before World War II, Romania was overwhelmingly agrarian. 
In the late 1940s, roughly 75 percent of the population was engaged 
in agriculture. It was a poor and backward peasant agriculture; 
inferior yields were eked from plots of land that grew ever smaller 
as the rural population increased. Although a fair amount of 
industrial activity was nurtured by state contracts and foreign 
investments, industrial development was slow and failed to create 
alternative employment opportunities for the overpopulated and 
impoverished countryside. The bourgeoisie was weakly developed. 
Atop the low social pyramid stood a disproportionately powerful 
social elite, a remnant of the nobility that had once owned most 
of the land in the Old Kingdom. Although reforms between 1917 
and 1921 had stripped them of all but 15 percent of the arable land, 
this aristocracy remained a puissant voice in political affairs. 

After World War II, Romania's social structure was drastically 
altered by the imposition of a political system that envisioned a 
classless, egalitarian society. Marxist-Leninist doctrine holds that 
the establishment of a socialist state, in which the working class 
possesses the means of production and distribution of goods and 
political power, will ensure the eventual development of com- 
munism. In this Utopia there will be no class conflict and no ex- 
ploitation of man by fellow man. There will be an abundance of 



93 



Romania: A Country Study 

wealth to be shared equally by all. The path to communism requires 
the ascendancy of the working class and the elimination of the rul- 
ing classes and the bourgeoisie. In Romania the latter was accom- 
plished relatively easily, but the former was more problematic, as 
most of the population were peasants and not workers. 

Following the Soviet imposition of a communist government in 
1945, the first order of business was to eliminate opposition to the 
consolidation of power in the name of the working class. The dis- 
location from the war assisted the new government in this objec- 
tive, as many of the ruling elite, whether from the land-owning 
nobility or the bourgeoisie, had either emigrated or been killed in 
the war. Many of the survivors left with the retreating German 
forces as the Red Army approached. Most Jews, who before the 
war had constituted a large segment of the communal and finan- 
cial elite, either died in fascist Romania or fled the country in the 
next few years. 

Consequently, a few measures taken in the early days of com- 
munist rule easily eradicated the upper crust from the ancien re- 
gime. Land reforms in 1945 eliminated all large properties and thus 
deprived the aristocracy of their economic base and their final 
vestiges of power. The currency reform of 1947, which essentially 
confiscated all money for the state, was particularly ruinous for 
members of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie who had 
not fled with their fortunes. In addition, the state gradually ex- 
propriated commercial and industrial properties, so that by 1950, 
90 percent of all industrial output was directly controlled by the 
state and by 1953 only 14 percent of the shops remained privately 
owned. 

Although potential opposition from the more economically and 
socially advanced members of society was all but eliminated almost 
immediately, the task of creating an industrial working class, in 
whose name the communists claimed power, had hardly begun. 
In 1950 less than 25 percent of the population lived in urban areas 
or worked in industry. But conditions in the countryside were ripe 
for social change in the very direction the regime required. The 
ravages of war and subsequent Soviet occupation had left the 
peasantry on the brink of famine. Much of their livestock and capital 
had been destroyed. Their misery was further compounded by a 
severe drought in 1945 and 1946, followed by a famine that killed 
thousands. More important for the goals of the regime, many of 
the peasants were becoming detached from the land and were willing 
to take the factory jobs that would result from the party's ambi- 
tious industrialization program. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 

The New Social Order 

The Peasantry 

The share of the labor force employed in agriculture decreased 
to less than 30 percent by 1981 , and this decline was accompanied 
by the destruction of many aspects of the peasant way of life. By 
1963 more than 95 percent of all arable land was controlled by the 
state, either through collective or state farms. As a result, small- 
scale agriculture was no longer available to support the traditional 
peasant way of life, and the family was no longer the basic unit 
of production and consumption. The peasants who remained on 
the land were forced to participate in large-scale, state-managed 
agriculture that paralleled other socialist enterprises. The peasants 
were permitted to till small "private" plots, which in 1963 account- 
ed for about 8 percent of all arable land. But even cultivation of 
these plots was subject to state interference (see Farm Organiza- 
tion, ch. 3). Initially some violent protests against collectivization 
occurred, but on the whole, protest took the form of plummeting 
yields. This process not only adversely affected living standards 
for town and country alike, but increased party penetration of the 
countryside, further reducing peasant autonomy. 

Several other factors contributed to the rural exodus and the 
decline of the peasant class, among them substantial wage differen- 
tials between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. In 1965 
peasant incomes were only half the national average. Although the 
state tried to remedy the situation by establishing minimum in- 
comes in the 1970s, remuneration for agricultural laborers remained 
well below that for industrial workers. In 1979 the average agricul- 
tural worker's income was still only 66 percent of the industrial 
worker's, and during the 1980s it rose to only 73 percent. A per- 
sistent and wide disparity also existed between rural and urban stan- 
dards of living. In the mid-1970s, the majority of rural households 
were without gas, not even half had electricity, and more than one- 
third were without running water. Even in the 1980s, washing 
machines, refrigerators, and televisions were still luxury items, and 
peasant expenditures for them and other nonbasic items and for 
cultural activities remained conspicuously below those of industri- 
al workers. In addition, rural citizens received lower pensions and 
child allowances and had much more limited educational oppor- 
tunity. 

Despite Ceau§escu's nationalistic glorification of peasant folk- 
lore and values, in the mid-1980s the Romanian peasant remained 
very much a second-class citizen. Adults perceived their lowly sta- 
tus and encouraged their children to leave the land. Young people 



95 




1* 





96 




97 



Romania: A Country Study 

were inclined to do so and showed a decided preference for occu- 
pations that would take them out of the village. The regime was 
unable to prevent this development because it lacked the invest- 
ment capital to both provide amenities to the countryside and to 
continue its industrialization program. Consequently the quality 
of the agricultural work force deteriorated to the point of inade- 
quacy. As the young, educated, and ambitious abandoned the fields 
for the factories, the laborers left behind were older and, increas- 
ingly, female. Although they constituted only 14 percent of the na- 
tional labor force in 1979, women made up 63 percent of agricultural 
labor. The average age of adult male farmers rose to 43.2 years 
in 1977. Furthermore, the men who remained on the land were 
generally the least capable and were unable to meet even the mini- 
mum requirements of industrial work. 

Many of these peasants were apathetic and, according to Ceauses- 
cu, willing to spend their time drinking and gambling in local pubs 
instead of working on the cooperative farms. A 1981 survey showed 
that some 34 percent of all agricultural cooperative members had 
avoided doing any work whatsoever for the cooperative during that 
entire year. Consequently the regime had to mobilize soldiers, ur- 
ban workers, college, high-school, and even elementary- school stu- 
dents to work in the fields at planting and harvest time. 

Ironically the systematization program, which placed plants and 
factories throughout the countryside to equalize living standards, 
actually made the situation worse. Even as demands were made 
for the peasantry to increase agricultural output, commuting from 
village to factory became a fairly widespread practice, drawing the 
best labor from an already deteriorated supply. As a result, many 
peasant families were transformed into extended households whose 
members participated in both farming and industrial work. In such 
families, at least one member commuted to a factory and worked 
for wages, whereas others worked on the cooperative farm to secure 
the privilege of cultivating a private plot. The factory wage raised 
the family's standard of living, and the plot provided fruits, vegeta- 
bles, meat, and dairy products that the family could consume or 
sell for extra cash. Even when members of the family had perma- 
nently migrated to nearby cities, these mutually advantageous eco- 
nomic ties were maintained, somewhat ameliorating economic 
conditions in the countryside. 

Some observers argued that this rural-urban nexus boosted sup- 
port for the regime in the countryside and contributed to political 
stability throughout the 1970s, when commuting workers constitut- 
ed some 30 percent of the urban work force (50 percent in some 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



cities). Although commuters provided labor without aggravating 
the urban housing shortage, having a large number of peasants 
in the factories had certain disadvantages. The poorly educated 
and relatively unskilled peasant workers could not be fully integrated 
into urban industrial society. Most were deeply religious, and their 
lives centered not on work but on Orthodox rituals and family. 
Commuters were often absent because of village celebrations or 
the need to tend the household plot. 

Peasant commuting also brought an increased awareness of the 
differences between rural and urban living conditions — particularly 
during the 1980s, when the overall standard of living sank to nearly 
unbearable levels. Rural areas were the most harshly affected, and 
despite the regime's efforts to restrict migration to cities, the process 
continued, albeit at a slower rate. In the late 1980s, the disappear- 
ance of the peasantry as a distinct class appeared virtually inevitable. 

The Proletariat 

Creation of a class-conscious proletariat was a primary goal of 
the PCR. Explosive growth in the industrial sector, which continu- 
ally garnered the lion's share of investment capital, ensured the 
transformation of the economy and, consequently, the social struc- 
ture. In 1950 industrial workers represented only 19 percent of the 
employed population. By 1988 the proletariat accounted for some 
60 percent of the working population. 

The ranks of the working class swelled with peasants from the 
villages, some as commuting workers, but most as migrants who 
took up permanent residence in the cities. In 1948 only 23.4 per- 
cent of the population lived in cities, but by 1988 over half were 
urban dwellers, most of whom had been born and raised in the 
countryside. In the late 1970s, some 60 percent of residents in the 
seven largest cities had rural origins. These workers exhibited rough- 
ly the same traditional peasant characteristics as peasant workers 
who retained residences in the villages. They were members of the 
Orthodox Church, parochial, poorly educated, and relatively un- 
skilled. Values inculcated by church, family, and village were not 
easily pushed aside, and rural-urban migrants had tremendous 
difficulty adapting to the discipline of the industrial work place. 
As a result, alcoholism and absenteeism were recurring problems. 
Moreover, neither commuters nor rural-urban migrants were 
interested in the political activity demanded of a class-conscious 
proletariat. In contrast, the small prewar industrial working class 
was a much more urbanized, skilled, and politically active group, 
which felt an affinity with the new regime not shared by those of 
peasant origin. 



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Romania: A Country Study 

As industrialization and urbanization progressed, the working 
class became more differentiated by type of industry and work 
process and by age group and social origin. The working class as 
a whole continued to exhibit very little class consciousness or solidar- 
ity. Over the years, as the standard of living slowly rose, the working 
class was accorded special advantages, and the circumstances of 
workers improved compared to other social groups. Socialist income 
policies reduced wage differentials between blue- and white-collar 
workers, so that by the 1970s many skilled workers earned as much 
or more than their better-educated compatriots. Likewise, urban 
workers gained the most from comprehensive welfare and social 
services introduced under socialist rule. 

Although it was never a significant source of political leadership, 
the working class initially was generally satisfied with its special 
status and at least tacitly approved of the regime and its policies. 
Later years, however, witnessed a growing discontent among the 
rank and file of the proletariat, much of which was related to work- 
ing conditions. The most common complaints concerned poor pay 
and slow advancement. Increasingly workers blamed the regime 
and the bureaucratic centrally planned economic system for 
problems in industrial enterprises. They believed that the system's 
waste and inefficiency not only affected wages and promotions, but 
also contributed to the precipitous decline in the standard of liv- 
ing. Although the late 1980s brought increases in wages, compared 
to other East European countries, wages remained quite paltry. 
Small as the increases were, they created inflation because of the 
scarcity of consumer goods. The regime sought to relieve workers 
of a portion of their disposable income by forcing them to buy shares 
in their factories, which was tantamount to confiscation and forced 
saving in that there was no popular control over these funds. The 
regime's inability to shorten the forty-eight-hour work week also 
provoked discontent, especially in light of the calls for citizens to 
devote an increasing number of hours to unpaid "patriotic work" 
on their day off. 

In 1989 almost all Romanian workers belonged to trade unions, 
which were organs for worker representation in name only. In real- 
ity the unions, which were controlled by the party after 1947, func- 
tioned as transmission belts carrying directives from the central 
administration to the rank and file and as tools of political sociali- 
zation to inculcate desired attitudes and values. Workers had to 
join trade unions to receive social welfare and many fringe benefits. 

In 1971 workers' councils were established at enterprises, os- 
tensibly to involve workers in economic decision making but in 
reality to shore up support for the regime. Few workers viewed 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



the councils positively. Data collected in the mid-1970s indicated 
that only one-third of workers actually submitted suggestions to 
their council, and of those who did so, only 40 percent thought 
their recommendations could influence enterprise policy. Most 
workers did not even know who their representatives were and did 
not participate in the councils, which were dominated by the same 
persons who directed other party, state, and mass organizations. 

Although workers shunned officially sanctioned channels, they 
covertly expressed their dissatisfaction through low productivity, 
absenteeism, and general apathy. The older and most skilled work- 
ers seemed least satisfied and frequently changed jobs in search 
of better positions and higher wages. By the late 1970s, some work- 
ers were airing their grievances in mass protests. In 1977 some 
35,000 miners in the Jiu Valley went on strike to protest food short- 
ages and new regulations that forced older workers to retire with 
reduced benefits. In 1979 roughly 2,000 intellectuals and workers 
attempted to form a free trade union and called for improved work- 
ing conditions, abolition of involuntary labor on weekends, offi- 
cial recognition of a national unemployment problem, and an end 
to special privileges for the party elite. 

Working-class discontent continued to grow in the 1980s. The 
majority of older workers expressed dissatisfaction with pay and 
wanted stronger links between individual productivity and wages, 
objecting to the pay system that penalized all workers if the enter- 
prise did not fulfill its production plan. Forced "patriotic labor" 
continued, and each citizen was required to work six days per year 
at local public works or face stiff penalties. Complaints about in- 
equitable distribution of resources among social groups became 
more frequent, and the perquisites for the party elite, such as 
chauffeured limousines and palatial residences, drew bitter criti- 
cism. In late 1987, mass demonstrations and riots occurred in 
Bra§ov, the second largest city. Angry workers protested pay cuts 
for unfilled production quotas, energy and food shortages, and the 
regime's repression. They burned portraits of Ceau§escu, ransacked 
city hall and local party headquarters, seized personnel records, 
and looted party food shops. There were rumors of similar inci- 
dents in other major cities as well. 

Although public protests were swiftly and brutally suppressed, 
worker dissatisfaction continued to smolder. But the majority of 
workers, perhaps because of chronological and psychological ties 
to a peasant past, were predisposed to react to even the most dire 
conditions with passive hostility rather than active opposition. At 
the close of the 1980s, the working class was sullen and dispirited 
to the point of apathy. 



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Romania: A Country Study 

The Intelligentsia 

Traditionally the Romanian intelligentsia — the educated elite of 
society — had been the children of the landed aristocracy who had 
moved to cities to become poets, journalists, social critics, doctors, 
or lawyers. Given the country's overall backwardness, any educa- 
tion beyond the elementary level accrued special privileges and high 
social status. The intelligentsia played a leading role in the life of 
the nation, providing a humanistic voice for major social problems, 
shaping public opinion, and setting value criteria. After 1918, as 
the aristocracy declined, the class of intellectuals and profession- 
als grew stronger. Throughout the interwar years, many of them 
occupied high political positions and were quite influential. 

During the first decade of communist rule, the old intelligentsia 
were all but eliminated. They lost their jobs, and their possessions 
were confiscated. Many were imprisoned, and thousands died or 
were killed. Those who survived the purge were blackmailed or 
frightened into submission and collaboration with the new regime. 
The intellectual arena was cleared of any opposition to communist 
power and policies, leaving the ruling party free to create a new 
intelligentsia — one that would be unquestionably loyal, commit- 
ted to the communist cause, and easily manipulated. The tradi- 
tional role of the intelligentsia had been irreversibly changed. 

The party set out to educate a new intelligentsia that would meet 
the needs of the crash program of industrialization. The number 
of people with secondary or higher education rose dramatically. 
From 1956 to 1966, the total number of Romanians with a higher 
education increased by 58 percent, and the number of students 
enrolled in universities more than doubled. A quota system that 
favored the children of peasant and proletarian families ensured 
the desired social composition of this rapidly expanding student 
population. Children of middle-class families were kept to a mini- 
mum by a selection system that allocated more points for social 
origin than for academic qualifications. At the same time, the 
establishment of the new political system, with its many institu- 
tions necessary for administering the centrally planned economy, 
required an ever-increasing number of white-collar workers. The 
regime was eager to pull these workers from the ranks of peasan- 
try and proletariat, regarding them as more politically reliable. By 
1974 more than 63 percent of nonmanual workers were sons and 
daughters of proletarian families. This prodigious social advance- 
ment produced a highly diverse intelligentsia. The intellectual elite 
was composed of two main subgroups— a creative elite similar to 
the traditional intelligentsia involved in scholarly and artistic pursuits, 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



and a new technocratic elite involved in industrial production and 
management. 

In contrast to the interwar period, when the intelligentsia shared 
the political stage with the ruling establishment, the role of intellec- 
tuals in socialist Romania became one of total subservience to the 
ruling elite. This reversal was particularly stifling for the creative 
intelligentsia, whose new mission was to paint a picture of social- 
ism that was pleasing, reassuring, and convincing to both the masses 
and the regime. Under such conditions, freedom of expression and 
creativity evaporated. As a reward for conformity and demonstrated 
ideological commitment, the new members of the creative intel- 
ligentsia received social and material privileges. Despite reduced 
wage differentials between white- and blue-collar workers and 
despite the regime's emphasis on the more technical professions, 
the new intellectual elite exhibited a marked disdain for manual 
labor. The intellectuals showed a marked preference for the same 
fields their predecessors had most highly regarded — philosophy, 
history, literature, and the arts. It was toward these endeavors that 
they encouraged their children. The interests of the intelligentsia 
were strikingly at odds with party canon, which maintained that 
the intelligentsia was not a class but a separate social stratum work- 
ing in harmony with the proletariat and performing the leading 
creative, executive, and administrative roles. 

As the technical intelligentsia grew larger and had a more power- 
ful voice in management, its members too were seen as a threat 
to political authority. Although increasing the quality and quanti- 
ty of industrial production was the goal of both the PCR and the 
technical intelligentsia, the means to that end was common cause 
for disagreement between loyal but technically incompetent ap- 
paratchiks (party careerists) and the younger, better educated tech- 
nocrats. Indicative of the rancor between the two was the latter' s 
undisguised contempt for General Secretary Ceau§escu. 

Until the late 1960s, the PCR leadership, despite some mistrust 
and aversion toward intellectuals, acknowledged that the coopera- 
tion and participation of skilled professionals was critical for the 
country's economic development. But with Ceau§escu's rise to pow- 
er, hostility toward the intelligentsia grew. In the early 1970s, an 
anti-intellectual campaign was launched to eradicate "retrograde 
values." Ceau§escu criticized the intelligentsia for their bourgeois 
and intellectualist attitudes. Members of the technical intelligent- 
sia were accused of resisting party policy, and thousands were dis- 
missed from research and administrative positions and reassigned 
to more overtly "productive" work. Writers and artists were de- 
nounced for works that did not proclaim the achievements and 



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Romania: A Country Study 

goals of socialism and aid in the creation of the new socialist man. 
The Writers' Union purged members who did not show renewed 
commitment to ideology and patriotism. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as the Ceau§escu personality 
cult permeated society, cultural conditions became increasingly 
repressive. The media were reorganized to allow for more strin- 
gent control, and the number of correspondents sent abroad was 
sharply reduced. (By 1988 there were none in the United States.) 
Western journalists increasingly were refused entry, and those who 
were admitted had very limited access to information. Foreign jour- 
nalists who dared to be critical were kept under police surveillance 
and frequently expelled. 

As nationalistic overtones grew more strident, restraints on schol- 
ars wanting to study in the West increased. The length of time per- 
mitted for research was reduced from ten months to three months. 
In later years, the regime consistently refused to allow students or 
scholars to take advantage of academic opportunities abroad. The 
number of United States lecturers in Romania under the Fullbright 
program dropped from ten to five, and the number of Romanian 
lecturers in the United States decreased from thirty-eight in 1979 
to only two in 1988. 

As the anti- intellectual campaign continued into the 1980s, in- 
telligentsia membership in the PCR declined sharply. In the late 
1960s, before the onset of the ideological campaign, roughly 23 
percent of PCR members were from the intelligentsia. By 1976 
the figure was only 16.5 percent. At the end of the 1980s, the in- 
telligentsia was the least satisfied of any social stratum. Probably 
neither the technical nor the creative elite would have argued for 
the more heroic version of socialism, with its devotion to egalitari- 
anism and the disappearance of class differences. On the contrary, 
members of the intelligentsia strongly believed that they deserved 
certain privileges. They were especially unhappy with salary lev- 
els, the party's stifling control over their careers, and their inse- 
cure position in society. 

Despite the high level of discontent among the intelligentsia, there 
was relatively litde overt dissent against the regime. In 1977, follow- 
ing the signing of the Helsinki Accords, a dissident movement in- 
volving several intellectuals under the leadership of the prominent 
writer Paul Goma did surface. After publicly condemning the regime's 
violation of human rights, many members of the group were arrest- 
ed, interrogated, or confined to psychiatric hospitals. Later that 
year, Goma was exiled to the West. In the 1980s there were sporadic 
cases of dissent, but most intellectuals expressed their dissatisfaction 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



by withdrawing into their private lives and avoiding, as much as 
possible, participation in institutionalized forms of public life. 

The Ruling Elite 

Before the Soviet imposition of a communist regime in 1945, 
party membership had been negligible, but immediately thereafter 
membership soared, reaching 250,000 by the end of that year. Most 
of the new members were from the working class or peasantry, or 
claimed to be, and by virtue of their social origins were considered 
politically reliable. Most joined the party for opportunistic reasons 
rather than out of new-found loyalty to the communist cause. These 
workers and peasants, although relatively uneducated, were hastily 
inducted into the nomenklatura — lists of key party and state posi- 
tions matched with politically reliable candidates. They were im- 
mediately eligible for some of the most powerful positions the party 
had to offer, and they soon had cause to develop a sense of loyalty 
to the political establishment and its communist principles. 

After the first decade of communist rule, the PCR membership 
included about 5 percent of the population over twenty years of 
age. Most of the members were over forty years old. The social 
composition of the party in 1955 revealed the favored position of 
the working class; though workers accounted for only 20 percent 
of the general population, they represented 43 percent of the mem- 
bership. Peasants, the majority of the population, were under- 
represented at only 34 percent — still a remarkable figure when 
compared with their political position in the ancien regime. The 
intelligentsia, although overrepresented with 23 percent of the mem- 
bership for their 9 percent of the population, had less influence than 
before the war. 

By the mid-1950s, a new political elite had emerged — the ap- 
paratchiks. Most were increasingly dogmatic functionaries, primar- 
ily of peasant origin, who had from the beginning occupied the 
key posts of the nomenklatura. As such, they had served as the driv- 
ing force behind the massive social and economic transformation 
of the country and had risen to positions of relative comfort and 
security. By the late 1950s, however, the old guard was beginning 
to lose key positions to a growing class of better educated and more 
competent technocrats. It was a more liberal climate in which tech- 
nical skills were better appreciated, and important appointments 
were based more on qualifications than on political loyalty. For 
a while the apparatchiks successfully resisted this trend, but as a 
result of the demand for technical competence, many were demoted 
to less important positions or removed to the provinces. The rapid 
growth of higher education provided an ever-increasing number 



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Romania: A Country Study 

of young technocrats to replace the apparatchiks. After Ceaugescu 
consolidated his power, however, the period of political liberaliza- 
tion came to an end. By 1974, with the anti- intellectual campaign 
well under way, the apparatchiks were again firmly entrenched. 

The social composition of the PCR in the 1980s affirmed that 
the battle against the intellectuals had been won. In 1987, 80 per- 
cent of the 3.6 million PCR members were of working-class or 
peasant origins. Approximately 10,000 of these members constituted 
the central nomenklatura — the true political elite. This elite, espe- 
cially its core — the Political Executive Committee — was empowered 
to steer societal development in the direction it deemed necessary 
and became the sole arbiter of the nation's social values (see Roma- 
nian Communist Party, ch. 4). 

That poorly educated bureaucrats dominated the party and 
government had severe consequences for society. The low stan- 
dard of living and cultural repression of the 1980s were directly 
attributable to the attitudes and values of this ruling elite, who were 
anti-intellectual, antitechnocratic, hostile to change, and increas- 
ingly xenophobic and isolationist. More specifically, these prejudices 
were the attitudes and values of President Ceau§escu, who presid- 
ed over probably the smallest ruling elite in Romanian history. 
Ceau§escu surrounded himself with apparatchiks who unabashed- 
ly contributed to his personality cult, and he installed members 
of his immediate and extended family in the most powerful party 
and government positions. 

The political elite enjoyed a lifestyle much different from that 
of most citizens. Members of this group lived in palatial homes 
expropriated from the previous elite, were cared for by servants, 
protected by bodyguards, and whisked to work in limousines. They 
had exclusive access to special shops and commissaries that offered 
a wide variety of food and luxury items. Ceau§escu lived in regal 
splendor. His residence in suburban Bucharest was protected by 
guards and traffic blockades. Several castles and palaces were reno- 
vated for his personal use and were no longer open to public visi- 
tation. He and his entourage travelled in a fleet of luxury cars, 
for which all traffic was stopped. 

The conspicuous perquisites enjoyed by Ceau§escu and his circle 
created resentment among the population, which was suffering 
from economic and cultural atrophy as well as political repression. 
Dissidents of various backgrounds called for the abolition of spe- 
cial privileges for the ruling elite, and by the late 1980s disaffec- 
tion was evident at all levels of society. 

In the past, nationalism had played an important role in the 
legitimacy of the ruling elite and in mobilizing support for its plans 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



for the country. By the late 1980s, however, nationalistic fervor 
was waning. The Soviet Union appeared much less threatening, 
and more than a few Romanians were drawn to Mikhail Gor- 
bachev's political and economic reforms. Ceau§escu's periodic 
mobilization campaigns during the 1970s and 1980s had damaged 
relations between the ruling elite and the rest of society to the point 
that more and more citizens were reluctant to rally around the PCR 
and were less accepting of its closed-fist political control and eco- 
nomic policies. Average citizens were weary of sacrificing to build 
a socialist Utopia for posterity and would have preferred a higher 
living standard in their own lifetimes. 

Social Mobility 

Declining social mobility was another important factor in the 
growing discontent among the citizenry. The economic develop- 
ment following the imposition of communist rule created consider- 
able upward mobility. The fast-growing industrial sector demanded 
more laborers, skilled workers, and managers. The ever-expanding 
state bureaucracy required an army of clerks and administrators, 
and the regime needed thousands of writers, artists, and philoso- 
phers to help create the new socialist man and woman. The rapid 
development of free education created a demand for teachers. In 
1969 more than 83 percent of the working population were the 
product of this mass social mobility and held positions of greater 
status than had their fathers. More than 43 percent of those in 
upper-level positions had working-class origins, and 25 percent had 
peasant backgrounds. In contrast, only 14 percent had roots in the 
intelligentsia. 

As the economic transformation slowed, such phenomenal so- 
cial mobility was no longer possible. Fewer positions at the top were 
being created, and they were becoming less accessible to the chil- 
dren of workers and peasants. The new economy demanded skilled 
personnel, and educational credentials became more important than 
political criteria for recruitment into high-status positions. Statis- 
tics showed that children of intellectuals and officials were far more 
likely to acquire these credentials than were children of peasants 
and workers. In the late 1960s, when peasants and workers con- 
stituted over 85 percent of the population, their children made up 
only 47 percent of the university student body, whereas children 
of the intelligentsia filled 45-50 percent of university slots. More- 
over, members of the intellectual elite were more likely to find places 
for their children in the most prestigious universities and facul- 
ties, whereas students from worker and peasant backgrounds 



107 



Romania: A Country Study 

were concentrated in the less sought after agricultural and techni- 
cal institutions. 

Such inequalities persisted into the late 1980s, largely because 
children of the intelligentsia had better opportunity to acquire lan- 
guage facility and positive attitudes toward learning. Furthermore, 
these families were more able to prepare their children for the com- 
petitive selection process through private tutoring. Some resorted 
to bribery to obtain special consideration for their children. A child 
from an intellectual family had a 70 percent chance of entering the 
university; the child of a worker or peasant had only a 10 percent 
chance. 

Despite the regime's repeated assaults on the intelligentsia and 
the ideological efforts to elevate the status of blue-collar work, most 
citizens continued to aspire to intellectual professions. Studies con- 
ducted in the 1970s at the height of the ideological crusade against 
intellectualism and the privileged class revealed that the majority 
of young Romanians planned to pursue higher education. Virtu- 
ally none declared any desire for a blue-collar career. And yet as 
a consequence of the party's effort to channel more of the popula- 
tion into production jobs, opportunities for professional careers grew 
increasingly rare. Enrollment in technical schools had increased 
to 124,000 by the end of 1970, which provided a surfeit of low- 
paid, low-status engineers. 

In the 1980s, it appeared that the boundaries between the social 
strata were beginning to harden. Research conducted in the 
mid-1980s suggested that some 87 percent of citizens born into the 
working class remained blue-collar workers. The intelligentsia 
showed an even greater degree of self- reproduction, and the rate 
of downward mobility from the intellectual elite into other social 
categories was remarkably low — lower in fact than in any other 
European member of Comecon. The hardening stratification along 
traditional lines gave evidence of a growing class consciousness, 
which was most evident among the intelligentsia, whose values, 
attitudes, and interests differed from those of other segments of 
society. Workers, too, exhibited increased class consciousness, as 
their aspirations and expectations went unfulfilled. Not only did 
social mobility in general decrease, it also declined within the work- 
ing class itself, creating greater potential for social unrest. 

Institutions and Organs of Society 
Family 

The Marxist position on the family is found in The Origin of 
Family, Private Property, and the State by Friedrich Engels. Its basic 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



premise is that the patriarchal family and its subjugation and ex- 
ploitation of women and children were born out of private-property 
relationships. Under socialism the abolition of private property 
would result in relationships between couples founded solely on 
love, and the emphasis on collective life would diminish the im- 
portance of the family as a unit for nurturing children. 

The Evolution of Family Law 

Family law in socialist Romania was modeled after Soviet fami- 
ly legislation. From the outset, it sought to undermine the influence 
of religion on family life. Under the ancien regime, the church was 
the center of community life, and marriage, divorce, and record- 
ing of births were matters for religious authorities. Under com- 
munism these events became affairs of the state, and legislation 
designed to wipe out the accumulated traditions and ancient codes 
was enacted. The communist regime required marriage to be legal- 
ized in a civil ceremony at the local registry prior to, or preferably 
instead of, the customary church wedding. Overall, a more liberal 
legal atmosphere prevailed, granting women greater rights within 
the family. The predominance of the husband was reduced, and 
the wife was given equal control over children and property and 
was entitled to keep her maiden name. The divorce procedure was 
greatly facilitated. In fact, if both parties wanted a divorce, and 
there were no children involved, the dissolution of the marriage 
could be accomplished simply by sending a joint statement to the 
local registry office. In addition to the right to divorce with rela- 
tive ease, abortion on demand was introduced in 1957. 

Because of the more liberal procedures, the divorce rate grew 
dramatically, tripling by 1960, and the number of abortions also 
increased rapidly. Concern for population reproduction and fu- 
ture labor supplies prompted the state to revise the Romanian 
Family Code to foster more stable personal relationships and 
strengthen the family. At the end of 1966, abortion was virtually 
outlawed, and a new divorce decree made the dissolution of mar- 
riage exceedingly difficult. 

As part of the program to increase birthrates, the legal age for 
marriage was lowered to fifteen years for women in 1984, and yet 
the rate of marriage remained quite steady — on average about 9 
marriages per 1,000 people per year. The divorce rate remained 
well below 1 per 1,000 until 1974. A study published in 1988, how- 
ever, showed that the divorce rate had risen steadily since 1974, 
although not to the pre- 1966 level. It must be noted, however, that 
divorces were measured against the total population and not the 
total number of marriages, which disguised the rising rate. The 



109 



Romania: A Country Study 

primary causes of divorce were violence and alcoholism. The study 
concluded that marital instability was once again a growing 
problem. 

Much family legislation concerned women in the workplace and 
was designed to increase the size of families. Provisions for preg- 
nant women and working mothers were comprehensive and gener- 
ous. Expectant and nursing mothers were not permitted to work 
under hazardous conditions, were exempt from overtime work, and 
after the sixth month of pregnancy and while nursing were exempt 
from night work — all with no reduction in salary. Nursing mothers 
were entitled to feeding breaks, which could total two hours per 
day — also with no reduction in pay. In addition, women were al- 
lowed paid maternity leave of 112 days — 52 days prior to and 60 
days after delivery. They were also entided to paid leave to care 
for sick children under three years of age. Without loss of benefits, 
mothers were permitted to take a leave of absence from work to 
raise a child to the age of six, or they could request half-time work. 

Changes in Family Structure 

Not only did households become smaller — mostly because of a 
lower fertility rate — there was also a transition from the tradition- 
al extended family of three generations in a single household to 
the nuclear family of only a couple and their children. By the late 
1960s, only 21.5 percent of families had grandparents living with 
them. This trend was hastened by improved old-age pensions that 
made it unnecessary for the elderly to live with their children and 
by the cramped quarters of urban living. However, in the coun- 
tryside, where about half of Romanian families still lived in the 
late 1980s, families tended to have more children, and extended 
families were common. And even when parents and their children 
lived in separate households, the close relations of kinship were not 
abolished, even after one or the other had moved to the city. Strong 
ties between households were evident in the extended family strate- 
gies that were aimed at maximizing resources by placing family 
members in various sectors of the economy. This process led to 
jointly owned property such as livestock, joint cultivation of garden 
plots, and shared material comforts from salaried labor. 

Family Life 

The process of socialist modernization gready affected family life. 
Through education and a comprehensive welfare system, the state 
assumed responsibility for providing assistance and transmitting val- 
ues. Although the family was identified as the fundamental unit 
of socialist society, and it heavily influenced the values of the 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



younger generation, its primary role had become population 
reproduction. Even that role was no longer a private matter, but 
was subject to the whim of government policy. But the prediction 
that socialism would provide for the transfer of domestic duties from 
the home to the public sector fell far short of fruition. In 1989 com- 
munal dining facilities and public laundries were still largely 
unavailable, and because the tertiary sector of the economy received 
the lowest priority, services such as house cleaning, home repairs, 
and dry cleaning were either inadequate or nonexistent. 

Consumer durables to lighten the burden of housework were 
available only to a privileged few. In the late 1960s, only 7.3 per- 
cent of households had electric refrigerators, 22.6 percent had gas 
stoves, 9.5 percent had washing machines, 3.2 percent had vacu- 
um cleaners, and 38.8 percent had electric irons. By the late 1980s, 
the situation had improved somewhat, but the majority still lacked 
these items. In addition to the difficulties associated with home 
maintenance, shopping for the family was laborious and time- 
consuming. The dearth of refrigerators and freezers forced most 
families to shop for food every day and because supermarkets were 
scarce, shopping entailed trips to several different stores where the 
customer typically had to stand in one queue to select merchan- 
dise and in another to pay for it. Inadequate public transportation 
made shopping even more toilsome. 

Family life for rural Romanians differed in many respects from 
that of urban families. Their living standards were lower, and they 
maintained values and behavior patterns that were firmly rooted 
in traditional peasant life. The unavailability of electricity to many 
rural households made it impossible for them to use refrigerators 
and washing machines, which in many cases would have been pro- 
hibitively expensive . Even when electricity was available and they 
could afford the appliances, many peasant women still did their 
laundry at the stream because it was a traditional site of social in- 
teraction. Using a washing machine gave a woman a reputation 
for being lazy and antisocial. Likewise, many rural families es- 
chewed refrigerators in favor of traditional ways of preserving food. 
Perhaps because farm produce was a source of income for many 
rural families, they consumed far less fresh meat, vegetables, and 
fruit than urban families, and the staple of the rural diet remained 
maize porridge flavored with cabbage, cheese, onion, or milk. This 
frugal everyday diet was interspersed with feasting on special oc- 
casions such as weddings, funerals, Easter, and Christmas. 

Rural family life was much more heavily influenced by religion 
than was urban society. Romanian Orthodoxy, rich in tradition, 
dictated the rhythm of life in a calendar of numerous holiday 



111 



Romania: A Country Study 

celebrations. Church attendance in rural areas far surpassed that 
in urban places. Most rural people viewed the civil marriage 
ceremony required by the state as a mere formality and lived 
together only after a church wedding. In addition, divorce was much 
less common in rural parts. Rural families spent a remarkable 
amount of free time in church and in church-related activities. The 
average sermon lasted more than three hours. Visiting, folk mu- 
sic, folk dancing, and listening to the radio were other popular 
activities. Urban families, on the other hand, exhibited more secu- 
larized values and were more likely to use their free time to pur- 
sue cultural activities. 

Although industrialization, urbanization, and education did not 
eliminate the cultural gap between rural and urban Romania, these 
processes did narrow it. Rural-urban contact occurred daily through 
commuting, and the accoutrements of urban living trickled back 
to families even in the most remote areas. Furthermore, although 
the influence of religion was not eradicated, it certainly declined, 
especially in urban areas, creating an unforeseen problem. Sur- 
veys indicated that the socialist ethics and values that the state 
expected the educational system to instill had not filled the void 
left by fading religious values. 

Women and Women's Organizations 

The socialist plan for the emancipation of women aimed to 
eliminate the "barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking 
drudgery" of their lives. The subservience of women was to be 
ended by establishing the complete equality of the sexes before the 
law and by making women economically independent through em- 
ployment outside the home. The legislation was easily accomplished, 
and Romanian women were indeed mobilized into the work force 
in large numbers. By 1970 some 74.9 percent of working-age wom- 
en (aged 20 to 59 years) were employed outside the home. But 
despite the theoretical commitment of socialism to eradicating sexual 
inequality, working women continued to bear the burden of car- 
ing for children, home, and husband. Romanian husbands tend- 
ed to regard cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping, and child care 
as essentially female duties. Consequently women were left with 
the lion's share of household responsibilities and far less time to 
pursue educational, recreational, cultural, or social activities. 

By the 1980s, illiteracy among females had long since been elimi- 
nated. Female enrollment in the primary education system was 
proportionate to their numbers, and a woman's access to higher 
education had also increased considerably. Some 44 percent of 
students pursuing higher education were women — up from 32.8 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



percent in 1945. Behind these figures, however, lurked stereotyped 
sex roles that were much more difficult to erase. Popularly held 
views continued to divide professions according to sexual suitabil- 
ity. Studies showed that most girls chose traditional feminine 
specializations, such as education and the humanities, whereas boys 
tended to favor technical and scientific fields. Consequently young 
men acquired skills and filled occupations that were held in higher 
regard and were better paid. 

A similar fissure occurred in the industrial workplace, where pat- 
terns of sex discrimination clearly penalized women. Although 
opportunities abounded for those who wanted to work, women were 
found primarily in the ready-made clothing, textile, soap, cosmetics, 
and public health industries. They were also the majority in the 
shoe and food industries and in trade. Thus women were concen- 
trated in light industries, whereas economic development favored 
heavy industry, which employed mostly men, was more modern- 
ized and automated, and paid better wages. Not only were wom- 
en concentrated in branches of the economy where they labored 
at more arduous tasks and earned less, women were seldom em- 
ployed as supervisors, even in the sectors where they dominated 
in numbers. Women also made up more than 60 percent of the 
agricultural work force, which constituted about two-thirds of the 
total female labor force. 

This sexual division of labor was due both to discrimination and 
to voluntary choices on the part of women not to enter certain 
professions and not to seek promotions. Generally the primary factor 
in the decision to limit themselves was the double burden of 
homemaking and child rearing, which left little time for profes- 
sional preparation or extra responsibilities in the workplace. In ad- 
dition, men had negative attitudes toward women's careers. In a 
1968 study to determine whether professional women were sup- 
ported in their endeavors by their spouses, only 35 percent of the 
husbands interviewed valued their wives' careers more than their 
housework. This attitude was reinforced by labor laws designed 
to protect women's reproductive capacities and provide for maternal 
functions, which prohibited women from working in particular 
occupations and placed restrictions on hours and work load in 
general. 

Although women represented some 30 percent of the PCR mem- 
bership in 1980, few actually participated in political activity. Of 
those women serving in government, most held less powerful 
positions at the local level or served on women's committees 
attached to local trade unions, where the work was largely ad- 
ministrative in nature. Women were usually involved in issues of 



113 



Romania: A Country Study 

special concern to their gender, such as child care, or health and 
welfare matters, and rarely served on the more important state com- 
mittees. 

Unlike in the West, feminist groups dedicated expressly to the 
articulation and representation of women's interests did not exist 
in Romania. A national committee of prominent women headed 
by Ceau§escu's wife, Elena, was organized to advise the govern- 
ment on women's issues. There were also traditional women's 
groups, such as social and educational associations and women's 
committees attached to local trade unions. These organizations 
served the interests of the PCR first and foremost. The PCR offi- 
cially regarded feminism and an independent women's movement 
as divisive and unacceptable. 

Clearly socialism had not resolved the conflict between the sex- 
es, and although it provided equal access to education and employ- 
ment, it did not provide equal opportunity to succeed. In that 
regard, Romania's experience was not very different from that of 
other countries, but it was ironic that such inequality between the 
sexes persisted in a country ideologically committed to its elimi- 
nation. 

The Education System 

The PCR viewed education as the primary vehicle for transform- 
ing society, instilling socialist behavior standards and values, and 
thereby creating the new socialist man. The provision of free and 
universal public education extended social opportunity to a broad 
segment of the population and became a paramount factor in the 
regime's legitimacy. At the same time, education provided the state 
with an adequate labor force for continued economic development. 
These basic objectives — societal transformation, legitimacy, and 
economic development — continued to be the most influential fac- 
tors in setting education policy. 

Administration 

In 1989 the PCR continued to set education policy and initiate 
changes in the system. Education was centrally controlled through 
the Ministry of Education and Training, which carried out party 
mandates and was responsible for the general organization, manage- 
ment, and supervision of education. Although in theory all educa- 
tional activities were subject to the authority of this central ministry, 
many of the specific duties were delegated to support organiza- 
tions, and lower party organs were involved in running the sys- 
tem at all levels. The degree of central state involvement varied. 
Higher education, because of its vital role in research and economic 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



development, was the most directly administered. On the other 
hand, at the lower levels, there was a fair amount of parental and 
popular participation in school affairs. 

Political Education and Socialization 

Education was a political socialization process from preschool 
through university and beyond. In kindergarten ideological train- 
ing aimed to instill love of country, the PCR, and President 
Ceau§escu. In addition, children were introduced to the Marxist 
concept of work, largely through imitation of the everyday work 
world. Instruction stressed equality between the sexes in the working 
environment and the equal importance of physical and intellectu- 
al work. Much of the ideological training was dedicated to socialist 
morality, which emphasized obedience to discipline and commit- 
ment to building socialism over the welfare and advancement of 
the individual, as well as honesty and politeness. 

Although ideological training in preschools was indirect, as chil- 
dren progressed through the system, it began to resemble other 
academic subjects. Students were increasingly obligated to partic- 
ipate actively in ideological training. The emphasis was placed on 
conformity and anti- individualism. Violations of the dress code, 
which dictated dress, hairstyle, and general appearance, were 
viewed as ideologically incorrect behavior. The primary source of 
teaching materials for political instruction were party newspapers, 
and typical topics for discussion were Ceausescu's speeches, decrees 
by the Central Committee, and the role of industry in the coun- 
try's economic development. At the high school and university level, 
students read classical texts of Marxism-Leninism and studied the 
Romanian interpretation of them. 

In addition to the ideological training accomplished within the 
education system, political training was supplemented by extracur- 
ricular activities arranged for young people through the national 
youth organizations — the Pioneers and the Uniunea Tineretului 
Comunist (UTC), or Union of Communist Youth (see Glossary) — 
which were closely affiliated with schools but controlled by the PCR. 
Students in the fifth to eighth grades were members of the Pioneers, 
and students at the high school or university level were UTC mem- 
bers. Membership in these organizations, which supervised almost 
all extracurricular activities, was mandatory. In the 1980s, however, 
the youth organizations were battered by criticism because of the 
younger generation's political apathy and infatuation with Western 
values, music, and dress. The UTC was castigated for the anti- 
socialist nature and "narrow individualism and careerism" of 



115 



Romania: A Country Study 

young people and many of its traditional responsibilities were trans- 
ferred to educational and cultural organs. 

Ideological profiles were kept on each student throughout his or 
her academic career, and failure to exhibit correct ideological be- 
havior was noted. Upward mobility within the education system, 
and hence, upward social mobility, depended on getting passing 
marks in discipline and ideological studies as well as in academic 
studies. University students who demonstrated political activism, 
perhaps by serving as UTC officers, often were invited to join the 
PCR. 

Education and Legitimacy of the Regime 

Along with the aim of political socialization, a chief goal of the 
communists from when they first held power was the "democrati- 
zation" of education, which meant compulsory primary education 
for all members of society and implied greater access to higher edu- 
cation for peasants and workers. Democratization of education was 
to serve as the wellspring of upward social mobility and an impor- 
tant source of legitimacy for the regime. Large investments were 
made in education, and illiteracy was all but eradicated by 1966, 
an important achievement considering that in 1945 some 27 per- 
cent of the population was unable to read or write. 

At the same time there was a massive expansion of enrollment 
in elementary education, and universal ten-year basic schooling 
was achieved by 1975. In that year 100 percent of those eligible 
to attend elementary school were enrolled; the corresponding figure 
for secondary education was 49 percent, and for higher education 
10 percent. By 1970 the number of teachers at the primary and 
secondary level was three times the pre- 1945 figure, and by 1975 
the student-to-teacher ratio fell to 20 to 1 . The university teaching 
staff also expanded dramatically — from approximately 2,000 
teachers in the 1938-39 academic year to more than 13,000 by 1969. 
Teaching, especially at the university level, had long been a pres- 
tigious profession. Teachers were required to be qualified in two 
specialties and were trained in guidance and counseling. 

Throughout the 1970s, efforts were made to link more closely 
the education system to the requirements of the economy and the 
industrial development of the nation. This had a dramatic impact 
at all levels of the educational structure, as the desire for close ties 
between the school and real-life situations meant greater empha- 
sis on technical and vocational education, whereas the humani- 
ties and liberal arts suffered. This polytechnic approach favored 
basic education with more courses in mathematics and natural and 
physical sciences, factory and farm work during school hours, and 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



special courses aimed at instilling love and respect for manual labor 
and eliminating bias in favor of academic work. As a result, the 
education system of the 1980s openly discouraged higher academ- 
ic education and favored training that would produce workers and 
managers as quickly as possible. 

Preschool and Kindergarten 

The state provided some preschool and child-care institutions, 
including nurseries for children under three and kindergartens for 
children between three and six or seven. In 1955 only 18.6 per- 
cent of children aged three to six were actually enrolled in kinder- 
garten. That figure increased to 41 .9 percent in 1974, but demand 
still far exceeded the spaces available. By 1981, 75 percent of chil- 
dren between three and four years old and 90 percent of children 
between five and six were attending kindergarten. For a charge 
of about two dollars per month, full-day care (including two meals 
each day) was provided, and the child was intellectually and socially 
prepared for school. Apparently most parents concurred that the 
principal role in the care and development of children between the 
ages of three and six belonged to state institutions and not the 
family. On the other hand, studies showed that parents were much 
less willing to use nurseries, because they believed the quality of 
care was poor, and they considered care of children under three 
a function of the family. 

Primary Education 

As of the late 1980s, compulsory education began at age six and 
concluded at sixteen. Despite considerable differences in quality 
between rural and urban schools, the first four years were fairly 
standard for all students and consisted of a general program taught 
by teachers trained in three-year pedagogical institutes. As part 
of the de-Sovietization program, compulsory study of Russian had 
been dropped, and the traditional Soviet five-point marking sys- 
tem had been replaced with a ten-point system. Many students did 
study foreign languages, however, usually beginning in the fifth 
grade. English and French were the most popular choices. In grades 
five through eight, students began to specialize and were encouraged 
to start learning trades. Teachers for students at this level were 
primarily university-trained. 

Secondary Education 

Secondary education, of which two years were compulsory, 
allowed the students three options. The general secondary schools 
lasted four years and were geared toward preparing students for 



117 



Romania: A Country Study 

the university. These schools could concentrate on a specific field 
of study, such as economics or music or on a particular for- 
eign language. Four- and five-year technological secondary schools 
trained technicians and industrial managers. Two- and three-year 
vocational high schools, extolled by the regime, trained skilled work- 
ers. Most primary school graduates attended vocational schools. 

Education at the secondary level clearly reflected a technical bias. 
Three years after the 1973 educational reforms, the ratio of gener- 
al to technical and vocational schools was reversed — from four 
general to every one specialized school in 1973 to one general to 
four specialized schools in 1976. During the 1970s, the number 
of students enrolled in technical studies increased from 53,595 to 
124,000. The trend toward vocationalism continued into the 1980s, 
but general secondary schools continued to carry more status, 
despite official rhetoric and preferential treatment for vocational 
and technical schools. To combat popular bias favoring intellectu- 
al education, the leadership made a conscious effort to incorporate 
elements of vocational education into academic schools and vice 
versa. 

In the late 1980s, the regime claimed that more than 40 percent 
of graduates of specialized schools went on to higher education. 
But most peasant and worker families sent their children for some 
sort of vocational training, whereas the social and political elite se- 
cured a general secondary education and usually a college degree 
and a higher social niche for their offspring. This restratification 
of the education system bred resentment among the working class 
and was troublesome for the regime's goal of educational democrati- 
zation. 

Another major problem was the growth in credentialism that in 
turn created a greater demand for more post- secondary education 
of all types. But the occupations most necessary for economic de- 
velopment were among the least sought, and the gap between the 
needs of the economy and the aspirations of young people widened. 
The majority of young Romanians wished to pursue higher edu- 
cation, even as education institutions were channeling students into 
production as skilled workers with specialized training. 

Higher Education 

Despite remarkable expansion in education at the primary level 
and increased numbers of secondary school graduates, the transi- 
tion to mass higher education did not occur. Competition for entry 
to universities and other institutions of higher learning was extreme- 
ly intense, and the procedures for admission were strict and com- 
plicated. Despite an impressive network of universities, technical 



118 



Children on a school outing, Cluj-Napoca 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 
State theater in Drobeta-Turnu Severin 
Courtesy Harriet Gerber 



119 



Romania: A Country Study 



colleges, academies, and conservatories, only 8 percent of those 
eligible for higher education were permitted to enroll. The central 
government allocated slots based on predicted demand for given 
occupations. 

Stringent entrance exams eliminated a large number of appli- 
cants. Some 90 percent of freshmen entering one university depart- 
ment had private tutoring for eight years before taking the tests. 
Because the exams were tailored to the course of study, as early 
as the fifth grade students began planning their specializations, so 
that they could devote the last four years of elementary school and 
four years of high school to the subjects in which they would be 
tested. Both high school teachers and university professors con- 
firmed that it was next to impossible to enter the university without 
private tutoring. 

The cost of a private tutor was prohibitive for many workers and 
peasant families, and rural-urban differences in education exacer- 
bated their difficulties. A point system that discriminated in the 
favor of workers and peasants was apparently not enough to com- 
pensate for poorer preparation. Such students had less chance of 
getting into universities and even when admitted were more likely 
to drop out. Most of the 20 percent of students dropping out after 
the first year were of peasant or working-class backgrounds. 

Although the state provided generous financial support ranging 
from low-cost housing and meals, free tuition, and book subsidies 
to monthly stipends, higher education was not free of charge. For 
those students who received financial aid, the amount depended 
on factors such as social background .and specialization. Some stu- 
dents were sponsored by a particular industrial enterprise, for whom 
they pledged to work for a certain amount of time after complet- 
ing their studies. 

Religion 

Church-State Relations 

Although officially atheistic, the state in 1989 recognized and 
financially supported sixteen different religious groups. These 
groups and the scope of their activity were controlled by the Depart- 
ment of Cults and were subject to strict regulations. Churches could 
not engage in any religious activity outside officially designat- 
ed religious buildings. This restriction prohibited open-air services, 
community work, pilgrimages, and evangelization. Religious edu- 
cation for young people was expressly forbidden, and religious class- 
es in general were prohibited. Severe restrictions limited the print- 
ing and import of bibles and other religious books and materials, and 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



their distribution was treated as a criminal offense. The state recog- 
nized no religious holidays and often asked for "voluntary labor" 
on important holidays in an apparent effort to reduce church 
attendance and erode religious influence. 

After 1984, under the guise of urban renewal, many churches 
of all denominations in and around Bucharest, including churches 
with unique spiritual and historical importance, were demolished 
by government orders. By 1988 approximately twenty-five had been 
razed, and sixty or seventy more were scheduled for destruction. 
Some of the buildings leveled were more than 300 years old, and 
many were classified as architectural monuments. Along with them, 
valuable icons and works of art were destroyed. Protests by con- 
gregation members, leading intellectuals, and Western governments 
failed to halt the demolition. 

The Romanian Orthodox Church 

In the late 1980s, the Romanian Orthodox Church, by far the 
largest denomination, claimed some 16 million members — roughly 
70 percent of the total population. The church had some 12,000 
places of worship and 9,000 priests and was the most generous- 
ly supported of all denominations. The most important positions 
in the Orthodox hierarchy were filled by party nominees, and 
the church remained patently submissive to the regime, even in 
the face of repeated attacks on the most basic religious values 
and continued violations of church rights. Church leaders laud- 
ed the "conditions of religious freedom" that the state had guaran- 
teed them and were known to collaborate with the Securitate in 
silencing clergymen who spoke out against the demolition of 
churches, interference in church affairs, and atheistic propaganda 
in the media. 

The Roman Catholic Church 

The next largest denomination, the Catholic Church, in the late 
1980s had about 3 million members, who belonged to two groups — 
the Eastern Rite Church, or Uniates, and the Latin Rite Church, 
or Roman Catholics. After 1948 the Department of Cults took 
the official position that "no religious community and none of its 
officials may have relations with religious communities abroad" 
and that "foreign religious cults may not exercise jurisdiction on 
Romanian territory." These regulations were designed to abolish 
papal authority over Catholics in Romania, and the Roman Catho- 
lic Church, although it was one of the sixteen recognized religions, 
lacked legal standing, as its organizational charter was never 
approved by the Department of Cults. The fact that most members 



121 



Romania: A Country Study 

of the Roman Catholic community were ethnic Hungarians prob- 
ably contributed to the church's tenuous position. In 1948 Roman 
Catholics were deprived of three of five sees, leaving only two 
bishops to attend to the spiritual needs of the large membership. 
Subsequently all Catholic seminaries and charitable institutions were 
closed and newspapers and other publications affiliated with the 
church were suppressed. A few seminaries were reopened in 1952, 
but they were generally provided little support by the state. 
Although the priest-to-members ratio remained quite high in the 
1980s, more than 60 percent of the active clergy were over 60 years 
of age, and owing to restrictions on enrollment in seminaries and 
theological colleges, their numbers were likely to decline. 

After 1982 the church was allowed only fifteen junior and thirty 
senior seminarians per year. Moreover priests received minimal 
salaries and had no pension plans nor retirement homes. The state 
controlled all clerical appointments, which meant that many vacan- 
cies went unfilled, and effective priests were transferred from par- 
ish to parish, whereas those who proved most loyal to the regime 
received the highest salaries and key appointments. Seminaries, 
priests, and congregations were closely watched and infiltrated by 
the Securitate. Even in the 1980s, the danger of being interrogat- 
ed, beaten, imprisoned, or even murdered was apparentiy very real, 
as most foreign visitors found priests and lay people alike too fright- 
ened to communicate with them. The government also restricted 
the amount of work that could be done to repair or enlarge church 
buildings. 

In the early 1980s, there were indications that tensions between 
the Vatican and the regime over bishopric appointments were eas- 
ing. Pope John Paul II successfully appointed an apostolic adminis- 
trator for the Bucharest archbishopric. As of 1989, however, the 
Romanian government had not officially recognized the appoint- 
ment, and the issues of inadequate church facilities, restrictions 
on the training of priests, and insufficient printing of religious 
materials remained unresolved. 

The Uniate Church 

Although its members are primarily Romanian, the Uniate 
Church has received even more severe treatment. By the late seven- 
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Uniates, or Eastern or 
Byzantine Rite Catholics, had broken away from the Orthodox 
Church and accepted papal authority while retaining the Ortho- 
dox ritual, canon, and calendar, and conducting the worship service 
in Romanian. In 1948, in an obvious attempt to use religion to 
foster political unity, the country's 1.7 million Uniates were forcibly 



122 



Central University Library in Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

reattached to the Romanian Orthodox Church. Some 14,000 recal- 
citrant priests and 5,000 adherents were arrested, at least 200 be- 
lievers were murdered during incarceration, and many others died 
from disease and hunger. The suppression of the Uniate Church 
required collaboration between the regime and the Romanian Or- 
thodox Church hierarchy, which maintained that the Uniates had 
been forcibly subjugated to Rome and were simply being reintegrat- 
ed into the church where they properly belonged. 

That the Uniate Church survived, albeit precariously and un- 
derground, long after it officially had ceased to exist was an em- 
barrassment to the regime and the Orthodox leadership. Even in 
the mid-1980s, there were still some 1.5 million believers, and about 
twenty "Orthodox" parishes that were universally regarded as Uni- 
ate. Besides 300 priests who were not converted, another 450 priests 
were secretly trained. The church had three underground bishops. 
After 1977 some Uniate clergymen led a movement demanding 
the reinstatement of their church and full restoration of rights in 
accordance with constitutional provisions for freedom of worship. 
In 1982 the Vatican publicly expressed concern for the fate of the 
Uniates and supported their demands. The Romanian authorities 
protested this act as interference in the internal affairs of the Roma- 
nian Orthodox Church. 



123 



Romania: A Country Study 
Other Religions 

Romania's Jewish community in the late 1980s numbered be- 
tween 20,000 and 25,000, of whom half were more than sixty-five 
years old. Jews enjoyed considerably more autonomy than any other 
religious denomination. In 1983 there were 120 synagogues, all 
of which had been relatively recently restored. For twenty-five years 
the Jewish Federation in Romania had been allowed to publish a 
biweekly magazine in four languages. There were three ordained 
rabbis, and religious education was widely available to Jewish chil- 
dren. In addition the government permitted the Jewish Federa- 
tion to operate old-age homes and kosher restaurants. On the other 
hand, there were repeated anti-Semitic outbursts in the official press 
and elsewhere that were condoned by the regime. 

Romania also has a Muslim community, which in the late 1980s 
numbered about 41,000. Two ethnic groups — Turks and Tatars — 
concentrated in the Dobruja region make up this religious com- 
munity. 

In the 1980s there were a number of Protestant and neo- 
Protestant denominations that were formally recognized and os- 
tensibly protected by the Constitution. The Reformed (Calvinist) 
Church, an entirely Hungarian congregation, had a membership 
of between 700,000 and 800,000. The Unitarian Church, also large- 
ly Hungarian, had between 50,000 and 75,000 members. The 
Lutheran Church had a membership of about 166,000 — mainly 
Transylvanian Saxons. Most of the neo-Protestant followers were 
converts from the Romanian Orthodox Church. Of these, the Bap- 
tists were the largest denomination with 200,000 members, followed 
by the Pentacostalists (75,000 members), Seventh Day Adventists 
(70,000 members), and a few other smaller groups. 

The neo-Protestant religions attracted an increasing number of 
followers in later years. The rapid growth, especially among Bap- 
tists and Pentacostalists, continued throughout the 1970s, and many 
young converts from the established churches were gained. This trend 
was troublesome to the regime because many neo-Protestants — 
especially Baptist clergymen — called on churches to resist state in- 
terference in their affairs and suggested that the state should respect 
Christians' rights and renounce atheism. In the late 1970s and in 
the 1980s, the regime responded to this quasi-political movement 
with a press campaign attacking the credibility of the denomina- 
tions and with police repression. Many congregations were fined 
heavily, and their most effective leaders and activists were arrest- 
ed or forced to emigrate, whereas others were threatened with dis- 
missal from their jobs and the loss of social benefits. Propaganda, 



124 




Monk sounding the call to vespers at Snagov Monastery near Bucharest 

Courtesy Barbu Alim 



125 



Romania: A Country Study 

media attacks, and police repression against Jehovah's Witnesses 
were especially harsh. Because the sect remained unregistered, its 
mere existence was illegal. The regime claimed that the religious 
beliefs espoused by the sect were "dangerous, antihumanistic, 
antidemocratic, and antiprogressive." 

Social Conditions 

The economic crisis of the late 1970s and the 1980s imposed a 
precipitous decline in social expenditures and social services. Be- 
tween 1980 and 1985, annual outlays for housing decreased by 37 
percent, for health care by 17 percent, and for education, culture, 
and science by 53 percent. This dramatic decrease in social spending 
meant that in the 1980s Romanians lived in conditions of im- 
poverishment akin to that experienced in the 1940s. 

Housing 

Although housing was a high priority, in the 1980s it remained 
inadequate in both supply and quality. The law allotted only twelve 
square meters of living space per person, and the average citizen 
had even less — about ten square meters. More than half a million 
workers lived in hostels; some had lived there for many years, even 
after they had married and had children. These hostels were known 
for their cramped and squalid conditions and for the heavy drink- 
ing and violence of their occupants. The lists of persons waiting 
for housing were long, and bribes of as much as 40,000 lei were 
necessary to shorten the wait. 

Defying reality, the PCR leadership pronounced the housing 
problem "solved for the most part" and predicted its total elimi- 
nation by 1990, an unlikely prospect in view of the fact that new 
housing construction during the Eighth Five- Year Plan (1986-90) 
had fallen far short of target. To achieve the official goal of four- 
teen square meters per person by the year 2000, it would have been 
necessary to complete an apartment every three minutes. Comecon- 
published statistics and even figures released by the Romanian 
government indicated that in fact there had been a sharp decline 
in the construction of new dwelling space. 

Public Health 

Health care in socialist Romania was provided free of charge 
by the state and, at least in theory, to all citizens. Indeed, between 
1940 and 1980, annual expenditures for public health increased 
considerably. There was a concurrent rise in the number of physi- 
cians and hospital beds available to the population. In 1950 there 
were 9.1 physicians and 41.6 hospital beds per 10,000 people. 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



By 1971 these numbers had risen to 12.1 and 84.7 respectively. 
Using officially reported infant mortality rates and life expectancy 
figures as indicators, public health improved. Infant mortality 
decreased from 116.7 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 49.4 
per 1,000 in 1970 and to only 23.4 per 1,000 in 1984. It should 
be noted, however, that infant deaths were officially recorded only 
if the infant was older than one month. Over the same period, life 
expectancy rose for men from 61 .5 to 67 years and for women from 
65 to 72.6 years. 

In later years, however, infant mortality apparently rose quite 
rapidly, particularly after 1984. In 1988 health officials confirmed 
the rise in infant mortality, blaming the incompetence of medical 
personnel, geographic remoteness, harsh weather, and even "care- 
less and uncooperative mothers" for the higher rate of mortality. 
Western observers suggested explanations such as harsh working 
conditions, especially in the textile industry, environmental pollu- 
tion, and a food supply that was inadequate for the needs of ex- 
pectant mothers and infants. Shortages of infant formula and 
inadequate concentrations of powdered milk resulted in malnutri- 
tion and death. Perhaps the greatest factor, however, was the 
government's demographic policy that forced women who were un- 
willing or in poor health to bear children. In the first year after 
the demographic policy was introduced in 1966, infant mortality 
increased by some 145.6 percent. There were even reports of new- 
borns in hospital incubators dying during government-ordered pow- 
er shutdowns. In 1989 the death rate of newborns stood at roughly 
25 per 1,000 live births. 

Although the mortality rate among the elderly decreased dur- 
ing the decades following the war, an unstable food supply, ener- 
gy shortages, and the increasing cost of living in the 1980s posed 
grave hardship for the aged, who lived on pensions that averaged 
only 2,000 lei per month. Staple foods were rationed throughout 
the 1980s and were often unavailable except at exorbitant prices 
on the black market. In late 1988, one kilogram of meat was priced 
at 160 lei, or about 8 percent of the monthly pension. Cheese cost 
as much as 120 lei and coffee about 1 ,000 lei per kilogram. Although 
utility rates rose sharply, most people periodically had no hot water, 
heat, or electricity. In late 1988, pensions were raised an average 
8 percent for some 1,352,000 people. It seemed doubtful, however, 
that the raise would make an appreciable difference in the face of 
erratic food and energy supplies and steadily rising inflation. 

The elderly, who represented a growing percentage of the popu- 
lation (14.3 percent in 1986), received shoddy treatment from the 
state. Through regulations issued at the local level, they were 



127 



Romania: A Country Study 

unable to move to larger cities — where food and health care were 
more readily available — even when their children offered to care 
for them. There was also widespread discrimination against the 
aged in health care. Hospitals responded to emergency calls from 
citizens over 60 years old slowly, if at all. Physicians routinely avoid- 
ed treating the elderly in nonemergency cases and reportedly were 
under strict instructions from the state to reduce drug prescrip- 
tions for the aged. Homes for old people, established and run by 
the state social security system, had appalling reputations. In these 
institutions, the elderly suffered from inadequate medical care, poor 
hygienic standards, and the same food and heating shortages that 
affected the general population. After 1984 the winter months 
brought many complaints that old people had to go without heat 
and hot water for as long as a week, and there were regular reports 
of deaths of elderly men and women because of poor heating. 

The disreputable treatment of the elderly was ironic in a coun- 
try that had a long tradition of geriatrics. After 1952 Romania had 
an Institute of Geriatrics, directed by Dr. Ana Asian until her death 
in 1968. Asian was known internationally for developing "rejuve- 
nation" drugs and for a philosophy of longevity that stressed so- 
cial factors and material needs. The First National Congress of 
Geriatrics and Gerontology, held in Bucharest in 1988, failed to 
criticize the dire situation of the elderly in Romania. 

Medical care was unevenly distributed throughout the country 
for all citizens, not just the elderly. There were substantial differ- 
ences between urban and rural standards. In the 1980s, although 
half the population continued to live in rural areas, only 7,000 (15.7 
percent) of the 44,494 physicians worked in the countryside. Con- 
sequently, many citizens had to travel great distances to get medi- 
cal care. The state did not provide free medical care to some 500,000 
peasants and 40,500 private artisans. In addition, access to medi- 
cal care often depended on the gratuities proffered. It was com- 
mon to offer medical personnel money, food, or Kent cigarettes 
(see Banking ch. 3). Moreover the quality of health care depend- 
ed on social standing. For example, only special health units that 
served party members, the Securitate, or the upper ranks of the 
military dispensed Western medications or had modern medical 
facilities comparable to those in the West. 

Although many of the diseases of poverty had disappeared, 
cancer, cardiovascular disease, alcoholism, and smoking-related 
illnesses were prominent. Alcoholism, judging by the dramatic in- 
crease in production and consumption of alcohol after the 1960s, 
was a serious problem. By 1985 wine and beer production was twice 
that of 1950, and hard liquor production was four times higher. 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



In 1980 beer consumption was eleven times that of 1950, brandy 
use was 2.2 times higher, and consumption of other alcoholic drinks 
was 5.8 times greater. 

Drinking was prominent in all segments of society, but especially 
in the villages, where almost every occasion for celebration involved 
consumption of alcohol. Young workers in hostels were notorious 
for heavy and competitive drinking, which often led to brawls, des- 
truction of public property, and violent crimes. 

The deterioration of the standard of living exacerbated the drink- 
ing problem. Although food was scarce, the supply of alcohol was 
ample, and there was little else on which to spend one's wages. 
Moreover, the use of alcohol was encouraged by the traditional 
practice of offering bottles of liquor as bribes or gifts. Finally, offi- 
cial pronouncements aside, the sale of alcohol brought considera- 
ble profit to the state, and little real progress was made against 
increased consumption despite its adverse effects on labor produc- 
tivity and work safety. 

After a long official silence on the incidence of AIDS (acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome) in Romania, the first media refer- 
ences to the disease began to appear in late 1985. Even then the 
brief articles contained very little information. They gave the tech- 
nical name and classification of the disease and mentioned that it 
was fatal but said nothing about how AIDS was transmitted, its 
symptoms, or what preventive measures could stops its spread. The 
articles mentioned only two risk groups — drug addicts and 
hemophiliacs — and made no reference to the prevalence of AIDS 
among homosexual men. Most likely this omission was due to the 
fact that homosexuals as a group were never publicly acknowledged. 
Not only was homosexuality a taboo subject, it was illegal and 
punishable by one to five years in prison. 

By 1987 Romania had reported only two deaths from AIDS and 
only thirteen carriers of the disease to the World Health Organi- 
zation. But nothing about the cases, deaths, or carriers appeared 
in the Romanian press, which continued to emphasize that the 
highest incidence of AIDS occurred in the West, particularly in 
the United States. In 1988, however, a committee was established 
to study the disease. Between 1985 and 1987, thousands of people 
were tested for AIDS. In mid- 1987 an information campaign was 
initiated. Articles in the press more frankly and factually covered 
the disease, admitting the existence of fifteen cases and two deaths 
from AIDS, as well as explaining for the first time that male 
homosexuals were the highest risk group. The symptoms were also 
listed. Still, efforts to combat the disease may have been seriously 
hampered by sexual taboos that persisted in Romanian society. 



129 



Romania: A Country Study 

High-risk groups such as homosexuals and prostitutes were un- 
likely to voluntarily submit to screening for fear of going to jail. 
In addition, the health service was impaired by the country's eco- 
nomic deterioration, and there was little hard currency available 
to purchase necessary testing and diagnostic equipment and sup- 
plies from the West. 

State Welfare Assistance 

The pension scheme in socialist Romania provided for state em- 
ployees only. Cooperatives, professional associations, and the clergy 
had to provide their own pensions. State employees were usually 
required to retire at age sixty-two for men and fifty-seven for wom- 
en. Retirement could be postponed for up to three years, or in- 
dividuals could request early retirement at sixty years of age for 
men and fifty-two for women if conditions for length of service were 
met (twenty-five years for women and thirty years for men). The 
employer adjudicated requests for early or postponed retirement. 
Pensions were based on the employee's salary level and length of 
service. Retirees without the required length of service had their 
pensions reduced accordingly. Pension amounts were not perma- 
nently fixed, but could be adjusted up or down according to the 
needs of the state, and presumably, the needs of the elderly. 

In addition to retirement pensions, the state provided pensions 
to invalids and survivors' benefits to the immediate families of de- 
ceased persons entided to retirement pensions. Monetary assistance 
was also provided under a state insurance plan in cases of sickness 
or injury. Again, this help was available only to state employees. 
The state also provided special programs for social assistance to 
orphans, people with mental or physical handicaps, and the elderly. 

* * * 

Many scholars have written on the structure and dynamics of 
Romanian society. Especially interesting and informative overviews 
can be found in Lawrence S. Graham's Romania: A Developing 
Socialist State and Ian Matley's Romania: A Profile. Michael Shafir's 
Romania: Politics, Economy, and Society is remarkable for depth and 
detail. The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism by William E. 
Crowther is an excellent description of both politics and society. 
A thorough examination of industrialization and urbanization and 
their impact on society is presented in Per Ronnas's Urbanization 
in Romania, a Geography of Social and Economic Change. A useful 
examination of systematization made all the more interesting and in- 
formative for its anthropological perspective is Steven L. Sampson's 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



National Integration Through Socialist Planning. Trond Gilberg's Mod- 
ernization in Romania since World War II describes socioeconomic 
modernization, education, political socialization, housing, social 
services, and medical care. Transylvania, the Roots of Ethnic Conflict, 
edited by John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi, and Louis J. Elte- 
to, and an article by George Schopflin, "The Hungarians of Roma- 
nia," provide thorough treatments of ethnic minority issues. Several 
articles by William Moskoff are invaluable for their information 
on women's issues and demographic policy. The following books 
provide excellent comparisons of Romanian and other East Euro- 
pean societies: Politics and Society in Eastern Europe, by Joni Loven- 
duski and Jean Woodall; Socialism, Politics and Equality, by Walter 
D. Connor; Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc, 
also by Connor; and Politics in Eastern Europe, by Ivan Volgyes. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



131 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Rolling mill at Gala^i Steelworks 



THE STALINIST ECONOMIC MODEL imposed on Roma- 
nia after World War II survived the following four decades large- 
ly unaffected by the liberalizing reforms that gradually occurred 
in other parts of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Indeed, in its 
degree of centralization, the pervasiveness of communist control, 
and the general secretary's personal dominance of economic poli- 
cy making and implementation, the Romanian model arguably 
eclipsed even the Soviet archetype. 

Through a highly centralized and interlocking party and state 
bureaucracy that reached from Bucharest to every farm and facto- 
ry, the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Roman — 
PCR, see Glossary) set economic goals, allocated resources, pro- 
cured and distributed industrial and agricultural output, controlled 
prices and wages, and monopolized banking and foreign trade. 
Ideological goals and the preservation of power and privilege for 
the party elite had superseded all other considerations in econom- 
ic decision making — even including the maintenance of a mini- 
mum standard of living for the general population. 

The 1980s were a period of extreme deprivation for most Roma- 
nians. Determined to retire as quickly as possible the foreign debt 
accrued during the previous decade and thereby reassert his coun- 
try's political and economic autonomy, General Secretary and Presi- 
dent Nicolae Ceau§escu demanded enormous sacrifice on the part 
of ordinary citizens. His effort to build large foreign-trade surpluses 
required exporting basic commodities in short supply at home. Food 
rationing was reimposed in 1981 for the first time since the early 
1950s, while the government continued exporting large amounts 
of food to earn foreign exchange. Consumers also faced chronic 
shortages of gasoline, electricity, and heat. Durables such as house- 
hold appliances and automobiles were exorbitantly expensive, and 
their use was discouraged by the authorities. 

In early 1989, Ceau§escu proclaimed that Romania had finally 
rid itself of the onerous foreign debt and could resume the pursuit 
of its long-term economic goal — the status of a multilaterally de- 
veloped socialist state (see Glossary) by the year 2000. His vision 
of making Romania a "medium-developed" country by 1990 clear- 
ly had not come to fruition, as the economy had suffered numer- 
ous reversals since 1980. Western economists asserted that during 
much of the decade, industrial and agricultural output may actu- 
ally have declined. This decline could not be confirmed by official 



135 



Romania: A Country Study 

statistics, which had become increasingly untrustworthy and clearly 
omitted many categories of information. 

The economic stagnation of the 1980s followed three decades of 
impressive industrial growth, when Romania had maintained one 
of the highest rates of capital accumulation and investment in the 
world. Industrial output by the end of the 1970s was more than 
100 times greater than in 1945. The most notable growth had oc- 
curred in basic heavy industry, particularly in the chemical, ener- 
gy, machine-building, and metallurgical sectors. Romania had 
become one of the world's leading producers and exporters of steel, 
refined petroleum products, machine tools, locomotives and roll- 
ing stock, oil-field equipment, offshore-drilling rigs, aircraft, and 
other sophisticated manufactures. Light industry's share of total 
output, however, had declined from more than 60 percent before 
World War II to less than 25 percent by the 1980s. The PCR in- 
dustrialization program had been able to draw on a rich natural 
endowment of basic raw materials, including the most extensive 
oil and gas reserves in Eastern Europe, coal, metallic ores and other 
minerals, and timber. Natural inland waterways and warm-water 
seaports facilitated domestic and foreign commerce. And numer- 
ous streams and rivers flowing from the highlands provided oppor- 
tunities for irrigation and electric power generation. These natural 
advantages notwithstanding, the economy of the 1980s suffered a 
severe raw materials and energy shortage as a large share of the 
most accessible reserves neared depletion. Furthermore, years of care- 
less resource exploitation had caused severe environmental degra- 
dation, with particular harm to the water supply, soil, and forests. 

Equally as critical to Romania's postwar development as its 
natural resources were its large reserves of underemployed rural 
labor that could be mobilized and transformed into an urban 
proletariat. But already by the end of the 1970s, it had become 
clear that this resource also was being exhausted. Romania faced 
an incipient labor shortage of the sort that had already stricken 
its more industrialized neighbors. This shortage was brought on 
by a declining birthrate, the aging of the population, the emigra- 
tion of skilled workers, and the squandering of labor resources 
through poor planning and management. All sectors of the econo- 
my suffered from low labor morale and productivity and a grow- 
ing dissatisfaction with working conditions, wages, benefits, and 
the general standard of living. This dissatisfaction had even be- 
gun to surface in unprecedented strikes, demonstrations, and other 
acts of defiance. 

The ambitious industrialization program had deprived agricul- 
ture of investment capital and manpower for most of the first four 



136 



The Economy 



decades of communist rule. But even as late as 1982, 28.6 percent 
of the working population was still engaged in farming. Applica- 
tion of more modern farming practices and an ambitious irriga- 
tion and land reclamation program had steadily raised production. 
Grain output more than quadrupled between 1950 and 1980. 
Nevertheless, output consistendy fell short of target and was gener- 
ally inadequate for domestic and export requirements. 

After decades of neglect, in the late 1970s agriculture had final- 
ly begun to receive investments at levels commensurate with its 
importance to the national economy. But by the early 1980s, the 
general economic crisis prevented importing the inputs needed to 
make the sector more productive. This development, combined with 
the counterproductive imposition of compulsory delivery quotas 
on private farmers and more centralized administration of the en- 
tire sector, resulted in agricultural stagnation through much of the 
1980s. 

Economic Structure and Dynamics 
Evolution 

From earliest times, the Romanian lands were renowned for their 
fertile soil and good harvests. As the Roman colony of Dacia, the 
region supplied grain and other foods to the empire for nearly two 
centuries. During the subsequent two millennia, a succession of 
foreign powers dominated the area, exploiting the rich soil and other 
resources and holding most of the native population in abject 
poverty. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that 
a unified, independent Romania finally emerged, opening the way 
for development of an integrated national economy. 

But even after Romania had gained independence, foreign in- 
terests continued to dominate the economy. Large tracts of the best 
grain- growing areas were controlled by absentee landlords, who 
exported the grain and took the profits out of the country. Out- 
siders controlled most of the few industries, and non-Romanian 
ethnic groups — particularly Germans, Hungarians, and Jews — 
dominated domestic trade and finance. The centuries of outside 
control of the economy engendered in the Romanian people an 
extreme xenophobia and longing for self-sufficiency — sentiments 
that would be exploited repeatedly by the nation's leaders through- 
out the twentieth century. 

On the eve of World War II, agriculture and forestry produced 
more than half of the national income (see Glossary). Reflecting the 
country's limited economic development, about 90 percent of export 
income in 1939 was derived from raw materials and semifinished 



137 



Romania: A Country Study 

goods, namely grain, timber, animal products, and petroleum. The 
most advanced industry at that time, oil extraction and refining, 
was controlled by Nazi Germany for the duration of the war and 
suffered severe bombing damage. 

For several years following the war, the devastated economy was 
burdened with reparation payments to the Soviet Union, which 
already by 1946 had expropriated more than one-third of the coun- 
try's industrial and financial enterprises. By mid- 1948 the Soviets 
had collected reparations in excess of US$1.7 billion. They con- 
tinued to demand such payments until 1954, severely retarding eco- 
nomic recovery. 

After the installation of a Soviet-styled communist regime, Roma- 
nia's economic evolution would faithfully follow the Stalinist pat- 
tern. Adopting a centrally planned economy under the firm control 
of the PCR, the country pursued the extensive economic develop- 
ment (see Glossary) strategy adopted by the other communist re- 
gimes of Eastern Europe but with an unparalleled obsession with 
economic independence. The development program assigned top 
priority to the industrial sector, imposed a policy of forced saving 
and consumer sacrifice to achieve a high capital accumulation rate, 
and necessitated a major movement of labor from the countryside 
into industrial jobs in newly created urban centers. The first step 
on this path was nationalization of industrial, financial, and trans- 
portation assets. Initiated in June 1948, that process was nearly 
completed by 1950. The socialization of agriculture proceeded at 
a much slower pace, but by 1962 it was about 90 percent completed. 

Beginning in 1951, Romania put into practice the Soviet sys- 
tem of central planning based on five-year development cycles. Such 
a system enabled the leadership to target sectors for rapid develop- 
ment and mobilize the necessary manpower and material resources. 
The leadership was intent on building a heavy industrial base and 
therefore gave highest priority to the machinery, metallurgical, 
petroleum refining, electric power, and chemical industries. 

Shortly after Nicolae Ceau§escu came to power in 1965, PCR 
leaders reevaluated the development strategy and concluded that 
Romania would be unable to sustain the rapid rate of economic 
growth it had achieved since the early 1950s unless its industry could 
be streamlined and modernized. They argued that the time had 
come to assume an intensive development strategy, for which the 
term "multilateral development" was coined. This process required 
access to the latest technology and know-how, for which Ceau§es- 
cu turned to the West. 

Economic growth during the first twenty-seven years of com- 
munist rule was impressive. Industrial output increased an average 



138 



The Economy 



12.9 percent per year between 1950 and 1977, owing to an excep- 
tionally high level of capital accumulation and investment, which 
grew an average 13 percent annually during this period. But with 
the concentration of resources in heavy (the so-called Group A) in- 
dustries, other sectors suffered, particularly agriculture, services, and 
the consumer-goods (Group B) industries (see table 2, Appendix). 

After 1976 the economy took a sharp downturn. A severe earth- 
quake struck the country the following year, causing heavy damage 
to industrial and transportation facilities. Ceausescu's vision of mul- 
tilateral development had made little headway, as the bureaucra- 
cy was unable to steer the economy onto a course of intensive 
development, which would have necessitated major improvements 
in efficiency and labor productivity. The population was demand- 
ing production of more consumer goods, and an incipient labor 
shortage was hindering economic growth. By 1981 the country was 
in a financial crisis, unable to pay Western institutions even the 
interest on the debt of more than US$10 billion accumulated dur- 
ing the preceding decade. Obsessed with repaying this debt as soon 
as possible, Ceau§escu imposed an austerity program to curtail im- 
ports drastically, while exporting as much as possible to earn hard 
currencies. Rationing of basic foodstuffs, gasoline, electricity, and 
other consumer products was in effect throughout the 1980s, bring- 
ing the Romanian people the lowest standard of living in Europe 
with the possible exception of Albania. In April 1989, Ceau§escu 
announced that the foreign debt had been retired, and he promised 
a rapid improvement in living conditions. Most foreign observ- 
ers, however, doubted that he could fulfill this pledge. 

Administration and Control 

Stalin's Legacy 

The Romanian economic model retained all the salient features 
of Stalinism, including state ownership of the means of produc- 
tion; communist party control of economic policy making and ad- 
ministration through interlocking party and state bureaucracies; 
democratic centralism, including concentration of decision-making 
power in the highest party executive organs and particularly in the 
person of the general secretary; annual and five-year economic plan- 
ning; nonreliance on the counsel of technical and managerial ex- 
perts in setting economic goals; forced deliveries of economic output 
to the state; pricing based on political and ideological considera- 
tions rather than market forces; reliance on mobilization campaigns 
in lieu of material incentives for workers; inflexibility and resistance 
to reform. 



139 



Romania: A Country Study 

Ownership of Economic Assets 

When the Constitution of 1965 declared Romania a socialist 
republic, the country had already made substantial headway in so- 
cializing its economic assets. And judging by Ceau§escu's words 
on the occasion of his sixty-ninth birthday in 1987, the campaign 
to eliminate private ownership appeared irreversible: "One can- 
not speak of a socialist economy and not assume the socialist owner- 
ship of the means of production as its basis. " The state owned and 
controlled all natural resources except for a steadily declining 
amount of agriculturally marginal land still in private hands (see 
Land, this ch). All of industry had been socialized, but for a small 
number of artisan workshops, which contributed less than 0.5 per- 
cent of total marketable output in the 1980s. Even cooperatives, 
categorized as socialist forms of ownership, had fallen into decline 
at the very time they were enjoying a renaissance in the Soviet 
Union and the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary). Cooperative farms, for ex- 
ample, were considered ideologically less acceptable than state 
farms, which had priority access to rich land, fertilizers, machinery, 
and other inputs. And cooperative industrial enterprises account- 
ed for only 4.3 percent of national output in 1984. 

Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party 

The Romanian economic structure was unusual in the extreme 
degree to which party and governmental hierarchies were inter- 
twined and even formally merged. This fusion of bureaucracies 
was even apparent in the architecture of the capital city, Bucharest, 
whose skyline in the late 1980s came to be dominated by a mas- 
sive new Palace of Government, housing both party and state agen- 
cies. All state administrative offices, from the national to the lowest 
local levels, were filled by carefully screened PCR careerists. As 
early as 1967, Ceau§escu had called for administrative streamlin- 
ing by eliminating the duplication of party and government func- 
tions. His solution was to assign responsibility for a given economic 
activity to a single individual. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the merging of party and state 
organs gained momentum, affording the PCR ever tighter con- 
trol over the economy. The process culminated in the emergence 
of national economic coordinating councils — administrative enti- 
ties not envisioned by the Constitution of 1965. These party- 
controlled councils provided Ceau§escu, who after 1967 held the 
dual titles of general secretary of the PCR and president of the 
Council of State, the means to dominate the economic bureaucracy. 



140 



The Economy 



One of the most powerful of the new joint party and state bod- 
ies was the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development, 
which Ceau§escu chaired from its inception in 1973. The new 
300-member council coopted the authority to debate and approve 
state economic plans — authority constitutionally granted to the 
Grand National Assembly (GNA — see Glossary). The latter' s role 
in the planning process became increasingly ceremonial, as real 
policy-making power shifted to the Supreme Council's permanent 
bureau — also chaired by Ceau§escu. At a joint meeting of party 
and state officials in June 1987, Ceau§escu announced the conver- 
sion of the permanent bureau into a quasi-military economic 
supreme command, further tightening his grip on planning while 
reducing the role of the governmental institution created for that 
purpose — the State Planning Committee. That same year, he signed 
a decree endorsing the 1988 annual economic plan even before ob- 
taining rubber-stamp approval by either the Central Committee 
of the PCR or the GNA. Thus the general secretary had assumed 
absolute authority in setting economic policy. 

Among other important joint party and state economic councils 
to evolve during the Ceau§escu era were the Central Council of 
Workers' Control over Economic and Social Activities, which over- 
saw economic plan fulfillment; the Council for Social and Economic 
Organizations, which controlled the size and functions of the minis- 
tries and enterprises; and the National Council of Science and Tech- 
nology. The latter was chaired by the general secretary's wife, Elena 
Ceau§escu, who was emerging as a powerful political figure in her 
own right. In June 1987, it was announced that this body there- 
after would collaborate with the Supreme Council of Economic and 
Social Development and would draft development plans and pro- 
grams, thus giving Elena Ceau§escu much of the authority con- 
stitutionally vested in the chairmanship of the State Planning 
Committee. 

Ceau§escu consolidated his control of the economy not only by 
creating new bureaucratic structures, but also by frequent rota- 
tion of officials between party and state bureaucracies and between 
national and local posts. In effect after 1971, the policy was highly 
disruptive. For example, twenty economic ministers were replaced 
in September 1988 alone. Rotation enabled Ceau§escu to remove 
potential rivals to his authority before they could develop a power 
base. He justified the policy by attributing virtually all the coun- 
try's economic problems to inept and dishonest bureaucrats intent 
on sabotaging his policies. Another control tactic was making high- 
ly publicized visits to factories, state farms, or major construction 
sites, where — usually accompanied by his wife — Ceau§escu would 



141 



Romania: A Country Study 

interview workers and front-line managers and solicit complaints 
about their superiors. The threat of public humiliation and removal 
effectively deterred the managerial cadres from independent 
thinking. 

Administrative Hierarchy 

The government body constitutionally endowed with supreme 
authority in administering the PCR's economic program was the 
Council of Ministers, whose members simultaneously held impor- 
tant positions in the party. The number of ministries fluctuated 
over the years because of repeated reform efforts to improve effi- 
ciency; in 1989, there were twenty-five ministries with a strictly 
economic mission. Supra-ministerial bodies known as branch coor- 
dination councils synchronized the activities of ministries in relat- 
ed sectors, for example, mining, oil, geology, and electric and 
thermal power; chemicals, petrochemicals, and light industries; 
machine building and metallurgy; timber, construction materials, 
cooperatives, and small-scale industry; transportation and telecom- 
munications; investment and construction; and agriculture, food 
processing and procurement, forestry, and water management. The 
ministries were responsible for accomplishing the economic goals 
set forth in the Unitary National Socioeconomic Plan. They as- 
signed production, financial, and operational targets and made in- 
vestment decisions for the economic entities subordinate to their 
authority. 

The first echelon of administration below the ministries consist- 
ed of the industrial centrale (sing., central — see Glossary). The cen- 
trale were analogous to the production associations of the Soviet 
Union and other Comecon countries. Conceived in the economic 
reforms of 1967 as autonomous economic entities vertically and 
horizontally integrating several producing enterprises as well as 
research and development facilities, the first centrale appeared in 
1969. Their number rapidly dwindled from the original 207 to only 
102 in 1974. Although in theory the centrale were created to decen- 
tralize planning, investment, and other forms of economic deci- 
sion making, their functions were never clearly delineated, and in 
the 1980s they appeared to have little real autonomy. Their authori- 
ty was limited to monitoring plan fulfillment and designating 
production schedules for the plants under their jurisdiction. 

At the bottom of the administrative hierarchy were the enter- 
prises and their individual production units. They received highly 
detailed production plans, operating budgets, and resource allo- 
cations from superior echelons and were responsible for accom- 
plishing the economic directives that came down to them through 



142 



The Economy 



the hierarchy. Notwithstanding official proclamations of enterprise 
self-management after the New Economic and Financial Mechan- 
ism (see Glossary) became law in 1978, the managerial cadres on 
this level enjoyed autonomy only in the mundane area of stream- 
lining operations to raise output. 

State and cooperative farms held a position in the administra- 
tive hierarchy analogous to that of industrial enterprises. They 
received detailed production plans that specified what was to be 
sown, what inputs would be provided, and how much farm out- 
put was to be delivered to the state. After 1980, county (judet — see 
Glossary) and village people's councils were responsible for fulfill- 
ment of agricultural production targets by the farms in their juris- 
diction (see Local Government, ch. 4). Machine stations, analogous 
to Stalin's machine-and- tractor stations, had been set up to con- 
trol access to equipment, thereby ensuring compliance with the PCR 
agricultural program. The manager of each machine station coor- 
dinated the work of, on average, five state and cooperative farms. 
In 1979, the stations became the focal point of a new managerial 
entity, the agro-industrial councils, which were intended to parallel 
the industrial centrale (see Farm Organization, this ch). 

In addition to its sectoral administrative structure, the econo- 
my was organized on a territorial basis. In every jude$, city, town, 
and commune, so-called people's councils — among their other 
functions — supervised the implementation of national economic 
policy by the enterprises and organizations located within their ter- 
ritory. The permanent bureaus of these bodies, without exception, 
were headed by local party chairmen, whose political credentials 
were validated by Bucharest. In 1976 a permanent Legislative 
Chamber of the People's Councils was established. Its member- 
ship — elected from the executive committees of the regional and 
local councils — debated economic bills before they were considered 
by the GNA. 

Planning 

Beginning in 1951 , following the Soviet economic model, Roma- 
nia adopted annual and five-year economic planning. As in the 
Soviet system, the principle of democratic centralism applied (see 
Organizational Structure, ch. 4). Thus, the economic plans com- 
piled by the central planning organs became the law of the land, 
and compliance was mandatory. 

In theory, the Unitary National Socioeconomic Plan, as economic 
plans were officially called after 1973, was based on information 
on current plan fulfillment, requests for resource allocations, and 
recommendations for investments that originated on the lowest 



143 



Romania: A Country Study 

echelons and rose through the bureaucracy to the central planners. 
Such a system involved a certain amount of give and take as en- 
terprises and centrale "negotiated" with the ministries for favora- 
ble production targets and resource allocations. In turn the 
ministries lobbied for their respective sectors to gain priority con- 
sideration in the state budget. But during the 1980s, input from 
lower echelons in the planning process received less consideration. 
In part, this development was due to the unreliability of informa- 
tion reported by the managerial cadres, from the local level up to 
the heads of the economic ministries themselves. Plan fulfillment 
data were supposed to serve as the basis on which future economic 
plans were compiled, but in the 1980s data became skewed when 
salary reforms — the so-called global accord — began linking mana- 
gers' incomes to the performance of the economic units under their 
supervision. In 1986 this remuneration system encompassed nearly 
11,000 managers and bureaucrats, even including the heads of 
ministries and the deputy prime ministers. In order to maintain 
their incomes, officials simply falsified performance reports. As a 
result, aggregate production figures were grossly inflated, and an- 
nual and five-year plan targets based on these figures became in- 
creasingly unrealistic. 

Besides distorting production reports, managers resorted to other 
income-protecting measures that impeded the flow of accurate in- 
formation to the central planners. Because wages and salaries were 
tied to plan fulfillment and severe penalties were levied for short- 
falls — even when caused by uncontrollable factors such as power 
shortages, drought, and the failure of contractors to deliver materials 
and parts — it was in the interests of the enterprises, centrale, and 
ministries to conceal resources at their disposal and to request more 
inputs than they really needed. Managers concealed surplus oper- 
ating reserves to ensure production in the event of unforeseen bot- 
tlenecks. This practice made accurate inventories impossible, 
resulting in inefficient use of resources. 

Pricing and Profit 

Because the market forces of supply and demand did not oper- 
ate in the centrally planned command economy, prices were cal- 
culated and assigned to goods and services by a governmental body, 
whose decisions were shaped by political and ideological consider- 
ations as well as economics. Following the tenets of Marxism, prices 
for basic necessities had been maintained at artificially low levels 
throughout the postwar period until 1982, when 220 different food 
items were marked up 35 percent. Even after the increases, 
however, food was priced below the cost of production, and state 



144 



The Economy 



subsidies were required to make up the difference. At the same 
time, prices for what the party categorized as luxury goods — blue 
jeans, stereo equipment, cars, refrigerators — were far higher than 
justified by production costs. Consequently, per capita ownership 
of consumer durables was the lowest in Eastern Europe except for 
Albania. 

The inflexible system of centrally controlled prices created seri- 
ous economic dislocation. Lacking the free-market mechanism of 
self-adjusting prices to regulate output, the economy misallocated 
resources, producing surpluses of low-demand items and chronic 
shortages of highly sought products, including basic necessities. This 
serious failing notwithstanding, the Ceausescu government in the 
late 1980s adamantly refused to modify the system and in fact was 
moving to strengthen the role of central planners in setting prices. 

Wholesale and retail prices were assigned by the State Commit- 
tee for Prices, with representation from the State Planning Com- 
mittee, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and International Economic Cooperation, the Central Statistical 
Bureau, and the Central Council of the General Trade Union Con- 
federation. The committee computed the price of an item based 
in part on normative industry-wide costs for the materials, labor, 
and capital used in its production. In addition, the price included 
a planned profit, which was a fixed percentage of the normative 
production cost. After a pricing revision, approved by the GNA 
in December 1988, the profit rate was set at between 3 and 8 per- 
cent of cost. An additional profit margin was factored into the price 
of commodities destined for export — 6 percent for soft-currency 
and 10 percent for hard-currency exports. 

Because prices were based on industry- standard costs, enterprises 
with lower than average costs earned above-plan profits, but those 
with high costs ran deficits and had to be supported by state subsi- 
dies. The New Economic and Financial Mechanism had called for 
making all enterprises self-financing, and those unable to break 
even were subject to dissolution. But as of early 1989, no instances 
of plants closing because of unprofitability had been reported. A 
pricing law enacted in December, 1988, would allow enterprises 
to retain all above-plan profit earned in 1990 but would require 
them to transfer half of such profits to the state budget during the 
subsequent four years. The enterprises channeled their share of 
profits into various bank accounts and funds that provided work- 
ing capital and financed investments, housing construction, social 
and cultural amenities, and profit sharing. The last fund paid 
bonuses to employees if any money remained following compul- 
sory payments to the state and the other funds. But if an enterprise 



145 



Romania: A Country Study 

failed to meet its production target — an increasingly common 
occurrence in the 1980s — the profit-sharing fund was reduced 
accordingly. 

The State Budget 

The Ministry of Finance directed the formulation of a detailed 
annual state budget, which was submitted to the GNA for approval 
and enactment into law. In theory, budget allocations took into 
account the analyses performed by the branch coordinating coun- 
cils, the various ministries, their subordinate centrale and enterprises, 
and the executive committees of jude$ and municipal people's coun- 
cils. But in reality, as the instrument for financing the Unitary Na- 
tional Socioeconomic Plan, the state budget was under Ceau§escu's 
firm control. The Council of Ministers had responsibility for super- 
vising its implementation. The state budget typically was approved 
in December and went into effect on January 1 , the beginning of 
the fiscal year (see Glossary), with expected revenues precisely off- 
setting authorized expenditures. Actual revenues and expenditures 
realized during the preceding year were officially announced at the 
same time, and the balance was carried over into the new state 
budget. Revenue estimates were set at the minimum level, while 
expenditures represented absolute ceilings. Consequently, budget 
surpluses were not unusual, particularly during the austere 1980s, 
when the top economic priority was elimination of the foreign debt. 
For example, a total surplus of 102 billion lei (for value of the leu; 
pi., lei — see Glossary) was accumulated during the years 1980-84, 
and in 1987 alone a 53.2 billion lei surplus was registered. 

The consolidated state budget was divided into national and lo- 
cal budgets. In 1989 local budget revenues were forecast to be 
25,446.8 million lei, while expenditures were set at only 14,078.7 
million lei. The surplus of more than 1 1 billion lei was to be trans- 
ferred to the national treasury to finance "society's overall develop- 
ment," a euphemism for centrally controlled capital investment 
at the expense of consumer goods and services. 

Revenues 

Profits from state enterprises and heavy turnover taxes levied 
on consumer goods, farm products, and farm supplies accounted 
for the bulk of revenue for the state budget. In 1989, for example, 
these two sources were expected to generate 69 percent of total 
revenues. Another large contributor was the tax on the "overall 
wage fund," which, though paid by the enterprises rather than in- 
dividuals after 1977, was actually a tax on the work force. During 
the 1980s, taxes levied directly on individuals accounted for an ever 



146 



The Economy 



larger share of revenues. For example, between 1981 and 1988, per- 
sonal taxes rose by a total of 64.8 percent. The official claim that 
individuals paid only about 1.2 percent of the total tax bill ignored 
the reality that both the tax on the wage fund and the turnover tax 
directiy affected individual purchasing power. The source of a large 
part of budget revenues was not identified in official announcements. 
In the 1989 state budget, for example, more than 6.3 percent of 
total revenues were not explained (see table 3, Appendix). 

Expenditures 

Financing the national economy (including capital investment) 
claimed the largest share of the state budget throughout the post- 
war period. More than 43 percent of the 1989 state budget, for 
example, was earmarked for this purpose. Social services were the 
second largest recipient, getting slightly more than 25 percent of 
1989 budget allocations. Actual outlays for social services, however, 
had declined during the belt-tightening of the 1980s. Reliable figures 
for military expenditures were generally not available, although 
according to official pronouncements, they were modest and declin- 
ing as a percentage of total outlays, accounting for less than 3 per- 
cent of the 1989 budget, as compared with 6.1 percent in 1960. 
Allocations for the police and security service were never published. 
A large portion of total budgetary expenditures (more than 27 per- 
cent) was not itemized in the 1989 state budget, as compared with 
14.8 percent not itemized in the 1984 budget and only 1.7 percent 
in 1965 (see table 4, Appendix). 

Banking 

The Role of Banking in a Centrally Planned Economy 

The banking system was nationalized soon after the installation 
of the communist regime and replicated the system that had evolved 
in the Soviet Union. Although organizational reforms were institut- 
ed in the course of the following four decades, the basic mission 
of banking and its relationship to the rest of the economy remained 
unchanged. 

The role of banking in the Stalinist economic model differs 
markedly from that in a market economy. Banks are state owned 
and operated and are primarily an instrument of economic con- 
trol. They do not compete for customers; rather, customers are 
assigned to them. Nor are they in business to make a profit, be- 
cause in the absence of money and capital markets, there is no 
mechanism to assign an accurate price for credit and thereby earn 
a fair profit. 



147 



Romania: A Country Study 

Economic reforms in the late 1970s assigned greater responsi- 
bility to the banks for policing the economy to ensure that enter- 
prises were operating and developing in compliance with the 
national plan. The banks accomplished this mission by monitor- 
ing enterprises' operations and assessing financial penalties for in- 
efficient use of resources. As one of the three principal sources of 
money to finance operations and investments — the others being 
state budget allocations and profits retained by enterprises from 
the sale of commodities — banks exercised considerable influence 
over all economic units. 

Banking Institutions 

The banking system in 1989 consisted of the National Bank of 
the Socialist Republic of Romania (known as the National Bank), 
the Investment Bank, the Bank for Agriculture and Food Indus- 
try, the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank, and the Savings and Con- 
signation Bank. In addition, a centralized Hard Currency Fund 
was set up in January 1988 to supervise all transactions involving 
hard currencies and to control the use of hard currency earnings 
to finance imports. The new body included representatives of the 
National Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, the Ministry of Finance, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 

Established in 1880, the National Bank was the heart of the bank- 
ing system. It issued the national currency, set exchange rates, 
monitored the flow of money, managed budgetary cash resources, 
coordinated short-term credit and discount activities, and partici- 
pated in the formulation of annual and five-year credit and cash 
plans in cooperation with the State Planning Committee and the 
Ministry of Finance. All industrial, transportation, and domestic 
trade enterprises maintained accounts in the National Bank. The 
bank also controlled the production, processing, and use of pre- 
cious metals and gems and had exclusive authority to purchase from 
individuals items made of precious metals or stones and items of 
artistic, historic, or documentary value. 

The Investment Bank, established in 1948, was the conduit by 
which investment resources — including state budget allocations — 
were directed to individual state, cooperative, consumer-cooperative, 
and other public organizations except for food-industry and agricul- 
tural enterprises. With hundreds of affiliates throughout the coun- 
try, the Investment Bank adjudicated loan applications from 
enterprises and granted long-term investment credit after verifying 
that the money would finance projects consistent with the national 
economic plan. The bank reviewed technical and economic invest- 
ment criteria and evaluated the feasibility of proposed investment 



148 



The Economy 



projects on the basis of accepted standards. In theory, it approved 
only investment projects that satisfied all legal requirements regard- 
ing need, suitability, and adherence to prescribed norms; had an 
adequate raw materials base and assured sales outlets; and served 
to improve the economic performance of the organization under- 
taking the project. The bank also granted short-term credit to con- 
struction enterprises and to geological prospecting and exploration 
organizations. The Investment Bank was responsible for calculat- 
ing capital depreciation allowances to be paid by the central govern- 
ment to the accounts of individual enterprises. 

The Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry was created in May 
1971 by expanding the functions and changing the name of the 
Agricultural Bank established three years earlier. The bank provided 
investment and operating credits for food-industry enterprises, state 
and cooperative farms, and private farmers and financed the dis- 
tribution of agricultural products within the country. 

The Savings and Consignation Bank, originally called the Sav- 
ings and Loan Bank, held the savings and current accounts of in- 
dividual citizens. The bank mobilized the cash resources of the 
population for investment through obligatory periodic transfers of 
deposited funds to the National Bank. 

The Romanian Foreign Trade Bank was established in July 1968. 
In 1987 its deposits totalled nearly 168 billion lei. The bank col- 
laborated with the Ministry of Finance to obtain and manage for- 
eign credit, and it handled transactions in both foreign currencies 
and lei for import and export services and tourism. Through strict 
control of hard-currency allocations, the bank encouraged the sub- 
stitution of domestic products for imports. 

In 1972 eight French banks joined the Foreign Trade Bank in 
setting up the Paris-based Banque Franco-Roumaine, which had 
a founding capital of 20 million francs. Later that year, the Anglo- 
Romanian Bank with a founding capital of US$7 million was es- 
tablished in London. And in 1976, the Frankfurt-Bucharest Bank 
AG, with a founding capital of DM20 million was set up in 
Frankfurt. 

Credit Policy 

The state banks alone possessed the legal authority to proffer 
credit, the essential function of which was to ensure the fulfillment 
of the goals set forth in the national plan. Unlike subsidies from 
the state budget, credits had to be repaid — with a small interest 
charge — according to a fixed timetable. Initially, the banks set in- 
terest rates at levels high enough merely to cover expenses, because 
it was not the function of interest to reflect the market value of 



149 



Romania: A Country Study 

money. But on January 1, 1975, a graduated scale of rates went 
into effect, whereby planned credits ranged from 0.5 to 5 percent; 
special loans to enable enterprises to meet their payment schedule 
ranged from 4 to 7 percent; and the rate for overdue loans went 
as high as 12 percent. Punitive surcharges were levied for delays 
in bringing investment projects into operation (2 percent) or for 
failing to free up unused machinery and equipment within six 
months (6 percent). Plant-modernization loans carried an interest 
charge of only 1 percent but were limited to 5 million lei per project 
and had to be repaid within four years. 

Currency 

In 1989 the official unit of currency, the leu, which consists of 
100 bani, was valued at about 14.5 lei per US$1. In 1954 the 
government set the gold parity of the leu at 148. 1 milligrams (where 
it remained as of 1989) and on this basis determined the official 
rate of conversion to Western currencies. But because Romania's 
centrally planned economy set prices independentiy of international 
economic forces, the official exchange rate quickly became divorced 
from reality. Thus, like the currencies of other Comecon states, 
the leu became a so-called ' ' soft" currency — one that cannot be 
used outside the country of issue. 

In addition to being a soft currency, the leu had no unitary ex- 
change rate consistentiy applied for all transactions. Bucharest used 
a bewildering range of conversion rates in order to pursue various 
economic objectives, such as fostering exports and tourism. 
Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), 
which had loaned hundreds of millions of dollars to Romania in 
the 1970s, insisted that the policy of multiple exchange rates be 
discontinued, at least thirteen different rates were still in use in 
1982 — one rate for imports and twelve for export transactions. Ac- 
cording to World Bank (see Glossary) analysts in the late 1980s, 
however, it appeared that a unified commercial exchange rate for 
the leu was Bucharest's goal. A separate, bonus exchange rate con- 
tinued to be offered to tourists. Both the commercial and noncom- 
mercial rates tended to remain in effect for long periods without 
the daily fluctuations that characterize hard currencies. 

The state retained a monopoly on foreign exchange. Private 
citizens could not hold foreign currencies or securities or have bank 
balances abroad without official permission, nor could they import 
or export Romanian banknotes. They were forbidden to own or 
trade in gold, to export jewelry or diamonds, and to engage in for- 
eign merchandise trade. All proceeds earned by foreign trade or- 
ganizations were surrendered to the Foreign Trade Bank. All hard 



150 



The Economy 



currency earnings were consolidated in the Hard Currency Fund, 
set up in 1988 to prevent foreign trade organizations, ministries, 
and enterprises from making unofficial hard currency transactions. 

On the black market, which thrived throughout the postwar era, 
especially during the austere 1980s, barter was more effective than 
the official currency in procuring the most highly sought goods and 
services. Kent brand cigarettes emerged as the most universally 
accepted unofficial medium of exchange, a status they could at- 
tain because of the state's prohibition against private ownership 
of hard currencies. The street value of one carton of Kents in 1988 
was approximately US$100. In the countryside, agricultural 
products became the de facto currency. 

Natural Resources 
Land 

The land itself is Romania's most valuable natural resource. All 
but the most rugged mountainous regions sustain some form of 
agricultural activity. In 1989 more than 15 million hectares — almost 
two-thirds of the country's territory — were devoted to agriculture. 
Arable land accounted for over 41 percent, pasturage about 19 per- 
cent, and vineyards and orchards some 3 percent of the total land 
area. 

Romania's soils are generally quite fertile. The best for farm- 
ing are the humus-rich chernozems (black earth), which account 
for roughly one-fifth of the country's arable land. Chernozems and 
red-brown forest soils predominate in the plains of Walachia, Mol- 
davia, and the Banat region — all major grain-growing areas. Soils 
are thinner and less humus-rich in the mountains and foothills, 
but they are suitable for vineyards, orchards, and pasturage. 

The area under cultivation has increased steadily over the cen- 
turies as farming has encroached on forest and pasture areas, marsh- 
es have been drained, and irrigation has been brought to the more 
arid regions. By late 1986, Romania had extended irrigation to 
roughly one-third of its arable land, and a major campaign had 
been conceived to drain the Danube Delta and develop it into a vast 
agro-industrial complex of some 1,440 square kilometers. The area 
of arable land grew incrementally from about 9.4 million hectares 
in 1950 to slightly more than 10 million hectares in the late 1980s. 

Another strategy to gain arable land was the controversial pro- 
gram of systematization of the countryside. This policy, first pro- 
posed in the early 1960s but seriously implemented only after a 
delay of some twenty years, called for the destruction of more than 
7,000 villages and resettlement of the residents into about 550 



151 



Romania: A Country Study 

standardized "agro-industrial centers," where the farm popula- 
tion could enjoy the benefits of urban life. Only those villages judged 
economically viable by the authorities were to be retained. Through 
eradication of villages, fence rows, and reportedly even churches 
and cemeteries, the government aimed to acquire for agriculture 
some 348,000 hectares of land. 

At the very time the government was attempting to increase the 
area of arable land, countervailing pressures were exerted by urban 
development, which consumed large tracts for residential and 
industrial construction. In May 1968, a law was passed to prohibit 
the diversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses without the 
approval of the central government. The law reversed the previ- 
ous policy of assigning no value to land in calculating the cost of 
industrial and housing projects. It did not, however, curtail the 
ideologically driven policy of industrializing the countryside, and 
some of the country's most fertile farmland was lost to development. 

Postwar farming practices took a heavy toll on the country's soil 
resources. It was estimated in the late 1980s that because of un- 
wise cultivation methods, 30 percent of the arable land had suffered 
serious erosion. Moreover, residual agricultural chemicals had 
raised soil acidity in many areas. 

Water 

Along with an abundance of fertile soil, Romanian agriculture 
benefits from a temperate climate and generally adequate precipi- 
tation. The growing season is relatively long — from 180 to 210 days. 
Rainfall averages 637 millimeters per year, ranging from less than 
400 millimeters in Dobruja (see Glossary) and the Danube Delta 
to over 1,010 millimeters in the mountains. In the main grain- 
growing regions, annual precipitation averages about 508 to 584 
millimeters. Droughts occur periodically and can cause major 
agricultural losses despite extensive irrigation. The drought of 1985 
was particularly damaging. 

Despite relatively generous annual precipitation and the presence 
of numerous streams and rivers in its territory, including the lower 
course of the Danube, which discharges some 285,000 cubic feet 
of water per minute into the Black Sea, Romania experienced 
chronic water shortages throughout the 1980s. Water consump- 
tion had increased by over thirteen times during the preceding three 
decades, taxing reserves to the limit. The 1990 official forecast 
envisioned consumption of 35 billion cubic meters, very close to 
nominal reservoir capacity. Large-scale agriculture and heavy 
industry were the major water users and polluters. Personal con- 
sumption was restricted by the growing scarcity of unpolluted 



152 



The Economy 



drinking water, which could be obtained from fewer than 20 per- 
cent of the major streams. 

The Danube and rivers emanating from the Transylvanian Alps 
and the Carpathians represent an aggregate hydroelectric poten- 
tial of 83,450 megawatts. Roughly 4,400 megawatts of this poten- 
tial had been harnessed by the mid-1980s — mostly during the 
preceding two decades. Important hydroelectric stations were built 
on the Danube, Arge§, Bistrr£a, Mare, Olt, Buzau, and Prut rivers 
(see fig. 3). These stations generated roughly 16 percent of Roma- 
nia's electricity in 1984. But chronically low reservoir levels in the 
1980s, caused by prolonged drought and irrigation's increasing 
demand for water, severely limited the contribution of hydroelec- 
tric power to the national energy balance (see Energy, this ch.). 

The country's water resources also were an increasingly impor- 
tant transportation medium. The government invested billions of 
lei in the 1970s and 1980s to develop inland waterways and ma- 
rine ports. The Danube-Black Sea Canal, opened to traffic in 1984, 
was the largest and most expensive engineering project in Roma- 
nian history. Major investments were made to modernize and 
expand both inland and marine ports, especially Constanta and 
the new adjacent facility at Agigea, built at the entrance to the 
Danube-Black Sea Canal. Another important project — still under 
construction in the late 1980s — was a seventy-two-kilometer canal 
linking the capital city, Bucharest, with the Danube (see Inland 
Waterways; Maritime Navigation, this ch.). 

Forests 

Over the centuries, the harvesting of trees for lumber and fuel 
and the relentless encroachment of agriculture greatly diminished 
the forestlands that originally had covered all but the southeastern 
corner of the country. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, forests re- 
mained a valuable national resource, occupying almost 27 percent 
of the country's territory. Growing primarily on slopes too steep 
for cultivation, the most extensive forests were found in the Car- 
pathians and the Transylvanian Alps. Hardwoods such as oak, 
beech, elm, ash, sycamore, maple, hornbeam, and linden made 
up 71 percent of total forest reserves, and conifers (fir, spruce, pine, 
and larch) accounted for the remaining 29 percent. The hardwood 
species predominated at elevations below 4,600 feet, while conifers 
flourished at elevations up to 6,000 feet. 

Forestry had a long tradition in Romania, and for centuries tim- 
ber was one of the region's primary exports. After World War II, 
the industry shifted its focus from raw timber to processed wood 
products. Increasingly aware of the economic value of the forests, 



153 



Romania: A Country Study 

the government established a Council of Forestry in 1983 to su- 
pervise afforestation projects and ensure preservation of existing 
woodlands. In 1985 afforestation work on a total of 52,850 hect- 
ares was completed. 

Fossil Fuels 

The late 1980s saw the rapid depletion of Romania's extensive 
reserves of fossil fuels, including oil, natural gas, anthracite, brown 
coal, bituminous shale, and peat. These hydrocarbons are distribut- 
ed across more than 63 percent of the country's territory. The major 
proven oil reserves are concentrated in the southern and eastern 
Carpathian foothills — particularly Prahova, Arge§, Olt, and Bacau 
judete, with more recent discoveries in the southern Moldavian 
Plateau, the Danube Plain, and Aradjude} (see fig. 1). Despite an 
ambitious program of offshore exploration, begun in 1976, signifi- 
cant deposits in the Black Sea continental shelf had yet to be dis- 
covered as of the late 1980s. Most of the country's natural gas 
deposits are found in the Transylvanian Plateau. The Southern 
Carpathians and the Banat hold most of the hard coal reserves, 
while brown coal is distributed more widely across the country, 
with major deposits in Bacau and Cluj judefa the southeastern Car- 
pathian foothills, and the Danube Plain. 

Total oil reserves in 1984 were estimated at 214 million tons. 
Western analysts interpreted consistently lower output figures and 
Romania's intense search for improved oil-recovery technology as 
evidence that reserves were being depleted rapidly. By the mid- 
1980s, comparatively little oil was being burned for heat and elec- 
tricity generation. Most of the domestically produced crude was 
being used as feedstock for refining into valuable gasoline, naphtha, 
and other derivatives. 

As oil's share of the energy balance was declining during the 
1970s and 1980s, natural gas and coal assumed increasing promi- 
nence. In the mid-1970s, Romania's natural gas reserves — the most 
extensive in Eastern Europe — were estimated at between 200 and 
240 billion cubic meters. This resource was all the more valuable 
because of its high methane content of 98 to 99.5 percent. Natural 
gas and gas recovered with crude oil fueled about half of the coun- 
try's thermoelectric power plants and provided feedstock for the 
chemical industry. Falling natural gas output figures in the 1980s 
suggested that this valuable resource also was being depleted. Roma- 
nian experts themselves predicted that reserves would be exhaust- 
ed by 2010. The country had to begin importing natural gas from 
the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Annual imports had reached 



154 



The Economy 



2 . 5 billion cubic meters by 1 986 and were expected to rise to about 
6 billion cubic meters after 1989. 

Although total coal reserves were estimated at 6 billion tons in 
the mid-1970s, much of this amount was low-quality brown coal 
containing a high percentage of noncombustible material. Only a 
fraction of the steel industry's considerable demand for coking coal 
could be covered by domestic sources. 

Other Minerals 

Romania possesses commercial deposits of a wide range of metal- 
lic ores, including iron, manganese, chrome, nickel, molybdenum, 
aluminum, zinc, copper, tin, titanium, vanadium, lead, gold, and 
silver. The development of these reserves was a key element of the 
country's industrialization after World War II. To exploit the ores, 
the government built numerous mining and enrichment centers, 
whose output in turn was delivered to the country's large and ever- 
expanding metallurgical and machine-building industries. 

The major known iron ore deposits are found in the Poiana-Rusca 
Mountains (a spur of the Transylvanian Alps) and the Banat, 
Dobruja, and the Harghita Mountains (in the Eastern Carpathians). 
Though commercially significant, these deposits were unable to 
satisfy the huge new steel mills that were the centerpiece of Roma- 
nia's industrial modernization after the mid-1960s. Indeed, by 1980 
Romania had to import more than 80 percent of its iron ore. Some 
experts predicted that domestic iron ore resources would be ex- 
hausted by the early 1990s. 

Most of the nonferrous metal reserves are concentrated in the 
northwest, particularly in the Maramures. Mountains (in the Eastern 
Carpathians) and the Apuseni Mountains (in the Western Car- 
pathians). The Maramures, range contains important deposits of 
polymetallic sulfides — from which copper, lead, and zinc are 
obtained — and certain precious metals. The Apuseni range holds 
silver and some of the richest gold deposits in Europe. Major cop- 
per, lead, and zinc deposits also have been discovered in the Bis- 
trija Mountains, the Banat, and Dobruja. Bauxite is mined in the 
Oradea area in northwestern Transylvania. Although new mines 
to extract these ores continued to be developed throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the proclaimed goal of self-sufficiency in nonferrous 
metals by 1985 was unrealistic, considering that in 1980 foreign 
sources supplied 73 percent of the zinc, 40 percent of the copper, 
and 23 percent of the lead consumed by Romanian industry. 

The country also has commercial reserves of other minerals, 
which are processed by a large chemical industry that barely exist- 
ed before World War II. The inorganic chemical industry exploits 



155 



Romania: A Country Study 

sulfur obtained as a metallurgical by-product or refined from 
gypsum, an abundant mineral. There are large deposits of pure 
salt at Slanic, Tirgu Ocna, and Ocna Mure§. Caustic soda, soda 
ash, chlorine, sulfuric and hydrochloric acid, and phosphate fer- 
tilizers are among the chemical products based on domestic raw 
materials. 

Labor 

Distribution by Economic Sectors 

A prerequisite for rapid economic growth after World War II 
was the wholesale transfer of labor from agriculture, which had 
employed 80 percent of the population before the war, to other 
sectors — primarily to heavy industry. The industrial work force 
grew by an average of 5 percent per year during the 1950-77 period, 
as Romania was accomplishing its most dramatic economic develop- 
ment, and industrial output was rising by an average 12.9 percent 
annually. As late as 1960, 65 percent of the labor force was still 
engaged in agriculture, with only some 15 percent working in in- 
dustry and 20 percent in other sectors. But in the course of the 
following two decades, the labor force would be transformed, as 
peasants left the land in the wake of agricultural collectivization 
to take better-paid jobs in the cities. Between 1971 and 1978, the 
outflow of rural labor accelerated to 11 percent per year — more 
than twice the rate of the 1950s and 1960s. 

By 1980 agriculture employed no more than 29 percent of the 
labor force, while industry occupied 36 percent and other sectors 
the remaining 35 percent. By this time the rural exodus had slowed, 
and although half the population continued to reside in rural areas, 
the reserves of able-bodied young men in agriculture had been 
reduced drastically. As a result, targets for expansion of the in- 
dustrial labor force were unattainable, and agriculture was becom- 
ing the domain of the elderly and women (see table 5, Appendix). 

Unpaid Labor 

The rapid realignment of the work force created difficulties for 
agriculture, particularly during planting and harvest seasons. To 
compensate for the loss of farm workers, the government followed 
the Stalinist practice of mobilizing soldiers, young people, and even 
factory workers to "donate" their labor. Throughout the communist 
era, these groups have supplied unpaid labor that made possible 
the massive civil engineering projects launched after World War 
II. In 1988 more than 720,000 high school and college students 
and 30,000 teachers were detailed to agricultural work sites, and 



156 



The Economy 



another 50,000 students and 2,000 teachers "donated" labor at 
construction projects. 

Throughout the 1980s, the government appeared to be growing 
more reliant on compulsory labor, issuing a decree in August 1985 
requiring all citizens to make labor and financial contributions to 
public works projects. At the same time, the military's role in the 
economy was also becoming more prominent. Soldiers worked on 
such important national projects as the Danube-Black Sea Canal, 
the Iron Gate hydroelectric project, and the Bucharest subway, as 
well as on more mundane details such as repairing streets and bring- 
ing in the harvest. After 1985, when Ceau§escu militarized the elec- 
tric power industry, army officers even became involved in the 
management of the civilian economy. 

Demographics 

Romania had a population of more than 23 million in 1987, but 
the active work force numbered about 10.7 million — an increase 
of only 550,000 workers since 1975. Women accounted for only 
about 40 percent of the labor force in 1988 and therefore represented 
the largest reserve of underused talent. After the mid-1970s, the 
rate of growth of the industrial labor force dropped significantly 
compared with the previous quarter century, falling from 5.1 per- 
cent in 1976 to 2.3 percent in 1980. Moreover, demographers fore- 
cast a growth of only 2.5 to 3.6 percent for the entire Eighth 
Five- Year Plan (1986-90). 

Three major trends precipitated the slowdown in the growth of 
the labor force. First, the reserve of underused rural labor that could 
be transferred to the industrial sector was nearing depletion; the 
countryside had lost nearly half a million men in the four years 
between 1976 and 1979 alone. Second, Romania's birthrate — after 
Poland's, the highest in Eastern Europe — declined as urbaniza- 
tion proceeded, and despite the government's pronatalist policy, 
this trend was not reversed. And finally, large numbers of skilled 
workers were emigrating. 

As in all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Romania's 
fertility level dropped significantly as urbanization brought more 
women into the work force and abortion became available on de- 
mand. In 1958 112,000 abortions were performed, but by 1965, 
the figure had skyrocketed to 1,115,000 annually, or approximately 
4 abortions for every live birth. Realizing that a lower birthrate 
would inhibit economic growth, the government began instituting 
a pronatalist policy and in 1966 declared an end to abortion on 
demand. But abortions — legal and illegal — continued to be per- 
formed at a worrisome rate, reaching 421,386 in 1983. A relatively 



157 



Romania: A Country Study 

ungenerous incentive program to promote childbearing, institut- 
ed in the 1960s, had little positive effect. As a result, the birthrate 
declined steadily after 1967 and by the early 1980s had become 
a serious concern for Romania's economic planners. 

Compared with the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe, 
Romania appeared to have a rather liberal emigration policy, but 
in the 1980s applicants for emigration increasingly were subjected 
to harassment and persecution. Most of the once- thriving Jewish 
community had been allowed to emigrate to Israel. In the late 1970s 
and throughout the 1980s, nearly 1,000 ethnic Germans were per- 
mitted to depart each month for the Federal Republic of Germa- 
ny (West Germany). Large numbers of ethnic Hungarians illegally 
crossed into Hungary to escape economic and cultural oppression. 
Western diplomats in Belgrade claimed that as many as 5,000 refu- 
gees crossed into Yugoslavia each year, and that in 1988 some 400 
persons were shot to death and many others drowned trying to swim 
across the Danube. Those seeking permission to leave legally often 
lost their jobs, housing, and health benefits and were forced to wait 
long periods for their exit papers. These harsh policies reflected 
the seriousness with which the regime regarded the loss of the coun- 
try 's skilled workers and its concern for the overall deterioration 
of the labor pool. 

Productivity 

Romania traditionally had one of the lowest levels of labor 
productivity in Europe. Agricultural units before World War II 
were small-scale and inefficient. Because of the high density of the 
rural population, much of the farmland had been subdivided into 
small parcels, making mechanization impractical. As a result, per 
capita farm output was low. Industrial labor productivity was some- 
what higher. Employing less than 10 percent of the labor force in 
1938, industry then produced 31 percent of total national income. 
The classic extensive development strategy pursued after the war 
accomplished gains in industrial output as a result of massive cap- 
ital and labor inputs, not because of improved labor productivity 
and efficiency. But beginning in the late 1970s, as labor reserves 
dwindled, continued economic growth required substantially im- 
proved productivity. The government's inability to make signifi- 
cant gains in this area and to make the transition to an intensive 
development strategy was a primary cause of the economic crisis 
of the 1980s. 

The postwar modernization process inevitably brought improve- 
ments in labor productivity in most sectors. Agriculture, however, 
because of the rapid loss of many of its most productive workers, 



158 



The Economy 



underinvestment and neglect by the central planners, and peasant 
demoralization in the aftermath of forced collectivization, remained 
one of the least efficient sectors of the economy. Although agricul- 
ture still employed some 28 percent of the labor force in the 
mid-1980s, it accounted for only 14 percent of national income. 
And in 1980, Romania ranked no better than twentieth of twenty- 
three European countries in terms of output per hectare of farm- 
land. Industrial labor productivity, on the other hand, improved 
steadily through the first three decades of communist rule, growing 
an average 7.9 percent per year between 1950 and 1977 — primar- 
ily because of the acquisition of modern machinery and technolo- 
gy. These improvements notwithstanding, in 1985 Romania ranked 
last among the East European Comecon countries in terms of per 
capita gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). 

Labor productivity growth rates slowed noticeably toward the 
end of the 1970s. The annual target of 9.2 percent for the Sixth 
Five- Year Plan (1976-80) proved unattainable. Instead, the govern- 
ment claimed to have achieved an annual growth of 7 . 2 percent — 
still a respectable accomplishment. The reliability of that figure, 
however, was questioned by Western analysts, who were becom- 
ing increasingly distrustful of official Romanian statistics. During 
the decade of the 1980s, the government set the unrealistic goal 
of doubling labor productivity by 1990. But this target would not 
be met, as the economy took a severe downturn. Western sources 
estimated, for example, that 1988 gross industrial output was no 
higher than and possibly lower than that of 1987, which in turn 
might have been lower than output in 1986. Because the govern- 
ment had predicated most of its ambitious economic growth tar- 
gets on improved labor productivity, the poor results in gross 
industrial output indicated that the labor situation had not im- 
proved. 

A number of factors underlay the chronically low productivity 
of Romanian labor. Foremost among these were the extreme degree 
of economic centralization, which gave workers little input in 
decisions that affected their working conditions and incomes, and 
the absence of rewards for personal initiative. The labor force en- 
dured low wages, few bonuses, ungenerous pensions, long work- 
weeks, poor living conditions, and a general sense of powerlessness. 

With an average per capita annual income of approximately 
US$1,000 in 1987, Romanian workers remained among the most 
poorly paid in Europe. Low labor remuneration, along with high 
taxes, and neglect of the consumer goods sector were deliberate 
government policies designed to accumulate funds for investment 
in the economy. Thus, while national income (see Glossary) rose 



159 



Romania: A Country Study 

an impressive 9.2 percent per annum between 1951 and 1982, wages 
during the same period grew by only 4.9 percent. In 1983 Ceau§es- 
cu, frustrated by persistent worker apathy, abolished fixed wages 
in favor of a policy that tied a worker's income directly to plan 
fulfillment by the enterprise. Previously every worker had been as- 
sured of receiving 80 percent of his or her nominal salary regard- 
less of performance, with the remaining 20 percent dependent on 
the individual's productivity. 

Rather than spurring the worker to produce more, the new 
remuneration policy in fact caused further demoralization because 
it invariably lowered wages. For example incomes fell by an aver- 
age 40 percent at the Heavy Machinery Plant in Cluj-Napoca after 
the new policy went into effect. Workers were now being penal- 
ized for factors beyond their control, such as parts shortages and 
power failures. Their reaction was predictable. Passive resistance 
in the form of sloppy workmanship, excessive absenteeism, and 
drinking on the job became commonplace. More alarming to the 
government, however, were the scattered but sizable strikes and 
demonstrations that were occurring with greater frequency in the 
late 1980s. Across the country there were reports of work stoppages 
in protest of the new wage law. Following the November 1987 out- 
break of riots at the Red Flag Truck and Tractor Plant in Bra§ov — 
precipitated by low wages, food shortages, and poor working 
conditions — Ceau§escu announced that pay raises for all industri- 
al workers and larger pensions would be phased in by the end of 
1990. After the raises, the average worker theoretically would be 
earning 3,285 lei per month, and average monthly pensions would 
pay some 2,000 lei. 

The Ceau§escu regime's approach to the problem of labor apa- 
thy in the late 1980s ran counter to the wave of reforms that were 
being tested in other Comecon nations at that time. Rather than 
encouraging workers with monetary incentives that recognized 
differences in skills and productivity, in 1988 and 1989 Ceau§escu 
offered modest wages that were graduated so that wage differen- 
tials between the highest- and lowest-paid workers were actually 
reduced. Wage hikes for the latter, averaging 33 percent, went into 
effect in August 1988, whereas increases of less than 10 percent 
for workers in the higher wage brackets were not scheduled to take 
effect until 1989. Instead of offering concessions that would im- 
prove their standard of living, Ceau§escu continued to exhort the 
workers to sacrifice for the building of socialism (see Glossary) and 
a better life for future generations. But these traditional motiva- 
tional appeals were becoming less effective as life grew harder for 
most citizens. 



160 



The Economy 



Workers increasingly felt alienated from the institutions that were 
supposed to be defending their interests, particularly the PCR and 
its labor organ, the General Union of Trade Unions of Romania 
(Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor din Romania — UGSR), which 
they viewed as merely another control mechanism, a conduit for 
the downward flow of directives from the central planners. A sur- 
vey taken shortly before the economic downturn of the late 1970s 
revealed that more than 63 percent of a sampling of 6,200 young 
Romanian workers felt their union was not representing their in- 
terests. 

Because of the late emergence of a working class, Romania had 
little experience with grass-roots labor movements. In 1979, 
however, Paul Goma, a prominent exiled dissident, and three com- 
patriots inside Romania — Vasile Paraschiv, Theorghe Brasoveneau, 
and Ionel Cana — led an ill-fated attempt to organize an indepen- 
dent union. The PCR would not tolerate such a threat to its con- 
trol of labor, and within a month, the three principal leaders had 
been arrested and the nascent union movement had been, at least 
temporarily, crushed. 

In addition to low wages and nonrepresentation of the workers' 
interests, several other developments contributed to the growing 
disaffection of labor. For years the government had promised a 
shortening of the workweek, which was supposed to have been cut 
to forty-five hours by 1985. Although a forty-six-hour week was 
proclaimed in 1982, in practice most Romanians continued to work 
forty-eight hours or more. Adding to their misery, average work- 
ers wasted hours each day waiting in line for basic foodstuffs, gaso- 
line, and other consumer items that were becoming ever more 
difficult to obtain. 

Poor placement practices created immediate job dissatisfaction 
and were a primary cause of the high labor turnover rate. A sur- 
vey of some 6,000 workers aged fourteen to thirty, taken in the 
relatively prosperous 1970s, revealed that more than half wanted 
to leave their jobs, and about one-quarter had already done so at 
least once. The problem of high turnover was most acute in the 
construction industry, where more than 28 percent of the work force 
quit their jobs during the 1982-86 period, and in the mining 
industry, which reportedly was hit even harder. To discourage turn- 
over, the new wage system announced in September 1983 con- 
tained a provision that required newly hired workers to remain 
with an enterprise for at least five years. Failing that provision, 
they would forfeit a large share of their salaries, which had been 
withheld in compulsory savings accounts, and they would have to 
repay the enterprise for training expenses. But punitive monetary 



161 



Romania: A Country Study 

measures of this type proved ineffective in an economy that offered 
workers few consumer goods on which to spend their money. 

Foreign Trade 

Goals and Policy 

During the postwar era, Romania used foreign trade effectively 
as an instrument to enhance the development of the national econ- 
omy and to pursue its goal of political and economic independence. 
In this context, earning a foreign-trade surplus was not a primary 
concern until the late 1970s. The primary goal, rather, was acqui- 
sition of the modern technologies and raw materials needed to create 
and sustain a highly diversified industrial plant. The export pro- 
gram was geared to earning the required hard currency to pur- 
chase these materials and technologies. But in the 1980s, the focus 
of foreign trade was shifted to curtail imports and run large hard- 
currency surpluses to repay the debt that had accrued in the previous 
two decades. Enterprises that produced for export received preferen- 
tial treatment in resource allocation and higher prices for their 
output. 

Foreign trade was a state monopoly. Trade policy was estab- 
lished by the PCR and the government, and its implementation 
was the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Inter- 
national Economic Cooperation. Subordinate to the ministry were 
special state agencies — foreign-trade organizations — that conducted 
all import and export transactions. In 1969 the ministry was reor- 
ganized to become essentially a coordinating agency, and within 
a year only three foreign-trade organizations remained under its 
direct control. This decentralization was short-lived, however, as 
the number of foreign-trade organizations was reduced from fifty- 
six in 1972 to forty in 1975, and all but four of these were returned 
to the ministry's control. 

Trading Partners 

Before World War II, the West accounted for more than 80 per- 
cent of Romania's foreign trade. During the postwar period up 
to 1959, however, nearly 90 percent of its trade involved Come- 
con nations. The Soviet Union was by far the most important trad- 
ing partner during this period. But the PCR's insistence on autarkic 
development led Romania into direct confrontation with the rest 
of the Soviet bloc. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev had envisioned an international division of labor 
in Comecon that would have relegated Romania to the role of sup- 
plier of foodstuffs and raw materials for the more industrially 



162 



International Trade Fair Building, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

developed members, such as the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) and Czechoslovakia. In April 1964, however, General 
Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej threatened to take Romania out 
of Comecon unless that organization recognized the right of each 
member to pursue its own course of economic development. 

As early as the 1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej had begun to cultivate eco- 
nomic relations with the West, which by 1964 accounted for near- 
ly 40 percent of Romania's imports and almost one-third of its 
exports. When Ceau§escu came to power in 1965, the West was 
supplying almost half of the machinery and technology needed to 
build a modern industrial base. In 1971 Romania joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glossary) and the 
following year it won admission to the IMF and the World Bank. 
In 1975 Romania gained most-favored-nation trading status from 
the United States. 

Between 1973 and 1977, Romania continued to increase its trade 
with the noncommunist world and initiated economic relations with 
the less-developed countries. In 1973 about 47.3 percent of its for- 
eign trade involved the capitalist developed nations, with which 
it incurred a large trade deficit that necessitated heavy borrowing 
from Western banks. During this period, major obligations to the 
IMF (US$159.1 million) and the World Bank (US$1,502.8 mil- 
lion) were incurred. 



163 



Romania: A Country Study 

To gain greater access to nonsocialist markets, Romania set up 
numerous joint trading companies. By 1977 twenty-one such 
ventures were in operation, including sixteen in Western Europe, 
three in Asia, and one each in North America and Africa. Roma- 
nia held at least 50 percent of the start-up capital in these compa- 
nies, which promoted its manufactured goods and agricultural 
products abroad. In 1980 Romania became the first Comecon 
nation to reach an agreement with the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC), with which it established a joint commission for 
trade and other matters. 

During the 1980s, however, trade relations with the West soured. 
Ceau§escu blamed the IMF and "unjustifiably high" interest rates 
charged by Western banks for his country's economic plight. For 
its part, the West charged Romania with unfair trade practices, 
resistance to needed economic reform, and human rights abuses. 
In 1988 the United States suspended most-favored-nation status, 
and the following year, the EEC declined to negotiate a new trade 
agreement with Romania. Meanwhile, attempts to increase trade 
with the less-developed countries had also met with disappointment. 
After peaking in 1981 at nearly 29 percent of total foreign trade, 
relations with these countries deteriorated, largely because the Iran- 
Iraq War had cut off delivery of crude oil from Iran. 

Frustrated by the downturn in trade with the West and the less- 
developed countries, Romania reluctantly returned to the Soviet 
fold during the 1980s. By 1986 socialist countries accounted for 
53 percent of its foreign trade. But the Ceau§escu regime continued 
to assert its independence, refusing to endorse the Comecon pro- 
gram that would allow enterprises to circumvent routine bureaucrat- 
ic channels and establish direct business relationships with 
enterprises in other member countries. And he refused to cooper- 
ate in Comecon attempts to establish mutual convertibility of the 
currencies of the member states (see table 6, Appendix). 

Structure of Exports and Imports 

The assortment of export products changed dramatically dur- 
ing the postwar era. Before the war, raw materials and agricultur- 
al products accounted for nearly all export income, but in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the primary exports were metallurgical products, es- 
pecially iron and steel; machinery, including machine tools, locomo- 
tives and rolling stock, ships, oil-field equipment, aircraft, weapons, 
and electronic equipment; refined oil products; chemical fertiliz- 
ers; processed wood products; and agricultural commodities (see 
table 7, Appendix). 



164 



The Economy 



Retirement of the Foreign Debt 

After 1983 Ceau§escu refused to seek additional loans from the 
IMF or the World Bank and severely curtailed imports from hard- 
currency nations while maximizing exports — to the great detriment 
of the standard of living. As a consequence, Romania ran balance- 
of-trade surpluses as large as US$2 billion per year throughout the 
rest of the decade. With great fanfare, Ceau§escu announced the 
retirement of the foreign debt in April 1989, proclaiming that 
Romania had finally achieved full economic and political indepen- 
dence. Shortly thereafter, the GNA enacted legislation proposed 
by Ceausescu to prohibit state bodies — including banks — from seek- 
ing foreign credits. 

Industry 

Geographic Distribution 

The development program sought to distribute industrial capacity 
evenly across the country. This policy of disaggregation often ap- 
peared counterproductive to western observers. For example, by 
siting a vast steel complex at Calara§i, some of the most valuable 
farmland in the country had to be sacrificed. But the PCR argued 
that dissemination of industry into the countryside was necessary 
to transform Romania from a peasant society to a proletarian so- 
ciety, one of the prerequisites for attaining communism. 

The campaign to industrialize all regions was moderately suc- 
cessful. In 1968 nearly half of the forty jude^e reported per capita 
industrial output of less than 10,000 lei, but by 1990 nojudei was 
expected to produce less than 50,000 lei per capita. In addition 
to the Bucharest agglomeration, which accounted for nearly one- 
seventh of total industrial output in 1986, major industrial centers 
had been built in many other regions of the country. Measured 
in value of industrial output, the ten leading judeie in 1986 were 
Bucharest, Prahova, Bra§ov, Arge§, Bacau, Gala$i, Timi§, 
Hunedoara, Sibiu, and Cluj — in that order. These ten jude$e ac- 
counted for 51 .2 percent of industrial production in 1986. The ten 
most industrially developed judeie, with 48.2 percent of all fixed 
industrial assets in 1986, were Bucharest, Galati, Prahova, 
Hunedoara, Bra§ov, Gorj, Arge§, Bacau, Dimbovr£a, and Dolj. 
On the other hand, the ten least developed judeie, Satu Mare, 
Boto§ani, Calara§i, Ialomi$a, Bistri$a-Nasaud, Covasna, Vrancea, 
Harghita, Salaj, and Vaslui, had only 8.9 percent of the fixed in- 
dustrial assets. 



165 



Romania: A Country Study 
Energy 

Crisis of the 1980s 

Despite significant energy resources and an extensive industry 
to exploit them, the sector performed poorly during the 1980s, seri- 
ously damaging economic performance as a whole and causing great 
hardship for the population. In 1986, for example, electricity 
production fell 2.6 percent below target; this poor performance 
resulted in an estimated 4.7 percent reduction in national income. 
Not only was the goal of energy self-sufficiency by 1990 not ful- 
filled, all trends indicated that in the 1990s Romania would be in- 
creasingly dependent on imported fuels and electricity — especially 
from the Soviet Union. The sector performed so poorly that 
Ceau§escu issued a decree in 1985 militarizing the energy indus- 
try. That decree stated that a military commander and subordinate 
cadres would be assigned to each power plant to improve its effi- 
ciency and ensure uninterrupted operation. 

The energy program for the 1980s called for drastically reduc- 
ing reliance on oil and gas, while increasing the contribution of 
coal, hydroelectric power, nuclear power, and nonconventional 
sources (see table 8, Appendix). Romanian industry was among 
the world's least energy-efficient. Measures to reduce waste were 
largely unsuccessful, and the population bore the brunt of conser- 
vation, even though private households accounted for only about 
6 percent of total consumption. During the 1980s, the government 
strictly rationed electricity, natural gas, gasoline, and other oil 
products, levying heavy fines for exceeding ration allotments. 

Electric Power 

Enormous investments made in the sector following World War 
II resulted in dramatic gains in capacity and output (see table 9, 
Appendix). Despite the impressive growth in output, averaging 8.3 
percent annually between 1966 and 1985, however, the power in- 
dustry did not keep pace with overall industrial growth, which aver- 
aged 9.5 percent annually during the same period. The result was 
an acute and worsening energy deficit. 

Thermal power plants burning fossil fuels accounted for more 
than 80 percent of electricity output in the mid-1980s, and the de- 
velopment program envisioned an installed capacity of 16,518 
megawatts at such plants by 1990. The largest thermal plants oper- 
ating in the mid-1980s were located at Rovinari in Gor] jude$ (1 ,720 
megawatts), Turceni in Gorj judej (1,650 megawatts), Braila (1,290 
megawatts), Mintia in Hunedoara^d^ (1,260 megawatts), Craiova 
(980 megawatts), Deva (840 megawatts), Ludu§ in Cluj judei (800 



166 



The Economy 



megawatts), Borze§ti in Botosanijw^/ (650 megawatts), Gala$i (320 
megawatts), and Bucharest (300 megawatts). After 1965, thermal 
plants producing both heat and electricity were favored, and by 
1984 their combined capacity exceeded 6,100 megawatts — roughly 
one-third of total installed capacity. A serious problem for ther- 
mal plants during the 1980s was the deteriorating quality of lig- 
nite fuel, which was damaging equipment and causing frequent 
shutdowns. At the start of the 1988-89 peak-demand season, only 
45 to 50 percent of total installed generating capacity was opera- 
tional. 

Capitalizing on the country's considerable hydroelectric poten- 
tial, the government built some 100 hydroelectric plants between 
1965 and 1985, bringing total capacity to 4,421 megawatts. 
Nevertheless, it was estimated in early 1989 that only 35 percent 
of the technically feasible hydroelectric potential had been tapped. 
The most important project was the 2, 100-megawatt Iron Gates 
I complex on the Danube. Built in collaboration with Yugoslavia, 
which operated a twin plant on the right bank, the project was com- 
pleted in 1972. In 1977 the two countries began work on a much 
smaller Iron Gates II project (sixteen twenty-seven-megawatt gener- 
ating units). Other important projects were the 220-megawatt 
Gheorghiu-Dej plant on the Arge§ River and a chain of fourteen 
smaller plants downstream with a combined capacity of 179 
megawatts; the V.I. Lenin complex of twelve plants on the Bistri- 
$a River; a chain of plants along the 737-kilometer Olt River total- 
ling more than 1,200 megawatts; a chain of sixteen plants on the 
Mare River with a total capacity of 536 megawatts; and numer- 
ous stations along the Buzau, Jiu, Prut, and other rivers. 

To offset declining petroleum and gas reserves, the PCR pinned 
its hopes on nuclear power. But these hopes were partially frus- 
trated by repeated setbacks in the construction of the first nuclear 
power plant at Cernavoda, which appeared unlikely to become oper- 
ational before 1992. The Cernavoda plant would use five 660- 
megawatt Canadian-built reactors. The Canadians also had been 
engaged to build a nuclear station at Victoria-Bra§ov. In 1982 a 
contract was signed with the Soviet Union to build the Moldova 
nuclear plant, which would have three 1,000-megawatt reactors. 
And preparatory work began in March 1986 for construction of 
a nuclear plant at Piatra Neamt, to be equipped largely by the Soviet 
Union. As late as 1985, the government was anticipating that 
nuclear plants would be supplying 20 percent of the nation's elec- 
tricity by 1990, when some 4,500 megawatts of capacity would be 
on line, but the long-range goal of building sixteen nuclear plants 
by 2000 appeared unattainable. 



167 



Romania: A Country Study 

Geothermal, solar, wind, methane, and small hydroelectric in- 
stallations produced the energy equivalent of nearly 450,000 tons 
of conventional fuel during the first three years of the Eighth Five- 
Year Plan (1986-90). The plan called for starting up some 240 
alternative-energy installations during this period, including 125 
solar and 70 methane plants. Methane accounted for over 80 per- 
cent of nonconventional energy production. In 1989 alternative 
energy sources were expected to double their output. The develop- 
ment program anticipated that such sources would contribute one- 
fifth of total energy capacity in 1995, when more than 60 percent 
of the geothermal, nearly 50 percent of the methane, and 63 per- 
cent of the small- stream hydroelectric potential would have been 
harnessed. 

A transmission grid of 1 10-, 220- , and 400-kilovolt lines with 
a total length of about 27,000 kilometers in the mid-1980s distribut- 
ed electricity throughout the country. Integrated into Comecon's 
Peace Unified Power System, the Romanian network was connected 
to the national grids of all neighboring states. In 1988 a 750-kilovolt 
transmission line built jointly with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria 
delivered some 5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to Romania 
from the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station. 

Oil and Gas 

With the largest petroleum reserves in Eastern Europe, Roma- 
nia was a major oil producer and exporter throughout much of the 
twentieth century. The oil extraction industry, developed primar- 
ily by German, United States, British, and Dutch companies, was 
the forerunner of the country's belated industrialization. In 1950 
oil satisfied nearly half of total energy needs. Peak production was 
reached in 1976, gradually declining in subsequent years, as many 
of the country's 200 oil fields began nearing depletion and discov- 
ery of new reserves waned. Increasingly large quantities of crude 
had to be imported, and in 1979 imports surpassed domestic produc- 
tion for the first time. Despite an accelerated exploration program, 
with average drilling depths increasing to 8,000 to 10,000 meters, 
oil output continued to decline in the 1980s. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, Romania became one of only ten 
countries producing offshore oil-drilling rigs. In 1988 seven such 
platforms were operating in the Black Sea under the supervision 
of the Constan{a-based Petromar enterprise to develop hydrocar- 
bon reserves in the continental shelf. 

During the 1970s, Romania invested heavily in developing an 
outsized oil-refining industry just as domestic petroleum produc- 
tion was beginning to decline and the world market price for crude 



168 



The Economy 



was skyrocketing. Some observers estimated that by 1980 the coun- 
try was losing as much as US$900,000 per day by exporting oil 
products derived from imported crude. But because these products 
found a ready market in the West — they accounted for 40 percent 
of exports to the West in the late 1980s — Romania continued large- 
scale processing of imported crude to earn hard currency. By 1988 
domestic crude output had fallen to 9.4 million tons, while refin- 
ing capacity stood at some 30 to 33 million tons annually. To keep 
the refineries running, ever larger volumes of crude had to be 
imported — first from members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), but after the outbreak of the Iran- 
Iraq War, from the Soviet Union. Soviet crude deliveries reached 
about 6 million tons in 1986. Under the terms of a barter arrange- 
ment, Romania was to receive at least 5 million tons of Soviet crude 
annually during the 1986-90 period in exchange for oil-drilling 
equipment and food products. 

The natural gas industry was unable to offset depletion of known 
reserves, and output declined from 1,216 billion cubic feet in 1976 
to 940 billion cubic feet in 1986. Some Western experts believed 
that Romanian reserves could be exhausted as early as 1990. Af- 
ter it had begun importing gas from the Soviet Union in the 
mid-1970s, Romania obtained incrementally larger shipments; in 
1986 it imported 2.5 billion cubic meters of Soviet gas. For its par- 
ticipation in projects to develop Soviet gas resources, Romania was 
expected to receive shipments of at least 6 billion cubic meters an- 
nually after 1989. In addition, as payment for transit rights for a 
200-kilometer gas pipeline across Dobruja to Bulgaria, Romania 
would be receiving an unspecified amount of Soviet gas for a twenty- 
five-year period. 

Coal 

The energy program of the 1970s and 1980s aimed for dramatic 
increases in coal output to compensate for the reduced role of oil 
and natural gas in power production. The use of oil and gas in 
electricity generation was projected to drop from 50 percent in 1981 
to 5 percent in 1990. When Romania's energy vulnerability had 
been revealed by the stoppage of crude oil shipments from Iran 
in the late 1970s, Ceau§escu launched a campaign to expand coal 
production rapidly. Because of labor unrest in the Jiu Valley, the 
primary coal-mining region, he decided to develop other coal fields. 
But the coal from the new mines turned out to be of poorer quali- 
ty and had a lower caloric content. Although a total of thirty-five 
new open-pit and underground mines began operating during the 
1982-85 period, the initial output target of 86 million tons annually 



169 



Romania: A Country Study 

by 1985 had to be revised to 64 million tons, and actual produc- 
tion amounted to just 44 million tons. Even as late as 1988, only 
58.8 million tons were mined. Poor mine-development methods, 
numerous accidents, pit flooding, equipment failure, and high labor 
turnover were the principal causes of the industry's disappointing 
performance. 

Coal production could not keep up with industrial needs. Near- 
ly three-fourths of coal output was burned by large thermoelectric 
power plants located at or near the major coal basins. Large quan- 
tities of coking coal had to be imported from the Soviet Union. 
In 1989 Hancock Mining Company of Australia signed a contract 
to deliver up to 6 million tons of coking coal annually for a twelve- 
year period. 

Machine Building 

Contributing about 35 percent of total industrial output in the 
1980s, machine building had become the largest industrial sector. 
The Soviet Union and Comecon helped set up and outfit machine- 
building plants in the 1950s, but during the 1960s Romania began 
acquiring technology and know-how from the West. In the 1980s, 
however, many manufacturing ventures initiated with Western 
partners in the previous decade were on shaky ground or had 
already failed. As a rule, capitalist enterprises found both the out- 
put and quality of goods produced by these ventures unsatis- 
factory. Because of restrictions on imports, domestic industry was 
required to satisfy nearly 90 percent of the country's machinery 
and equipment needs during the 1980s. 

In terms of both volume and diversity of output, the machinery 
sector was impressive. In 1982 Romania ranked tenth in the world 
in the production of machine tools and was the world's largest 
exporter of railroad freight cars and the third largest exporter of 
oil-field equipment. It was one of the few countries to build offshore- 
drilling platforms. A symbol of industrial sophistication, the giant 
rigs were assembled at the Gala$i shipyard using domestically 
manufactured components. And great strides had been made in 
the production of aircraft, electronic and electrical equipment, ships, 
and ground vehicles. 

Aircraft Industry 

The aircraft industry in Romania dates from 1925, when the 
first airplane factory began operation in Bra§ov. Following World 
War II, the few production facilities not retooled for other pur- 
poses built only light planes and gliders. But in 1968, in keeping 
with PCR aspirations of economic autonomy, the government 



170 



The Economy 



revived production of heavy aircraft and established the National 
Center of the Romanian Aircraft Industry under the Ministry of 
Machine Building. The center oversaw the operation of airframe 
plants in Craiova, Bacau, Bucharest, and Bra§ov, and the Tur- 
bomecanica plant in Bucharest, where all the jet engines for 
Romanian-built planes were manufactured. 

Romania was able to acquire both Western and Soviet technol- 
ogy to manufacture modern aircraft. The most successful projects 
involving such technology transfer included the Soviet-designed 
Yak-52 piston-engine two-seater (the primary trainer used in the 
Soviet Union) and Ka-126 agricultural-use helicopter; the Rom- 
bac 1-11 airliner, built under license from British Aerospace us- 
ing a fuselage designed by British Airways and a Rolls-Royce 
engine; Viper engines built under license from Rolls-Royce; and 
the French-designed IAR-316 Allouette III and IAR-330 Puma 
helicopters. A noteworthy example of homegrown aircraft design 
was the IAR-93 Orao combat aircraft and a later model, the 
IAR-99, which were developed jointly with Yugoslavia. 

Automotive Industry 

In 1965 a fledgling automotive industry produced only 3,653 
passenger cars. In the 1980s, the industry consisted of three large 
auto assembly plants (at Pite§ti, Craiova, and Cimpulung in Arge§ 
judef), eight subassembly enterprises, and more than 100 automo- 
tive parts factories. Production in 1988 amounted to 121,400 pas- 
senger cars and 17,400 trucks — well below the target set forth in 
the Eighth Five- Year Plan, which had anticipated an annual produc- 
tion of 365,000 automobiles by 1990. 

A plant in Pite§ti began assembling Dacia passenger cars in 1968 
under license from Renault and turned out its millionth unit in 
1985. In 1986 an affiliated plant in Timi§oara began building a 
subcompact, the Dacia 500, using exclusively Romanian-designed 
and Romanian-produced components; the plant expected the car 
to compete on the world market beginning in 1990. Other automo- 
tive centers in the 1980s were Craiova (Oltcit automobiles produced 
under license from Citroen); Cimpulung (Aro cross-country vehi- 
cles); Bra§ov (trucks and tractors); Braila (earthmovers); and 
Bucharest (vans and panel trucks). In 1989 negotiations were un- 
der way to set up a joint venture with two Japanese corporations 
to manufacture buses and trucks at a factory in Bucharest for sale 
to third- world countries. 

Between 50 and 80 percent of the automotive industry's output 
during the 1980s was exported. Poor quality control, however, 
damaged the international reputation of Romanian vehicles. Hungary, 



171 



Romania: A Country Study 

a primary client, complained that 60 to 70 percent of Dacia cars 
delivered in 1 986 were defective and required repairs before they 
could be sold to the public. 

Locomotives and Rolling Stock 

Claiming to be the world's largest exporter of railroad cars, 
Romania sold roughly 70 percent of its output to foreign clients 
during the 1980s, and during the 1970-84 period it exported more 
than 100,000 freight cars, 3,000 passenger coaches, and 1,500 
locomotives. The Soviet Union bought the lion's share, including 
the entire output of 70-ton and 105-ton freight cars. The August 
23 Machinery Plant in Bucharest, the largest manufacturing facil- 
ity in the country, was a major producer of diesel-electric locomo- 
tives and railroad cars. Other important plants were located in 
Craiova in OXt jude$, Arad, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Caracal, Ia§i, 
and several other cities. In the mid-1980s, a large new plant was 
built at Caracal to produce grain cars for export to the Soviet Un- 
ion in exchange for electricity. 

Machine Tools 

Annual production of machine tools in the two decades after 1965 
expanded more than six- fold in terms of tonnage. At the same time, 
ever more sophisticated units were manufactured, and the mone- 
tary value of output rose by a factor of thirty-one. During the 1980s 
in particular, Romania pushed to replace imported machine-tool 
technology with its own products and began designing and build- 
ing high-precision units featuring numerical control, automatic 
lines, and flexible processing cells. The Scientific Research and 
Technological Engineering Institute for Machine Tools, established 
in 1966, coordinated a successful research and design program that 
placed Romania among the world's top ten machine-tool manufac- 
turers in the 1980s. Romania manufactured 35.5 percent of the 
universal and specialized machine tools on the Comecon product 
list — second only to the Soviet Union. 

Computers and Automation Technology 

The high-status automation-technology and computer industries 
received priority treatment during the 1970s and 1980s. Plants be- 
gan producing a wide range of computers, peripherals, industrial 
electronic measuring equipment, and electronic control systems for 
domestic consumption and export — primarily to other Comecon 
and Third-World countries. In 1973 the United States firm Con- 
trol Data Corporation set up a joint venture with the Bucharest 
Industrial Central for Electronics and Automation — known as the 



172 



The Economy 



Rom-Control-Data Company — to manufacture and market com- 
puter disk drives and printers. The joint venture was among the 
most successful operating on Romanian territory and was earning 
an annual profit of 7 to 8 percent in the late 1980s. More than 
a dozen major automation-technology plants and research centers 
were located in Bucharest by the mid-1980s, and facilities had also 
been built in such cities as Timisoara and Cluj-Napoca. In the late 
1980s the Bucharest Computer Enterprise was producing fourth- 
generation Independent microcomputers, and its Felix models found 
application in machine-tool control, data transmission, and robotics. 
Romania intended to double its production of computer equipment 
during the Eighth Five- Year Plan. 

Electrical Engineering 

Nearly half of Romania's electricity output was generated by 
Soviet equipment, and the Piatra Neam$ nuclear plant, the con- 
struction of which began in 1986, was expected to use mostiy Soviet- 
supplied components. It was not until 1970 that domestic indus- 
try was able to manufacture steam turbines larger than 6 megawatts, 
but by the 1980s Romania was producing 330-megawatt steam tur- 
bines, hydraulic turbines of all sizes, boilers, nuclear reactor compo- 
nents, transformers, and other power-engineering equipment. By then 
Romania had become the largest foreign supplier of electric power 
transformers to the Soviet Union. The major power-engineering plants 
included the Bucharest Heavy Machinery Plant, the Re§i$a Machine- 
Building Plant, and the Vulcan enterprise in Bucharest. 

Shipbuilding 

After the mid-1960s, the shipbuilding program developed rapidly, 
as the industry made the transition from small-tonnage vessels to 
huge bulk-cargo and special-purpose ships. By the late 1980s, Con- 
stanta, the country's most important shipyard, was building 
165,000-deadweight-ton ore carriers, 150,000-deadweight-ton oil 
tankers, sea-going railroad ferry ships, and offshore-drilling plat- 
forms. Other important shipbuilding centers were Mangalia (site 
of Romania's largest naval base) and several cities along the 
Danube — Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Okeni£a, Giurgiu, Braila, Gala- 
$i, and Tulcea — that built river craft and smaller ocean-going ships. 
In 1989 the Galaji shipyard launched an 8,000-deadweight-ton roll- 
on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) container carrier — the first of its kind built in 
the country. 

Metallurgy 

Attaining self-sufficiency in steel to supply the vital machine- 



173 



Romania: A Country Study 

building industry was a primary economic goal after World War 
II. It was Romania's determination to pursue that goal and to build 
the Gala^i steelworks that precipitated the clash with Khrushchev 
and Comecon in 1964. Steel output rose from 550,000 tons in 1950 
to 1.8 million tons in 1960 to 6.5 million tons in 1970. Despite 
this impressive growth, production fell short of demand, and the 
steel was of insufficient quality for many machine-building appli- 
cations. Therefore the government decided in the early 1970s to 
build a state-of-the-art steelworks at Tirgovi§te using West Ger- 
man technology. In the second half of the decade, another large 
complex was built at Calara§i — again with Western technology. 
But the industry failed to reach its 1980 production target of 18 
million tons, as the country headed into a general economic decline. 
Production in 1985 was 13.8 million tons, and in 1988 it was 14.3 
million tons — still below target but sufficient to place Romania 
among the world's top ten producers on a per capita basis. 

Romania also imported Soviet technology. Using Soviet rolling 
mills delivered in 1985, the Gala$i steelworks and the Republica 
works in Bucharest began manufacturing 1 , 420-millimeter seam- 
less steel pipe for Soviet gas pipelines; Romania was the only non- 
Soviet Comecon member to obtain this technology. In the late 
1980s, the Soviets also agreed to equip a new steel plant at Slatina. 

The Soviet Union also became the chief foreign supplier of raw 
materials for the steel industry, including iron ore and coking coal. 
Because of its participation in the Krivoy Rog iron-ore develop- 
ment project, Romania was assured of receiving 27 to 30 percent 
of output from that complex up to the year 2000. Australia was 
another promising supplier; the Hancock Mining Company signed 
a contract to improve the ore-transloading facility at Constanta and 
to deliver 53 million tons of iron ore between 1988 and 2000. 

Nonferrous metallurgy, which dates to pre-Roman times, became 
increasingly important after World War II. Output during the 
period of 1966-82 increased an average 8. 1 percent annually. Non- 
ferrous metals increased their share of total industrial output from 
3.2 percent in 1966 to 4.0 percent in 1982. Following World War 
II, Romania built flotation plants at six new sites and modernized 
existing facilities. Major centers of the industry included Brane§ti 
in Galaji Baia Mare, Cop§a Mica in Sibiu judet, Zlatna in 

AAba.jude$, Tulcea, Oradea, Slatina, and Moldova Noua in Cara§- 
Severinj'ttd^. The copper and aluminum industries received spe- 
cial attention. Aluminum output increased by a factor of twenty- 
seven between 1965 and 1987. Construction of a major new alu- 
minum combine, using Soviet technology, was under considera- 
tion in the late 1980s. New copper, titanium, and vanadium mines 



174 




Castle and steel mill at Hunedoara 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

were also being developed to reduce dependence on imports. 
Through participation in projects to develop nonferrous metal 
resources in the Soviet Union and in a number of Third-World 
nations, Romania secured foreign supplies of critical ores. 

Chemicals 

The chemical sector developed rapidly after World War II and 
especially after 1965. Before the war, it generated less than 3 per- 
cent of total industrial output and its product list was limited to 
carbon black; hydrochloric and sulfuric acid; soda ash; caustic soda; 
and a few types of chemical fibers, paints, and lacquers. By the 
1980s, the industry produced between 10 and 20 percent of indus- 
trial output and accounted for more than 25 percent of export earn- 
ings. The petrochemical branch was the heart of the industry, 
producing about half of total output. The largest petrochemical com- 
plexes were built at Ploe§ti and Pite§ti, but numerous smaller 
production units were scattered across the country. With new plants 
at Turda, Tirnaveni in Mure§jwde£ Ocna Mure§, and Govora in 
VilceajWtf/, Romania became the largest producer of sodium- and 
chlorine-based products in Comecon after the Soviet Union. New 
sulfuric acid plants were built at Cop§a Mica, Victoria in Ialomija 
judef, and Navodari in Constanta judej. 



175 



Romania: A Country Study 

In later years, Romania reduced its emphasis on bulk chemi- 
cals and focused on more sophisticated products, such as special 
plastics, synthetic rubber, chemical fibers, electrodes, pharmaceu- 
ticals, dyes, and detergents. The government also gave priority to 
artificial fertilizers, building plants at Valea Calugareasca in Pra- 
hova. jude$, Fagara§, Tirnaveni, Navodari, Piatra NeamJ, Victor- 
ia, Tirgu Mure§, Craiova, Turnu Magurele in Teleorman judef, 
and Slobozia. The Eighth Five- Year Plan (1986-90) called for dou- 
bling the production of agricultural chemicals. 

Light Industry 

Traditionally the leading products of this sector were processed 
foods, textiles and clothing, and furniture. In the 1980s, food- 
processing plants produced about 1 3 percent of total industrial out- 
put, and processed foods were a major source of foreign currency 
earnings. The trend of the 1980s was to locate such plants in agro- 
industrial centers near the source of agricultural products in order 
to reduce transport losses and streamline processing. Textiles and 
clothing accounted for about 12 percent of industrial output in the 
early 1980s, but much of this production was exported. A severe 
shortage of all items of apparel persisted within Romania throughout 
the 1980s. After 1981 the government stopped publishing produc- 
tion statistics for cotton and wool clothing, knitwear, underwear, 
hosiery, footwear, and similar items. 

Furniture, especially wood furniture, had long been a major ex- 
port product. In 1980, for example, Romania claimed to be the 
world's sixth largest furniture exporter. Important furniture-making 
centers were Tirgu Mure§, Ia§i, Tirgu Jiu, Arad, and Oradea. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 
Railroads 

The basic structure of the national railroad network had been 
completed by the outbreak of World War II, when the total sys- 
tem length was 9,900 kilometers. In 1986 the network had a com- 
bined length of 11,221 kilometers, including 10,755 kilometers of 
1.435-meter standard- gauge, 421 kilometers of narrow-gauge, and 
45 kilometers of broad-gauge track; about 3,060 kilometers of route 
had been double- tracked; and 3,328 kilometers of track had been 
electrified — roughly 30 percent of the system (see fig. 5). 

The Thirteenth Party Congress of the PCR called for divert- 
ing freight from the highway system onto the railroads and increas- 
ing the volume of rail transport by 10 to 13 percent during the 
1986-90 period. In 1984 the railroads carried 289.3 million metric 



176 



The Economy 



tons, as compared with 417.7 million metric tons transported by 
the highways. Measured in ton-kilometers, however, railroads 
hauled more than ten times as much freight as the highways (75.2 
billion and 7.3 billion metric ton-kilometers, respectively). 

Two important railroad construction projects completed in the 
1980s were the Vilcele-Rimnicu Vilcea line, which connected the 
Pite§ti-Curtea de Arge§ mainline with the Piatra Olt-Podul Olt 
mainline and shortened the distance to Transylvania by 100 kilo- 
meters, and the Borcea-Cernavoda line (part of the North-South 
Trans-European System), which tripled the traffic capacity of the 
Bucharest-Dobruja-Constanja route. These projects required build- 
ing some of the longest bridges, viaducts, and tunnels in the coun- 
try. Construction of the Bucharest subway system was another 
major investment in rail transportation during the 1980s. 

Highways 

The highway network remained relatively underdeveloped in the 
late 1980s. Of 72,799 kilometers of roads in 1985, only 11,000 could 
be classified modern by international standards. In 1985 the system 
included 15,762 kilometers of concrete, 20,208 kilometers of black- 
top, 27,729 kilometers of gravel, and 9,100 kilometers of dirt roads. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, highways took on a larger share of freight 
and passenger transport, although the PCR program for the late 1980s 
attempted to reverse the trend. Among major road construction 
projects of the Ceausescu era, the Trans-Fagara§an Highway, the 
Sibiu-Bucharest-Constanja super-highway, and the Cernavoda 
Bridge (the longest on the Danube) were the most noteworthy. 

Inland Waterways 

As a result of a long-term effort to develop inland navigation, 
river transport increased by 50 percent during the 1980-85 peri- 
od. Except for the lower Prut River in the east and the Bega Canal 
in the west, commercial navigation was restricted to the Danube 
waterway. The Danube-Black Sea Canal, which became operational 
in 1984, was the costliest engineering project in the country's his- 
tory. The 64-kilometer canal linking Cernavoda and Constanta 
required excavating twice as much earth and rock as had the Pana- 
ma Canal. The massive undertaking involved building some 150 
kilometers of access roads, modernizing 80 kilometers of railroad 
track, and erecting thirty-six major bridges. Three important new 
port facilities were developed along the canal: Cernavoda, projected 
to transload as much as 7 million tons annually; Medgidia, ex- 
panded to handle 11.5 million tons a year; and Basarabi, which 
had a capacity of about 1 million tons annually. With an average 



177 



Romania: A Country Study 



m 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



HUNGARY C "' S £ e m Ba S aMan 
Oradea 



Suceavi 



f \ 

Botosani^j* 



SOVIET 
UNION 




^Roman^J 



Cluj-Napoca 

TurdaJ^=t^^[i r 9u Mure; 
\ Media 



\Birlac 



iSibiu 



nedoara* ] 



Petrosani \ 



Resita \ ^Rimnicu 
W \ Drobeta- {T>rgu Jiu j^'^ea 

. Turnu 



Brasov , 

icu 
a 

irgoviste 



Vintu 
{Gheorghe 
Focsani 



Buzau. 

^loiest 



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42 



YUGOSLAVIA > 

s 

.—A . 



BULGARIA 



• • — International boundary 
® National capital 

• Populated place 
Road 

-4- — h Railroad 



50 100 Kilometers 



s: 



Figure 5. Transportation System, 1982 



depth of 7 meters, the canal can accommodate seagoing ships as 
large as 5,000 deadweight tons and drafts of 5.5 meters. The canal 
was projected to carry up to 75 million tons of freight annually, but 
in its first five years of operation, traffic was disappointingly light. 

In 1983 work began on a twenty-seven-kilometer lateral canal 
running northeast from Balta Alba on the Danube-Black Sea Canal 
through two natural lakes to a new port being built on the Black 
Sea at Midia. Two new ports were built along the route at Ovidiu 
and Lumini^a. Officially known as the Poarta Alba-Midia-Navodari 
Canal, it was opened to traffic in late 1987. 

In 1985 Romania undertook the second-costliest canal project 
in its history. The project would tranform the southern part of the 
Arge§ River into a seventy-two-kilometer navigable canal, providing 
Bucharest a direct link to the Danube and the Black Sea. The project 
had originally been started in 1952 but had been abandoned shortly 
thereafter. 



178 



The Economy 



Upstream from Cernavoda, a chain of weirs and locks was built 
on the Danube to ensure a minimum navigation depth of 2 . 5 meters 
as far as the Yugoslav border. Aside from Galati and Braila, which 
could be considered seaports, the most important inland ports were 
Giurgiu, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, and Or§ova. 

Maritime Navigation 

After 1965 the maritime fleet grew rapidly, and modern seaport 
facilities were developed. By 1989 the commercial fleet consisted 
of 275 vessels with a total capacity of more than 5 million dead- 
weight tons and included 15 modern Ro-Ro ships. But the goal 
of the Eighth Five-Year Plan — a fleet capacity of 8 million dead- 
weight tons by 1990 — was clearly unattainable. 

Constanta handled about 65 percent of marine traffic, transload- 
ing more than 52 million tons annually during the 1980s. A port- 
modernization program had been started in 1964, and the first Ro- 
Ro facility went into service in 1979. By 1988 the port was han- 
dling more than 700,000 tons of Ro-Ro cargo annually and was 
processing containerized, pelletized, packaged, and bulk cargoes. 
Construction of a new port facility — Constanja-Sud — was near- 
ing completion in the late 1980s. Located in the town of Agigea, 
south of the old port, Constanja-Sud was projected to cover some 
2,000 hectares. It was designed to accommodate vessels as large 
as 165,000 deadweight tons. When completed, the port was ex- 
pected to become one of the ten largest in the world. Integrated 
into the national rail and highway systems, and with direct access 
to a major international highway, Constanta also serves as the ter- 
minus of the Danube-Black Sea Canal. 

Sea-going ships as large as 12,000 deadweight tons are able to 
ascend the Danube as far as Galati and Braila. Mangalia, on the 
Black Sea south of Constanta, is a secondary seaport but is the site 
of the most important naval installation. 

Air Transport 

In 1984 the nation's two airlines, TAROM and LAR, had a 
fleet of seventy heavy transport aircraft. Air service was offered 
to every region of the country through a network of 160 airfields, 
of which 15 had runways 2,500 meters or more in length. Four 
international airports (Bucharest, Constanta, Timisoara, and Sucea- 
va) provided connections to thirty-eight foreign destinations. In 
passenger volume, the busiest airports were Bucharest, Caranse- 
be§ in Cara§- Severin judej, Timi§oara, Satu Mare, Boto§ani, Ia§i, 
and Constanta. Between 1965 and 1984, the volume of cargo 
transported by air increased from 5 million to about 40 million 



179 



Romania: A Country Study 

ton-kilometers, while passenger transport rose from 374 to 1,936 
million passenger-kilometers. 

Telecommunications 

Although Romania's telecommunications systems had developed 
moderately by the 1980s, they lagged behind those of other Come- 
con members. In 1989 Romania operated thirty-nine AM and thirty 
FM radio stations, thirty-eight television broadcasting stations, and 
one satellite ground station. Television was not introduced until 
the mid-1960s, and, although the number of receivers owned by 
the population rose steadily to about 3.9 million in 1989, televi- 
sion did not have the pervasive influence on society that it did in 
other parts of Eastern Europe. Only about twenty-two hours of 
television programming were broadcast each week (see Mass Me- 
dia, ch.4). In 1988 the Bucharest Electronics Enterprise, the sole 
manufacturer of television sets in Romania, expected to produce 
650,000 black-and-white and color television receivers, about half 
of which would be exported. The plant also manufactured radios. 
Much of the local telephone system had been automated by the 
late 1980s. In 1985 there were 1,962,681 telephone subscribers in 
Romania. 

Agriculture 

Agricultural Regions 

The historic provinces of Walachia, Transylvania, Moldavia, 
Dobruja, and the Banat have distinct soil and climatic conditions 
that make them suitable for different types of agriculture (see Cli- 
mate, ch. 2; Land, this ch.). The breadbasket of Romania is 
Walachia, which provides half the annual grain harvest and roughly 
half the fruit and grapes. Truck farming, especially in the Ilfov 
Agricultural District surrounding Bucharest, is also important. 
Despite the fertility of Walachia's soil, yields fluctuate considera- 
bly from year to year because of recurrent droughts. Transylva- 
nia, which receives more precipitation than Walachia, has poorer 
soils and more rugged terrain that restricts large-scale mechanized 
farming. Livestock raising predominates in the mountains, and 
potatoes and grains are the principal crops in the central basin. 
Moldavia has generally less fertile soil than Walachia and receives 
scant rainfall. Its primary crops are corn, wheat, fruit and grapes, 
and potatoes. The Banat region has a nearly ideal balance of rich 
chernozem soils and adequate precipitation. Grain, primarily wheat, 
is the principal crop; fruits and vegetables are also important. 
Dobruja, a region of generally inadequate rainfall, was becoming 



180 




Danube-Black Sea Canal near Constanta 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 
Trans -Fagarasan Highway Through the Transylvanian Alps 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 



181 



Romania: A Country Study 

agriculturally more important during the 1980s, because much of 
the marshland in the Danube Delta was being drained and brought 
under cultivation. The traditional crops of Dobruja are grain, sun- 
flowers, and legumes. 

Major Crops 

Corn and wheat (predominantly of the winter varieties) occupied 
nearly two-thirds of all arable land in the 1980s and about 90 per- 
cent of all grain lands. Corn, the staple of the peasant diet, was 
grown on 3.1 million hectares in 1987, while wheat was sown on 
2.4 million hectares. Other important grains included barley 
(560,000 hectares), oats (70,000 hectares), rice (47,000 hectares), 
and rye (42,000 hectares). Among the major nongrain crops, the 
most widely grown in 1987 were hay (870,000 hectares), sunflow- 
ers (455,000 hectares), potatoes (350,000 hectares), soybeans 
(350,000 hectares), sugar beets (271,000 hectares), feed roots 
(70,000 hectares), corn silage (50,000 hectares), and tobacco (35,000 
hectares). Wine and table grapes were widely grown, but the best 
vineyards were in Moldavia. Romania had gained a reputation for 
fine wines as early as the nineteenth century, and subsequently be- 
came one of the major producers of Europe. 

Thanks to the increased use of fertilizers and plant-protecting 
chemicals and the expansion of arable land area through irriga- 
tion and drainage, grain output rose steadily from only 5 million 
tons in 1950 to between 20 and 30 million tons in the 1980s. How 
much grain was produced in the late 1980s was unclear because 
official figures had become unreliable. The Romanian government 
reported a 1987 grain harvest of more than 31.7 million tons, a 
record amount and far larger than the 1985 harvest of 23 million 
tons. The United States Department of Agriculture, however, es- 
timated the 1987 harvest at only 18.6 million tons — well below the 
harvest of 1985. 

Livestock 

Prior to the dramatic increase in grain cultivation in the 
nineteenth century, livestock raising, sheep breeding in particu- 
lar, was the most important economic activity in the country. But 
with the diversion of grazing land and a perennial shortage of fod- 
der, livestock raising fell into decline. After a drastic reduction in 
livestock inventories in World War II, herds were gradually 
replenished, but the number of horses continued to decline, as 
agriculture became more mechanized. Catde were raised through- 
out the country, particularly in the foothills of the Carpathians. 



182 



The Economy 



Sheep predominated in the mountainous areas and Dobruja. Pigs, 
poultry, and rabbits were raised on a wide scale. 

Private farmers, who produced a large share of livestock brought 
to market, operated under dire conditions. The state theoretically 
was obliged to provide fodder to the livestock breeders it contract- 
ed to fatten animals. But fodder and protein-rich mixed feeds were 
not made available in the necessary quantities, especially in the 
1980s, when imports were drastically curtailed. 

Fishing 

The numerous rivers emanating from the central mountains, the 
Danube, the Black Sea coastal waters, and Lake Razelm in the 
Danube Delta provide rich fishing grounds. The lower Danube 
supplies roughly 90 percent of the total catch, about 80 percent 
of which is consumed fresh. In 1985 approximately 260,100 tons 
were produced, and the 1986 plan called for 380,100 tons. Fish 
farming was being practiced on an increased scale in the late 1980s, 
particularly in the Danube Delta, where more than 63,000 hect- 
ares were expected to be covered with fish ponds by 1990. 

Farming Practices 

By the mid-1980s, more than 30 percent of the country's 10 mil- 
lion hectares of cropland was irrigated. The remaining 7 million hect- 
ares were subject to recurrent and sometimes severe droughts, which 
were particularly destructive in the southern and eastern regions. 

At the same time, large areas of land along the Danube and in 
its delta were waterlogged, and the government decided to drain 
much of this marshland and make it arable. The Danube Delta, 
covering more than 440,000 hectares, was being developed rapid- 
ly after 1984. By 1989 some 35,750 hectares had been made ara- 
ble and large areas of pastureland had been created. By 1990 more 
than 144,000 hectares of the delta were expected to be useful agricul- 
tural land. 

Poor crop rotation practices, with corn and wheat sown year af- 
ter year on the same ground, led to serious depletion of soil 
nutrients, and supplies of chemical fertilizers were inadequate to 
restore the lost fertility. In the early 1980s, for example, only thirty- 
four to thirty- six kilograms of fertilizer were available per acre. Fur- 
thermore, much of the best farmland had been severely damaged 
by prolonged use of outsized machinery, which had compacted the 
soil, by unsystematic application of agricultural chemicals, and by 
extensive erosion. 

During the first three decades of communist rule, agricultural 
planners ordered the slaughter of thousands of workhorses, which 



183 



Romania: A Country Study 

were to be replaced by more powerful tractors. Indeed, the num- 
ber of tractors available to agriculture grew from 13,700 in 1950 
to 168,000 in 1983. But with the onset of the energy crisis, the re- 
gime reversed its policy. A program adopted by the National Coun- 
cil for Agriculture, Food Industry, Forestry, and Water 
Management in 1986 called for increasing horse inventories by 
90,000 head by the end of the decade and reducing the number 
of tractors in service by nearly one-third. By 1990, according to 
plans, horse-drawn equipment would perform 18 to 25 percent of 
all harvesting and virtually all hauling on livestock farms. 

Farm Organization 

Cooperative and state farms were the two primary types of farm 
organization, although a significant number of small private farms 
continued to exist in the 1980s. State farms accounted for more 
than 17 percent and cooperatives nearly 75 percent of all arable 
land. In 1982 cooperatives employed 2.2 million farmers, while 
state and private farms employed about 400,000 each. 

The formation of state farms, which were intended to be the rural 
equivalent of socialist industrial enterprises, had begun as early 
as 1945. These ideologically favored farms received the best lands 
expropriated in 1949 and during the major collectivization cam- 
paign of the 1958-62 period, and they had priority access to machin- 
ery, chemicals, and irrigation water. Because of these advantages, 
state farms reported higher crop yields than did cooperative farms. 
Like other state enterprises, state farms operated according to the 
directives of the central government. Workers received a fixed wage 
in return for their labor on the farm and had no private plot rights. 
Their incomes in the 1980s approached those of urban workers. 

Although cooperative farms owned their land and certain basic 
equipment, they had little more autonomy than the state farms. 
Their directors routinely accepted production directives from 
Bucharest with little objection. The cooperatives were told what 
crops to grow, how to grow them, and how much to deliver to the 
state. Many smaller cooperatives were ordered to combine into as- 
sociations during the 1970s and 1980s to pool their assets. Accord- 
ing to a decree issued by the Council of State, cooperative farmers 
were required to work at least 300 days per year on the coopera- 
tive, and they were subject to transfer to other farms or even to 
construction and lumber work sites if their own cooperative had 
no work for them. Between 40 and 60 percent of the average cooper- 
ative farm income was derived from the sale of products from pri- 
vate plots. Despite this supplementary income, cooperative farmers 
earned only about 60 percent as much as their counterparts on state 



184 




Villagers and their livestock at the animal market in Negreni 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 
Outdoor market, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 



185 



Romania: A Country Study 

farms in the 1980s. Cooperative farmers also had much smaller 
pension benefits. 

As late as 1988, almost 9.5 percent of the country's 15 million 
hectares of agricultural land remained in private hands. As a rule, 
this land was located in relatively inaccessible mountainous regions, 
where use of heavy machinery was impractical. In addition, in 1988 
cooperative farms reserved some 922,000 hectares (about 6 per- 
cent of all arable land) for private plots, which were cultivated by 
families working on the cooperatives. These plots averaged 1,500 
square meters in area, but in rugged terrain they could be con- 
siderably larger. Thus in the late 1980s, the private sector was still 
cultivating more than 15 percent of the country's agricultural 
land — the highest total in Eastern Europe after Poland and Yu- 
goslavia. Privately owned land could not be sold, nor could it be 
inherited by persons unable to tend it adequately. 

Even official government statistics revealed that private agricul- 
ture was more than four times as productive as socialized agricul- 
ture in the cultivation of fruit; twice as productive in grain growing 
and poultry raising, and 60 percent more efficient in milk, beef, 
pork, and vegetable production. In 1987 the private sector produced 
half the sheep, 40 percent of the beef, 28 percent of the pork, and 
63 percent of the fruit output. 

Despite the higher productivity of private agriculture and its 
major contribution to total farm output, the Ceau§escu regime sys- 
tematically penalized the nonsocialist sector. At the very time most 
of the communist world was beginning to permit peasants to lease 
larger tracts for longer periods, Romania was actually reducing 
the area under private cultivation — from 967,500 hectares in 1965 
to 922,841 in 1985. Beginning in 1987, an area of at least 500 square 
meters (or one-third) of each private plot was required to be sown 
in wheat, and the harvest was to be traded to the state for the yield 
from an equivalent amount of land cultivated by the cooperative 
farm. This policy was designed to discourage peasants from spend- 
ing an inordinate amount of time cultivating their private plots 
instead of working for the cooperative. Its effect, however, was to 
further demoralize the farm population and thus make it less 
productive. 

In the late 1980s, the systematization program aimed to subor- 
dinate privately owned land and private plots on cooperative farms 
to the regional agro-industrial councils and thereby tighten cen- 
tral control of private farming (see Administration and Control, 
this ch.). Systematization would eliminate many of the plots, as vil- 
lages were levelled to create vast fields for socialized farming. This 
policy directly contradicted the government's mandate in the 1980s 



186 



The Economy 



that the population essentially feed itself by cultivating small plots 
(even lawns and public parks had been converted to vegetable 
gardens) and breeding poultry and rabbits. 

Administration 

Romanian agriculture in the late 1980s remained the most cen- 
tralized in Comecon. A complicated and constantly changing net- 
work of overlapping state and party agricultural bureaucracies had 
evolved over the previous four decades. The Ministry of Agricul- 
ture set production targets and oversaw the distribution of resources 
among the judeie. It became the frequent target of Ceau§escu's ire 
and received much of the blame for agriculture's persistent 
problems. In 1978 the Congress of the Higher Councils of Socialist 
Agricultural Units and of the Whole Peasantry and its permanent 
bureau, the National Agricultural Board, were established. The 
apparent purpose of the new body was to approve and thereby 
legitimize the PCR's policy directives. The following year a joint 
party and state agricultural policy-making body was established — 
the National Council For Agriculture, Food Industry, Forestry, 
and Water Management. Meeting as frequently as four times a 
year in plenary session, the council provided a forum for Ceau§es- 
cu to address thousands of agricultural specialists and functionaries. 

In 1979 pursuant to the guidelines of the New Economic and 
Financial Mechanism enacted the previous year, a network of agro- 
industrial councils was set up to coordinate the activities of as many 
as five state and cooperative farms in an area served by a single 
state machinery station. A Stalinist holdover abandoned in the rest 
of Eastern Europe, these stations controlled access to tractors and 
other heavy equipment. In the 1980s the agro-industrial councils 
gained additional powers to coordinate agricultural production, food 
processing, research, and agricultural training. After 1980 jude$ and 
village people's councils bore responsibility for fulfilling agricul- 
tural production targets set in Bucharest. In each jude} a General 
Directorate for Agriculture and Food Industry made assignments 
to individual state and cooperative farms. 

Procurement and Distribution 

State farms, like other socialist enterprises after the implemen- 
tation of the New Economic and Financial Mechanism, were in 
theory self-financed and self-managed concerns that were expect- 
ed to earn a profit while delivering assigned quantities of output 
to the state. In reality, few state farms in the 1980s could turn a 
profit, because the government's procurement prices were consis- 
tendy lower than production costs. Cooperatives and private farmers, 



187 



Romania: A Country Study 

too, had large state-imposed quotas to fill even before satisfying 
their own food requirements. A 1984 decree specified the quantity 
of production to be delivered to the state by farmers. For example, 
potato growers were required to deliver three tons per hectare of 
land cultivated, and dairy farmers had to turn over 800 liters of milk 
per cow. To ensure compliance with the compulsory quotas, Ceau§es- 
cu reinstituted the Department for Contracting, Acquiring, and Stor- 
ing Farm Produce, which had been disbanded in 1956. The state 
was able to hold sway over individual farmers because it controlled 
the supply of fertilizers, herbicides, machinery, construction materi- 
als, and other inputs. To gain access to these materials, the farmer 
had to sign delivery contracts. Farmers who failed to comply with 
the delivery quotas even risked losing their land. 

Farmers were permitted to keep for their own use any food re- 
maining after their quotas had been filled, and they could sell the 
surplus at farmers' markets, where prices in the early 1980s were 
frequently five times the state procurement prices. A law passed 
in 1983 required peasants to obtain a license to sell their products 
on the open market, and it imposed a maximum commodity price 
of 5 percent above the state retail price. Disappointing harvests 
in the early 1980s convinced the government to raise procurement 
prices. As a result, peasant incomes rose by some 12 percent 
between 1980 and 1985, and farm output increased by about 10 
percent. Private farmers in the mid-1980s were obliged to sell to 
the state 30 percent of the milk, 50 percent of the pork, 12 percent 
of the potatoes, and comparable shares of other commodities they 
produced. 

Throughout the 1980s, a self-sufficiency program, mandated by 
the PCR, was in effect. Each village andjude} was responsible for 
producing, to the maximum extent possible, the food needed by 
the local population. In reality the program was another means 
for procuring agricultural products for export. Nearly all the produc- 
tion from the three types of farms was confiscated by state procure- 
ment agencies, which then returned the amount of food the state 
deemed sufficient to meet the dietary needs of the village and jude$. 
The quantity returned invariably was less than that delivered. The 
self-sufficiency program in effect reversed the rationalization of the 
1970s, when regions specialized in the crops and livestock best suited 
to local conditions. Thus a portion of the prime grain lands of 
Walachia had to be diverted to truck farming, while cool, wet 
regions of Transylvania attempted to grow sunflowers. The self- 
sufficiency program seriously impeded the distribution of agricul- 
tural products among regions and damaged the domestic market- 
ing system. 



188 



Waiting in line for cooking oil, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

The party secretary of each jude$ was responsible for delivering 
a specified quota of food to the state. Because these individuals react- 
ed in different ways to the countervailing needs of their constituents 
and the central authorities, there was considerable regional varia- 
tion in food supplies. Many party secretaries began understating 
output figures so that less would have to be delivered to Bucharest 
and more would be available for the people of their jude$. Aware 
of this regional variation, citizens made food-hunting forays into 
other jude$e hoping to find stores better stocked. Ceau§escu ordered 
the militia to monitor the highways and railroads to prevent "ille- 
gal" food trafficking. 

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing itself was torn 
between a sense of responsibility to safeguard the interests of the 
agricultural sector and its obligation to fulfill the regime's man- 
date to maximize procurement. To resolve these conflicting loyal- 
ties, in February 1986 a separate Ministry of Food Industry and 
Procurement was established. 

Consumption 

Although gross agricultural output had been increasing at a rate 
four times higher than population growth between 1950 and 1980, 
food availability remained inadequate. In 1981 rationing was 
imposed for the first time since 1953, and it remained in effect 



189 



Romania: A Country Study 

throughout the decade, as the regime exported as much as possi- 
ble to pay off the foreign debt. In 1985 the average citizen was eligi- 
ble to receive 54.88 kilograms of meat and fish, 1.1 kilograms of 
margarine, 9.6 kilograms of cooking oil, 14.8 kilograms of sugar, 
114.5 kilograms of flour, 45.3 kilograms of potatoes, 20 kilograms 
of fruit, and 114 eggs per year. In reality, most Romanians were 
unable to obtain even these scant rations, as the situation deterio- 
rated even further in following years. The food supply program 
of 1988 enacted by the GNA provided for an annual per capita 
consumption of 38 liters of milk, 3.5 kilograms of cheese, 1.5 kilo- 
grams of butter, 128 eggs, 21 kilograms of sweets, 3.6 kilograms 
of rice, 500 grams of oatmeal, and 22 kilograms of cornmeal. 

Reliable statistics on food consumption were not available dur- 
ing the 1980s. Comecon statistical reports omitted Romanian data 
after 1981. Romania's own statistical yearbooks stopped report- 
ing figures for consumption of food and many other commodities, 
including clothing, appliances, automobiles, and bicycles. Ceauges- 
cu claimed in November 1988 that the daily per capita calorie in- 
take of Romanians was 3,200 calories, which he termed excessive. 
He promised to improve food supplies in 1988 by slaughtering 8 
million sheep and between 7 . 5 and 12.5 million hogs — an unlikely 
proposal considering that the entire national inventory included 
only 18.6 million sheep and 14.3 million hogs. 

Goals for the 1990s 

According to long-standing PCR predictions, by 1990 Roma- 
nia was to have attained the status of a ' 'medium-developed coun- 
try," and by the year 2000, it was to have become a multilaterally 
developed socialist country. By the end of the century, according 
to Ceau§escu's vision, the country would have an overwhelmingly 
industrial economy, employing a well-trained, highly skilled work 
force in technologically advanced branches, such as electronics, com- 
puters, and aeronautics. The "new agrarian revolution" would 
have made agriculture more productive by applying the latest scien- 
tific advances and better utilizing available resources. 

As late as 1989, Ceau§escu was confidently predicting that dur- 
ing the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1991-95) the energy problem would 
be completely resolved. The plan would focus on modernizing 
metallurgy, chemistry, mining, oil production, and raw material 
processing. Foreign trade would receive greater emphasis, and 
Romania would remain an active member of Comecon. The rate 
of accumulation and investment in the economy would remain 
among the world's highest, hovering around one-third of gross na- 
tional product. Achieving these goals would mean a continuation 



190 



The Economy 



of consumer sacrifice and no immediate improvement in the stan- 
dard of living. 

* * * 

Several excellent English-language publications dealing with the 
Romanian economy appeared in the 1980s. Michael Shafir's Roma- 
nia: Politics, Economics, and Society and William E. Crowther's The 
Political Economy of Romanian Socialism describe the evolution, struc- 
ture, and performance of the economy in the twentieth century. 
Daniel N. Nelson's Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era provides 
insight into the relationship between the people and the political 
and economic institutions that control their lives. Richard F. Staar's 
fifth edition of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe summarizes the 
administrative changes of the 1970s and 1980s. The East European 
Economic Handbook, whose main contributor is Alan H. Smith, 
presents comprehensive statistical information and analysis of all 
aspects of the economy. Romania, 40 Years (1944-1984), edited by 
Vlad Georgescu, contains excellent essays by Paul Gafton and Ser- 
ban Orescu on the performance of Romanian industry and agricul- 
ture since World War II. Radio Free Europe Research publications 
are an indispensable source for the most current information and 
analysis of the economic situation in Romania. For readers of 
Romanian, Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania, published 
by the Central Statistical Directorate in Bucharest, is a useful refer- 
ence work. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



191 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




President Nicolae Ceausescu 



THE PROMULGATION of the Constitution of 1965, in which 
Romania officially proclaimed its status as a socialist republic, was 
a milestone on its path toward communism. The country had set 
out on that path in 1945 when the Soviet Union pressured King 
Michael to appoint communists to key government positions, where 
they provided the power base for a complete communist takeover 
and the abolition of the monarchy in December 1947. The politi- 
cal system installed in April 1948, when the Romanian People's 
Republic was created, was a replica of the Soviet model. The sys- 
tem's goal was to create the conditions for the transition from 
capitalism through socialism (see Glossary) to communism. 

The formal structure of the government established by the Con- 
stitution of 1965 was changed in a significant way by a 1974 amend- 
ment that established the office of president of the republic. The 
occupant of that office was to act as the head of state in both domestic 
and international affairs. The first president of the republic, Ni- 
colae Ceau§escu, still held the office in mid- 1989 and acted as head 
of state, head of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul 
Comunist Roman — PCR, see Glossary), and commander of the 
armed forces. His wife, Elena Ceau§escu, had risen to the second 
most powerful position in the hierarchy, and close family mem- 
bers held key posts throughout the party and state bureaucracies. 
The pervasive presence of the Ceau§escus was the distinctive fea- 
ture of Romania's power structure. 

Romania's political system was one of the most centralized and 
bureaucratized in the world. At the end of the 1980s, the Council 
of Ministers had more than sixty members and was larger than the 
council of any other European communist government except the 
Soviet Union. Joint party- state organizations not envisioned by the 
Constitution emerged and proliferated. The organizations functioned 
as a mechanism by which the PCR and the Ceaugescus controlled 
all government activity and preempted threats to their rule. 

Despite Ceau§escu's tight control of the organs of power and the 
effectiveness of the secret police, more properly the Department 
of State Security (Departamentul Securita$ii Statului — Securitate), 
in repressing dissent, sporadic political opposition to the regime 
surfaced in the 1980s. The Western media published letters writ- 
ten by prominent retired communist officials accusing Ceau§escu 
of violating international human rights agreements, mismanaging 
the economy, and alienating Romania's allies. 



195 



Romania: A Country Study 

Although Romania remained in Soviet-dominated military and 
economic alliances, PCR leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his 
successor, Ceausescu, pursued a defiandy independent foreign poli- 
cy. During the 1958-75 period, they successfully cultivated con- 
tacts with the West, gaining most-favored-nation trading status from 
the United States and membership in the International Monetary 
Fund (see Glossary), the World Bank (see Glossary), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and other international organi- 
zations. Romania condemned the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Or- 
ganization (Warsaw Pact) invasion of Czechoslovakia and was the 
only member of the pact to maintain diplomatic relations with Is- 
rael following the June 1967 War. After 1975, however, Romania 
became increasingly isolated from the West, on which Ceau§escu 
heaped much of the blame for his country's economic dilemma. 
In the 1980s, international outcries against human rights abuses 
further isolated the Stalinist Romanian regime from both the West 
and the East. Relations with Hungary were particularly tense, as 
thousands of ethnic Hungarians fled across the border. At the close 
of the decade, Ceausescu' s regime was badly out of step with the re- 
form movements sweeping the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary. 

Governmental System 

Since the imposition of full communist control in December 1947, 
Romania has had three constitutions. The first, designating the 
country a ''people's republic," was adopted by the Grand Nation- 
al Assembly (GNA, see Glossary) in April 1948, just four weeks 
after the assembly had been reorganized under new communist 
leadership. The second, adopted in September 1952, was closer to 
the Soviet model. The third, ostensibly reflecting Romania's social 
and ideological development, went into effect on August 21, 1965. 

In many ways similar to the initial constitutions of the other 
Soviet-dominated states of Eastern Europe, the 1948 constitu- 
tion was designed to mark Romania's entry into the first stage of 
the transition from capitalism to socialism. There was no separa- 
tion of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. As a people's 
democracy, the state was said to derive power from the people's 
will, expressed through the GNA. A nineteen-member Presidium 
was elected by and from the GNA membership to provide con- 
tinuity of legislative authority when the assembly itself was not in 
session. The highest executive and administrative organ was the 
Council of Ministers, which functioned under the direction of 
the prime minister. Although not mentioned in the constitution, 
the PCR, under close Soviet supervision, functioned as the su- 
preme decision-making authority over and above the government. 



196 



Government and Politics 



At the ministry level, the most important decisions were taken under 
the supervision of Soviet advisers. 

The right of private property ownership was guaranteed, although 
the constitution provided that privately held means of production, 
banks, and insurance companies could be nationalized when the 
"general interest" so required. Less than two months after the adop- 
tion of the constitution, the GNA passed legislation nationalizing 
the main industrial and financial institutions. 

The organs of state power in the regions, counties, districts, and 
communes were designated "people's councils." Formally estab- 
lished by law in 1949, these bodies were organized into a central- 
ized system in which the lower-level councils were fully subordinated 
to the next higher council, and all functioned under the direct con- 
trol of the central government. 

Largely patterned after the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Un- 
ion, the 1952 constitution specifically designated the Romanian 
Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Roman — PMR) — as the 
communist party was known between 1948 and 1965 — the coun- 
try's leading political force. The nation's close ties with the Soviet 
Union were strongly emphasized, and the Soviets were described 
as great friends of the Romanian people. Whereas the 1948 con- 
stitution declared that "the Romanian People's Republic was born 
amid the struggle conducted by the people, under the leadership 
of the working class, against fascism, reaction, and imperialism," 
the 1952 version asserted that the republic "was born and consoli- 
dated following the liberation of the country by the armed forces 
of the Soviet Union." 

As had its predecessor, the 1952 constitution guaranteed full 
equality to national minority groups, and it also established an au- 
tonomous administrative unit for the large ethnic Hungarian 
population — the Hungarian Autonomous Region. The region was 
given its own council and local authorities, although these bodies 
were clearly subordinated to the organs of the central government. 

Citizens were guaranteed the right to work for remuneration; 
the right to rest, ensured by the establishment of an eight-hour work- 
day and paid annual vacation; the right to material security when 
old, ill, or disabled; and the right to education. The constitution 
stated that full equality in all aspects of economic, political, and 
cultural life was guaranteed to all working people regardless of na- 
tionality, race, or sex. 

The constitution also guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, public demonstration, and worship. Churches, however, 
were forbidden to operate schools except for the training of reli- 
gious personnel. Other provisions guaranteed the protection of the 



197 



Romania: A Country Study 

person from arbitrary arrest, the inviolability of the home, and the 
secrecy of the mails. Citizens also had the right to form public and 
private organizations, although associations having a " fascist or 
antidemocratic character" were prohibited. 

It was the citizens' duty to observe the constitution and the laws 
of the republic, to preserve and develop socialist property, to practice 
work discipline, and to strengthen the "regime of people's democra- 
cy. " Military service and the defense of the nation were described 
as duties of honor for all citizens. 

In March 1961, the GNA established a commission to draft a 
new constitution. At the same time, the 1952 constitution was re- 
vised to transform the Presidium into the State Council. The new 
body, vested with supreme executive authority, consisted of a presi- 
dent, three vice presidents, and thirteen members. As was the case 
with the Presidium, the State Council was elected by and from the 
GNA membership and was, in theory, responsible to it. 

The State Council had three kinds of powers — permanent pow- 
ers, powers to be exercised between assembly sessions, and special 
powers that could be exercised in exceptional circumstances. The 
permanent powers were exercised by the president, who as head 
of state represented the republic in international relations. Between 
GNA sessions, the State Council was empowered to oversee the 
activity of the Council of Ministers, appoint and recall members 
of the Supreme Court and the commander in chief of the armed 
forces, supervise the functioning of the Office of the Prosecutor 
General, or Procuratura (see Glossary), and convene standing com- 
missions of the assembly. 

The council could also issue decrees having the force of law, 
although, technically, these had to be submitted to the next GNA 
session for ratification. If circumstances prevented the assembly 
from convening, the council was authorized to appoint the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, declare war, order mobilization, proclaim a state 
of emergency, approve the budget, and prepare economic plans. 

Although the constitution drafted by the 1961 commission was 
never adopted, it served as the basis for the work of a second com- 
mission named in June 1965. Chaired by Ceau§escu, the commis- 
sion prepared a new draft and submitted it to the party congress 
and the State Council. After approval by these bodies, the Consti- 
tution was adopted by the GNA on August 21, 1965, and after 
important amendments in 1974, it remained in effect in late 1989. 

With the promulgation of the 1965 Constitution, the country 
was officially renamed the Socialist Republic of Romania. In adopt- 
ing this name, the Romanian leadership was asserting that the 



198 



Government and Politics 



country had completed the transition from capitalism and had be- 
come a full-fledged socialist state. 

The most innovative provision of the 1965 Constitution is the stipu- 
lation that the leading political force in the entire country is the Roma- 
nian Communist Party — the only legal party. Under its leadership, 
the working people have the expressed goal of building a socialist 
system to create "the conditions for transition to communism." 

Whereas the 1952 constitution repeatedly stressed the country's 
close ties to the Soviet Union and the role of the Red Army in the 
liberation of Romania, the 1965 Constitution omits all references 
to the Soviet Union. Instead it refers only to the policy of main- 
taining friendly and fraternal relations with all socialist states and, 
in addition, expresses the intention of promoting relations with non- 
socialist states. 

The 1965 Constitution declares that the basis of the economy 
is socialist ownership of the means of production. Cooperative farm- 
ers, however, are permitted to own some livestock and tools, cer- 
tain craftsmen are guaranteed ownership of their workshops, and 
peasants not in cooperatives are able to own small parcels of land 
and some farm implements. In the 1980s, however, these provi- 
sions for private ownership of farmland were violated by a con- 
troversial plan known as systematization (see Land, ch. 3). 

In contrast to the 1952 constitution, which provided for represen- 
tation in the GNA at a ratio of one deputy for every 40,000 per- 
sons, the 1965 document fixed the number of deputies at 465 and 
required the establishment of that number of electoral districts of 
equal population. A later amendment reduced the number of 
deputies to 369. 

The provision of the 1952 constitution establishing the Hungarian 
Autonomous Region among the sixteen regional units was delet- 
ed in the 1965 Constitution, ostensibly in order to integrate all 
minority groups into the Romanian political community. PCR 
spokesmen asserted that while the heritage and political rights of 
the various nationality groups would be respected, the country 
would be united under the leadership of the party. A 1968 territorial 
reorganization eliminated the sixteen regional units and established 
a system of thirty-nine (subsequently increased to forty) judeje or 
counties (see fig. 1). 

Structure and Functioning of the Government 

Central Government 

In 1989 the major institutions of the central government were 
the GNA, the State Council, the office of president of the republic, 



199 



Romania: A Country Study 

the Council of Ministers, and the court system. The president was 
elected by the GNA for the duration of a legislative period and 
remained in office until a successor was elected during the next 
legislative period. 

Grand National Assembly 

The Grand National Assembly was nominally the supreme or- 
gan of state power and supervised and controlled the functions of 
all other state organs. It consisted of 369 deputies elected by univer- 
sal adult suffrage from an equal number of electoral districts for 
a five-year term of office. In accordance with a 1974 constitution- 
al amendment, the GNA met in regular session twice a year, and 
special sessions could be called by the State Council, the Bureau 
of the GNA, or, in theory, by one- third of the total number of 
deputies. If circumstances prevented the holding of elections, the GNA 
was empowered to extend its term of office for as long as necessary. 

The GNA had the constitutional authority to elect, supervise, 
and recall the president of the republic, the State Council, the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the attorney general. The 
GNA had ultimate authority for regulating the electoral system, 
debating and approving the national economic plan and the state 
budget, and overseeing the organization and functioning of the peo- 
ple's councils. 

The GNA was empowered to establish the general line of the 
country's foreign policy and had ultimate responsibility for the 
maintenance of public order and national defense. The Constitu- 
tion gave it the authority to declare war, but only in the event of 
aggression against Romania or an ally with which Romania had 
a mutual-defense treaty. A state of war could also be declared by 
the State Council. 

Other GNA powers included adopting and amending the Con- 
stitution and controlling its implementation. Empowered to inter- 
pret the Constitution and to determine the constitutionality of laws, 
the GNA was in effect its own constitutional court. To exercise 
its authority as interpreter of laws, the GNA elected the Constitu- 
tion and Legal Affairs Commission, which functioned for the du- 
ration of a legislative term. The 1965 Constitution specified that 
up to one-third of the commission members could be persons who 
were not GNA deputies. The 1974 amended text, however, omit- 
ted this provision. The primary duty of the commission was to pro- 
vide the assembly with reports and opinions on constitutional 
questions. 

The GNA elected a chairman to preside over sessions and direct 
activities. The chairman and four elected vice chairmen, who 



200 



Government and Politics 



formed the Bureau of the GNA, were assisted in their duties by 
a panel of six executive secretaries. In addition to the Constitu- 
tion and Legal Affairs Commission, there were eight other GNA 
standing commissions: the Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Ad- 
ministration Commission; the Credentials Commission; the Defense 
Problems Commission; the Education, Science, and Culture 
Commission; the Foreign Policy and International Economic Co- 
operation Commission; the Health, Labor, Social Welfare, and 
Environmental Protection Commission; the Industry and Economic 
and Financial Activity Commission; and the People's Councils and 
State Administration Commission. Their functions and responsi- 
bilities were substantially increased during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Reports, bills, or other legislative matters were submitted to the 
standing commissions by the GNA chairman for study and for 
recommendations on further action. 

To conduct business, the GNA required a quorum of one-half 
of the deputies plus one. Laws and decisions were adopted by sim- 
ple majority vote with the exception of an amendment to the Con- 
stitution, which required a two-thirds majority of the full assembly. 
Laws were signed by the president of the republic and published 
within ten days after adoption. 

Until the early 1970s, election to the GNA and to the organs 
of local government was based on the Soviet model, with one can- 
didate for each seat. A 1972 decree stated that thereafter more than 
one candidate could be nominated for a deputy seat in the GNA 
or in the people's councils. In 1975, of 349 seats in the GNA, 139 
were open to "multiple candidacy," and in 1980 the ratio was even 
higher — 190 of 369. A total of 594 candidates were nominated by 
the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front for the 369 GNA seats 
in the 1985 election. But the front emphasized that the introduc- 
tion of multiple candidacies was never intended to offer the elec- 
torate a choice of political platforms. 

The State Council 

The Constitution stipulated that the State Council was the 
supreme body of state power in permanent session, and that it as- 
sumed certain GNA powers when that body was out of session. 
As of mid- 1989, the State Council consisted of the president of the 
State Council, four vice presidents, a secretary to the president, 
and fifteen members. At its first session, the newly elected GNA 
selected the State Council from its own membership. The council 
remained in office until another was elected by the succeeding GNA. 
Although the president of the State Council was simultaneously 
the president of the republic, the Constitution dictated that the 



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Romania: A Country Study 

council was to function on the principle of collective leadership. 
In 1989 all but two members of the State Council were also mem- 
bers of the PCR Central Committee and held other important party 
posts. 

Amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1974 reduced the 
scope of the power of the State Council in favor of the power of 
the president. In this connection, Article 63 listed only five per- 
manent powers for the State Council, as opposed to eleven in the 
1965 Constitution. Among the powers that were deleted were ap- 
pointing and recalling the supreme commander of the armed forces; 
representing the republic in international relations; granting citizen- 
ship, amnesty, and asylum; and appointing and recalling diplo- 
matic representatives. 

Other permanent powers of the State Council were establishing 
election dates; ratifying or rejecting international treaties (except 
for those whose ratification or rejection was within the purview of 
the GNA); and establishing decorations and honorary titles. The 
provision in the 1965 text of the Constitution giving the State Coun- 
cil the right to appoint and recall the heads of central bodies of 
state administration (excluding the Council of Ministers) was 
replaced with the nebulous stipulation that the State Council "or- 
ganizes the ministries and other central state bodies," another limi- 
tation of its prerogatives. 

GNA powers that devolved to the State Council between assem- 
bly sessions or when exceptional circumstances prevented the GNA 
from acting included the authority to appoint and recall members 
of the Council of Ministers and members of the Supreme Court. 
The right to appoint or recall the prosecutor general was omitted 
in the 1974 amended Constitution. The State Council could also 
assume powers to establish legal norms, to control the application 
of laws and decisions passed by the GNA, and to supervise the 
Council of Ministers, the ministries and the other central bodies 
of state administration as well as the activities of the people's coun- 
cils. In the event of a national emergency, the State Council could 
also exercise the GNA's power to declare a state of war. 

In December 1967, the GNA elected PCR General Secretary 
Ceau§escu president of the State Council, thereby making him head 
of state. The rationale for concentrating party and government pow- 
er in Ceausescu's hands was to provide unitary leadership and there- 
by improve efficiency and ensure full party control at the highest 
level of government. The decision to unite the two posts, as well 
as to combine a number of party and government positions on lower 
administrative levels, had been taken at a national party confer- 
ence. Outside observers saw the move as one of a series of steps 



202 



Government and Politics 



designed to ensure the continued subordination of both the party 
and the state apparatus to Ceau§escu's personal power. 

President of the Republic 

The 1974 amended Constitution created the office of president 
of the republic. Although listed below the GNA and the State Coun- 
cil, the president was the most powerful figure and had the authority 
to act on behalf of both the GNA and the State Council. Creation 
of the office was a watershed event in Ceau§escu's methodical con- 
solidation of power. Although he had held the position of head of 
state after 1967, it was only after 1974 that he emerged as an in- 
ternational figure, launching an energetic career of foreign travel 
and diplomacy. 

The official motivation for the PCR decision to establish the office 
of president was to improve the functioning of the organs of state 
power — both domestic and international. It was also stressed that 
the president would be able to exercise those functions of the State 
Council not requiring plenary meetings. In fact, after 1974 rule 
by presidential decree became common practice. 

On the recommendation of the Central Committee of the PCR 
and the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, the president was 
elected by a two-thirds majority of GNA deputies. He represent- 
ed the state in internal and international relations. And as chair- 
man of the Defense Council, he was also the supreme commander 
of the armed forces. He was empowered to proclaim a local or na- 
tional state of emergency. 

Ceau§escu greatly broadened the powers of the presidency in 
domestic political life. He appointed and recalled the ministers and 
the chairmen of other central bodies of state administration. When 
the GNA was not in session — that is, for most of the year — he ap- 
pointed and recalled the president of the Supreme Court and the 
prosecutor general without even consulting the State Council. He 
frequently presided over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, 
and he usurped the State Council's power to grant pardons, citizen- 
ship, and asylum. 

The president's prerogatives in international relations included 
establishing the ranks of diplomatic missions, accrediting and recall- 
ing diplomatic representatives; receiving the credentials and let- 
ters of recall of diplomatic representatives of other states; and 
concluding international agreements on behalf of Romania. 

Council of Ministers 

Defined in the Constitution as the supreme body of state adminis- 
tration, the Council of Ministers exercised control over the activities 



203 



Romania: A Country Study 

of all state agencies on both the national and local levels. Although 
the size and composition of the Council of Ministers fluctuated, 
its basic elements were the prime minister, the deputy prime 
minister, the ministers, and the heads of certain other important 
government agencies. Unlike the 1952 constitution, which listed 
twenty- six specific ministries, the 1965 version fixed neither the 
number of ministries nor their particular areas of competence. 

In 1989 the Council of Ministers had sixty-one members includ- 
ing the prime minister, three first deputy prime ministers, six deputy 
prime ministers, twenty-eight ministers, and twenty-four committee 
chiefs or state secretaries with ministerial rank. Elena Ceau§escu 
held two positions in the council — first deputy prime minister and 
chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology. All 
but one of the members of the council were also members or can- 
didate members of the PCR Central Committee, and the nine first 
deputies or deputies were members or candidate members of 
the PCR Political Executive Committee, usually known as Polex- 
co (see Glossary). 

The Constitution gave the Council of Ministers responsibility 
for the general implementation of the nation's domestic and for- 
eign polices, the enforcement of laws, and the maintenance of public 
order. As the supreme governmental body, the council coordinat- 
ed and controlled the activities of the ministries and other state or- 
gans at all levels. The council directed economic matters by drafting 
the Unitary National Socioeconomic Plan and state budget and 
providing for their implementation. In addition it directed the es- 
tablishment of economic enterprises and other industrial and com- 
mercial organizations. 

The council's responsibilities also included the general adminis- 
tration of relations with other states and the conclusion of interna- 
tional agreements. Its prerogatives in the area of defense, however, 
were diminished by the 1974 constitutional amendments. The coun- 
cil's right to act for the general organization of the armed forces 
was replaced by the provision that it could take measures in that 
area only "according to the decision of the Defense Council." 

Formally elected by the GNA at the beginning of each new as- 
sembly session, the council's term of office continued until the elec- 
tion of a new council by the succeeding assembly. Both collectively 
and individually, the council members were responsible to the GNA 
or — between sessions — to the State Council. The Constitution as- 
serted that the Council of Ministers was to operate on the princi- 
ple of collective leadership to ensure the unity of its political and 
administrative actions. 



204 



Government and Politics 



After the promulgation of the 1965 Constitution and especially 
after Ceau§escu was elected president of the republic in 1974, the 
Council of Ministers underwent numerous reorganizations. The 
number of ministries almost doubled. Several of them, for exam- 
ple, the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum, and Geology, were repeat- 
edly split and merged. Some of the departments in separate 
ministries were combined to form new ministries or central organi- 
zations. In 1989 Romania had the largest number of ministries and 
central organizations of any East European state. 

Agency reshuffling and the reassignment or dismissal of large 
numbers of officials plagued the ministries. Between March 1985 
and the beginning of 1988, there were over twenty government 
reorganizations affecting such key functions as defense, finance, 
foreign trade, and foreign affairs. In 1984, at least twelve ministers 
were removed. The following year, the ministers of foreign affairs 
and national defense were replaced, and in 1986 the ministers of 
foreign affairs, foreign trade, and finance lost their positions fol- 
lowing criticism from high-level PCR officials for trade shortfalls. 
In 1987, in the largest government reshuffle to date, eighteen minis- 
ters were dismissed over a four- week period, and some were ex- 
pelled from the party. 

Judicial System 

The general organization and functioning of the judiciary was 
established by the Constitution and by the 1968 Law on the Or- 
ganization of the Court System. Overall responsibility for the func- 
tioning of the courts was vested in the Ministry of Justice, and the 
prosecutor general was charged with the general application of the 
law and the conduct of criminal proceedings. 

To fulfill its responsibility for the functioning of the courts and 
the supervision of state marshals, state notaries, and the national 
bar organization, the Ministry of Justice was divided into six direc- 
torates: civil courts, military courts, studies and legislation, per- 
sonnel, administration, and planning and accounting. In addition, 
the ministry included a corps of inspectors, an office of legal af- 
fairs, and the State Notary Office. 

The court system included the Supreme Court, jude$ courts, lower 
courts, military courts, and local judicial commissions. The Con- 
stitution placed the judiciary under the authority of the GNA, and 
between assembly sessions, under the authority of the State Council. 
The Supreme Court, seated in Bucharest, exercised general con- 
trol over the judiciary activity of all lower courts. 

Members of the Supreme Court were professional judges ap- 
pointed by the GNA to four-year terms of office. The Supreme 



205 



Romania: A Country Study 

Court functioned as an appeals court for sentences passed in low- 
er tribunals and, in certain matters specified by law, could act 
as a court of first instance. It could also issue guidance, in the form 
of directives, on legal and constitutional questions for the judi- 
cial actions of lower courts and the administrative functions of 
government agencies. The Supreme Court was divided into three 
sections — civil, criminal, and military. A panel of three judges 
presided over each section. The minister of justice presided over 
plenary sessions of the entire court held at least once every three 
months for the purpose of issuing guidance directives. 

In 1989 there were forty judei courts and the municipal court of 
Bucharest, which hadjude} court status. Each court on this level was 
presided over by a panel of two judges and three lay jurors, known 
as people's assessors, and decisions were made by majority vote. 
People's assessors were first introduced in December 1947 and were 
given additional legal status in 1952 by the Law on the Organiza- 
tion of Justice. Most of the people's assessors were appointed by 
the PCR or by one of the district bodies of the mass organizations. 

Subordinate to the judei courts were various lower courts. In the 
city of Bucharest, these lower courts consisted of four sectional 
courts, which functioned under the supervision of the municipal 
court. The number of lower courts and their territorial jurisdic- 
tion were established for the rest of the country by the Ministry 
of Justice. Panels consisting of a judge and two people's assessors 
presided over courts on this level, and verdicts were based on 
majority vote. 

Military courts were established on a territorial basis, subdivi- 
sions being determined by the Council of Ministers. The lower mili- 
tary tribunals had original jurisdiction over contraventions of the 
law committed by members of the armed forces; the territorial mili- 
tary tribunals exercised appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the 
lower units. In certain situations specified by law, cases involving 
civilians could be assigned to military courts. At each level, the 
military courts, when acting in the first instance, consisted of two 
judges and three people's assessors. In appeals cases on the ter- 
ritorial level, the courts consisted of three judges only. As in the 
civil courts, decisions were reached by majority vote (see Law and 
Order, ch. 5). 

In 1968 the GNA enacted a law establishing a system of judicial 
commissions to function as courts of special jurisdiction in the state 
economic enterprises and in localities. These commissions were 
designed as "an expression of socialist democracy" to provide for 
the increased participation of working people in the settlement of 
problems involving minor local disputes and local economic issues. 



206 



Government and Politics 



The Procuratura exercised general supervision over the appli- 
cation of the law and the initiation of criminal proceedings. Elect- 
ed by the GNA for a five-year term, the prosecutor general exercised 
supervisory powers that extended to all levels of society, from 
government ministers down to ordinary citizens. Procuratura 
subunits were hierarchically organized and included offices in each 
judicial district plus the prosecutor's military bureau. 

Joint Party-State Organizations 

Joint party-state organizations were an innovation in Romani- 
an political life; the Constitution made no reference to them. 
Ceau§escu used the organizations to increase his authority and 
minimize the possibility of government action that could challenge 
the power structure. At the beginning of 1989 there were nine joint 
party-state organizations. Five of them were headed by either Ni- 
colae or Elena Ceausescu: the Defense Council; the Supreme Coun- 
cil for Economic and Social Development; the National Council 
for Science and Education; the National Council for Science and 
Technology; and the National Council of Working People. The 
remaining party-state organizations were the National Council for 
Agriculture, Food Industry, Forestry, and Water Management; 
the Central Council of Workers' Control of Economic and Social 
Activities; the Economic and Social Organization Council; and the 
Silviculture Council. 

The names of these organizations themselves bespeak the am- 
biguity and redundancy of their powers. Alongside the existing 
ministries and other central organizations, three of the joint party- 
state organizations dealt with economic problems, two with science, 
two with agriculture and forestry, and two with social problems. 
The new structures were accountable to both the PCR Central 
Committee and the Council of Ministers or the State Council. The 
regional branches of some of the party-state councils were placed 
under the direct supervision of local party committees. 

One of the most important joint party- state organizations and 
the first to be created (in 1969), the Defense Council had decision- 
making powers for high-level military affairs. At the inception of 
the Defense Council, its chairman, Ceau§escu, automatically be- 
came supreme commander of the armed forces. After 1974 the presi- 
dent of the republic became ex officio chairman of the Defense 
Council. Some observers considered the creation of the council a 
move to weaken Ceau§escu's opponents in the armed forces. 

The membership of the Defense Council reflected its importance. 
Besides the chairman, other members were the prime minister, the 



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Romania: A Country Study 

minister of national defense, the minister of interior, the minister 
of foreign affairs, the chairman of the Department of State Securi- 
ty, the chairman of the State Planning Committee, the chief of 
staff — who held the position of ex officio secretary — and three other 
members. Among the members in the late 1980s was General Hie 
Ceau§escu, the president's brother, who was the chief of the Higher 
Political Council of the Army and the official historian of the regime. 

The Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development, 
created to supervise development of the national economy and to 
coordinate social and economic planning, had fourteen sections, 
which paralleled both the existing ministries and State Planning 
Committee departments with similar areas of concern. Another joint 
party- state organization, the Central Council of Workers' Con- 
trol of Economic and Social Activities had broad authority to make 
overall economic policy and to ensure plan fulfillment (see Adminis- 
tration and Control, ch. 3). 

Local Government 

Local government bodies, known as people's councils, existed 
on thejude}, town, and commune level. The 1965 Constitution had 
also provided for subunits of state administration on regional and 
district levels, but a territorial-administrative reorganization vot- 
ed by the GNA in 1968 replaced the 16 regions and 150 intermediate 
districts with a system of 39 jude$e and 44 independent municipal 
administrations. Judei lines in the southeastern part of the country 
were subsequently redrawn, creating a fortieth judei; the munici- 
pality of Bucharest, which had judet status; and a surrounding 
agricultural district. 

In addition to the establishment oijudei and municipal people's 
councils, local councils were also set up in 142 smaller towns, and 
communal councils were formed in rural areas. A number of smaller 
communes were combined in order to give them a larger popula- 
tion base. Boundaries of eachjwdtf/ were drawn to include about 
fifty communes consisting of 4,000 to 5,000 persons each. 

Along with the territorial reorganization, the decision was also 
made to combine party and government functions on the judet lev- 
el so that the same person acted both as party committee first secre- 
tary and as people's council chairman. In explaining this fusion 
of party and state authority, Ceau§escu stated that there were many 
instances in which offices in both the party and the government 
dealt with the same area of interest, a practice that resulted in inef- 
ficiency and unnecessary duplication of party and state machinery. 
Despite fusion of party and government functions, however, the 
bureaucratic structure on all government levels continued to expand. 



208 



1 



New civic center in Satu Mare 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 




According to the Constitution and the 1 968 Law on the Organi- 
zation and Operation of People's Councils, the people's councils 
were responsible for the implementation of central government de- 
cisions and for the economic, social, and cultural administration 
of their particular jurisdictions. Deputies to the people's councils 
were elected for five-year terms, except for the communes and 
municipal towns, where the term was two-and-one-half years. 

Organized to facilitate highly centralized control, the people's 
councils functioned under the general supervision of the GNA or, 
between assembly sessions, under the direction of the State Coun- 
cil. The Law on the Organization and Operation of People's Coun- 
cils specifically placed the people's councils under the overall 
guidance of the PCR. 

Each people's council had an executive committee as its chief 
administrative organ and a number of permanent committees with 
specific responsibilities. The executive committee, consisting of a 
chairman, two or more deputy chairmen, and an unspecified num- 
ber of other members, functioned for the duration of the council's 
term of office. Each executive committee also had a secretary, who 
was appointed with the approval of the next-higher-ranking coun- 
cil and was considered an employee of the central government. The 
chairman of an executive committee in a city, town, or commune 
served as the mayor of that unit. The executive committee was 



209 



Romania: A Country Study 

responsible to the people's council that elected it and to the execu- 
tive committee of the next higher council. 

The executive committee implemented laws, decrees, and deci- 
sions of the central government; carried out decisions made by the 
people's council; worked out the local budget; and drafted the lo- 
cal economic plan. It was also charged with directing and controlling 
the economic enterprises within its area of jurisdiction and with 
supervising the executive committees of inferior councils. The ex- 
ecutive committee was also responsible for the organization and 
functioning of public services, educational institutions, medical pro- 
grams, and the militia. 

Electoral System 

Although the Constitution asserted the right of all citizens eigh- 
teen years of age and older to participate in the election of all 
representative bodies with a universal, direct, equal, and secret vote, 
it did not determine how elections were to be organized or specify 
who was responsible for conducting them. The Constitution did 
declare, however, that the right to nominate candidates belonged 
to the PCR, as well as to all labor unions, cooperatives, youth and 
women's leagues, cultural associations, and other mass organi- 
zations. 

Elections were organized under the direction of the Socialist 
Democracy and Unity Front, the national entity that incorporat- 
ed the country's numerous mass organizations under the leader- 
ship of the PCR. All candidates for elective office needed the 
approval of the front in order to be placed on the ballot. 

The Socialist Democracy and Unity Front was established in 
November 1968 under the original name of the Socialist Unity 
Front. It succeeded the People's Democratic Front, which had ex- 
isted since the communists began to organize effectively during 
World War II. The Socialist Democracy and Unity Front listed 
among its member organizations, in addition to the PCR, the labor 
unions; cooperative farm organizations; consumer cooperatives; 
professional, scientific, and cultural associations; student, youth, 
women's, and veteran's organizations; religious bodies; and 
representatives of Hungarian, German, Serbian, and Ukrainian 
minorities. In the late 1980s, chairing the organization was among 
Ceau§escu's many official duties. In addition to a chairperson, the 
front had an executive chairman, one first vice chairman and six 
other vice chairmen, two secretaries and eighteen members. 

The Socialist Democracy and Unity Front conducted a general 
election in March 1985, when 369 deputies to the GNA were elect- 
ed. Of the 15,733,060 registered voters, 97.8 percent voted for 



210 



Government and Politics 



front candidates, while 2.3 percent voted against them — about 33 
percent more than in 1980, according to published results. Although 
this figure was the highest number of dissenting votes ever record- 
ed, outside observers contended that the percentage would have 
been much higher in an open election. 

Romanian Communist Party 

Founded in 1921, the Communist Party was declared illegal in 
1924 and forced underground until 1944. Because of the party's 
association with Moscow, it was unable to attract broad support. 
The communists came to power as a result of the Soviet occupa- 
tion of Romania during the final year of the war. With Soviet back- 
ing, the party gradually consolidated power and sought to extend 
its base of popular support. In early 1948, it merged with a wing 
of the Social Democratic Party to form the Romanian Workers' 
Party. By the end of 1952, however, almost all of the Social 
Democrats had been replaced by Communists. 

Membership 

At the close of World War II the Communist Party had fewer 
than 1 ,000 members. Three years later, at the official congress that 
sanctioned the merger with the Social Democratic Party, it reported 
more than 1 million members. This rapid growth was the outcome 
of an intensive propaganda campaign and membership drive that 
employed political and economic pressures. Subsequently, a purge 
of so-called hostile and nominal members during the early 1950s 
resulted in the expulsion of approximately 465,000 persons. 

During the early years of full Communist control, the party con- 
sidered itself the vanguard of the working class and made a sus- 
tained effort to recruit workers. By the end of 1950, the party 
reported that 64 percent of leading party positions and 40 percent 
of higher government posts were filled by members of the working 
class. Efforts to recruit workers into the party, however, consis- 
tently fell short of goals. 

By 1965, when the name Romanian Communist Party was offi- 
cially adopted, membership had reached 1,450,000 — about 8 per- 
cent of the country's population. Membership composition at that 
time was 44 percent workers, 34 percent peasants, 10 per cent in- 
telligentsia, and 12 percent other categories. 

After his accession to power in 1965, Ceau§escu sought to in- 
crease the party's influence, broaden the base of popular support, 
and bring in new members. His efforts to increase PCR member- 
ship were extremely effective. By February 1971 , the party claimed 
2.1 million members. The Twelfth Party Congress in 1979 



211 



Romania: A Country Study 

estimated membership at 3 million, and by March 1988, the PCR 
had grown to some 3 . 7 million members — more than twice as many 
as in 1965, when Ceausescu came to power. Thus, in the late 1980s, 
some 23 percent of Romania's adult population and 33 percent 
of its working population belonged to the PCR. 

At the Thirteenth Party Congress in November 1984, it was an- 
nounced that the nationality composition of the PCR was 90 per- 
cent Romanian, 7 percent Hungarian (a drop of more than 2 
percent since the Twelfth Party Congress), less than 1 percent Ger- 
man, and the remainder other nationalities. 

As of 1988, workers made up about 55 percent of the party mem- 
bership, peasants 15 percent, and intellectuals and other groups 
30 percent (see table 10, Appendix). Because of the PCR's special 
effort to recruit members from industry, construction, and trans- 
portation, by late 1981 some 45.7 percent of workers in these sec- 
tors belonged to the party. In 1980 roughly 524,000 PCR members 
worked in agriculture. Figures on the educational level of the mem- 
bership in 1980 indicated that 11 percent held college diplomas, 
1 5 percent had diplomas from other institutions of higher learn- 
ing, and 26 percent had received technical or professional training. 

In the 1980s, statistics on the age composition of the party were 
no longer published. The official comment on the subject was that 
the party had a "proper" age composition. Outside observers, 
however, believed that the average age of the membership had risen 
dramatically. The share of pensioners and housewives increased 
from 6.6 percent in 1965 to 9 percent in 1988. 

Women traditionally were underrepresented in the PCR. In late 
1980, they accounted for only 28.7 percent of the party's mem- 
bers, prompting Ceau§escu to call for increasing their representa- 
tion to about 35 percent. 

A document on the selection and training of party cadres adopted 
by a Central Committee plenum in April 1988 provided informa- 
tion on the backgrounds of individuals staffing the political appara- 
tus. According to that document, workers, foremen, and technicians 
supplied 79.8 percent of the cadres of the PCR apparatus, 80.1 
percent of the apparatus of the Union of Communist Youth 
(Uniunea Tineretului Comunist, UTC — see Glossary), and 88.7 
percent of the trade union apparatus. By late 1987, the proportion 
of women in the party apparatus had risen to 27.8 percent from 
only 16.8 percent in 1983. More than 67 percent of activists in the 
state apparatus and 59.4 percent in the trade unions were under 
forty-five years of age. The document also asserted that 95.7 per- 
cent of PCR Central Committee activists and 90.7 percent of 
activists in judej, municipal, and town party committees were 



212 



Government and Politics 



graduates of, or were attending, state institutions of higher edu- 
cation. 

Organizational Structure 

As the fundamental document of the PCR, the party statutes 
set basic policy on party organization, operation, and membership. 
Originally adopted in May 1948, the statutes underwent several 
modifications, with significant revisions in 1955, 1965, 1967, 1969, 
1974, and 1984. Many of these changes strengthened Ceau§escu's 
hold on the party and reduced the role of rank-and-file members. 

All organs of the party were closely interrelated and operated 
on the principle of democratic centralism. (Derived from the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union, this concept required a firm 
hierarchical subordination of each party organ to the next higher 
unit. In practice, party programs and policies were directed from 
the center and decisions of higher organs were unconditionally bind- 
ing on all lower organs and on individual members.) The statutes 
called for the free and open discussion of policy questions at con- 
gresses, conferences, and local membership meetings. But discipline 
required that once a decision was made, the minority fully sub- 
mitted to the will of the majority. 

According to the party statutes, the supreme organ of the PCR 
was the party congress, consisting of delegates elected by the jude$ 
conferences at a ratio of 1 delegate per 1 ,000 members. The party 
congress, which convened at least once every five years, elected 
the PCR general secretary, the Central Committee, and the Cen- 
tral Auditing Commission and discussed and adopted programs 
and policies proposed by central party organs. 

Between congresses the leading party organ was the Central Com- 
mittee. At the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1984, the Central Com- 
mittee consisted of 265 full and 181 candidate members — twice as 
many members as in 1969. The Central Committee was responsi- 
ble for the overall direction of party activities and the implemen- 
tation of policies established by the party congress. In addition, 
it screened nominations for the more important party and state 
positions. Party statutes required a plenary session of the Central 
Committee at least four times a year. 

Several important changes in the structure of the party leader- 
ship were enacted by the Central Committee in March 1974, a few 
months before the Eleventh Party Congress. The Standing Presidi- 
um of the Central Committee, whose members were the most in- 
fluential individuals in the party, was abolished and replaced by 
the Polexco Permanent Bureau. Although formally the Central 
Committee elected the leading party organs, in practice the Polexco 



213 



Romania: A Country Study 

Permanent Bureau was a self-perpetuating body, and any change 
in its membership or in that of the Secretariat was generated from 
within rather than through a democratic decision by the Central 
Committee. The Secretariat, most of whose members were full or 
candidate members of the Polexco, had responsibility for oversee- 
ing the implementation of party decisions. As general secretary of 
the party, Ceausescu headed both the Polexco Permanent Bureau 
and the Secretariat and chaired the Polexco. 

The Central Committee was backed by an extensive bureaucratic 
structure that in many instances paralleled the organization of the 
government ministries. A chancellery office, headed by a chief and 
three deputies, coordinated the committee's overall administrative 
activities. Party work was organized under several permanent sec- 
tions, which were typically headed by a supervisory secretary, and 
a number of administrative sections and functional commissions. 
The designations of the sections were agriculture, armed forces and 
security forces, cadre, culture and education, economic affairs, for- 
eign relations, letters and audiences, local economic administra- 
tion, organization, party affairs, propaganda and media, social 
problems, and administration. 

In 1989 the following commissions were directly tied to the Cen- 
tral Committee: the Party and State Cadres Commission; the Ideol- 
ogy, Political and Cultural Activities, and Social Education 
Commission; the Party Organization and Mass and Public Organi- 
zation Commission; and the Economic Cooperation and Interna- 
tional Relations Commission. Most of these commissions appeared 
redundant, addressing problems within the purview of the Cen- 
tral Committee sections, various joint party-state organizations, 
and the ministries. 

As the center for decision-making and policy control, the Polexco 
Permanent Bureau was the most powerful body in the country. Es- 
tablished in 1974, the Permanent Bureau went through several stages. 
Initially it consisted of five members, but after the Twelfth Party Con- 
gress in 1979, it expanded to fifteen members. In 1984, however, 
it was reduced to eight members, including Nicolae and Elena 
Ceausescu, and in June 1988 it had only seven members. Most ob- 
servers agreed that in fact the decision-making process was limited 
to the Ceausescus and their most trusted allies, not all of whom held 
positions in the Permanent Bureau, the Polexco, or the Secretariat. 

Little information was available on the responsibilities of the 
Polexco, although some observers regarded it as an administra- 
tive link between the Permanent Bureau and the Central Com- 
mittee. In practice, it functioned as a rump Central Committee 



214 




Communist Party Central Committee Headquarters, Bucharest 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 

Palace of the Council of State; May Day banner reads ; "May Our Dear 
Fatherland, the Romanian Socialist Republic, Live Long and Flourish, " 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 



215 



Romania: A Country Study 

when the latter was not in session. The Secretariat served as the 
continuing administrative unit of the party. It supervised the exe- 
cution of policies decreed by the Permanent Bureau. 

Two other important party organs functioned under the super- 
vision of the Permanent Bureau and the Secretariat: the Central 
Auditing Commission and the Central Collegium, formerly known 
as the Party Control Commission. Consisting of seventy-three mem- 
bers (none of whom could belong to the Central Committee), the 
Central Auditing Commission was empowered to exercise gener- 
al control over party financial affairs and examine the management 
of finances by the various party organs. During the 1980s, the com- 
mission literally became a place of exile for officials who had fallen 
out of favor. The twenty-two-member Central Collegium dealt with 
matters of party discipline and served as a type of appeals court 
for penalties imposed on members hyjudei or local party committees. 

An interlocking of authority and functions at the highest level 
of the party and state was evidenced in the frequency with which 
the senior party officials also held important government posts. In 
the late 1980s, all the members of the Polexco Permanent Bureau, 
the Polexco, and the Secretariat were GNA deputies, and most of 
them held prominent positions in the State Council, the Defense 
Council, or the Council of Ministers. 

The party statutes described the basic party organization as the 
foundation of the party. Basic party organizations existed in fac- 
tories, offices, cooperatives, military and police units, social and 
cultural organizations, and residential areas. Some of the party units 
consisted of a few members, whereas those in the larger enterprises 
could have as many as 300 members. In 1980 there were an esti- 
mated 64,200 basic party organizations. 

The local and occupational basic party organizations implement- 
ed party directives and programs, recruited and indoctrinated new 
members, and disseminated propaganda directed at those outside 
the party. Members had the duty to participate in social, econom- 
ic, and cultural activities, particularly those associated with eco- 
nomic enterprises, and to examine critically production and 
community life in the light of party ideology and goals. In all their 
activities, the local party units were required to uphold the dis- 
cipline of the party and to adhere to the policies established by the 
ruling bodies of the PCR. 

Between the basic party organizations and the higher organs of 
the PCR stood a hierarchy of party committees organized on the 
judej, town, and communal levels. Each of these units was directly 
subordinate to the next higher level of the party organization. Each 
party committee set up its own bureau and elected a secretariat. 



216 



Government and Politics 



In most cases the secretariat consisted of a first secretary, a first 
vice-chairman, and three or more vice-chairmen or secretaries. 

The activity of the bureau was conducted through several func- 
tional departments, which generally consisted of sections on person- 
nel, administration, agitation and propaganda, economic enterprises, 
youth, and women's affairs. The judei and city committee also had 
their own control commission and training programs. The first secre- 
tary of the jude$ committee served as chairman of tkejudej people's 
council, linking the party and government offices. 

At each of these levels— judet,, city, town, and commune — the 
highest authoritative organ was the party conference, which played 
a role similar to that of the party congress on the national level. 
The party statutes called for the convening of conferences every 
five years in thejudefe, in the city of Bucharest, and in the larger 
towns. In communes and smaller towns the conference was held 
every two years. Although the conferences were held ostensibly to 
discuss problems and formulate policies, they served in practice 
as transmission belts for the official party line set down by the cen- 
tral PCR authorities. Judei conferences and the Bucharest city con- 
ference elected candidates to the national party Congress. 

Ideology and Party Program 

In the early 1970s, the PCR carried on a campaign to strengthen 
the Marxist character of its ideological, cultural, and educational 
activities. Within limits Ceau§escu encouraged "socialist democra- 
cy" and open communication between the masses and the party 
leadership. He defined "socialist democracy" as a spirit of social 
responsibility among the citizens to perform their duties in accor- 
dance with the needs and imperatives of society as a whole. Socialist 
democracy sought to stimulate the masses to support the cause of 
socialism by involving them in PCR programs so that the individu- 
al citizen's goals and values coincided with those of the party. 

In the mid-1970s, Ceau§escu announced a new ideological pro- 
gram and the tightening of party control over government, science, 
and cultural life. Some observers regarded this campaign as a 
response to Soviet criticism of Ceau§escu's foreign policy. It may 
have been a reminder to Moscow that socialism was not endan- 
gered in Romania and that the Soviets could not use this pretext 
to justify intervention as they had done in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Others considered it an assertion of authority by Ceausescu to com- 
bat domestic ideological laxity and what he perceived as corrupt- 
ing Western influences. Partially directed at the youth of the nation, 
the campaign included curbs on alcohol in the youth clubs and on 
the screening of foreign television programs and music. 



217 



Romania: A Country Study 

Another objective was increased party control over literature and 
cultural life. New ideological guidelines were issued for writers, 
publishers, and theaters. Ceausescu declared that the arts must serve 
the single purpose of socialist-communist education. At the same 
time, he called for increasing guidance of the arts by all levels of 
the PCR and requested that works of art and literature be judged 
for their conformity to party standards and their service to the work- 
ing class. Although Ceau§escu ruled out repressive measures, he 
asserted that the party would rely on persuasion to implement the 
new ideological program. 

In the late 1980s, the PCR ideological program consisted of two 
major components — the political and ideological education of the 
citizenry and the scientific study of Romanian history. The form- 
er entailed the thorough study of PCR experience, Ceau§escu's 
theses and recommendations, and the classics of Marxism- 
Leninism. The scientific study of Romania's history was considered 
profoundly important in developing the population's awareness of 
their Dacian-Roman origin and the continuity of Romanian habi- 
tation of their homeland, particularly in the face of historical claims 
made by neighboring countries. 

During the 1980s, the party's perception of its role in society 
changed. It no longer saw itself as the detached vanguard of the 
working class, but rather as the vital center of the nation and soci- 
ety. The party's identification with national interests was inter- 
preted as rejection of the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat," 
a phrase that was supplanted in party parlance by "state of the 
revolutionary workers' democracy." The policies pursued by the 
PCR were designed to maintain firm control of economic plan- 
ning and administration. Party control was enhanced by the ter- 
ritorial and administrative reorganization of 1968, which set up 
commissions in all of the new jude^e to function under the direct 
supervision of thejudef PCR committees. These commissions gave 
the party direct control over local economic programs. 

Party Training 

In early 1970, the PCR carried out a major reorganization of its 
primary institution for the training of leading party workers, the Stefan 
Gheorghiu Party Academy, which was renamed the Stefan Gheor- 
ghiu Academy for Social-Political Education and the Training of Lead- 
ing Cadres. The academy's mission was to train party activists and 
develop party leaders who could resolve problems by "applying the 
science of political leadership to the party and society." In Septem- 
ber 1986, the academy was renamed the Party Academy for Social 
and Political Training, but its structure was not changed. 



218 



Government and Politics 



In 1989 the academy still consisted of two departments, one for 
the training of cadres in the party and mass organizations and a 
second for the training of personnel working in economic and state 
administration. Each department was subdivided into a number 
of institutes, sections, and training centers. 

Admission to academy programs was carefully controlled by the 
party. Courses in the first department lasted four years, and can- 
didates were selected from among activists in the jude$ and city party 
committees, central PCR bodies, and mass organizations. Politi- 
cal activists in the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of 
Interior, and the Department of State Security were also eligible 
for training in the first department. 

The PCR also maintained the Institute of Historical and Social- 
Political Studies in Bucharest, which functioned under the direct 
supervision of the Central Committee, and lower-level training pro- 
grams that operated under the judei party committees. 

In 1988 the PCR Central Committee adopted a document set- 
ting forth policy on cadre political and ideological training. The 
document demanded that party and state bodies work with great- 
er determination to accomplish the political, ideological, and revolu- 
tionary education of cadres. The Central Committee also adopted 
a draft program for improving cadre training in the party appara- 
tus, the ministries, and industrial enterprises. It called for special 
programs to send party workers without access to political schools 
to university courses for political and managerial training. 

The study programs, which included practical work, discussion 
of specific problems, and field trips, covered such subjects as au- 
tomated data processing, socioeconomic analysis, forecasting, and 
many specialized topics. To facilitate training of large numbers, 
branches of the Party Academy's Center for the Education and 
Training of Party and Mass Organization Cadres were set up in 
Bucharest and in three jude$e. 

Mass Organizations 

The PCR fostered the development of a large number of mass 
organizations that functioned as its auxiliaries. These included tradi- 
tional mass organizations (youth, labor, and women's organiza- 
tions) and new types of political mass organizations such as the 
National Council of Working People. Mass organizations represent- 
ing major ethnic groups also emerged. 

Citizens were constitutionally guaranteed the right to join 
together in organizations. At the same time, the Constitution de- 
fined the leading role of the party in relation to the mass organiza- 
tions, asserting that through such organizations the PCR "achieves 



219 



Romania: A Country Study 

an organized link with the working class, the peasantry, the intel- 
ligentsia, and other categories of working people and mobilizes them 
in the struggle for the completion of the building of socialism." 

There were two broad classes of mass organizations: those based 
on common interests and categories of persons, such as youth and 
women's associations; and those based on professions, such as the 
General Union of Trade Unions (Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor 
din Romania, UGSR — see Glossary). Several of the groups be- 
longed to international organizations and associations, such as the 
World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth. 

In November 1968, the Council of Working People of Hungar- 
ian Nationality and the Council of Working People of German Na- 
tionality were established. The former had units in fifteen judeie, 
and the latter was active in nine. In judeie with substantial Serbian 
or Ukrainian populations, local councils were established for these 
groups. The nationality councils were affiliated with the Socialist 
Democracy and Unity Front. 

The purpose of the nationality councils, Ceau§escu declared, was 
to "cultivate socialist patriotism, socialist internationalism, and de- 
votion to our new order and to the common fatherland . . . against 
any backward nationalistic concepts and manifestations." Although 
the councils facilitated communication between the PCR and ethnic 
groups, they functioned primarily as transmitters of official nation- 
ality policies. During the 1980s, the councils served as a forum for 
expressing Romanian nationalism in the prolonged dispute with neigh- 
boring Hungary on the question of minority rights in Transylvania. 

Union of Communist Youth 

Founded in 1949, the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea 
Tineretului Comunist — UTC, see Glossary) was modelled after 
Komsomol (the Soviet communist youth organization). Having es- 
sentially the same organizational structure as the PCR, the UTC 
was both a youth political party and a mass organization. Its mis- 
sion was to educate young people in the spirit of communism and 
mobilize them, under the guidance of the PCR, for the building 
of socialism. The UTC organized political and patriotic courses 
in schools, among peasant groups, and among workers and mem- 
bers of the armed forces. It also guided and supervised the activi- 
ties of the Union of Communist Student Associations. 

In the 1980s, the UTC remained one of the most powerful mass 
organizations in the country, having a membership of some 3.7 mil- 
lion in 1984 compared with 2.5 million in early 1972. Member- 
ship was open to persons between the ages of fifteen and twenty- six; 



220 



Government and Politics 



UTC members over eighteen could also become members of the 
PCR. The Tenth Party Congress in 1969 introduced the require- 
ment that applicants under the age of twenty-six would be accept- 
ed into the party only if they were UTC members. 

The structure of the UTC underwent a number of changes in 
the decades following its creation. In early 1984, the organization 
functioned on the national level with an eight-member Secretari- 
at, including the first secretary, who was also the UTC chairman, 
and a bureau of twenty-one full and ten candidate members. The 
first secretary of the UTC also held the position of minister of youth. 
In the late 1980s, Ceau§escu's son, Nicu, functioned as UTC first 
secretary. In each of the forty jude$e and the city of Bucharest, UTC 
committees were patterned after the national-level organization. 
The UTC had its own publishing facilities and published its own 
propaganda organ, Scinteia Tineretului (The Spark of Youth). 

A second youth movement, the Pioneers, was created for young 
people between the ages of nine and fourteen. The organization's 
responsibilities paralleled those of the UTC and involved political 
and patriotic training. Until 1966 the Pioneers functioned as an 
integral part of the UTC, but thereafter it was under the direct 
control of the party Central Committee. 

General Union of Trade Unions 

As the official organization representing all blue- and white-collar 
workers, the General Union of Trade Unions of Romania (Uniunea 
Generala Sindicatelor din Romania — UGSR, see Glossary) was 
the largest of the country's mass organizations, with a member- 
ship of 7.3 million in 1985. Headed by a Central Council, the 
UGSR consisted of eleven labor union federations and forty-one 
area councils, one for each jude$ and the city of Bucharest. The Cen- 
tral Council had a chairman, appointed by the PCR Central Com- 
mittee, eight vice chairmen, two secretaries, and an executive 
committee of forty-eight members. In the late 1980s, there were 
an estimated 12,000 local union units. 

The primary function of the labor unions was the transmission 
of party policies to the rank and file. The UGSR statutes specified 
that the organization would conduct its activities under the politi- 
cal leadership of the PCR; a similar provision was included in the 
statutes of the judei UGSR committees. In early 1971 , in the after- 
math of increased labor problems, the PCR took steps to reform 
the labor union organization. Proclaiming a democratization of the 
UGSR and its component unions, Ceau§escu promised workers 
protection of their interests and a voice in the appointment of in- 
dustrial management. According to Ceausescu, democratization 



221 



Romania: A Country Study 

meant that the labor unions would serve the party as a framework 
for organizing consultations with the masses and as a forum where 
workers could debate the country's economic and social develop- 
ment. But UGSR statutes introduced later that year failed to re- 
form the system, and labor unions were still unable to take the 
initiative in matters of wages and the standard of living (see Labor, 
ch.3). 

Political Developments During the Ceau§escu Era 
Period from 1965 to 1970 

After becoming PCR first secretary in March 1965, Ceau§es- 
cu's first challenge was consolidating his power. Posing a major 
threat to his authority were three of his predecessor's closest 
associates — Chivu Stoica, a veteran party leader; Gheorghe Apostol, 
first deputy prime minister and a former PCR first secretary; and 
Alexandru Draghici, minister of interior and head of the powerful 
state security apparatus. 

A temporary compromise was found in a system of collective 
leadership with Ceau§escu acting as head of the party and Stoica 
becoming president of the State Council and, as such, head of state. 
Apostol remained first deputy minister, and Draghici kept the 
position of minister of interior. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who had 
served as prime minister under Gheorghiu-Dej , retained that po- 
sition. At the same time, changes were made in the party statutes 
to prevent one man from holding dual party and government offices 
as Gheorghiu-Dej had done. 

At the Ninth Party Congress in July 1965, Ceau§escu was able 
to add a number of supporters to an enlarged PCR Central Com- 
mittee and to change his tide to general secretary. At the same time 
a new body was added to the party hierarchy — the Executive Com- 
mittee, which stood between the Standing Presidium and the Cen- 
tral Committee. Although Ceau§escu was not able to gain full 
control of the Executive Committee immediately, in time the new 
body provided him the means to place his supporters in the lead- 
ing PCR organs and to implement his own policies. 

Political observers identified three principal factions within the 
PCR during the 1965-67 period: Ceau§escu and his supporters; 
the veteran party men led by Stoica, Apostol, and Draghici; and 
the intellectuals, represented by Maurer. Those people allied with 
Ceau§escu, who was forty-seven years old when he came to pow- 
er, tended to be men of his own generation and outlook, and 
whenever possible he engineered their appointment or promotion 
into important party, government, and military positions. 



222 



Government aand Politics 



One of Ceau§escu's foremost concerns was what he termed the 
vitalization of the PCR. To achieve this end, he not only brought 
younger people into the top party organs but also sought, for a limited 
time, to broaden the professional skills represented in those bodies 
through the recruitment of technicians and academicians. At the 
same time, he allowed increased technical and scientific contacts with 
Western nations and lifted the ban on works by certain foreign writers 
and artists, thereby gaining support among intellectuals. 

1967 Party Conference 

At a special National Conference of the PCR in December 
1967 — the first such event in twenty-two years — Ceau§escu con- 
tinued to strengthen his position. Attending the conference were 
members of the Central Committee and 1,150 delegates from lo- 
cal party organizations. Ceau§escu elected to employ the technique 
of the party conference rather than a special party congress in order 
to have his proposals approved by a larger body than the Central 
Committee. At the same time, he wanted to avoid election of a 
new Central Committee, which a party congress would have re- 
quired. 

Ceau§escu proposed a number of reforms in the structure and 
functioning of the party and government, and he asserted the need 
to eliminate duplication. He proposed that the Central Commit- 
tee limit itself to basic decisions of economic policy and that specific 
matters of implementation be left to the ministries. 

Political and ideological activity, Ceau§escu proposed, would re- 
main under the control of the Central Committee and would be 
given greater emphasis and direction through the creation of an 
ideological commission that would develop an intensified program 
of political education. A defense council, composed of the party's 
Standing Presidium and other members, would be established to 
deal with most military questions, but basic guidance for both the 
armed forces and the state security apparatus would remain the 
responsibility of the Central Committee. Major foreign policy ques- 
tions would be decided by the Standing Presidium. 

Ceau§escu proposed several reforms in the organization and 
responsibilities of government organs and called for redrawing the 
country's administrative subdivisions. He sought to broaden the 
activities of the GNA and its commissions, and he recommended 
a larger role for the Council of Ministers in formulating long-term 
economic plans. In addition, he suggested that the heads of three 
important mass organizations — the UGSR, the UTC, and the Na- 
tional Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives — be included 
in the government and be given ministerial ranking. 



223 



Romania: A Country Study 

The National Conference unanimously adopted Ceau§escu's 
proposals and reversed the party statutes adopted in 1965 that 
prevented the party leader from simultaneously holding the posi- 
tion of head of state. The official rationale for uniting the highest 
offices of the party and state was to eliminate duplication of func- 
tions and increase efficiency. Stoica was given a position in the party 
Secretariat and later, in 1969, was named chairman of the Cen- 
tral Auditing Commission. 

In implementing Ceau§escu's recommendations, certain posi- 
tions in the party and state organizations were fused. For exam- 
ple, judet and city party first secretaries became chairmen of the 
corresponding people's councils, and secretaries of local party units 
and labor union representatives became involved in the councils 
of industrial enterprises. 

Immediately following the National Conference, the GNA con- 
vened to elect Ceau§escu president of the State Council. Apostol 
was demoted from his position as a first deputy prime minister to 
his previously held post of UGSR chairman. Draghici was removed 
from the party Secretariat and given a position as a deputy prime 
minister under Maurer, who was reappointed prime minister. With 
the successful demotion of his chief rivals, Ceau§escu emerged at 
the close of 1967 as the undisputed leader of both the party and 
the state. 

Rehabilitation and De-Stalinization 

With his power base firmly established, Ceau§escu proceeded 
to dissociate his regime from the Gheorghiu-Dej era. In April 1968, 
at a plenary session of the Central Committee, the Gheorghiu-Dej 
regime was indicted for abuses of power, and the victims of his 
political purges were officially rehabilitated. Because of his close 
association with Gheorghiu-Dej and his position as head of the in- 
terior ministry during the period of the purges Draghici was relieved 
of all his positions. Apostol and Stoica were censured but were al- 
lowed to remain in their posts, although their standing in the party 
was considerably weakened. 

During the 1968-70 period, Ceau§escu pursued a cautious poli- 
cy of de-Stalinization in domestic affairs while maintaining Roma- 
nia's independent stance in international relations. The domestic 
relaxation was short-lived, however, and in April 1968, Ceau§es- 
cu cautioned intellectuals and artists not to overstep the bounds 
established by the party. 

Tenth Party Congress 

The Tenth Party Congress of August 1969 reelected Ceau§escu 



224 



Government and Politics 



PCR general secretary, enlarged the Central Committee from 121 
to 165 members, purged some of Ceausescu's potential opponents, 
and further revised the party statutes. The statute revisions provided 
for electing the Central Committee by secret ballot and transferred 
responsibility for electing the general secretary from the Central 
Committee to the party congress. It was also decided that the party 
congress would be convened every five — rather than four — years 
so that it could discuss and adopt a five-year economic plan for 
the country. 

Nearly half of the older members of the Central Committee were 
replaced by younger men who supported Ceau§escu. Two mem- 
bers of the old guard, Apostol and Stoica, were conspicuously not 
reelected, and immediately after the congress, Apostol lost his po- 
sition as UGSR chairman after being charged with "serious 
breaches of Communist morality." 

Eleventh Party Congress 

The Eleventh Party Congress in November 1974 adopted the 
party program (a massive document establishing the framework 
for party activity for the following quarter century), the directives 
for the Sixth Five- Year Plan (1976-80), and the guidelines for the 
economy from 1974 through 1990. The congress failed, however, 
to complete all the items on its agenda, leaving such unfinished 
business as party statute revisions to the Central Committee for 
finalization. 

The report of the Central Committee surveyed the party's 
achievements, examined "the problems of international political 
life" and cooperation with other countries, and defined the national 
goal as the building of a "multilaterally developed socialist socie- 
ty." The foreign policy objectives set forth in the report included 
the establishment of a "new world order," disarmament, and a 
"new type of unity" in the international communist movement. 

The draft directives of the 1976-80 plan projected continued rapid 
development of "the technical and material basis of the national 
economy, and of the whole of society." The directives earmarked 
some one-third of the gross national product for investment, the 
highest rate in the communist world, and predicted an annual rate 
of industrial growth of between 9 and 1 percent for the period 
up to 1990. 

The congress considered a proposal to appoint Ceaugescu PCR 
general secretary for life. Ceau§escu rejected the proposal in a brief 
speech, possibly because of the objections of Western communist 
delegates in attendance and the potential damage the appointment 
would cause to his international image. 



225 



Romania: A Country Study 

The congress elected a new Central Committee, which was ex- 
panded to 205 members and 156 alternate members, and removed 
43 members elected at the Tenth Congress, including former Prime 
Minister Maurer. Numerous party and government officials were 
assigned new positions. The Central Committee elected a twenty- 
eight-member Polexco, which selected the membership of the Per- 
manent Bureau (created in March to replace the Presidium). Far 
from the broadly based committee initially projected, the Perma- 
nent Bureau comprised only Ceau§escu and a handful of persons 
who owed their rise entirely to him. Thus Ceau§escu's personal 
rule was further strengthened and institutionalized. 

Twelfth Party Congress 

The Twelfth Party Congress in November 1979 was attended 
by 2,656 delegates representing approximately 3 million party mem- 
bers and by delegations from 98 countries. None of the more senior 
officials from the other East European and Soviet parties was 
present. Ceau§escu presented a lengthy report detailing the eco- 
nomic shortcomings and mistakes of the previous five years, par- 
ticularly those in the agricultural sector. He stressed the necessity 
for greater efficiency and for additional austerity measures, espe- 
cially energy conservation. Announcing that offshore oil had been 
found in the Black Sea, Ceau§escu proclaimed the goal of energy 
self-sufficiency within ten years. 

On internal party matters, Ceausescu stressed the need for greater 
discipline and pointed out shortcomings in ideological, political, 
and cultural activities. To detect potential adversaries, party mem- 
bers' records were to be examined by the Party and State Cadres 
Commission, headed by Elena Ceau§escu. 

The Twelfth Congress witnessed an unprecedented attack on 
Ceau§escu's personal leadership by a former high-ranking party 
official, Constantin Pirvulescu, who openly opposed Ceau§escu's 
reelection as general secretary, accusing him of putting personal 
and family interests above those of the party and the country. He 
accused the congress of neglecting the country's real problems in 
its preoccupation with Ceau§escu's glorification. Observers noted 
that this unprecedented attack came from a man who could not 
be accused of pro-Soviet sentiments, because he had been a staunch 
defender of PCR autonomy. Nor could he, at the age of eighty- 
four, be accused of personal ambition. Pirvulescu's remarks were, 
according to press reports, evidence of discontent in the party ranks. 
Pirvulescu was stripped of his delegate credentials, expelled from 
the congress, and placed under strict surveillance and house 
arrest. 



226 



Government and Politics 



The congress elected a new Central Committee of 408 members, 
including 163 alternate members, and a Polexco of 27 full and 18 
alternate members. The Polexco Permanent Bureau was expand- 
ed from eleven to fifteen members. This steady growth reflected 
Ceau§escu's desire to make the body an institutional gathering of 
the most powerful people in the government and party. 

Thirteenth Party Congress 

At the Thirteenth Party Congress of November 1984, Ceau§es- 
cu's address was devoted mostly to the economy. The report made 
clear that there would be no substantial effort to increase the stan- 
dard of living and that forced industrialization would continue un- 
abated. It revealed that the industrial growth rate during the first 
four years of the decade had been much lower than was projected 
by the eleventh and twelfth congresses. The report did not men- 
tion food shortages and rationing. Ignoring the fact that electricity 
and fuel supplies to the general population had been cut drastical- 
ly, Ceau§escu blithely predicted that by 1995, Romania would be 
energy self-sufficient. 

A major part of the report was devoted to the question of political- 
educational activity and the "fashioning of a new man" in order 
to "elevate the socialist revolutionary awareness of all working peo- 
ple." Observers pointed out that the report featured Ceau§escu's 
Stalinist ideological orthodoxy more prominently than ever before. 
He called for intensified study of Marxist philosophical writings 
and urged the party to fight "mysticism" and "obscurantism" (eu- 
phemisms for religion), as well as "obsolete" and "foreign" ideo- 
logical influences. 

The congress elected a new Central Committee of 446 members, 
who in turn selected a commission to propose the composition of 
a new PCR Polexco of 23 full members and 25 alternate mem- 
bers. Among the new alternate members were Ceau§escu's son 
Nicu, whose political ambitions were undisguised, and Tudor 
Postelnicu, one of Ceau§escu's most trusted security men after the 
defection of Ion Pacepa in 1978 (see Security and Intelligence Ser- 
vices, ch.5). The size of the Permanent Bureau was reduced to eight 
members, only five of whom remained from the 1979 Permanent 
Bureau. All personnel changes after the Thirteenth Congress were 
designed to increase Ceau§escu's power base. 

Cult of Personality 

The distinctive feature of Romania's political power structure 
in the 1980s was the cult of personality surrounding Nicolae and 
Elena Ceau§escu. Some observers argued that the phenomenon 



227 



Romania: A Country Study 

was the continuation of Romania's historical legacy. Others held 
that it was Ceau§escu's unique political creation. 

Following Ceau§escu's rise to power in 1965, Romanians had 
enjoyed a short-lived liberalization, as the new leader sought to 
achieve genuine popularity. By 1971, however, the regime had reas- 
serted its Stalinist legacy in socioeconomic and cultural matters. 
Thereafter ideological orthodoxy retained a tight hold on all in- 
tellectual life, and meaningful reforms failed to materialize. After 
assuming the newly established position of president of the repub- 
lic, Ceau§escu was increasingly portrayed by the Romanian media 
as a creative communist theoretician and political leader whose 
"thought" was the source of all national accomplishments. His 
tenure as president was known as the "golden era of Ceau§escu." 
The media embellished all references to him with such formulaic 
appellations as "guarantor of the nation's progress and indepen- 
dence" and "visionary architect of the nation's future." In 1989, 
Ceausescu functioned as the head of state, the PCR, and the armed 
forces; chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social 
Development; president of the National Council of Working Peo- 
ple; and chairman of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front. 

In the 1980s, the personality cult was extended to other mem- 
bers of the Ceau§escu family. Ceau§escu's wife, Elena, held a 
position of prominence in political life far exceeding protocol 
requirements. As first deputy prime minister, she took part in offi- 
cial negotiations with foreign governments and communist par- 
ties. She chaired both the National Council on Science and 
Technology and the National Council for Science and Education. 
Her most influential position, however, was that of chief of the Party 
and State Cadres Commission, which enabled her to effect organiza- 
tional and personnel changes in the party apparatus and the govern- 
ment. By the mid-1980s, Elena Ceaugescu's national prominence 
had grown to the point that her birthday was celebrated as a na- 
tional holiday, as was her husband's. With allies throughout the 
Central Committee and the powerful secret police, Elena Ceausescu 
had emerged as one of the foremost contenders to succeed her hus- 
band, who in 1989 was reported to be in failing health. Their son, 
Nicu, was a candidate member of the Polexco, and two of Ceau§es- 
cu's brothers held key positions in the army and the secret police. 
In 1989, some twenty- seven of Ceau§escu's close relatives held top 
party and state positions. 

Emergence of an Organized Opposition 

Postwar Romania had less labor unrest and fewer overt acts of 
antigovernment defiance than any other East European country. 



228 



Poster marking the sixty-fifth 
anniversary of the Romanian 
Communist Party, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 



Victory of Socialism Boulevard 

leading to the new Palace fljj 
of the Republic, Bucharest 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 





229 



Romania: A Country Study 

During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Gheorghiu-Dej 
regime feared the unrest might spill over into Romania. But even 
though there was student unrest and tension among the Hungarian 
population of Transylvania, the regime was not seriously threat- 
ened. The gradual deterioration of the economy as well as poor 
and dangerous working conditions led to significant unrest during 
the late 1970s, however. In 1977 a prolonged strike by coal miners 
in the Jiu Valley climaxed in the miners holding the prime minister 
captive in a mine shaft for two days. As a result of this incident, 
the Securitate still maintained constant surveillance over the region 
more than a decade later. Despite further deterioration of the econ- 
omy, the severe food shortages, and energy and fuel restrictions 
during the 1980s, only limited signs of unrest were observed, thanks 
to the strict surveillance and repressive measures of the internal 
security forces. But in November 1987, a massive protest occurred 
in the city of Bra§ov. Some 30,000 workers staged a violent pro- 
test against harsh living conditions and the prospect of another 
winter of food and energy shortages. The spontaneous demonstra- 
tion began at a tractor and truck plant and spread into the streets. 
Joined by onlookers, the workers chanting anti-Ceau§escu slogans 
marched on the city hall and ransacked the mayor's office. The 
protest was broken up by militia and the Securitate, and a num- 
ber of workers were arrested. Though it was crushed, the Bra§ov 
protest represented a rallying point for the possible emergence of 
an organized opposition. 

In March 1989, a letter addressed to Ceau§escu criticizing his 
dictatorial policy reached the West. Written by a group of retired 
senior communist officials, it accused Ceau§escu of violating in- 
ternational human rights agreements, including the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act (Helsinki Accords); ignoring the constitutional rights of 
citizens; mismanaging the economy; and alienating Romania's al- 
lies. The signatories called for a halt to the systematization pro- 
gram of destroying rural villages and forcibly relocating peasant 
families (see Land, ch.3). The letter was signed by former Gener- 
al Secretary Gheorghe Apostol; former Politburo member and 
Deputy Prime Minister Alexandru Birladeanu; Constantin Pir- 
vulescu, a co-founder of the PCR; Corneliu Manescu, a former 
Romanian foreign minister and one-time president of the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly; and Grigore Raceanu, a veter- 
an party member. Many analysts considered the letter the most 
serious challenge to Ceau§escu's rule to date. The regime relocat- 
ed and isolated all signatories and reportedly subjected them to other 
repressive measures. The United States expressed official concern 



230 



Government and Politics 



for their safety, and several other Western governments subsequent- 
ly limited their relations with Romania. 

Mass Media 

In the late 1980s, the media continued to serve as propaganda, 
indoctrination, and disinformation tools to develop support for the 
regime's domestic and foreign policies and to consolidate Ceau§es- 
cu's personal power. The system of media control was highly cen- 
tralized and involved an interlocking group of party and state 
organizations, supervising bodies, and operating agencies, whose 
authority extended to all radio and television facilities, film stu- 
dios, printing establishments, newspapers, and book publishers and 
to the single news agency. The control apparatus also regulated 
public access to foreign publications, films, newscasts, books, and 
radio and television programs. 

The 1965 Constitution promised freedom of information, but 
expressed the reservation that it ''cannot be used for aims hostile 
to the socialist system and to the interests of the working people." 
In 1971, following a trip to China, Ceau§escu reinforced PCR 
authority over the highest information-control and policy-making 
bodies in the government. The former State Committee for Cul- 
ture and Art, which was an element of the Council of Ministers, 
was reconstituted as the Council for Socialist Culture and Educa- 
tion and answered directly to the Central Committee of the PCR. 
Similar changes were made in the Committee of Radio and Tele- 
vision, which became the Council of Romanian Radio and Tele- 
vision. In 1985 a joint party-state organization, the National Council 
for Science and Education, chaired by Elena Ceau§escu, was creat- 
ed. Its responsibility was to ensure uniform policy implementation 
in science, technology, and education, and it provided the regime 
another mechanism with which to control educational activities. 

The propaganda and media section of the Central Committee 
exercised general guidance and supervision of all publications and 
dissemination procedures. Its policies and directives, in turn, were 
implemented by such government-controlled agencies as the Roma- 
nian Press Agency and the individual publishing houses, printing 
establishments, book distribution centers, motion picture studios, 
and radio and television stations. 

The UN's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), which collects statistics from all member states, report- 
ed that during the 1 980s the number of Romanian daily and peri- 
odical publications dropped sharply. Whereas in 1969 Romania 
published fifty-one dailies, twenty- three weeklies, and two semi- 
weeklies, in 1985 there were only thirty-six dailies and twenty-four 



231 



Romania: A Country Study 

weeklies. Daily newspapers had a total annual circulation of more 
than 1.1 billion copies. Major mass organizations, government- 
sponsored groups, local government organs, and the PCR and its 
subsidiaries published the most important and influential news- 
papers, both in Bucharest and in the various judefe. Little latitude 
was allowed either in the content or format of the news. 

The most authoritative newspaper, Scinteia, was founded in 1931 
as the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party and in the late 1980s had by far the largest daily circulation. 
It was the outlet for party policy pronouncements and semiofficial 
government positions on national and international issues. Until 
the early 1970s, Scinteia was published as an eight-page daily, but 
thereafter it was condensed to four pages with one six-page issue 
per week. Its editorials, feature sections, and chief articles were 
frequentiy reprinted or excerpted in the provincial newspapers, shop 
bulletins, and enterprise newsletters. 

After Scinteia, the most important daily was Romania Libera, es- 
tablished by the Socialist Unity Front in 1942. Although the paper 
featured items of national and international interest, it concentrated 
on local issues. The only paper allowed to publish one-page ad- 
vertisement sections, Romania Libera was in great demand. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, the daily Munca, published by the UGSR, became 
a weekly publication. Scinteia Tineretului, which addressed the young- 
er element of the population and stressed the ideological and po- 
litical training of youth as the basis for a "sound socialist society/' 
was another national daily. The most widely circulated minority- 
language newspapers were the Hungarian daily Elbre and the Ger- 
man daily Neuer Weg. Both publications generally repeated the news 
of the national newspapers but also featured items of minority in- 
terest. They promoted the official government position on such sen- 
sitive issues as Romanian-Hungarian tensions and served as 
mouthpieces for anti- Hungarian propaganda. 

The number of periodicals also decreased in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Whereas in 1969 there were 581 Romanian periodicals, in 1985 
there were only 422. All periodicals were considered official publi- 
cations of the various sponsoring organizations and were subject 
to the same licensing and supervising controls as newspapers. Vir- 
tually all magazines and journals were published by mass organi- 
zations and party- or government-controlled entities, such as 
institutes, labor unions, cultural committees, and special interest 
groups. They covered a broad range of subjects and included tech- 
nical and professional journals, among them magazines on litera- 
ture, art, health, sports, medicine, statistics, politics, science, and 
economics. 



232 



Casa Scinteii, publishing house for major periodicals, Bucharest 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 

Established in 1949, the Romanian Press Agency (Agenda Romana 
de Presd — Agerpres) operated as a department of the central govern- 
ment under the control of the PCR Central Committee. Agerpres 
had exclusive rights to the collection and distribution of all news, 
pictures, and other press items, both domestic and foreign. In the 
1980s, Agerpres increasingly concerned itself with reporting offi- 
cial ceremonial (protocol) events and foreign news. For foreign dis- 
semination, it issued the daily Agerpres News of the Day and the weekly 
Agerpres Information Bulletin. For domestic consumption, Agerpres 
distributed about 45,000 words of foreign news coverage daily to 
various newspapers and periodicals and to radio and television 
broadcasting stations. It also provided articles from Western wire 
services to government and party officials in classified bulletins. 
The Agerpres network of press correspondents in foreign countries 
was largely dismantied after several defections, and in 1989 Agerpres 
maintained only a few correspondents in the other East European 
countries. 

After 1960, recognizing the importance of radio as a medium 
for informing the public and molding attitudes, the regime launched 
a large-scale effort to build broadcasting facilities and manufac- 
ture receiving sets. The number of radio receivers increased from 
2 million in 1960 to 3.2 million in 1989. Receivers and amplifiers 



233 



Romania: A Country Study 

that reached group audiences in public areas were installed through- 
out the country. 

In the 1980s, Romanian radio broadcast three programs on medi- 
um wave and FM. Until the mid-1980s, there were also six regional 
programs, with transmission in Hungarian, German, and Serbo- 
Croatian. Each week about 200 hours of broadcasts in thirteen lan- 
guages were beamed to foreign countries by Radio Bucharest. 

Since its inception in 1956, television broadcasting has been close- 
ly linked with radio as an increasingly important instrument of 
"propaganda and socialist education of the masses." Like radio, 
television operated under the supervision of the Council of Roma- 
nian Radio and Television, whose policy guidelines were received 
directly from the party apparatus. Television frequently came un- 
der close scrutiny and criticism by the Central Committee and by 
national congresses on "socialist education." At the June 1982 Cen- 
tral Committee plenum and again in 1984, Ceau§escu denounced 
the "polluting" influence of Western propaganda and its impact 
on literary, theatrical, film, and artistic broadcasts and stated that 
radio and television should report current events from a Marxist- 
Leninist perspective. 

In 1989 there were approximately 3.9 million television sets in 
Romania. Following the energy crisis of 1984, the two TV chan- 
nels were merged and broadcasting was reduced from 100 to 22 
hours per week. Programs in Hungarian and German were 
dropped. Because of these cutbacks and the greater ideological con- 
tent of the broadcasts, the number of viewers actually declined, 
and some citizens resorted to building their own antennae to receive 
Bulgarian and Soviet programs. 

Before World War II, Romania was one of the leading book- 
publishing nations in southeastern Europe. But after 1948, the new 
communist regime nationalized all publishing facilities and made 
the publishing industry a propaganda and indoctrination instru- 
ment. From 1955 to 1966 the number of titles gradually increased, 
reaching a plateau of about 9,000. In the following decades, 
however, book publishing declined dramatically, and in 1985 only 
3,063 titles were published — about one-third as many as during 
the 1960s. Not only the number, but also the variety of books pub- 
lished during the 1970s and 1980s was reduced. By far the largest 
number of titles credited to a single author was attributed to 
Ceau§escu, whose writings were published in Romanian and in 
foreign languages in large printings. 

The Council for Socialist Culture and Education controlled all 
printing and publishing activities. It formulated policy guidelines 



234 



Government and Politics 



for the publishing industry and used other government agencies, 
the various publishing houses, and book distribution centers to su- 
pervise and coordinate day-to-day operations. The council allocated 
paper, determined the number of books to be printed, and set the 
sale prices of publications. The number of publishing houses de- 
lined from about twenty-five in the early 1970s to eighteen in the 
late 1980s. 

Film production, distribution, and exhibition also operated un- 
der the supervision of the Council for Socialist Culture and Edu- 
cation. There were two production studios — one in Bucharest that 
produced documentaries, newsreels, cartoons, and puppet films, 
and another in Buftea (near Bucharest) that made feature films. 

Until the late 1960s, Romanian films reflected a strong French 
influence. Both the native and co-produced pictures of this period 
were of high quality, and several won awards at international film 
festivals. In later years, however, the regime repressed artistic ex- 
pression in the film industry, and as a result, fewer and lower-quality 
films were made. In 1985 only twenty-six films were produced. 
Furthermore, according to UNESCO statistics, fewer foreign films 
were allowed into the country. Whereas in 1968 Romania import- 
ed 188 feature films, in 1984 the number declined to 72. Also 
noteworthy is that in 1 968 approximately 40 percent of imported 
films came from the Soviet Union, while 60 percent were from the 
West, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany), but in 1985 no films were imported from the West nor 
from any hard-currency country. 

Foreign Policy 

Foreign policy formulation, according to the Constitution, is the 
responsibility of the GNA, and its implementation is within the 
purview of the Council of Ministers. In reality the highest eche- 
lons of the PCR — in 1989 the Ceausescu circle, the Permanent 
Bureau, and the Polexco — formulated foreign policy. Party deci- 
sions were channeled through the Central Committee's Directorate 
for International Affairs to the GNA, which approved them auto- 
matically and without amendment. The State Council had the ex- 
ecutive function of ratifying international treaties and establishing 
diplomatic relations with other states. As the head of state, the presi- 
dent of the republic represented Romania in international relations. 

The Council of Ministers coordinated and implemented foreign 
policy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation. Because 
decision-making powers resided in the party leadership, however, 
the ministries functioned almost exclusively as administrative 



235 



Romania: A Country Study 

agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for 
implementing party directives in diplomatic, educational, cultur- 
al, and scientific relations with other states and with international 
organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and International 
Economic Cooperation functioned as the central organ for the coun- 
try's international trade and economic activities. 

In 1989 the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs remained essentially the same as that established by the Con- 
stitution of 1965. The ministry had five geographical and eight func- 
tional directorates. Geographical directorates were set up for the 
socialist countries; Western Europe; Africa; Asia, Middle East, and 
Oceania; and the Americas. There were functional directorates for 
consular affairs; culture and press; diplomatic courier and cable 
service; finance and accounting; foreign economic relations and 
international organizations; organization, control, and personnel 
training; protocol; and supply and administration. 

In 1989 the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation consisted of nine geographical directorates and 
twelve functional directorates, two of which were merged in a 
separate department. The geographical directorates included Africa, 
Asia and Oceania, Latin America, Middle East, North America, 
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Come- 
con), non-Comecon socialist countries, Soviet Union, and Western 
Europe. The functional directorates were economic, administra- 
tive, and secretariat; export- import I (authorizing exports and im- 
ports and monitoring the production of export commodities by the 
heavy equipment, machine-building, electrical engineering, metal- 
lurgical, extractive, and electric energy industries); export-import 
II (authorizing exports and imports and monitoring the produc- 
tion of export commodities by the chemical and petrochemical, 
wood-processing, agriculture, food-processing, and light industries); 
finance and accounting; foreign contracts, agreements, and legal 
matters; foreign trade and international economic cooperation plan; 
hard currency; organization and control; personnel, education, and 
remuneration; and prices and effectiveness of foreign trade opera- 
tions. In addition, there was the international economic coopera- 
tion department consisting of two directorates — export of complex 
installations, international bids, and technical assistance; and joint 
companies and coordination of international economic coopera- 
tion activity. Over the years the ministry was subjected to several 
reorganizations and restructurings. 

In 1989 Romania maintained diplomatic relations with 125 coun- 
tries (1 18 at the ambassadorial level) and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). Although most governments maintained 



236 



Government and Politics 



embassies in Bucharest, some Western countries maintained only 
symbolic representation or conducted business from a neighbor- 
ing country because of the shortage of food and the inadequate heat- 
ing during the winter. Romania also had trade relations with certain 
states with which it had not established formal diplomatic ties. 

In 1989 Romania continued to be a member of the UN and a 
number of UN specialized agencies. It was also a member, albeit 
an often reluctant one, of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see 
Glossary), more commonly known as the Warsaw Pact, and 
Comecon. 

Relations with Communist States 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 

After coming under communist control in 1948, Romania was 
closely aligned with the international policies and goals of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union. But after mid- 1952, when 
Gheorghiu-Dej had gained full control of the party and had be- 
come head of state, Romania began a slow disengagement from 
Soviet domination, being careful not to incur the suspicions or dis- 
approval of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. The Gheorghiu-Dej 
regime strongly supported the Soviet suppression of the Revolu- 
tion of 1956 in Hungary, hoping thereby to enhance prospects for 
the removal of Soviet occupation forces that had remained in Roma- 
nia after the war. In fact Soviet forces were withdrawn in 1958, 
enabling Gheorghiu-Dej to take the first significant steps to diminish 
Soviet influence over Romanian foreign policy. 

Gheorghiu-Dej rejected Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's plan 
to integrate the economies of the Comecon states and subordinate 
national economic plans to an overall planning body. Gheorghiu- 
Dej objected not only to the loss of economic autonomy but also 
to the subservient role Khrushchev envisioned for Romania — 
supplier of raw materials and agricultural products for the more 
industrially developed members. Therefore he proceeded with his 
own plans for the country's industrial development, asserting the 
right of each Comecon state to develop its economy in accord with 
national needs and interests. To lessen dependence on Comecon, 
the regime gradually expanded economic relations with noncom- 
munist states (see Foreign Trade, ch.3). 

The conflict with the Soviet Union became more acute in 1962, 
when Gheorghiu-Dej again rejected the Comecon plan for Roma- 
nia and announced the signing of a contract with a British-French 
consortium for the construction of a large steel mill at Galaji. 



237 



Romania: A Country Study 

Romanian- Soviet relations continued to deteriorate as Gheorghiu- 
Dej exploited the Sino-Soviet dispute and supported the Chinese 
position on the equality of communist states and rejection of the 
Soviet party's leading role. In November 1963, Romania declared 
its readiness to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute, a suggestion 
Moscow found arrogant and hostile. 

A statement issued by the Central Committee in April 1964 
declared the right of Romania and all other nations to develop 
national policies in the light of their own interests and domestic 
requirements. During the remainder of that year, the volume of 
economic and cultural contacts with Western nations increased sig- 
nificantly. Because of the increased tensions in Indochina that were 
developing into the Vietnam War, however, the regime curbed its 
efforts to improve relations with the United States. 

Following the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965, 
Ceau§escu continued a foreign policy that frequentiy diverged from 
that of the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw 
Pact. Ceausescu antagonized the Soviet Union by establishing diplo- 
matic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many) in 1967 and by refusing to follow the Soviet lead in breaking 
relations with Israel in the wake of the June 1967 War. 

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces was 
a turning point in Romanian relations with Comecon and the War- 
saw Pact. Some observers maintain that Ceau§escu's denunciation 
of the invasion marked the apogee of Romanian defiance of the 
Soviet Union. But Ceau§escu was careful not to press the policy 
to the point of provoking military intervention. The regime inter- 
preted as a clear warning the enunciation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine — the concept articulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezh- 
nev that the protection of socialism in any communist state is the 
legitimate concern of all communist states. 

After 1968 pressures mounted on Romania to cooperate more 
fully in the Warsaw Pact and to agree to a supranational planning 
body within the framework of Comecon. Nevertheless, the Ceauses- 
cu regime continued to resist the Soviet efforts toward economic 
integration. Several important events during the 1968-70 period 
strengthened Romania's international position, namely the visits 
of President Charles de Gaulle of France and President Richard 
M. Nixon of the United States and the long-delayed signing of a 
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1970. 

As of mid- 1989, Ceau§escu had dealt with several Soviet leaders 
during his tenure as head of state — Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andro- 
pov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Relations 
were most strained during the Brezhnev era, which witnessed the 



238 



Government and Politics 



Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Nixon visit to 
Romania, Soviet accusations of a Romanian plot to organize a pro- 
Chinese bloc in the Balkans, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

In 1976 Ceausescu received Brezhnev in Bucharest — the first offi- 
cial visit by a Soviet leader since 1955. The final communique of 
the meeting reflected continuing disagreements between the two 
countries, as Romania refused to side with the Soviets in their dis- 
pute with China. In 1978, after visiting China, Ceausescu attend- 
ed a Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Moscow, where he rejected 
a Soviet proposal that member countries increase their military ex- 
penditures. On his return to Bucharest, Ceau§escu explained the 
refusal by stating that any increase in military expenditure was con- 
trary to the socialist countries' effort to reduce military tensions 
in Europe. Perhaps because of Ceausescu' s uncooperative attitude, 
a 1980 Romanian attempt to secure supplies of energy and raw 
materials from the Soviet Union and other Comecon countries failed 
when those countries demanded world market prices and payment 
in hard currency. Nor would the Soviet Union guarantee that it 
would increase or even maintain existing levels of oil exports to 
Romania for the following year. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused Romania to distance 
itself further from Brezhnev. When the UN General Assembly voted 
on a resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional with- 
drawal of Soviet troops, Romania broke with its Warsaw Pact al- 
lies and abstained. And one month later, at a meeting of communist 
states in Sofia, Romania joined the Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea (North Korea) in refusing to endorse the invasion. 

During Andropov's brief tenure as Soviet leader, relations re- 
mained frigid. The wording of the communique following a meet- 
ing with Ceau§escu in Moscow suggested that Andropov intended 
to pressure Romania to bring its foreign policy into line with the 
Warsaw Pact. The Romanian leadership appeared to suspect An- 
dropov of pro-Hungarian sympathies because of his close personal 
friendship with First Secretary Janos Kadar of Hungary. Roma- 
nian disagreements with the Soviet position on intermediate nuclear 
forces in Europe also surfaced during the Andropov period. 

Ceau§escu's Moscow meeting with Chernenko in June 1984 was 
cordial and promised an improvement in the Romanian-Soviet rela- 
tionship. Ceau§escu had backed Chernenko over Andropov to suc- 
ceed Brezhnev, and their mutual regard was reflected in less 
divergent positions on international issues. In contrast with previ- 
ous years, Ceau§escu began to increase his criticism of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States for 
the deterioration of international relations. 



239 



Romania: A Country Study 

With the replacement of Chernenko by Gorbachev in 1985, po- 
litical relations between Romaina and the Soviet Union began to 
cool again, although the economic relationship improved. Soviet 
oil deliveries rose while Romania became the largest supplier of 
oil- and gas-drilling equipment to the Soviet Union. In other 
spheres, however, relations were tense, as Ceau§escu's Stalinist 
philosophy conflicted with Gorbachev's program of glasnost' (open- 
ness) and perestroika (restructuring). In reaction to the political 
changes occurring throughout Eastern Europe in the wake of Soviet 
reforms, Romania moved toward retrenchment. Ceausescu rejected 
the decentralization of economic planning and management, the 
reintroduction of market mechanisms, and private enterprise as 
incompatible with socialism. 

Romania also rejected much of Gorbachev's foreign policy. In 
December 1987, Ceau§escu failed to attend a Warsaw Pact sum- 
mit in East Berlin, where Gorbachev briefed leaders on his trip 
to Washington. While the Soviets frequendy spoke of positive trends 
in East- West relations and progress in arms control, Ceau§escu's 
statements took exception. He criticized the rationale for the Soviet- 
United States dialogue, stating that the international situation re- 
mained complex and fraught with the danger of war. Romania in- 
creasingly adopted a more hawkish position than the Soviet Union 
and the other Warsaw Pact members on a number of East-West 
issues. 

In May 1987, Gorbachev visited Romania, and the two leaders 
publicly aired their differences. Referring to complaints of mistreat- 
ment of the Hungarian minority, Gorbachev reminded Ceau§es- 
cu of the need to demonstrate "tact" and "consideration" in 
nationality policy. He also criticized nepotism in the Eastern bloc, 
without mentioning Ceau§escu by name, and complained about 
Romania's unwillingness to expand cooperation with the other 
members of Comecon. In October 1988, Ceau§escu visited Moscow 
for official discussions with Gorbachev but failed to improve the 
state of bilateral relations. By that time, the Hungarian- Romanian 
dispute had become an even more serious issue. 

Romania's objections to perestroika influenced its relations with 
other East European countries. It appeared that two major camps 
were emerging within the Warsaw Pact, with Bulgaria, Czecho- 
slovakia, East Germany, and Romania lining up against restruc- 
turing and Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union favoring it. 
Romania strove to improve its relationship with the countries shar- 
ing its dislike tor perestroika. Bulgaria had already established a special 
relationship with Ceau§escu and his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej . 
Ceau§escu and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, the two East 



240 



Government and Politics 



European leaders with the longest tenure, met at least twice year- 
ly and signed numerous joint venture and trade agreements. 

Relations with Czechoslovakia improved markedly after Ceauses- 
cu's May 1987 visit, largely because of the countries' shared op- 
position to perestroika. Likewise, even before Gorbachev's rise to 
power, Romanian-East German relations had been fostered by cer- 
tain shared resentments of Soviet actions. East Germany's Erich 
Honecker was the only Warsaw Pact leader to appear in Bucharest 
on the occasion of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of 
Romania's liberation. 

Hungary 

Although in the postwar period Romania and Hungary were 
''fraternal states in the socialist community of nations," bilateral 
relations were marred by historical hostility, and disputes continued 
to erupt throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 

In 1977 Kadar visited Romania, and he and Ceau§escu signed 
a comprehensive agreement governing bilateral relations. The 
agreement called for more cultural exchanges between the coun- 
tries and for setting up additional consulates in Szeged and Cluj- 
Napoca for that purpose. The Hungarian government hoped the 
agreement would improve its contact with the Hungarian minori- 
ty in Romania, but the Ceau§escu regime failed to implement the 
agreement and continued its policy of forced assimilation under 
the guise of enhancing national unity. 

In the 1980s Romanian-Hungarian relations remained tense. The 
Hungarian government and intellectual circles began to express con- 
cern over the issue of ethnic assimilation in Romania. In 1982, 
reports of mistreatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylva- 
nia further exacerbated relations. The media of both countries pub- 
licized the controversy, and an energetic anti-Hungarian propaganda 
campaign on the anniversary of Romania's union with Transylva- 
nia brought relations to their lowest level since World War II. 

With the progressive deterioration of Romanian- Hungarian re- 
lations, polemics crept into official political statements. In 1985 the 
Central Committee secretary for international relations in Budapest 
blamed the poor relations on the political climate and reduced hu- 
man contacts, presumably referring to a series of measures taken 
by Romania to hinder contacts between Transylvanian ethnic Hun- 
garians and Hungarian visitors. The next day, Ceau§escu at a Cen- 
tral Committee plenum criticized "nationalism, chauvinism, and 
revanchism wherever it was to be found." In turn Radio Budapest 
accused Romania of failing to implement the 1977 agreements signed 
by Kadar and Ceausescu. 



241 



Romania: A Country Study 

A particularly serious episode in the chronology of the crisis was 
the Hungarian Ministry of Culture's 1986 publication of the three- 
volume History of Transylvania. The work followed Bucharest's pub- 
lication of two volumes describing atrocities committed against 
Romanians by Hungarian forces occupying Transylvania from 1940 
to 1944. The Romanians started a propaganda campaign against 
the publication of Hungary's three-volume work. Ceau§escu ad- 
dressed a joint plenum of the German and Hungarian nationality 
councils and condemned the publication as the "revival of Hor- 
thyist, fascist, and even racist theses by reactionary imperialist 
circles." 

In 1987 relations between the two countries further worsened 
as large numbers of ethnic Hungarians began leaving Romania. 
The Hungarian government established an interdepartmental com- 
mittee and allocated the equivalent of approximately US$5 mil- 
lion to resettle the refugees. Meanwhile, 40,000 people marched 
to the Romanian embassy in Budapest to protest the planned demo- 
lition of Transylvanian villages. The demonstration, organized by 
Hungary's dissident Democratic Forum, appeared to have the tacit 
support of the Hungarian government. The protesters regarded 
the planned demolitions as an attempt to disperse the ethnic Hun- 
garian population, which they claimed numbered some 2.5 mil- 
lion persons. Following the demonstration, Hungary was ordered 
to close its consulate in Cluj-Napoca and vacate its embassy in 
Bucharest, which was to be converted to a cultural center. 

In an attempt to resolve some of the issues dividing the coun- 
tries and to obtain guarantees for the rights of the Hungarian 
minority in Romania, new Hungarian leader Karoly Grosz met 
Ceau§escu in August 1988 at the Romanian city of Arad — the first 
meeting between the countries' leaders in more than ten years. The 
day-long discussion was fruitless, as the Romanians rejected two 
key proposals. The first called for reopening the consulates closed 
during the dispute — the Romanian office at Debrecen and the Hun- 
garian facility at Cluj-Napoca. The second appealed for an end 
to the rural systematization program (see Systematization: A Set- 
tlement Strategy, ch.2). 

In March 1989, Hungary declared that it would lodge a com- 
plaint with the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva con- 
cerning Romania's failure to abide by cultural agreements, its policy 
of forced assimilation of minorities, and the flood of refugees into 
Hungary. At Geneva the Hungarian representative accused Roma- 
nia of "severe violations of basic human rights," while his Roma- 
nian counterpart reproached Hungary for "pursuing irredentist 
goals." The Hungarian government therefore decided to join the 



242 



Government and Politics 



Geneva Refugee Convention and to establish refugee camps in the 
eastern part of the country and in Budapest. 

The Swedish representative to the UN Human Rights Commis- 
sion submitted a resolution calling for an investigation of alleged 
human rights violations by Romania. The Swedish initiative was 
cosponsored by Australia, Austria, Britain, France, and Portugal. 
Later Hungary made an offer to * 'co-sponsor" the resolution. 
Romania rejected the criticism as meddling in its internal affairs. 
The Romanian representative to the Commission claimed that all 
ethnic groups in Romania enjoyed 4 'legal guarantees and the means 
to preserve their cultural identity." 

Relations with Noncommunist States 

West Germany 

In January 1967, Romania became the second Warsaw Pact 
state after the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with 
West Germany, an action based on the Warsaw Pact's Bucha- 
rest Declaration of 1966. The declaration affirmed that there were 
"circles that oppose revanchism and militarism and that seek the 
development of normal relations with countries of both the East 
and the West as well as a normalization of relations between the 
two German states." The declaration also included a statement 
affirming that a basic condition for European security was the es- 
tablishment of normal relations between states "regardless of their 
social system." 

In the period after 1967, relations with West Germany passed 
through several stages. Initially, Romania minimized differences 
in ideology and foreign and domestic policy. But friction soon sur- 
faced over the question of ethnic German emigration. In 1979 West 
Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Bucharest and 
extended credit guarantees of approximately US$368 million in 
return for Romanian pledges to facilitate the reunification of eth- 
nic German families. The issue resurfaced in 1983 when the so- 
called education tax would have increased West Germany's pay- 
ment of the equivalent of US$2,632 per ethnic German emigrant 
to US$42,105. After visits by Bavarian premier Franz Joseph 
Strauss and West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Gen- 
scher, an agreement was reached whereby the West German gov- 
ernment increased its payment per emigrant to approximately 
US$5,263. According to press reports, the agreement remained 
in effect until June 30, 1988, and provided for the emigration of 
11,000 to 13,000 Transylvanian Saxons annually. The West Ger- 
man publication Die Welt reported that in January 1989 a follow-up 



243 



Romania: A Country Study 

agreement had been reached by which Romania would continue 
to permit emigration at the previous rate. 

Political relations with West Germany, which had been their most 
cordial during Willi Brandt's chancellorship, took a sharp down- 
turn in the 1980s. Ceau§escu's 1984 visit to Bonn had sought to 
exploit a setback in West German relations with Bulgaria, East 
Germany, and the Soviet Union. Observers believed that Ceausescu 
was determined to rebuild his tarnished reputation in the West. 
But disagreements over arms control, trade, and the treatment of 
ethnic Germans prevented the issue of a joint communique. 

After the mid-1980s, West German official criticism gave way 
to direct acts of protest against Romanian policies. In April 1989, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that the situation for Romania's 
ethnic Germans had become intolerable. At the same time, the West 
German Foreign Ministry lodged an official condemnation of 
Romania's human rights policies. 

United States 

Relations with the United States were initiated on a limited scale 
in the early 1960s, and ambassadors were exchanged in 1964. But 
with the United States' increased involvement in the Vietnam War, 
relations deteriorated. In the late 1960s, following Romanian con- 
demnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 
opening of the Paris peace talks, political relations between the two 
states improved significantly, but economic relations remained 
minimal because of United States restrictions on trade with Eastern 
Europe. 

Evidence of improved relations between the nations was Presi- 
dent Nixon's visit to Romania in August 1969 — the first visit by 
an American head of state to a communist country since the 1945 
Yalta Conference. Nixon received an enthusiastic welcome, and 
a wide range of international problems were discussed. The coun- 
tries agreed upon the mutual establishment of libraries, the open- 
ing of negotiations for the conclusion of a consular convention, and 
the development and diversification of economic ties. Ceau§escu 
visited the United States in October 1970 to attend the twenty- 
fifth anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. 

Nixon moved to strengthen economic relations with Romania, 
and in 1972 the United States Congress debated granting most- 
favored-nation status. In 1975 a three-year agreement made Roma- 
nia the first East European country to receive the special trade sta- 
tus, and in 1981 bilateral trade reached US$1 billion. But because 
of persistent reports of human rights violations in Romania, and 
the regime's decision to impose an education tax on applicants for 



244 



Government and Politics 



exit visas, the United States Congress hesitated to renew most- 
favored-nation status. 

In November 1985, Secretary of State George Schultz visited 
Bucharest and warned that Romania could lose most-favored-nation 
status unless it changed its human rights policies. Both sides agreed 
to establish a system of consultation on human rights issues. Roma- 
nia did not abide by the agreement, however, and at the begin- 
ning of 1987 it was removed from the list of countries allowed to 
export certain goods — mainly raw materials — duty-free to the Unit- 
ed States. The United States Congress voted to suspend most- 
favored-nation status for six months because of Romanian limita- 
tions of religious freedom, restrictions on emigration, and perse- 
cution of its Hungarian minority. The Reagan administration, 
however, succeeded in getting congressional approval for its recom- 
mendation to renew the status, hoping the action would encourage 
Romania to improve its human rights record. 

In February 1988, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead 
visited Bucharest and restated United States disapproval of Roma- 
nia' s human rights policies. Ceau§escu, in turn, accused the United 
States of meddling in Romanian internal affairs. Later the same 
month, the United States State Department announced that Roma- 
nia had relinquished its most-favored-nation trade status. 

The deterioration in relations continued, and in March 1989 the 
United States Department of State called off plans for a meeting 
with high-ranking Romanian officials, warning that a further crack- 
down against critics of the regime would have negative consequences 
for bilateral relations. 

Other Western Countries 

After the mid-1960s, political, economic, and cultural ties also 
expanded with other Western countries, particularly Austria, Brit- 
ain, France, and Italy. Economic relations with these countries were 
especially important to Romania, and several trade and joint- 
venture agreements were negotiated. 

After the late 1970s, relations with these countries, as with the 
West in general, took a sharp downturn. In particular relations 
with France deteriorated severely. For centuries French culture had 
exercised profound influence on Romania, which viewed itself as 
France's special friend in Eastern Europe. President de Gaulle's 
visit in 1968 reaffirmed this feeling of amity. But during the 1980s, 
human rights abuses, the poor performance of French-Romanian 
joint ventures, and unfair Romanian trade practices (including the 
dumping of steel) poisoned the relationship. 



245 



Romania: A Country Study 

Perhaps the most damaging episode in French-Romanian rela- 
tions was a spy scandal in the early 1980s known as the "Tanase 
affair." Virgil Tanase, a dissident Romanian writer, accused the 
Romanian government of mounting a plot to assassinate himself 
and another emigre, Paul Goma. Shortly thereafter, President Fran- 
cois Mitterand cancelled an official visit to Romania and relations 
worsened rapidly. Romania expelled several French journalists, 
and in March 1989, France recalled its ambassador in reaction to 
the persecution of signers of a letter condemning Ceausescu's rule. 

Relations with Britain took a similar course. Optimistic joint- 
venture and trade agreements in the 1970s, including licenses from 
British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce to build sophisticated aircraft, 
were followed in the 1980s by official revulsion for Ceau§escu's hu- 
man rights abuses. The British considered withdrawing their am- 
bassador from Romania and stripping Ceau§escu of an honorary 
British distinction. 

Middle East 

The Middle East situation posed a dilemma for the Ceau§escu 
government, which sought to maintain relations with both sides 
of the conflict. In 1969 Romania announced an agreement to ele- 
vate its relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level, while con- 
tinuing to voice support for "the struggle of the Arab people to 
defend their national independence and sovereignty" and calling 
for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. 

The Ceausescu regime maintained good relations with both Egypt 
and Israel and played an intermediary role in arranging Egyptian 
President Anwar as Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977. In the follow- 
ing years Romania maintained contacts with all parties in the con- 
flict and cautiously endorsed the Camp David Accords, in contrast 
with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. In later 
years, Romania called for a global approach to the Middle East 
crisis that would involve all interested parties, including the PLO. 
Ceau§escu offered to act as an intermediary and met several Arab 
leaders including PLO chairman Yasir Arafat. Some observers be- 
lieved Ceau§escu's intermediary efforts were designed to gain ac- 
cess to new sources of Middle East oil to compensate for the 
suspension of Iranian oil deliveries. 

After the late 1970s, Romania advocated a peace plan featuring 
four points: Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied 
from June 1967, including East Jerusalem and southern Lebanon; 
establishment of an independent state governed by the PLO; 
guarantees for the security of all states in the region; and convoca- 
tion of an international peace conference, with representatives from 



246 



Government and Politics 



the PLO, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Although Is- 
rael rejected all four points of the plan, it continued to maintain 
good relations with Romania. 

After 1985 relations with Israel gradually deteriorated. Although 
the countries continued to exchange high-level visits, they failed 
to make major breakthroughs. Romania continued to insist on Israeli 
concessions, including direct negotiations with the PLO. In August 

1987, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, after nine hours 
of talks with Ceau§escu in Bucharest, reported no progress on the 
issue of Middle East negotiations. A few months later, Ceausescu 
invited representatives of the PLO and the Israeli-Palestinian Di- 
alogue Committee to a meeting in Romania, but that discussion 
too bore no fruit. 

Relations with the PLO were generally good, and Arafat and 
other high-ranking PLO officials frequendy travelled to Bucharest. 
The Romanian media described Arafat as a personal friend and 
comrade of Ceau§escu. Between November 1987 and December 

1988, Arafat met with Ceau§escu five times. The PLO opened one 
of its first diplomatic offices in Bucharest, and several bilateral agree- 
ments were concluded, some of which reportedly offered the PLO 
educational and even military training facilities in Romania. 

Africa 

After 1970 Ceau§escu systematically cultivated relations with the 
less-developed countries, African nations in particular. Numerous 
African leaders called on Ceau§escu in Bucharest, and he embarked 
on long African tours almost every year. Ceausescu travelled to 
nearly every African country except South Africa on several occa- 
sions. These annual tours gave him the opportunity to appear as 
an international statesman, and they resulted in general trade agree- 
ments. The less-developed countries were viewed as a source of 
raw materials and a market for Romanian manufactured goods 
that did not fare well in the West. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

The Ceau§escu regime's conduct at the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna, which concluded 
in January 1989, reinforced Romania's poor reputation on the is- 
sue of human rights. After a twenty-six-month review, an East- 
West consensus emerged, but Romania announced it was not bound 
by the agreement. From the start of the negotiations, Romania had 
attempted to dilute the draft text prepared by the nonaligned states. 
During the final negotiations, it submitted seventeen amendments 
to remove human rights provisions from the final document, in 



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Romania: A Country Study 

part because the Ceau§escu regime realized that the agreement 
would facilitate emigration and create a serious brain drain. Other 
delegations, including some from Warsaw Pact states, rejected these 
efforts. Romania's refusal to abide by the agreement drew universal 
condemnation from the other delegations and represented another 
step toward the international isolation of Ceaugescu's Romania. 
It appeared unlikely, however, that the defiant regime in Bucharest 
would be greatly swayed by international objections to its human 
rights policies. 

* * * 

Among the most important studies of the Romanian political 
system are Mary Ellen Fischer's examinations of the Ceau§escu 
regime: "Participatory Reforms and Political Development in Roma- 
nia," in Political Development in Eastern Europe, edited by J an F. Tris- 
ka and Paul M. Cocks; "Political Leadership and Personnel Policy 
in Romania: Continuity and Change, 1965-1976," in World Com- 
munism at the Crossroads, edited by Steven Rosefielde; and "The 
Romanian Communist Party and Its Central Committee: Patterns 
of Growth and Change," in Southeastern Europe. Other excellent 
sources of information and analysis include Michael Shafir's Roma- 
nia: Politics, Economics, and Society; Daniel N. Nelson's Romania in 
the 1980s; and William E. Crowther's The Political Economy of Roma- 
nian Socialism. Foreign policy issues are reviewed and analyzed in 
Aurel Braun's Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and 
Military Limits of Autonomy; Ronald H. Linden's "Romanian For- 
eign Policy in the 1980s: Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkages," in 
Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s: Trends and 
Prospects, edited by Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik; 
George Schopflin's "Romanian Nationalism," published in Survey; 
and Robert Weiner's Romania's Foreign Policy and the United Nations. 
(For additional information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



248 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Frieze depicting battle between Greeks and Amazons, sculpted at 
Constanta, ca. A.D. 250 



THE MEASURE OF ROMANIA'S success in the area of national 
security has been its ability to achieve and maintain the status of 
a sovereign, independent nation-state. Thus measured, Romania 
has succeeded over the long term despite some major defeats along 
the way. In its postwar incarnation as a communist state and mem- 
ber of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), Romania 
has enjoyed more national security than ever before. 

In 1989 Romania relied on a relatively small professional mili- 
tary establishment and larger reserve and paramilitary forces to 
provide defense against external threats. The regular armed forces 
consisted of ground, air, and naval services as well as border guards. 
The Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Roman — 
PCR, see Glossary) controlled the armed forces through its po- 
litical apparatus within them. PCR General Secretary Nicolae 
Ceau§escu also exercised considerable personal control over the top 
military leaders by using his power to appoint and dismiss them. 

Because Romania's military doctrine, strategy, and policies 
differed from those of its Warsaw Pact allies, the country had 
the reputation of being the maverick of the Warsaw Pact. Its 
independent positions frequently brought it into conflict with the 
Soviet Union, the senior alliance partner. Soviet reluctance to 
provide Romania with up-to-date weaponry has made it the most 
poorly equipped Warsaw Pact member state. Yet Romania's unique 
stance inside the Soviet-led alliance has helped it establish diverse 
military contacts and relations with countries outside the Warsaw 
Pact. 

The PCR controlled Romania's system of law and order and 
operated it to maintain its absolute political power in the country. 
Judicial officials and courts routinely promoted the requirements 
of party and state over the rights of individual citizens. Ceau§escu 
provided the security and intelligence services with the resources 
and latitude to suppress his political opponents at home and abroad. 
Consequently there was little organized opposition to Ceau§escu 
in 1989. 

Romania faced few serious external threats in the late 1980s. 
The greatest threats to national security stemmed from internal 
political and economic weaknesses. Many observers surmised that 
a prolonged struggle between would-be successors to Ceau§escu 
could result in political turmoil that would weaken the nation's 
defense posture. Likewise, economic decline and hardship could 



251 



Romania: A Country Study 

give rise to internal disorder or even open rebellion against the PCR, 
which would make Romania more vulnerable to external pressures. 

Historical Background 

Romania suffered frequent invasions and long periods of for- 
eign domination throughout its history because of its location at 
the crossroads of Europe and Asia and its relative weakness. Its 
territorial integrity often hinged on alliances with powerful states 
that were willing to protect it against the designs of others. Thus 
the development of military power to overcome chronic weakness 
and to underwrite national independence has been a constant theme 
in Romanian history. 

Defense of Romanian Lands in Ancient Times and the 
Middle Ages 

As early as 500 B.C., the Persians, Macedonians, and Romans 
threatened the Getae and Dacians, the two tribes from which 
modern Romanians descended (see Early History, from Prehistory 
to the Seventeenth Century, ch. 1). The Roman legions of Em- 
peror Trajan (A.D. 98-1 17) conquered much of the region in the 
early years of the second century and occupied it for almost two 
centuries. 

During the Middle Ages, the forebears of today's Romanians 
depended on the protection of a local military leader {voivode — see 
Glossary), who defended them in exchange for their allegiance and 
tribute. In times of danger, the free peasantry provided soldiers 
for local voivodes to command. The principalities of Moldavia and 
Walachia staved off the depredations of nomadic barbarians and 
avoided absorption by more powerful neighbors, but the Kingdom 
of Hungary and Hungarian noblemen ruled over the peasant 
descendants of the ancient Geto-Dacians in Transylvania and the 
Banat. All peoples of southeastern Europe, including the early 
Romanians, were soon subjected to several centuries of domina- 
tion by an external power. 

Ottoman Domination and the Struggle for National 
Unity and Independence 

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the lands of modern 
Romania became a battleground for Ottoman armies invading 
southeastern Europe and for local voivodes who resisted their in- 
cursions. Moldavia and Walachia succumbed and accepted rule 
by the Ottoman Empire despite some great victories won by their 
armies and voivodes such as Stephen the Great, Voivode of Mol- 
davia (1457-1504). Although Ottoman suzerainty proved to be 



252 



National Security 



relatively lenient, the sultans forbade the principalities to main- 
tain armies that could be used to fight for independence. Michael 
the Brave, prince of Walachia (1593-1601), defied them, briefly 
emancipated and united the principalities, and defeated Ottoman 
armies in 1596. But the latter reasserted control over the princi- 
palities and killed Michael in 1601. 

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the expanding Rus- 
sian and Habsburg, or Austro- Hungarian, empires began to con- 
test Ottoman domination of the Balkans and fought many battles 
against the Ottoman armies on the territory of Moldavia and 
Walachia. A Walachian voivode, Tudor Vladimirescu, led a brigade 
of 6,000 men fighting in tsarist ranks in the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1806-12. Vladimirescu received the Russian Order of St. 
Vladimir for his service. In 1821 he led a rebellion in Walachia 
against Ottoman rule. Tsar Alexander I, however, did not approve 
of his actions, and Vladimirescu fell out of favor with the Russian 
Empire. 

In 1848 Romanian nationalists formed an armed force to fight 
for the liberation and unification of the principalities into a modern 
state. Recognizing the challenge that this development implied, 
Russian and Habsburg armies invaded to forestall unification. The 
unsuccessful revolution of 1848 showed that there would not be 
a Romanian nation- state, independent of control by any empire, 
until the military power needed to defend it was established. 

Military Development under Alexandra loan Cuza 

Colonel Alexandru loan Cuza, a hero of 1848 who became prince 
of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia in 1859, 
emphasized the establishment of a large, modern army on the level 
of the major powers of Europe. He believed that the viability of 
the first autonomous Romanian state depended on strong armed 
forces, under national control, that were capable of deterring would- 
be invaders. He formed a Ministry of War and a general staff to 
administer and train the army of the United Principalities. 

Cuza established a working military relationship with France, 
which had a tremendous influence on the development of the 
modern Romanian army. In 1859 the French emperor, Napoleon 
III, sent a ten-year military mission of instructors and specialists 
to the United Principalities. They trained the first Romanian army 
and directed the construction of factories and foundries to manufac- 
ture arms, equipment, ordnance, and other war materiel. Napo- 
leon III accepted Moldavian and Walachian officers into French 
military academies at St. Cyr, Metz, Brest, and Saumur. Cuza 
also established programs of military cooperation with Belgium and 



253 



Romania: A Country Study 

Serbia, and these programs supplied the United Principalities with 
several types of armaments. Cuza sent military attaches to observe 
combat around the world, including the battles of the American 
Civil War. 

The Law on the Organization of the Army, drafted by Cuza 
and passed by the parliament of the United Principalities in 1864, 
established three major divisions at Bucharest, Ia§i, and Craiova; 
set up a regular standing army of 20,000 soldiers and territorial 
defense units with 25,000 reserves; and formed the first Romanian 
officer training college. Cuza's successor, a German prince, who 
ruled as Carol I (1866-1914), had served as an officer in the Prus- 
sian Army and experienced combat in Denmark in 1864. Carol 
I continued the military development initiated by Cuza; the army 
built by Cuza and Carol I played a decisive role in achieving full 
independence and sovereignty for Romania. 

War of Independence, 1877-78 

During the summer of 1877, Romanian soldiers guarded the 
650-kilometer Danube River boundary and engaged in artillery 
duels with Ottoman gunners until Russian armies could arrive and 
cross the river to confront Ottoman forces. An initial defeat at the 
village of Plevna, located in the territory of modern Bulgaria, 
obliged the Russians to ask Carol I to send his forces across the 
Danube. Carol mobilized 40,000 soldiers and ordered them into 
combat alongside battered tsarist armies at Plevna, Rahova, and 
Vidin in contemporary Bulgaria. They made a decisive contribu- 
tion to Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, there- 
by underpinning Romania's claim to national independence and 
sovereignty, which was officially recognized by the Congress of Ber- 
lin in 1878. 

The Romanian Army in World War I 

Prior to World War I, Carol I emphasized military ties with Ger- 
many and forced France to compete with Germany as a source of 
military assistance for, and influence on, the Romanian state. The 
sympathies of most Romanians, however, lay with France. In 1913 
Romania mobilized nearly 500,000 men against Bulgaria during 
the Second Balkan War and, at a decisive moment, marched vir- 
tually unopposed on the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. 

Although it sympathized with France, Britain, and Russia, 
Romania maintained an armed neutrality during the first two years 
of World War I. The warring alliances tried to induce Romania 
to enter the war on their side in return for territorial gain. The 
Central Powers offered Bukovina and Bessarabia, which would be 



254 



National Security 



carved out of tsarist Russia. The Triple Entente promised Roma- 
nia Transylvania, which would be detached from the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. 

Romania finally joined the Entente in August 1916 and fought 
alongside Russian armies on the eastern front. It mobilized ap- 
proximately 750,000 men against German and Austro-Hungarian 
soldiers in the northern Carpathian Mountains and against Ger- 
man and Bulgarian troops along its southern border. Romanian 
forces suffered a string of early and catastrophic defeats, and 
Bucharest was occupied in December 1916. The final blow to the 
Romanian effort in the war was the collapse of Russian armies in 
October 1917, which disrupted Romania's supply lines. As a result, 
Romania was obliged to sue for peace in December 1917. Roma- 
nia lost approximately 400,000 soldiers to combat wounds or dis- 
ease, as well as untold numbers of civilians. 

Although Romania was a defeated power, its French and Brit- 
ish allies eventually were victorious, and it reaped major territori- 
al gains as a result of the peace treaties that officially ended World 
War I. It received Transylvania from Austria-Hungary, Dobruja 
from Bulgaria, and Bukovina and Bessarabia from Soviet Russia 
(see fig. 1). These gains nearly doubled its size but also earned it 
the enmity of its immediate neighbors. 

Security During the Interwar Years and World War II 

Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia formed the Little En- 
tente under French influence during the interwar years to act as 
a counterweight against the possible resurgence of German influence 
in southeastern and central Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Romania continued to look to France to guarantee its security, at 
least until Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia's territorial 
integrity in the Munich Agreement of September 1938. After 
Munich, French guarantees meant little, and Romania accommo- 
dated the reality of German hegemony in the region. 

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 squeezed 
Romania between the territorial ambitions of Germany and the 
Soviet Union. Beginning in 1940, Germany forced Romania to 
cede territory to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union (see 
Greater Romania to the End of World War I, 1920-45, ch. 1). 
In September German forces occupied Romanian territory under 
the pretext of protecting the country's oil resources, access to which 
had already been secured in a 1939 commercial agreement. In 
November 1940, Romania joined Germany, Italy, and Japan in 
the Anti-Comintern Pact and became Hitler's base of operations 
to conquer the Balkans. 



255 



Romania: A Country Study 

On June 22, 1941, Romania's third and fourth armies, a total 
of thirty divisions, joined Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's attack 
on the Soviet Union. Its forces were by far the largest and possi- 
bly the best of the fifty divisions allied with the Wehrmacht (Ger- 
man armed forces) on the eastern front. Romania joined the war 
largely in the hope of regaining northern Bukovina and Bessara- 
bia, establishing a greater Romania at the Soviet Union's expense 
along the northern Black Sea coast, and also because it was simply 
too weak to resist Germany. 

The third and fourth armies fought at Odessa and Sevastopol 
but became bogged down with a German army group in front of 
Stalingrad in October 1942. In November the Red Army coun- 
teroffensive at Stalingrad focused on encircling the powerful Ger- 
man Sixth Army by striking its flanks held by the relatively weaker 
Romanian armies. Northeast of Stalingrad, three Soviet armies 
punched through the Romanian Third Army and its spearhead, 
the Romanian First Armored Division. Southwest of Stalingrad, 
two Soviet armies smashed the Sixth Corps and the Eighteenth In- 
fantry Division, the strongest elements of the Romanian Army. 
By November 23, the Soviet armies completed their encirclement 
of the German Sixth Army. In bearing the brunt of the Red Ar- 
my's breakthrough at Stalingrad, nineteen Romanian divisions were 
badly mauled, and more than 250,000 Romanian soldiers were 
killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action. In August 1943, 
the war reached Romanian soil dramatically: 178 B-24 bombers 
from the United States Army's eighth and ninth air forces con- 
ducted a bombing raid from North African airfields against the 
oil fields at Ploiesti, a major source of fuel for the Wehrmacht. The 
raid reduced Romanian oil production by half and destroyed much 
of the country's military industry. 

The Red Army refocused its strategic attention on Romania in 
mid- 1944. It sought to occupy Romania, knock it out of the war, 
and from there advance across the Danube Delta through the Car- 
pathian Mountains into Yugoslavia and Hungary before wheel- 
ing north to roll up the right flank of Nazi Germany. Having 
penetrated northern Bukovina at the end of 1943, the Red Army 
launched the Ia§i-Kishinev Operation in August 1944 by sending 
eight armies with more than 1 million men across the Prut River 
along two convergent axes from Ia§i and Kishinev in Bessarabia 
to drive through the Foc§ani Gap to capture the Ploiesd oil fields 
and Bucharest. Soviet armies driving from Kishinev pinned down 
the remnants of the German Sixth Army and seven divisions of 
Romania's Third Army on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the 
bulk of Soviet forces driving from Ia§i encircled the German Eighth 



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National Security 



Army and the remaining fourteen divisions of the Romanian Fourth 
Army. On the first day of the operation, Red Army forces de- 
stroyed five divisions of the Fourth Army in fighting northwest of 
Ia§i. Remaining Romanian divisions simply disintegrated as their 
troops deserted the front. 

After the August 23, 1944, coup d'etat against military dictator 
General Ion Antonescu, King Michael arranged Romania's sur- 
render to the Red Army. The following day, Hitler ordered 150 
German bombers to attack Bucharest in a vain attempt to force 
Romania to rejoin the war. Romania then declared war on Ger- 
many and put its scattered forces under the command of the Red 
Army. These forces included parts of the Fourth Army; the four 
divisions of the First Army, which guarded the disputed Romanian- 
Hungarian border during the war; and the Tudor Vladimirescu 
First Volunteer Division, a force recruited by the Red Army from 
Romanian prisoners of war taken at Stalingrad who were willing 
to submit to communist indoctrination. These forces helped to liber- 
ate Bucharest and clear German forces from the rest of Romania, 
and they finished the war fighting alongside the Red Army in Hun- 
gary and Czechoslovakia. In all, Romania suffered an estimated 
600,000 casualties during World War II. 

Under the terms of the September 1944 armistice signed in 
Moscow, Romania accepted Red Army occupation of the country 
at least until peace negotiations commenced, agreed to pay US$300 
million in war reparations, and put its oil production, rolling stock, 
and merchant fleet at the Soviet Union's disposal. Given the situ- 
ation on the ground, the Soviet Union dominated the Allied Con- 
trol Commission, which administered Romania for three years after 
the war. The Soviet Union also retained the right to maintain its 
occupation of Romania in order to keep open its lines of commu- 
nication to Soviet forces occupying Austria. Under the 1947 peace 
treaty, Romania permanently surrendered large tracts to Bulgar- 
ia and the Soviet Union (see Armistice Negotiations and Soviet 
Occupation, ch. 1). 

Development of the Romanian Armed Forces after World War II 

The Soviet occupation of Romania made the Red Army the 
predominant external influence on the development of the Roma- 
nian armed forces after 1945, especially after the communists seized 
power in 1947. After the war, obviously pro-German elements were 
purged from Romania's armed forces under Red Army supervi- 
sion. Meanwhile, a second division of former Romanian prisoners 
of war that was organized and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union 
entered in late 1945 to join the Tudor Vladimirescu First Volunteer 



257 



Romania: A Country Study 

Division as the nucleus of the new Romanian Army under Soviet 
control. Once the communist regime took power, fully 30 percent 
of the Romanian officers and noncommissioned officers were purged 
from the ranks. They represented Romania's most experienced sold- 
iers and the greatest source of opposition to the increasing Sovietiza- 
tion of the Romanian Army. The Romanian military establishment 
was reorganized according to the Soviet model. Soviet officers served 
as advisers to Romanian units down to the regimental level, and 
large numbers of Romanian officers went to the Soviet Union to 
receive education and training. 

Emil Bodnara§, a member of the PCR Politburo who was in ex- 
ile in Moscow during the war and had returned to Romania with 
the Red Army in 1944, became the first postwar minister of na- 
tional defense in 1947. In many cases, trusted party functionaries 
were simply assigned appropriate military ranks and appointed to 
crucial posts in the armed forces. Political loyalty to the PCR served 
as a more important selection criterion than did professional mili- 
tary competence or experience. The party closely monitored the 
political attitudes of officers who were not members of the PCR. 

When the PCR was firmly in control of the country and Roma- 
nia securely within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union was will- 
ing to withdraw its occupation forces, which happened in May 1958. 
By the mid-1960s, however, the Ceau§escu regime had begun to 
de-Sovietize the armed forces, to reemphasize Romanian military 
traditions, and to carve out an autonomous position within the 
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, was the watershed 
event in postwar Romanian military development. 

Military Doctrine and Strategy 

In 1989 Romania had a military doctrine unique within the War- 
saw Pact, a doctrine that had emerged during the two decades fol- 
lowing the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Unlike 
the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member states, it did not sub- 
scribe to the alliance's joint military doctrine devised by the Soviet 
Union. Romania's political leadership developed a military doc- 
trine based on the country's experience in interstate relations as 
well as its own interest in maintaining power. Ceausescu was in- 
creasingly identified as the founder of Romanian military doctrine 
and came to be linked to legendary Romanian military heroes and 
leaders such as Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave. 

Evolution of Military Doctrine 

Because historically its enemies had had tremendous numerical 



258 



National Security 



and technological superiority, Romania had succumbed to them 
despite occasional periods of rebellion and armed resistance. Ex- 
periences as the ally of Russia in World War I, Nazi Germany 
in World War II, and the Soviet Union afterward had taught Roma- 
nia, however, that allowing a stronger country to dictate its politi- 
cal and military course could lead to ruin and loss of sovereignty. 
In the wake of the Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia in 
1968, Ceau§escu deviated from standard Warsaw Pact doctrine and 
promulgated a distinct national military doctrine for Romania. 
Known as "War of the Entire People" (Lupta Intregului Popor), 
this doctrine was largely a reaction to the failure of Czechoslovak- 
ia to resist the Soviet-led invasion. Its basic premise was that the 
people would resist with all means at their disposal any "imperi- 
alist" incursion into Romania and would defend the nation's 
sovereignty, independence, and socialism (see Glossary). Thus, War 
of the Entire People implied defense not only of the nation but also 
of Romania's particular style of socialism and the political power 
of the PCR hierarchy that controls it. 

War of the Entire People defmed imperialism in an omnidirec- 
tional sense as the greatest threat to Romania. Any nation, whether 
a capitalist North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country 
or an erstwhile socialist Warsaw Pact ally that sought to dominate 
Romania militarily, constituted an imperialist threat. Although left 
unstated, in the context of the time, the clearest threat was a Soviet 
or Warsaw Pact intervention in Romania similar to what occurred 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

The Law on National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Roma- 
nia, passed by the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1972, codi- 
fied and further elaborated War of the Entire People. The law stated 
that Romania would declare war only to defend itself or a Warsaw 
Pact ally against external aggression. The 1972 law also made ac- 
ceptance of surrender, cession, or occupation of national territory 
an illegal act. It made GNA approval a requirement for the entry 
of foreign troops into Romania and declared that Romania's armed 
forces may respond only to orders or directives issued by the coun- 
try's national command authority. These provisions were designed 
to prevent the Soviet Union from disrupting national resistance 
to an invasion of Romania or justifying an invasion by installing 
a compliant faction of the PCR to request and legitimize the Soviet 
Union's "fraternal assistance" or intervention. 

War of the Entire People mandated a system of national territorial 
defense modeled on that of Yugoslavia and called for mobiliz- 
ing all of the country's human and material resources to mount 
continuous resistance against any aggressor, invader, or occupier 



259 



Romania: A Country Study 

until Romania was liberated. Thus the regular armed forces ceased 
to be the exclusive focus of military doctrine. The Patriotic Guards 
were established and received great attention and considerable 
resources (see Reserves and Mobilization, this ch.). To explain the 
relationship of the regular army and the irregular Patriotic Guards, 
Romanian military historians began writing about the role of peasant 
masses in rising up to join princes, nobles, and the professional war- 
rior caste to defend the Romanian lands against invasions during the 
Middle Ages. 

Military Strategy 

According to the assumptions explicit in its military doctrine since 
1968, Romania's greatest likelihood of future military conflict is 
a defensive war fought on its territory against a more powerful ag- 
gressor. Thus, Romania's strategy aims at victory achieved not 
through a military defeat of an invading enemy, but through mas- 
sive, prolonged resistance that denies an enemy the possibility of 
a rapid, successful military operation against Romania. During a 
protracted war of attrition against a foreign occupation, Romania 
would seek international sympathy and support for its struggle to 
throw off its invader. Strategists hoped that the aggressor would 
suffer international political opprobrium outweighing any conceiv- 
able strategic benefit of a continued occupation. Meanwhile, Roma- 
nians would drain the morale of occupying forces through con- 
stant harassing actions. As a result, an invader would eventually 
withdraw or retreat from Romania to cut its political and military 
losses. 

To execute this strategic concept, Romania's political and mili- 
tary leaders have developed a particular type of military organiza- 
tion and tactics. A strategy of prolonged resistance against invading 
forces depends on the ability of the relatively small regular armed 
forces to slow an advancing enemy and to provide time for paramili- 
tary units to mobilize. Although the latter' s effectiveness in com- 
bat is uncertain, Romanian experts assert that one- third of the 
country's population can be put under arms in a national emer- 
gency and that it would require an army of 1 million men to main- 
tain an occupation of Romania, much less to pacify it. Romania's 
leaders have elaborated the basic operational and tactical princi- 
ples that underlie this strategy. Foremost among them, Romania 
would fight a more powerful invader on terms that would neutral- 
ize the latter' s numerical and technological superiority. It would 
avoid large batdes between its ground forces and the enemy in favor 
of small-unit attacks on an invading army in areas where it is un- 
able to deploy large forces. 



260 



Soldiers at Lake Herastrau 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



Romania placed confidence in its ability to choose propitious times 
and favorable terrain for batde. The use of surprise and night at- 
tacks would help the paramilitary forces offset the preponderance 
of a conventional occupation army. Familiarity with the country's 
rugged terrain would also favor Romanian defenders. The narrow 
valleys of the Carpathian Mountains and Transylvanian Alps, which 
cut through the center of Romania, could serve as a formidable base 
of operations for protracted guerrilla warfare against an invader. 
Finally, Romanian doctrine calls for the local population to follow 
a "scorched earth" policy throughout the countryside along the ene- 
my's invasion route to deny it sources of supply and to complicate 
its logistical support of an extended occupation of Romania. 

Arms Control 

In 1989 Romania viewed arms control as an element of its mili- 
tary doctrine and strategy that had the potential to promote its na- 
tional security. It was the most vocal Eastern European proponent 
of a general military disengagement in Europe, maintaining that 
general reductions in armaments and military activities by NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact would minimize the threat of a general Euro- 
pean conflict. In 1985 Romania repeated its previous calls for the 
establishment of a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone in the 
Balkans. 



261 



Romania: A Country Study 

Romania adopted positions on arms control issues that would 
reduce the ability of its Warsaw Pact allies to intervene in its in- 
ternal affairs. It urged that NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dis- 
solved simultaneously. It called for the United States and the Soviet 
Union to cease maintaining bases or troops on the territory of al- 
lied countries, declaring that they constitute a violation of the host 
country's sovereignty and provide opportunities for external pres- 
sure on the host government. 

Romania strongly advocated, and benefited from, the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
signed in Helsinki in 1975. The confidence-building measures con- 
tained in the Final Act stipulate that when a signatory nation con- 
ducts large-scale maneuvers, involving 30,000 or more troops within 
300 kilometers of international boundaries, it should give neigh- 
boring states prior notice of the size and geographic area of the 
exercise. This provision made it more difficult to use maneuvers 
as a pretext to mobilize for an invasion of another country. Thus, 
the Helsinki Final Act complicated possible Soviet military action 
against Romania. 

Armed Forces 

In 1989 Romania maintained 180,000 men in its armed forces, 
or about 1 soldier for every 128 citizens — the second lowest ratio 
of regular military personnel to population in the Warsaw Pact. 
It compensated for this small regular force by maintaining large 
reserve and paramilitary formations. 

Command and Control of the Armed Forces 

In 1989 Romania had a well-developed centralized system for 
administering and directing its armed forces. The government had 
nominal responsibility for the armed forces, but the PCR hierar- 
chy exercised real authority. As PCR general secretary and chief 
of state, Ceau§escu also held the powerful positions of supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces and chairman of the Defense Council. 

Yet there have been periodic indications of friction between the 
professional military and the Ceau§escu regime. During the 1970s 
and early 1980s, Ceausescu had legitimate reasons to be concerned 
about the potential for a pro-Soviet military coup d'etat. His poli- 
cy of remaining independent of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact made him more dependent on the loyalty and reliability of 
the armed forces to maintain his political power than was the case 
in other communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which could rely 
on Soviet intervention to preserve their rule against domestic 
challenges. 



262 



National Security 



Government and Party Organization for Defense 

The GNA had constitutional responsibility for national securi- 
ty and the authority to declare war or a national emergency, to 
order mobilization, to ratify an armistice or peace treaty, to ap- 
point the supreme commander of the armed forces, and to award 
the ranks of marshal, general, and admiral. When the GNA was 
not in session, however, the Council of State assumed these pow- 
ers and Ceau§escu, as chairman of the latter, wielded these pow- 
ers effectively. The small circle of Ceau§escu, his family, and his 
closest political associates exercised real national security and defense 
policy-making authority, requesting and using expert advice as they 
deemed necessary. 

Composed of party and state officials, the Defense Council ex- 
amined and coordinated all problems related to national security, 
including both external defense and internal security. It provided 
strategic direction to the armed forces, supervised military-related 
industries, and made national military and economic mobilization 
plans to be executed by the Council of State. In addition to Ceau§es- 
cu, the Defense Council also included the prime minister, minister 
of national defense, chief of the Higher Political Council of the 
Army, chief of staff of the Patriotic Guards, minister of interior, 
minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the State Planning Com- 
mittee. The chief of the General Staff of the armed forces served 
as secretary to the Defense Council. Theoretically responsible to 
the GNA and the Council of State, the Defense Council directly 
advised Ceau§escu on national security and defense issues. 

The Defense Council structure also existed at lower adminis- 
trative levels. Local party first secretaries chaired defense councils 
in the forty judeje (counties) and some larger municipalities. Other 
members included the local people's council secretary, commander 
of the nearest military garrison, his political deputy, chief of staff 
of the Patriotic Guards for the area, head of the local Ministry of 
Interior office, Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului 
Comunist — UTC) officials, and directors of major economic en- 
terprises in the area. In peacetime local defense councils had respon- 
sibility for organizing all resources and productive capacity under 
their authority, for making local mobilization plans to fulfill 
national defense requirements, and for operating the military 
conscription system. In wartime they were charged with maintain- 
ing uninterrupted, or restoring disrupted, militarily essential 
production. 

In contrast to the policy-making authority and strategic control 
exercised by the PCR hierarchy and the Defense Council, the 



263 



Romania: A Country Study 



GENERAL 
SECRETARY 






GRAND NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY 










1 






CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE 




DEFENSE 
COUNCIL 






COUNCIL OF 
STATE 











SECRETARY FOR 
MILITARY AND 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 



MINISTRY OF 
NATIONAL DEFENSE 



COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS 



HIGHER POLITICAL COUNCIL 
OF THE ARMY 



DIRECTORATE FOR PATRIOTIC GUARDS 



DIRECTORATE FOR MILITARY JUSTICE 
DIRECTORATE FOR TRAINING 



DIRECTORATE FOR REAR SERVICES 



DIRECTORATE FOR MILITARY PUBLISHING 



GENERAL STAFF 



DIRECTORATE FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 



DIRECTORATE FOR ARMS PRODUCTION 



DIRECTORATE FOR COMMUNICATIONS 



CENTER FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH 
IN MILITARY HISTORY AND THEORY 



GROUND FORCES 



NAVAL FORCES 



BORDER GUARDS 



Figure 6. Government and Party Organization for Defense, 1988 



Ministry of National Defense had day-to-day administrative 
authority over the armed forces in peacetime and was responsible 
for implementing PCR policies within them. In peacetime the 
general staff made provisional strategic and operational plans, based 
on general guidance from the Defense Council, coordinated the 
actions of the armed services, and exercised operational and tacti- 
cal control of the armed forces as a whole. 

The Ministry of National Defense comprised several directorates 
and other organizations (see fig. 6). The Directorate for Military 
Intelligence (Direcjia de Informajii a Armatei — DIA) provided the 
General Staff with assessments of the strategic intentions of the 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and monitored indications and 
warnings of imminent hostilities against Romania. The Directorate 
for Military Publishing operated the Military Publishing House 
and published the monthly armed forces journal Via$a Militara (Mili- 
tary Life) and the daily military newspaper Apararea Patrei (Defense 



264 



National Security 



of the Homeland). Several directorates of the Ministry of Nation- 
al Defense had extensive interconnections with civilian ministries, 
especially ones that supplied the armed forces materiel, armaments, 
and logistical support. For example, in 1989 a Romanian admiral 
headed the Department of Naval Transportation within the civilian 
Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications. In wartime 
other important ministries like it would be subordinated to the 
Ministry of National Defense. The Higher Political Council of the 
Army enjoyed a unique, somewhat autonomous status within the 
Ministry of National Defense. It operated as part of the latter but 
was subordinate to the PCR Central Committee. The Center for 
Studies and Research in Military History and Theory examined 
Romania's military experience as an input to the formulation of 
strategic and operational plans by the general staff. 

Party Control of the Military 

Of all national institutions, in 1989 only the armed forces were 
potentially strong and organized enough to challenge PCR rule. 
For that reason, the Ceaugescu regime tightly controlled the mili- 
tary establishment by maintaining a PCR apparatus within it, co- 
opting the highest-ranking officers, manipulating promotions and 
appointments, and allowing the internal security service to oper- 
ate within the armed forces. Ceau§escu and the PCR exerted their 
control over the military through the Higher Political Council of 
the Army, the party's military branch. Ceau§escu himself was given 
general officer rank and served as the highest party representative 
in the armed forces when he headed the Higher Political Council 
of the Army's forerunner between 1950 and 1954. 

The Higher Political Council of the Army conducted political 
education within the military, supervised a huge network of polit- 
ical officers from the highest command echelon to company- sized 
units, reviewed promotions and other personnel matters, and moni- 
tored and reported on the political reliability and loyalty of mili- 
tary personnel to the Ceausescu regime. Its political indoctrination 
program was founded on socialist and nationalist ideologies and 
emphasized the leading role of Ceau§escu and the PCR in society 
and the economy. It conspicuously lacked the pro-Soviet sentiment 
and ' 'socialist internationalism" characteristic of indoctrination in 
the other Warsaw Pact countries. In 1989 approximately 90 per- 
cent of all soldiers and sailors were PCR or UTC members. Vir- 
tually all officers were PCR members, and usually only PCR 
members were eligible for promotions to higher ranks. Officers were 
subject to party discipline outside the military chain of command. 



265 



Romania: A Country Study 

Thus the PCR had the power to remove officers of all ranks on 
political grounds. 

In addition to using formal party mechanisms, Ceausescu 
exercised other means of control over the armed forces. Many 
high-ranking officers were fully integrated into party and state 
policy-making bodies and enjoyed considerable privilege and sta- 
tus because of their positions. In 1989 three general officers, Ion 
Dinca, Ion Coman, and former Minister of National Defense Con- 
stantin Olteanu were full or alternate members of the PCR Politi- 
cal Executive Committee (Polexco). Dinca was also one of three 
first deputy prime ministers. Coman was the PCR Central Com- 
mittee secretary for military and security affairs. The minister of 
national defense was usually a full PCR Central Committee mem- 
ber when he occupied his post and then received a promotion to 
the Polexco. Olteanu became minister of national defense in 1980 
and a Polexco member in 1983. Vasile Milea became minister of 
national defense in 1985 but had not achieved Polexco membership 
as of mid- 1989. During the 1980s, military representation in the 
PCR Central Committee dropped from more than 4 percent of the 
membership to about 2 percent. In addition to the minister of na- 
tional defense, the chief of the general staff, the chief of the Higher 
Political Council of the Army, and the commanders of the armed 
services and army corps were also Central Committee members. 

The domestic security service, the Department of State Securi- 
ty (Departamentul Securitajii Statului — Securitate), thoroughly 
penetrated the country's armed forces and had informants in place 
at all levels to monitor the loyalty of military personnel to the PCR 
and to Ceau§escu personally. One of its directorates had responsi- 
bility for counterespionage within the armed forces. The Ceauses- 
cu regime's major concern was the degree of Soviet influence within 
the professional officer corps. The Soviets reportedly had tried to 
exploit their traditionally strong ties with the officer corps to pres- 
sure Ceau§escu. Some observers believed that the Soviet Union 
might lend its support to a military coup d'etat in the expectation 
that Romania would become a more compliant ally under differ- 
ent leadership. 

Ceau§escu and the Military 

The armed forces, which had a history of intervention in polit- 
ics before the advent of communist power, have been the only plau- 
sible threat to Ceau§escu's rule since the late 1960s. He has 
frequently rotated cadres within the Ministry of National Defense 
and the top military command positions to prevent the emergence 
of strong, politically independent military leaders. And he has 



266 




Casa Centrala a Armatei (Central Army House), Bucharest 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 

unceremoniously fired senior officers and promoted ambitious 
lower- ranking officers to higher posts, thereby using his patronage 
to command their loyalty. 

In 1971 forty general staff officers were purged and arrested, 
conceivably for plotting to overthrow Ceau§escu. In May 1974, 
Ceau§escu unexpectedly purged five senior commanders and in 
1976 suddenly dismissed General Ion Ionita, his long-time politi- 
cal ally. Rumors of anti-Ceausescu conspiracies or attempted revolts 
within the military circulated freely in Romania in the 1980s. In 
1983 an abortive military coup d'etat was reportedly crushed and 
twelve officers were executed for plotting it. Ceau§escu then made 
his brother Hie a lieutenant general and appointed him deputy 
minister of national defense and chief of the Higher Political Council 
of the Army to increase his control of the armed forces. Later in 
1983, Ceau§escu spent considerable energy visiting military units, 
apparently in an effort to reaffirm his credentials as supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces. Ceau§escu's handling of this alleged 
revolt amply demonstrated his mastery of the mechanisms of party 
and personal control over the armed forces, which has enabled him 
to eliminate potential threats before they become organized 
challenges. 

Whether rumored military revolts were confirmed or not, the 
professional military had real grievances with the PCR and the 



267 



Romania: A Country Study 

Ceau§escu regime. Many of Ceau§escu's military policies con- 
tradicted some basic interests of the officer corps, diminished its 
professional status, and served as potential sources of political and 
military friction. Some officers opposed Ceau§escu's policy of con- 
frontation with the Soviet Union because it denied the armed forces 
access to more sophisticated Soviet weapons and equipment as well 
as military assistance. Romanian officers might have been willing 
to accept a less independent military policy in return for a larger 
supply of higher-quality arms from the Soviet Union. The officer 
corps probably chafed at Ceau§escu's reductions in the country's 
defense budget as well as the extensive use of armed forces per- 
sonnel in domestic construction projects, which had a negative im- 
pact on military training and readiness. Ceau§escu's habit of 
manipulating high-level military promotions to further his politi- 
cal interests and suddenly dismissing top military commanders also 
annoyed professional officers. 

The importance ascribed to the Patriotic Guards in Romania's 
military doctrine and strategy served to undermine the prestige and 
professional autonomy of the regular armed forces. With its em- 
phasis on the employment of irregular paramilitary and guerrilla 
detachments, War of the Entire People required the Ministry of 
National Defense to cooperate closely with the Patriotic Guards 
and supply them with equipment. The latter' s requirement for rela- 
tively large quantities of low- technology, low-cost arms conflicted 
with the former's desire for smaller numbers of more advanced 
weapons and equipment. Although the Ministry of National 
Defense had to share its budget and resources with the Patriotic 
Guards, it exercised less than full control over them. The consider- 
able independence of the Patriotic Guards led Western analysts 
to conclude that they were established, at least partially, to serve 
as a rival armed force counterbalancing the regular armed forces. 

Armed Services 

Professional officers have stressed that, despite the emphasis 
placed on Romania's irregular or paramilitary units, only the tradi- 
tional armed services are trained and equipped to fulfill the full 
range of military missions. In 1989 the ground forces remained 
the largest, most important, and most influential armed service. 
However, the air and naval forces had steadily developed and in- 
creased in importance to Romania's military strategy during the 
preceding two decades. 

Ground Forces 

In 1989 the ground forces numbered 140,000 men, of whom 



268 



National Security 



two-thirds were conscripted soldiers. The country was divided into 
Cluj, Bacau, and Bucharest military regions in the west, east, and 
south, respectively (see fig. 7). In wartime the ground forces in 
each military region would become an army corps with their head- 
quarters in Cluj-Napoca, Ia§i, and Bucharest. The ground forces 
consisted of eight motorized rifle (infantry) divisions, two tank di- 
visions, four mountain infantry brigades, and four airborne regi- 
ments. Motorized rifle divisions were organized along the Soviet 
model with three motorized rifle regiments, one tank regiment, 
and a full complement of 12,000 infantry soldiers (see fig. 8). They 
were mechanized to a considerable extent, operating more than 
3,000 BTR-50, BTR-60, TAB-2, and TAB-77 armored person- 
nel carriers and more than 400 BRDM-1, BRDM-2, and TAB- 
C armored reconnaissance vehicles. Tank divisions had three tank 
regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, and 10,000 men. Tank 
divisions operated more than 800 T-54 and T-55, 350 M-77, and 
30 T-72 tanks. 

The artillery, antitank, and air defense regiments of ground forces 
divisions provided specialized fire support that enabled motorized 
rifle and tank regiments to maneuver. In 1989 the artillery regi- 
ments of motorized rifle and tank divisions included two artillery 
battalions, one multiple rocket launcher battalion, and one surface- 
to-surface missile battalion. Romania's artillery units operated 
nearly 1,000 Soviet-designed towed artillery pieces with calibers 
ranging from 76 to 152 millimeters, approximately 175 SU-100 
self-propelled assault guns, and more than 325 multiple rock- 
et launchers, including the 122mm truck-mounted BM-21 and 
130mm M-51. Surface-to-surface missile battalions were divided 
into three or four batteries, each equipped with one missile launcher. 
They operated thirty FROG-3 and eighteen SCUD missile launch- 
ers. The FROG-3, a tactical missile first introduced in 1960, was 
being replaced in other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. Proven 
to be fairly inaccurate in combat, FROG and SCUD missiles would 
be ineffective weapons carrying conventional high-explosive war- 
heads. Tipped with nuclear or chemical warheads, however, they 
could be devastating. According to one former Romanian official 
writing in 1988, Romania produced chemical agents that could be 
delivered by battlefield missiles. 

Antitank regiments were equipped with Soviet-made 73mm, 
76mm, and 82mm recoilless rifles, 57mm antitank guns, and 
AT- 1 /SNAPPER and AT-3/S AGGER antitank guided missiles 
(ATGM). Whereas the AT- 1 /SNAPPER was primarily a shoulder- 
fired weapon, more advanced AT-3/SAGGER ATGMs were 
mounted on BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles. 



269 



Romania: A Country Study 



Bouncfaf y representation 

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HUNGARY f 



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^ Cluj-Napoca m |^^| 

_ ? Mure? [q] 



Bacau* 



SOVIET 
UNION 

P V' v 



10th # ' 

last ' i 



Timisoara 



Brasov 



Curtea de 
Arge$ 



Craiova 



C 2nd 



Bucharest 

Giurgiu < 



A 




YUGOSLAVIA S 



^BULGARIA 



| 



Military region 
headquarters 
Motorized rifle 
division 



— • • — International boundary 
® National capital 
• Military deployment 



O | Tank division 

Mountain infantry 
- brigade 

|^^| Airborne regiment 



center 
Naval base 

100 Kilometers 



Figure 7. Major Military Installations, 1989 



Air defense regiments provided motorized rifle and tank divi- 
sions with mobile protection against enemy air attack. They con- 
sisted of two antiaircraft artillery battalions and one surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) battalion, each composed of several batteries. Air 
defense regiments were equipped with medium-range SA-6 SAM 
launcher vehicles, shoulder-fired short-range SA-7 missiles, and 
more than 500 30mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm antiair- 
craft guns. Romania's mountain infantry and airborne units are 
noteworthy. Approximately 30 percent of the country's terrain is 
mountainous; therefore, these units can be employed to great ef- 
fect. Transported by helicopters, which Romania began manufac- 
turing in the mid-1970s, the mountain units are highly mobile. 

Air Force 

In 1989 the Romanian Air Force had approximately 32,000 per- 
sonnel and, because of the high technical qualifications required 



270 



National Security 



of them, less than one-third were conscripts. The air force operat- 
ed more than 350, mostly Soviet-built, combat aircraft. It also had 
responsibility for transport, reconnaissance, and rotary wing air- 
craft as well as the national air defense system. The air force's 
primary mission was to protect and support the ground forces in 
defending the country against invasion. It also had a major role 
in operating, maintaining, and supplying trained personnel for the 
national airline TAROM. 

The air force was divided into three tactical air divisions. Each 
air division had two regiments with two or three squadrons of in- 
terceptor and one squadron of ground attack aircraft as well as sup- 
porting transport, reconnaissance, and helicopter elements (see fig. 
9). With a few notable exceptions, most aircraft in the Romanian 
order of battle were designed and produced in the Soviet Union. 
The air force had fifteen interceptor squadrons, three with fifteen 
MiG-23 fighters each and twelve with similar numbers of MiG-21 
fighters. Romania received its first MiG-23s from the Soviet 
Union in the early 1980s, nearly ten years after the plane entered 
service in Soviet and some other Warsaw Pact air forces. Soviet 
allies in Third World countries such as Syria, Libya, and Iraq had 
the MiG-23 in their inventories before Romania did. Romanian 
fighters carried the 1960s-era Soviet AA-2/ATOLL air-to-air mis- 
sile. The air force had six ground attack squadrons operating eighty- 
five 1950s-era MiG-17 aircraft made in the 1950s, which had been 
modified and transferred from duty as interceptors when Roma- 
nia acquired the MiG-21, and thirty-five Romanian-built IAR-93 
Orao ground-attack fighters. In 1989 the air force had an addi- 
tional 125 Orao close air-support aircraft on order. 

Transport, reconnaissance, and helicopter squadrons support- 
ed the ground forces by airlifting ground forces units, collecting 
intelligence on the composition and disposition of hostile forces, 
and conducting medical evacuation, mobile command, and utili- 
ty functions. In 1989 Romania had eleven An-24, eight An-26 (both 
smaller than the United States C-130 transport), and several other 
Soviet transport aircraft, as well as four Polish Li- 2 and two 
American-made Boeing 707 transports. Using its total lift capa- 
bility, however, it could transport only the men and equipment 
of one airborne battalion. Reconnaissance squadrons operated 
twenty Soviet 11-28 aircraft built in the 1950s. Helicopter squadrons 
operated fifty-five IAR-316B Allouette III and forty IAR-330 Puma 
helicopters produced in Romania under French license and twenty- 
five Soviet Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. Helicopter squadrons direcdy 
supported the ground forces by providing enhanced mobility and 
fire power for small units. The air force had a large pilot training 



271 



Romania: A Country Study 



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272 



National Security 



program, which reflected an apparent intention to develop increased 
capabilities. In 1989 it had sixty Czechoslovak-produced L-29 and 
L-39 jet training aircraft, twenty older Soviet MiG-15 trainers, 
and a small but growing inventory of Romanian-built trainers. 

The fourteen interceptor squadrons of the air force were the first 
line of defense in the country's air defense system. The air force 
also controlled the ground-based air defense network of 135 SA-2 
surface-to-air missiles, early warning radar, and command, con- 
trol, and communications equipment dispersed among twenty sites 
around the country. The national military command authority in 
Bucharest and in the country's oil-producing region around Ploiesti 
were the areas best protected against air attack. In 1989 Romania 
still depended on the Soviet Union to supply all of its air defense 
weapons and equipment. 

Naval Forces 

In 1989 the Romanian Navy had more than 7,500 sailors, or- 
ganized into a Black Sea Fleet, the Danube Squadron, and the 
shore-based Coastal Defense. It had the mission of defending the 
country's coastlines against enemy naval bombardments and am- 
phibious assaults, or at least blunting them. All sailors were trained 
to use infantry weapons and tactics to fight in a land war, in the 
likely event that the Romanian Navy would be neutralized in a 
surface engagement with a more powerful naval force. Its major 
naval bases and shipyards were the Black Sea ports of Mangalia 
and Constanja. It also made use of Danube River anchorages at 
Braila, Giurgiu, Sulina, Galaji, and Tulcea. The Romanian naval 
order-of-battle included several minor surface combatants and larger 
numbers of fast-attack craft and patrol boats. Beginning in the early 
1980s, Romania placed greater resources into its naval construc- 
tion program and built new patrol boats, frigates, and even des- 
troyers using Chinese and Soviet designs. This increased production 
may have been intended to increase Romania's export sales. In 
1986 Romania took delivery of a Soviet Kilo-class diesel subma- 
rine, and it was speculated that additional units could be received 
in subsequent years. 

In 1985 Romania commissioned its first large surface unit, a 
6,000-ton guided missile destroyer, the Muntenia, built in the 
Mangalia shipyard. The Muntenia was based on the design of the 
1960s-era Soviet Kashin-class destroyers. Its weapons were almost 
exclusively of Soviet manufacture. Muntenia had four dual SS- 
N-2C/STYX antiship missile launchers and one dual SA-N-4 
surface-to-air missile launcher. It was equipped with 100mm guns, 
two torpedo tubes, and a helicopter deck that could shelter two 



273 



Romania: A Country Study 



HEADQUARTERS 



AIR DIVISION 
STAFF 



AIR REGIMENT 



FIGHTER/GROUND FIGHTER/INTERCEPTOR 
ATTACK SQUADRON SQUADRONS 



RECONNAISSANCE 
SQUADRON 



AIR REGIMENT 



FIGHTER/GROUND 
ATTACK SQUADRON 



FIGHTER/INTERCEPTOR 
SQUADRONS 



TRANSPORT 
SQUADRON 



HELICOPTER 
SQUADRON 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1988-89, London, 1988, 52-53. 



Figure 9. Organization of a Romanian Air Force Division, 1987 

IAR-316B Alouette III antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. 
In 1989 a second unit of the same type as the Muntenia was under 
construction. Between 1983 and 1985, Romania built three 1,900- 
ton Tetal-class frigates using the 1970s-era Soviet Koni-class as a 
model. Equipped with a dual 76mm gun, antiaircraft guns, four 
torpedo tubes, and two ASW rocket launchers, these frigates could 
be used as submarine chasers or maritime escorts. A fourth Tetal 
unit was under construction in 1989. For logistical support, the navy 
operated two 3,500-ton Croitor-class combatant tenders. Modeled 
on the Soviet Don-class, they had four dual SA-N-5 surface-to-air 
missile launchers, one dual 57mm gun, antiaircraft guns, and a 
helicopter deck. These ships also went to sea in the early 1980s. 

In 1989 the Romanian Navy operated the following ships: three 
400-ton Poti-class ASW corvettes armed with two twin 57mm gun 
turrets, four torpedo tubes, and two ASW rocket launchers (ob- 
tained from the Soviet Union in 1970); three 300-ton Kronshtadt- 
class ASW corvettes equipped with various guns and depth charges 
(received from the Soviet Union in 1956); six Osa I-class fast at- 
tack craft (missile) carrying four SS-N-2A/STYX antiship mis- 
sile launchers and antiaircraft guns (transferred from the Soviet 



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National Security 



Union in the 1960s); twenty-two 40-ton Huchuan-class hydrofoil 
fast attack craft (torpedo) armed with two torpedo tubes and an- 
tiaircraft guns (the first three units were delivered from China in 
1973); twelve 200-ton Romanian-built Epitrop-class fast attack craft, 
which mounted four torpedo tubes and antiaircraft guns on an Osa- 
class hull; twenty-five Shanghai II-class fast attack craft (gun) 
(received from China beginning in 1977); two 1,500-ton Cosar- 
class minelayers armed with 57mm guns (built in Romania dur- 
ing the early 1980s); and four modernized Democratia-class coastal 
minesweepers (built in the 1950s in the German Democratic 
Republic — East Germany). 

Coastal Defense was the shore-based component of defense 
against attack from the Black Sea. Headquartered at Constanta, 
the 2,000-man Coastal Defense regiment operated in several sec- 
tors along Romania's 245-kilometer coastline and was organized 
into ten artillery batteries with 130mm, 150mm, and 152mm guns, 
three antiship missile batteries with SSC-2B/SAMLET launchers, 
and eight batteries of antiaircraft artillery. 

The Danube Squadron included eighteen 85-ton VB-class river- 
ine patrol boats, armed with 85mm main guns, 81mm mortars, 
and antiaircraft guns, eight 40-ton VG-class boats, and twenty- 
five VD-class inshore minesweeping boats. It also operated sever- 
al units of the 400- ton Brutar-class armored boat, equipped with 
a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher and a 100mm gun mounted in 
a tank turret. The Danube Squadron's mission was to defeat hostile 
ground forces attempting to ford the Danube River and to ensure 
the river's availability as a line of communication. 

Border Guards 

In 1989 the Border Guards were a separate, smaller armed service 
equal in standing to the other three services and also subordinate 
to the Ministry of National Defense. With a force of 20,000 sol- 
diers, the Border Guards had the mission of defending Romania's 
nearly 3,200-kilometer border with Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugosla- 
via, and the Soviet Union and preventing Romanians from leav- 
ing the country illegally. 

The Border Guards were organized into twelve brigades and were 
equipped essentially in the same way as the motorized infantry 
troops. These brigades were responsible for thirty-two-kilometer- 
wide border sectors of varying lengths depending on the difficulty 
of the terrain in their area of operation. They staffed watch tow- 
ers, patrolled fences and well-lit border strips, and maintained elec- 
tronic sensors and surveillance systems along the border. Approxi- 
mately 600 Romanian Navy sailors functioned as the maritime 



275 



Romania: A Country Study 

component of the Border Guards. They operated several Shanghai 
II-class fast attack craft (gun) as riverine patrol boats on the Danube 
borders with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 

In the 1980s, the Border Guards reportedly used lethal force to 
prevent illegal emigration to Romania's more liberal neighbors, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Consequently, the borders with Yugo- 
slavia and Hungary were more heavily guarded than were those 
with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The latter were ordinarily 
guarded only at major highway and railroad-crossing points. The 
Border Guards also helped to enforce customs and export laws by 
controlling the flow of goods across Romania's borders. 

The Border Guards were the first line of Romania's defense in 
wartime. They had the mission of preventing an invader's special 
forces units from infiltrating to sabotage, disrupt, or disorganize 
military mobilization. In the event of an invasion or attack, the 
Border Guards would offer initial resistance, use delaying tactics, 
and try to impede the enemy's advance until the ground forces and 
Patriotic Guards units could mobilize and reinforce them. 

Military Personnel 

In 1989 virtually all men who were eighteen years of age or older 
had to serve in the armed forces or Ministry of Interior units to 
maintain them at full strength. The terms of service in the armed 
forces were sixteen months in the ground forces and air force and 
two years in the navy and in the Border Guards. The armed units 
of the Ministry of Interior, the security troops, and the militia 
(police) also served two years (see Ministry of Interior and Securi- 
ty Forces, this ch.). They were selected during the same annual 
induction cycle as were those called to serve in the armed forces. 
Students accepted into civilian universities were required to serve 
nine months on active duty prior to matriculation or to take in- 
struction from the military faculty and become reserve officers af- 
ter graduation. The demographic strain of universal male military 
conscription on the national labor pool, however, forced the 
Ceau§escu regime to cut the armed forces by 10,000 soldiers in 
1987. Also because of demographic trends, by 1989 women had 
achieved a small, but increasingly visible, role in the armed forces. 

According to Article 36 of the 1965 Constitution, defense of the 
country is the duty of all citizens, and military service is obligato- 
ry, but only men were subject to induction into the armed forces. 
Young men generally accepted compulsory military service as a 
reality of life in Romania. There were no provisions for conscien- 
tious objection and no alternatives to military service. Conscien- 
tious objectors had traditionally been subject to harsh treatment 



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National Security 



by political authorities. Seventh Day Adventists who refused to serve 
in the army during the 1930s were imprisoned. During World War 
II, citizens who refused military service were charged with trea- 
son and summarily executed. In the late 1960s, small numbers of 
Nazarenes were arrested for objecting to compulsory military ser- 
vice. In 1989, however, authorities granted limited numbers of 
deferments from service in extreme cases of family hardship or ill- 
ness and granted, as well, some educational exemptions. Still Roma- 
nia lacked the organized movement of youths opposing military 
service that had developed in several non- Soviet Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries in the 1980s. 

Military Training 

The 1972 Law on the Organization of National Defense man- 
dated universal premilitary training for Romanian youths. Each 
year more than 650,000 young men and women between ten and 
twenty years of age received basic military training at schools and 
work. They were organized into what were called Youth Homeland 
Defense detachments. In the summer, they attended 200 ground 
forces, 40 air force, and 15 navy training camps located through- 
out the country. During several weeks of training camp, they wore 
the blue uniform of the Patriotic Guards. The Ministry of Nation- 
al Defense, the Patriotic Guards, and the UTC supplied the mili- 
tary equipment and instructors for premilitary training. The 
program sought to compensate for short service terms by prepar- 
ing young men for service in the armed forces. Young women used 
their premilitary training in later service with the Patriotic Guards. 
A major objective of premilitary training was to inculcate youths 
with socialist, and especially nationalist, values. In addition, Youth 
Homeland Defense detachments could be deployed for certain mis- 
sions and duties if needed in wartime. 

After induction into the armed forces, the basic training cycle 
for conscripts was similar to that in most of the world's armies. 
It started with individual physical conditioning, close-order drill, 
small-arms firing, and fundamental small-unit tactics, followed by 
training in more complex equipment and crew- served weapons and 
the assignment of a military specialty, and appropriate training 
in it, after several months. Approximately 20 to 30 percent of ba- 
sic military training time for conscripts was devoted to political in- 
doctrination. The emphasis on political education among soldiers 
was evident in the fact that the large majority of them were UTC 
members. More than 70 percent of the noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) in the armed forces were members of the PCR. At the 
time of induction, the most qualified conscripts were made NCOs 



277 



Romania: A Country Study 

in return for extending their service beyond the normal sixteen- 
month or two-year term. Nevertheless, the short service term in 
the armed forces made the training and retention of competent 
NCOs a chronic problem. 

In 1989 daily existence for soldiers was harder than for most 
citizens. The daily dietary allowance for soldiers was 2,700 calories, 
which consisted mainly of bread and small quantities of meat in 
stews and soups. Dairy products and fruit were generally absent 
from the military diet because they were in short supply even in 
the civilian sector. Military units cultivated gardens and raised 
animals for slaughter to supplement their rations. In many in- 
stances, however, this home-grown produce and meat was sold for 
cash on the black market. 

Officer Education 

In 1989 officers in the armed forces received higher than aver- 
age salaries and extensive benefits such as priority housing. They 
had relatively high social standing and prestige. Officers still en- 
joyed fewer perquisites and privileges than their counterparts in 
the other Warsaw Pact countries, however. Yet the officer's profes- 
sion remained a path of upward mobility, especially for young men 
from remote jude\e and agricultural communities. 

In 1989 there were several ways of earning a commission in the 
armed forces. Romania had a number of military secondary schools 
for officer training in cities and larger towns. After passing a 
competitive admission examination, cadets could enter a military 
secondary school at the start of their ninth year of formal educa- 
tion or after completing their terms of service as conscripts. Mili- 
tary secondary schools offered a three- or four-year curriculum of 
mathematics, physics, chemistry, applied science and engineering, 
geography, foreign languages, physical conditioning, and sports. 
Many, like the Alexandru loan Cuza Naval Secondary School or 
the Nicolae Balcescu Military Officers College, were named for 
heroic military leaders from Romanian history. Military secondary 
schools began accepting women for training as communications, 
chemical defense, transportation, air defense, quartermaster corps, 
medical, and topographic officers in 1973. 

In 1989 approximately 70 percent of the second lieutenants on 
active duty had received commissions by graduating from military 
secondary schools. While on active duty, approximately 50 per- 
cent of all officers continued their professional training by develop- 
ing a military specialty in resident or correspondence courses at 
schools for armor in Pitesti, infantry in Bacau, artillery in Ploie§ti, 
missiles in Bra§ov, military engineering in Lugoj in Timi§ judef, 



278 



Soldiers from the military academy at Alba Iulia 
Courtesy Scott Edelman 

and communications in Bucharest. The other 30 percent of officers 
on active duty received commissions after completing university- 
level courses of study at more elite institutions. 

The General Military Academy and the Military Technical 
Academy, both located in Bucharest, were the most prestigious mili- 
tary educational establishments. An army general, usually senior 
in rank and experience to the minister of national defense, headed 
the General Military Academy. The four-year courses of study at 
the military academies, concentrating on general military science, 
military engineering, or party work and organization, led to a 
university degree as well as a commission as a junior officer. Also 
located in Bucharest, the Aurel Vlaicu Military Academy for Avi- 
ation Officers, named for the founder of Romania's prewar air- 
craft industry, and the military faculty of the University of Bucharest 
also produced commissioned graduates. 

As captains, navy lieutenants, and majors, promising officers 
applied to attend two- to five-year advanced command and staff 
courses at the General Military Academy. Until the early 1960s, 
mid-career officers were assigned to elite Soviet military academies 
for higher professional education similar to that provided in war 
colleges in the United States and other Western countries. Gradu- 
ation from either the Soviet General Staff Academy or Frunze Mili- 
tary Academy was almost a prerequisite for advancement to general 



279 



Romania: A Country Study 

officer rank and a requirement to become minister of national 
defense in the non- Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. When Roma- 
nia began to follow a course of greater independence within the 
Warsaw Pact, however, it stopped sending its officers to the Soviet 
Union for training. This reduced the chance that Romanian officers 
would develop a loyalty toward their Soviet counterparts stronger 
than that to Ceaugescu, the PCR, and the Romanian government. 
It also largely eliminated opportunities for the Soviet Union to 
recruit spies from among the Romanian officer corps. At a more 
practical level, the military had to train its own officers to fight 
according to a military doctrine and strategy different from that 
of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. 

Reserves and Mobilization 

In a concession to the need for economy, the ground forces main- 
tained only one motorized rifle and one tank division at near-full 
strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment (category one) in 
1989. One tank and three motorized rifle divisions were held at 
50 to 75 percent of their wartime strength (category two); four mo- 
torized rifle divisions were kept at less than 50 percent of complete 
readiness (category three). Romania also relied heavily on large 
reserve and paramilitary forces that could be equipped and trained 
at less cost than could regular forces and could mobilize rapidly 
in a condition of imminent hostilities. 

In 1989 approximately 4.5 million men, or approximately 20 
percent of the country's total population, were in the reserve mili- 
tary service age-group of 18 to 50 years. More than 550,000 of 
these people had served on active duty in the armed forces during 
the previous five years. They were subject to periodic recall for 
refresher training in weapons and small unit tactics. 

In addition to its system of reserve service, Romania had the 
Patriotic Guards, which were staffed by about 700,000 citizens, 
both men and women. In keeping with the doctrine of War of the 
Entire People, the Patriotic Guards were a combined territorial 
defense or national guard and civil defense organization, which 
was established immediately after the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia. The Patriotic Guards worked closely with 
the Ministry of National Defense but were directly subordinate to 
the PCR and the UTC. Relying more on ordinary citizens than 
on the professional military, the Patriotic Guards served as a poten- 
tial counterweight to or check on the power and influence of the 
regular armed forces. 

In 1989 the Patriotic Guards were organized into company- and 
platoon- sized units in almost every juafy, municipality, town, village, 



280 



National Security 



and industrial or agricultural enterprise. Under the command of 
the first secretary of the local PCR apparatus, they conducted basic 
and refresher training in small-arms handling, demolition, mor- 
tar and grenade-launcher firing, and small-unit tactics. In wartime 
they had responsibility for local antiaircraft defense, providing early 
warning of air attack, defending population centers and important 
elements of national infrastructure, and conducting civil engineering 
work as needed to reestablish essential military production after 
an attack. They would reconnoiter and attack enemy flanks and 
rear areas, combat airborne units and special forces penetrating 
deep into Romania, and mount resistance operations against oc- 
cupying forces. In keeping with their guerrilla image, the Patriot- 
ic Guards wore plain uniforms with no insignia or badges of rank. 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 

As a Warsaw Pact member, Romania adopted armed forces uni- 
forms and insignia modeled on those of the Soviet Union. Follow- 
ing the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
however, there was a gradual movement away from the Soviet 
model and a partial return to the pre-World War II army accoutre- 
ments, including the steel helmet formerly known as the "Dutch 
helmet" and the national crest on head gear, belt buckles, and sleeve 
patches. 

In 1989 the armed forces used four categories of uniforms: full 
dress, dress, service, and field. The full dress uniform was worn 
for formal occasions such as parades, ceremonies commemorating 
Armed Forces Day (October 25), Navy Day (the first Sunday in 
August), Air Force Day (the third Sunday in July), and Border 
Guards Day (June 25); conferral of promotions in rank or mili- 
tary decorations; and official receptions. The dress uniform was 
worn during off-duty hours or during classes at higher military 
schools. The service uniform was for duty in garrison, and the field 
uniform was used during training, maneuvers, and firing exercises. 
The color of the basic uniform for the ground and air force was 
olive drab, and for the navy it was blue. 

Officers wore blue full dress and dress uniforms, which consist- 
ed of a single-breasted, open-collar service jacket; matching trousers 
with a red stripe; black, low quarter shoes or high riding boots; 
and a service hat. Officers participating with a troop formation in 
a parade wore the olive drab uniform with a cotton khaki shirt and 
olive drab tie, a steel helmet, an ornate gold pistol belt, brown 
gloves, breeches, and high riding boots. Officers in the reviewing 
stand had the option of wearing the blue uniform with long trou- 
sers, black low quarter shoes, the service hat, a white shirt and 



281 



Romania: A Country Study 

black tie, white gloves, and a ceremonial dirk or the olive drab uni- 
form but with a service hat, a white shirt and olive drab tie, and 
white gloves. The dress uniform for officers was either blue or olive 
drab with long trousers and low quarter shoes but without the or- 
nate pistol belt and ceremonial dirk. In winter the olive drab uni- 
form was worn with a double-breasted overcoat and brown gloves. 
Enlisted personnel and noncommissioned ranks wore an olive drab 
shirt and trousers, a brown leather belt with brass buckle, a garri- 
son cap, and black combat boots. In winter they wore an olive drab 
overcoat and a pile cap. 

The service uniform was the same as the dress olive drab uni- 
form except that officers wore a brown leather Sam Browne belt, 
breeches, and high boots. Enlisted personnel could wear a field jack- 
et as an outer garment with a brown leather belt and brass buckle. 
The field uniform was the same as the service uniform except that 
officers wore the field jacket instead of the service jacket with the 
Sam Browne belt and hard shoulder boards. Enlisted personnel 
wore the steel helmet in place of the garrison cap. Depending on 
the season, the overcoat, gloves, and pile cap were worn in the field. 

The prominent features that distinguished air force, air defense, 
and airborne personnel from army personnel were the background 
color of the shoulder boards, the color of the collar tabs, and the 
color of the service hat band. Reminiscent of the pre-World War 
II era, general and field-grade air force officers wore a series of 
gold braids topped by a diamond on their sleeves. Members of the 
elite mountain- troop units wore distinctive olive drab ski pants, 
field jackets, ski/mountain boots, thick white socks rolled over the 
boot tops, and olive drab berets. For field training, reconnaissance 
unit personnel wore a mottled green and brown camouflage jump- 
suit with attached head cover in summer and a white uniform in 
winter. Navy personnel wore uniforms similar in color and style 
to those used by most of the world's navies. The winter uniform 
was navy blue, and the summer uniform featured a tropical white 
service jacket. Enlisted seamen wore a visorless hat with a black 
band and a hat ribbon worn in pigtail fashion. 

In 1989, Romanian military rank structure conformed to that 
used by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations. There 
were four general officer ranks, three field- grade ranks, and four 
company-grade ranks. Enlisted ranks included privates and non- 
commissioned officers. The naval rank structure was analogous, 
but there were only three admiral ranks. 

All rank insignia was displayed on shoulder loops or shoulder 
boards and tended to be ornate for commissioned officers and plain 
for enlisted personnel. General officers wore a shoulder board with 



282 



National Security 



a red background and a broad ornate gold stripe and silver stars 
set on a red background. The shoulder board worn by air force 
general officers had a blue background, whereas that worn by navy 
admirals featured a navy blue background and gold stars. Field- 
grade officers wore a shoulder board with three longitudinal gold 
stripes on a background of the color designated for the branch of 
service and smaller silver stars. For company- grade officers, the 
shoulder board had two longitudinal gold stripes and even smaller 
silver stars. The shoulder boards of enlisted and noncommissioned 
officer ranks featured transverse gold stripes on a background of 
olive drab or the color designated for the branch of service along 
with a branch-of- service metallic insignia. Navy officers wore gold 
sleeve stripes and stars, and the lowest enlisted seamen wore gold 
chevrons on the sleeve (see fig. 10; fig. 11). 

The Military and the National Economy 

The Ceau§escu regime pursued a policy designed to ensure that 
the armed forces would not become an unacceptable burden on 
the economy. In fact, the armed forces during the 1970s and 1980s 
made important economic contributions, providing cheap labor and 
managerial cadres. As economic problems mounted in the mid- 
1980s, the government curtailed military spending and broad- 
ened the use of the armed forces in the civilian economy. At the 
same time, the arms industry earned badly needed hard currency 
through weapons and materiel exports. 

Military Budget 

After five years of sustained military budget increases in the early 
1980s, the Ceau§escu regime reduced military expenditures by 4.8 
percent in the 1986 state budget. At his instruction, the GNA passed 
an additional 5 percent cut in military spending and the size of 
the armed forces. It also adopted a change in the 1965 Constitu- 
tion to hold a national referendum to confirm or to reject this reduc- 
tion. Young Romanians aged fourteen to eighteen, who were likely 
to favor any cut that might decrease their chances of induction into 
military service, were allowed to vote on the referendum. On 
November 23, 1986, in balloting typical of that during Ceau§es- 
cu's rule, a reported 99.9 percent of all eligible citizens turned out 
and voted unanimously in favor of the 5 percent reduction. This 
electoral ploy may have enabled Ceausescu to overcome more easily 
the apparent opposition to the plan among the professional military. 

Implementing the decision made in the November referendum, 
Romania cut its 1987 military expenditures by US$156 million to 
US$1,171 billion, an actual reduction of more than 11 percent. 



283 



Romania: A Country Study 




284 



National Security 



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Romania: A Country Study 

Active units discharged 10,000 soldiers and mothballed 250 tanks 
and armored vehicles, 150 artillery pieces, and 25 aircraft. Deteri- 
orating economic conditions and a chronic labor shortage in the 
mid-1980s probably necessitated the cut in military spending and 
the force reductions that accompanied it. Nevertheless, a genuine 
commitment to disarmament — and its attendant potential for 
enhancing Romania's security — and desire to demonstrate this 
commitment cannot be entirely discounted as a factor behind the 
unilateral reductions. 

Arms Production 

In 1989 the Soviet Union still provided the majority of heavy 
arms and complex equipment in Romania's inventory. In the 
preceding two decades, however, Romania had made considera- 
ble progress toward building an independent domestic arms indus- 
try. At the PCR Central Committee plenum in April 1968, 
Ceau§escu officially made development of a domestic arms indus- 
try a national priority. He recognized the inherent vulnerability 
in Romania's reliance on the Soviet Union, a potential adversary, 
as its principal arms supplier. Ceau§escu claimed that Romania 
in 1985 was producing more than two-thirds of the weapons and 
military equipment essential for the country's defense. 

At first Romania concentrated on developing its capabilities in 
low-technology areas, producing spare parts for, repairing, and 
modifying Soviet-made weapons and equipment for the ground 
forces. By the early 1980s, Romania had a large-scale program of 
naval construction and had reestablished its prewar aviation in- 
dustry. It built minor surface combatants and fighter aircraft us- 
ing its own designs and produced more complicated units under 
licensing arrangements with the Soviet Union and other countries. 
Several Western countries assisted Romanian arms production ef- 
forts as a reward for the country's adopting an independent stance 
within the Warsaw Pact. Besides contributing to its increased in- 
dependence of the Soviet Union, domestic arms production also 
increased Romania's exports and became a source of hard currency. 

Using Soviet designs provided under license, Romania produced 
a number of armored fighting vehicles for its ground forces. The 
TAB-72 was a modified version of the Soviet BTR-60 armored 
personnel carrier, and the TAB-77 was the counterpart of the Soviet 
BTR-70. The TAB-72 had an improved Romanian-designed tur- 
ret, upgraded optical equipment and gun sights, and increased ele- 
vation angles for its 14.5mm and 7.62mm machine guns for use 
in an antiaircraft mode. It featured a better power-to-weight ratio 
than the BTR-60 and a greater road speed. One TAB-72 variant 



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used a Soviet 82mm mortar in place of its turret. The TAB-77 
had either a Romanian-made turret or mounted six Soviet 
AT-3/SAGGER antitank guided missiles. The TAB-C was essen- 
tially a domestic version of the Soviet BRDM-2 armored recon- 
naissance vehicle first built in the early 1960s. 

The M-77 tank, also known by the designation TR-77, was the 
first produced in Romania since World War II. It mounted the 
turret and 100mm gun from the Soviet T-54/T-55 tank but had 
a Romanian-designed six-roller track and suspension system for 
improved mobility over rugged terrain. Romania produced towed 
and truck-mounted Soviet and Czechoslovak B-ll, M-51, and 
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, as well as DAC-443 light and 
DAC-665 medium military cargo trucks using a chassis design 
purchased from a firm in the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany). These trucks were used as ground forces transports, 
communications and electronics vans, bridging equipment carri- 
ers, and mobile multiple rocket launcher platforms. Romania also 
manufactured all small arms, ammunition, munitions, mortars, 
grenade launchers, communications equipment, and some spare 
parts for more complex weapons used by its ground forces. 

Naval Construction 

After the early 1970s, the Soviet Union curtailed transfers of naval 
vessels, and licenses to construct them, to Romania, forcing it to 
turn to other potential suppliers and develop a domestic program 
of naval construction. China allowed Romania to build units of 
two classes of fast attack craft under license. In the late 1970s, 
Romania began constructing the first of nineteen Huchuan-class 
boats in the Drobeta-Turnu Severin shipyard and several Shan- 
ghai II-class boats in the Mangalia shipyard. At the same time, 
Romania developed some more original units. It built eighteen 
eighty-five-ton VB-class armored riverine patrol boats beginning 
in 1973. Based on their experience in building Chinese boats, 
Romanian shipbuilders designed and constructed fourteen Epitrop- 
class hydrofoil fast attack craft in the early 1980s. Romania built 
thirty VD-class riverine minesweeping boats and several units of 
the heavily armed Brutar- class riverine patrol boat (see Naval 
Forces, this ch.). 

The Soviet Union began to reestablish its earlier role in Roma- 
nian shipbuilding in the 1980s, granting licenses to build copies 
of the Kashin-class guided missile destroyer and Koni-class frig- 
ates — the Romanian Muntenia- and Tetal-classes, respectively. 
Although Romania built the hulls for ships of these classes, the 



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Romania: A Country Study 



Soviet Union supplied all armament and electronic equipment need- 
ed to outfit them. 

Aviation Industry 

In the 1960s and 1970s, Romania reestablished its pre- World 
War II position as one of the few countries with a national avia- 
tion industry. The Soviet Union cooperated to an extent but also 
tried to confine Romania to producing relatively unsophisticated 
aircraft at a lower level of aviation technology. Romania therefore 
established extensive ties with several non- Warsaw Pact countries 
and undertook licensed production of foreign aircraft and coproduc- 
tion of the IAR-93, the first non-Soviet combat aircraft ever built 
and flown in the air force of a Warsaw Pact member state. 

Romania had a strong national aviation industry during the 
interwar years. It produced more than eighty models of aircraft 
and employed 20,000 engineers, technicians, and other workers. 
But most of its aircraft production capability was destroyed in bomb- 
ing raids during World War II, and the post-war recovery of the 
industry proceeded slowly. The Soviet Union forced Romania to 
convert its remaining capacity to tractor production but eventual- 
ly allowed it to resume production of motorized gliders and agricul- 
tural, utility, scout, and medical evacuation aircraft. Advancing 
the aviation industry to a higher technological level became a pri- 
ority when Ceau§escu came to power in 1965. 

Romania began producing light military training aircraft in the 
early 1970s. The first, the IAR-28MA, was developed on the ba- 
sis of the IS-28M2 motorized glider. In 1974 the first of seventy- 
five IAR-823 two-seat turboprop primary training aircraft was built 
for the air force. In 1978 the Soviet Union granted a license to 
produce 200 two-seat YaK-52 piston engine trainers annually for 
the Soviet Air Force. Four years later, Romania began producing 
the IAR-825TP TRIUMF two-seat turboprop training aircraft for 
its own air force. In 1986 the Soviet Union awarded Romania 
production of the single-seat YaK-53 trainer, an upgraded YaK-52. 
Building Soviet-designed training aircraft, however, did littie to 
increase the technology base of the Romanian aviation industry. 

As of 1989, Romania's greatest achievement in the aviation field 
was the development and production of the IAR-93, a single-seat 
light fighter aircraft, in collaboration with Yugoslavia. The joint 
Yugoslav-Romanian (YUROM) program began in 1970, and serial 
production of the IAR-93 started in 1979. The IAR-93, designed 
for a close air-support and ground-attack role, was produced in two 
variants. The thirty IAR-93 A aircraft in service with the Romani- 
an Air Force in 1989 had two Rolls-Royce Viper Mk 632 turbojet 



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engines. The 165 IAR-93B aircraft on order had two afterburner- 
equipped Mk 633 engines. The IAR-93 had a fully-loaded com- 
bat radius of 300 to 400 kilometers. It was armed with two twin- 
barrel 23mm cannons and carried a maximum bomb load of 1 ,300 
kilograms on four wing pylons and one fuselage attachment point. 
In conjunction with bringing the IAR-93 into service, Romania 
developed and built the compatible IAR-99 advanced jet trainer 
at Craiova in the 1980s. 

In the mid-1970s, the Romanian state aviation firm, Industria 
Aeronautica Romana (IAR), began building the first of 200 
Alouette III and 100 Puma helicopters on a license from the French 
firm Aerospatiale, under the designations IAR-316B and IAR-330, 
respectively. The air force operated the IAR-316B and IAR-330 
as armed transports in support of the ground forces. They had py- 
lons for four AT-3/SAGGER antitank guided missiles or sixteen 
57mm rockets. 

Military Labor 

The government traditionally relied on the military as a reserve 
labor force for gathering harvests and building railroads. In the 
1980s, however, the armed forces became increasingly involved 
in other areas of the civilian economy. The use of military units 
in the civilian sector was practically a necessity in view of Roma- 
nia's severe economic difficulties. To alleviate the chronic labor 
shortage and to overcome occasional labor unrest and other dis- 
ruptions, the regime used the military as a corps of engineers on 
170 important public construction projects. During the mid-1980s, 
military commanders and troops were deployed in power plants 
and energy-related industries to maintain order and to ensure the 
regime's control over the critical energy sector (see Energy, ch. 3). 

In 1988 Ceau§escu stated that 50 percent of active duty military 
personnel worked on civilian projects at some point during their 
service. Troops worked on the Bucharest-Danube Canal, the Agigea 
Lock on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the bridge over the Danube 
between Fetesti and Cernavoda, the Constan$a-Mangalia railroad, 
the Iron Gates II hydroelectric plant, the Bucharest subway, the 
Palace of the Republic, and the Ministry of National Defense build- 
ing. Troops worked almost continuously on irrigation, land recla- 
mation, and reforestation projects. 

Foreign Military Relations 

Until the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, Romania had few military ties to countries outside the War- 
saw Pact. After 1968 Romania looked toward the West, China, 



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Romania: A Country Study 

and Third World countries for military cooperation in all areas. 
It developed additional sources of arms supplies, besides the Soviet 
Union, to meet its requirements for national defense; ensured it- 
self diverse political support in the event of an attack or invasion; 
and developed markets for its arms exports. Political and military 
officials modeled Romania's new military doctrine on that of Yu- 
goslavia and coordinated defense plans with its independent neigh- 
bor. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Romania pursued an active 
program of military cooperation with China, including licensed 
production of fast attack craft in its shipyards and exchanges of 
high-level military delegations. Romania's military ties to China, 
which challenged Soviet leadership of the communist world, were 
particularly irritating to the Soviet Union. Romania also expand- 
ed its cooperation in defense matters with neutral European coun- 
tries including Austria and Switzerland. It reportedly trained 
Nicaraguan military pilots in the early 1980s. In October 1986, 
the minister of national defense visited the United States secretary 
of defense in Washington. Romania also had a program of recipro- 
cal warship port visits with the United States, Britain, and France. 

The Warsaw Pact 

In the late 1950s, Romania curbed excessive Soviet influence 
over its armed forces, built up in the years after World War II, 
and ceased sending its officers to the Soviet Union for military edu- 
cation and training. After 1962 it did not allow Warsaw Pact troop 
maneuvers on its territory, although occasional command and staff 
exercises were permitted. In November 1964, PCR General Secre- 
tary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej announced a unilateral reduction 
in the term of compulsory military service from two years to six- 
teen months and in the size of the Romanian armed forces from 
240,000 to 200,000 soldiers. His successor, Ceau§escu, openly as- 
serted that these moves reflected the precedence of Romanian na- 
tional interests over Warsaw Pact requirements. He criticized Soviet 
domination of the alliance, its command, and policy making, and 
he called for structural changes in the Warsaw Pact, to include rotat- 
ing the position of commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces 
among non-Soviet officers and allowing the non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact member states a bigger role in decision making. In the late 
1960s, Romanian forces essentially quit participating in joint War- 
saw Pact field exercises except for sending staff officers to observe 
them, and Ceau§escu announced that Romania would no longer 
put its military forces under the Warsaw Pact's joint command, 
even during peacetime maneuvers. 



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In the midst of the 1968 "Prague Spring" crisis over internal 
political liberalization in Czechoslovakia, Ceau§escu traveled to 
Prague to demonstrate his support for party First Secretary Alex- 
ander Dubcek and Czechoslovak autonomy. Romania declined to 
join the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia or to 
allow Bulgarian forces to cross its territory to intervene in Czecho- 
slovakia. At a massive demonstration in Bucharest on the day after 
the invasion, Ceau§escu denounced the intervention as a violation 
of Czechoslovakia's national sovereignty, international law, and 
the terms of the Warsaw Pact itself. He declared that, unlike 
Czechoslovakia, Romania would resist a similar invasion of its ter- 
ritory, and he placed Romanian forces on alert status. He estab- 
lished the paramilitary Patriotic Guards with an initial strength 
of 100,000 citizens to provide a mechanism for the participation 
of the country's population in a system of total national defense. 
Later in August, major troop movements along Romania's bor- 
ders with the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria indicated a 
similar threat of intervention in Romania. These threatening move- 
ments may have been intended to intimidate Ceau§escu, who was 
conferring with Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito at the time. 

Determined to prevent alliance maneuvers from serving as a ve- 
hicle for intervention in Romania, Ceausescu refused to allow War- 
saw Pact exercises on Romanian territory in the wake of the 1 968 
action against Czechoslovakia. After its deviation from the com- 
mon alliance line on Czechoslovakia, Romania became the object 
of several joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers conducted near its bor- 
ders that were designed to pressure it politically. These exercises 
coincided with other major displays of Romanian independence 
from the Warsaw Pact. 

Shortly before Ceau§escu visited China in June 1971, the Soviet 
Union mounted a major exercise on its southern border with Roma- 
nia. During "South- 71," as the exercise was called, the Soviet Un- 
ion mobilized twelve ground forces divisions, and the Soviet Black 
Sea Fleet operated off the Romanian coast. It requested, but Roma- 
nia denied, permission to transport three divisions across Roma- 
nia to Bulgaria for the maneuvers. South-71 was an indication of 
Soviet displeasure with Ceau§escu for making the first visit to China 
by a Warsaw Pact head of state since the Sino- Soviet split in the 
late 1950s and for maintaining good relations with its communist 
rival. South-71 forced Romania into a partial mobilization but did 
not disrupt Ceau§escu's trip to China. Soviet, Czechoslovak, and 
Hungarian units conducted the "Opal-71" exercises along Hun- 
gary's border with Romania in August 1971. Ceau§escu's failure 
to travel to the Crimea for a summer meeting with Soviet leader 



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Romania: A Country Study 

Leonid Brezhnev, customary for East European leaders, may have 
been related to the military activity along Romania's borders. 

Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and during the 1980s, 
Romania continued and further developed its autonomous posi- 
tion in the Warsaw Pact. It refused to allow Soviet forces to traverse 
Romanian territory to Bulgaria for joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers. 
In 1974 Romania denied a Soviet request to construct a broad- 
gauge railroad from Odessa across eastern Romania to Varna, Bul- 
garia, that could be used to transport major troop units. Roma- 
nia's stance against the use of its territory by allied forces effectively 
isolated Bulgaria from the other Warsaw Pact countries except by 
air or sea transport. 

Romania continued to participate fully in formal alliance politi- 
cal meetings in which it could publicly express its views, assert its 
interests, and influence the formulation of official Warsaw Pact 
statements and documents. It openly adopted positions different 
from those of the Soviet Union. Romanian demands for genuine 
consultation and greater Eastern European input into decision mak- 
ing resulted in the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
in 1976 and other formal deliberative bodies within the Warsaw 
Pact. Romania used these consultative mechanisms to publicize 
its disagreements with the Soviet Union over alliance policy. In 
1978 it publicly opposed Soviet initiatives to achieve tighter mili- 
tary integration in the Warsaw Pact and to increase the military 
expenditures of the Warsaw Pact member states. In 1980 Roma- 
nia refused to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when it 
abstained instead of voting against the United Nations General As- 
sembly resolution condemning the Soviet action. It later openly 
called on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. In 1984 
Romania publicly opposed the Soviet decision to deploy short-range 
ballistic missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia to counter 
the 1983 NATO deployment of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) 
in Western Europe. 

Romania remained a Warsaw Pact member state in 1989, but 
retained its well-established reputation as a maverick within the 
Soviet alliance. It maximized its autonomy within the boundaries 
of the Warsaw Pact, minimized its participation, and avoided an 
outright withdrawal from the alliance, which the Soviet Union 
would not have tolerated. The Soviet Union countenanced these 
displays of independence because, as part of the Warsaw Pact's 
southern tier, Romania had a less strategic location than East Ger- 
many, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary; it did not border on 
a NATO country; and it retained its rigid internal communist 
regime. 



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Arms Sales 

Romania produced Soviet weapons and military equipment 
under license not only for its own armed forces, but also for ex- 
port to the Soviet Union and to both Soviet-allied and nonaligned 
countries in the Middle East and Africa. In the early 1980s, an- 
nual arms transfers abroad averaged US$620 million, or between 
5 and 6 percent of total exports, making Romania the world's 
ninth largest arms exporter and second only to Czechoslovakia 
among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. 

The Ministry of National Defense's foreign trade division and 
the state-owned firm Romtehnica handled Romania's arms sales 
abroad. The majority of its sales of Soviet-designed AK-47 and 
AKM assault rifles, BM-21 and M-51 multiple rocket launch- 
ers, TAB- 7 2 armored personnel carriers, and munitions and ord- 
nance went to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Iraq, Libya, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) during 
the early 1980s. In 1983 Romania and Libya signed a formal 
military cooperation agreement based on the supply of 
Romanian-made infantry arms, military vehicles, and explosives 
to the latter. Iraq remained Romania's best Middle East cus- 
tomer. Besides selling arms, Romania repaired and overhauled 
Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles that had been damaged in the 
battles of the Iran-Iraq War. 

In 1984 Romania agreed to sell 200 M-77 tanks, its improved 
version of the Soviet T-55, to Egypt as well as to provide train- 
ing and maintenance and to assist Egypt in undertaking licensed 
production of the M-77. Romania exported spare parts — 
produced under license — for French Alouette III and Puma 
helicopters in service with the air forces of Algeria, Angola, and 
Ethiopia. It tried unsuccessfully to sell its versions of the French- 
designed helicopters, IAR-316B and IAR-330, in Latin America 
in competition with the original manufacturer Aerospatiale. 

For Romania, arms sales represented a stable export market 
that helped to absorb some underutilized productive capacity in 
its heavy manufacturing sector and to earn hard currency until 
the mid-1980s. Arms transfers to the Soviet Union allowed Roma- 
nia to reduce somewhat its trade imbalance with that country. 
Trading weapons for oil with countries in the Middle East ena- 
bled Romania to develop a non-Soviet source of energy supplies. 
After several years of steady increases, however, arms sales 
abroad dropped to US$270 million in 1986. Arms production 
and sales became a less valuable part of the economy in the late 
1980s and even became a burden on the civilian sector. 



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Romania: A Country Study 

Law and Order 

The PCR and the Ceau§escu regime placed a far greater em- 
phasis on order than on the rule of law. The Constitution of 1965 
was superficially similar to the constitutions of Western democra- 
cies, but a tremendous gap existed between the rights stipulated 
in it and the human rights and civil liberties respected by the party 
and state. As a result, Romania earned the reputation as being 
the most repressive state in Eastern Europe. Although abuses were 
perpetrated by the Ministry of Interior and its Department of State 
Security, the Ministry of Justice and the judicial system were either 
unable or unwilling to prevent them. 

The 1965 Constitution theoretically guaranteed equal rights for 
all citizens regardless of ethnic origin or religious belief (Article 
17); freedom of association (Article 27); freedom of speech (Arti- 
cle 28); freedom of conscience and religious belief (Article 30); as 
well as the inviolability of the person (Article 31), the domicile (Ar- 
ticle 32), and correspondence and communications (Article 33). 
However, the Constitution also stipulated that no citizen may ex- 
ercise these rights when they conflict with the "socialist order" or 
serve aims "hostile to the interests of the Romanian working peo- 
ple." Because the PCR alone defined the interests of the working 
people, no Romanian was able to exercise his or her rights to 
challenge the rule of the PCR and Ceau§escu. The riglits of the 
citizenry were not inalienable; they were given by the party and 
as such could be taken away. 

Judicial System 

The Ministry of Justice was responsible for the administration 
of justice and the maintenance of law and order. Under the Con- 
stitution, it was charged with defending the socialist order, pro- 
tecting individual rights, and reeducating those who violate the 
country's laws, in that order of precedence. The Ministry of Justice 
exercised its authority through its main component, the Office of 
the Prosecutor General (Procuratura), which was established in 
1952. The Procuratura operated the court system, decided juris- 
dictional questions, and compiled statistics on crime. It also over- 
saw the central criminology institute and forensic science laboratory. 

Although the judicial system was theoretically independent, the 
PCR controlled it through its power to appoint judges and through 
the rules of party discipline. The judicial system took its orders 
directly from the Ministry of Interior and the security service. As 
a result, the government has never failed to win a conviction, ac- 
cording to Romanian dissidents. The GNA possessed formal 



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authority to appoint the prosecutor general (attorney general) for 
a five-year term, and he was theoretically responsible only to it, 
or to the Council of State when the former was not in session. The 
prosecutor general represented the interests of the party and govern- 
ment in all legal disputes. He could petition the Supreme Court 
for interpretations of existing laws or propose changes in criminal 
statutes or new legislation to the GNA. He also appointed lower- 
level prosecutors in thejude$e. The Procuratura was supposed to 
investigate and resolve any charges that the Ministry of Interior 
or the security service had acted illegally or improperly. Yet the 
latter operated virtually unchecked in the late 1980s, following only 
directives issued by Ceau§escu and the PCR. Below the national 
level, the Procuratura was organized in the forty judefa the munic- 
ipality of Bucharest, and smaller localities. Its prosecutors had great- 
er latitude to issue arrest warrants, review evidence, monitor 
investigations, arraign suspects, and file suits than did prosecu- 
tors in most legal systems. 

Courts 

The court system was organized at national, judel, and local lev- 
els. It operated for a long time under the 1947 Law on the Or- 
ganization of the Judiciary, which placed many professional judicial 
functions in the hands of ordinary citizens, who were selected and 
instructed by the PCR. The 1947 law put two lay judges along- 
side one professional jurist on 16,000 local judicial commissions 
that heard cases involving labor disputes, civil complaints, family 
law, and minor crimes and violations of public order. A judicial 
reform implemented in 1978 established panels of between three 
and seven "popular" judges, recruited from the masses of work- 
ers and peasants, to serve as local working people's judicial coun- 
cils for two-year terms. These judges were appointed by and 
responded to local PCR committees or people's councils, the UTC, 
official trade unions, and other PCR-controlled mass organizations. 

Operating in small municipalities, towns, and large industrial 
and agricultural enterprises, working people's judicial councils 
played a significant role in dispensing justice. They handled up 
to 50 percent of all court cases. The management of a work unit 
investigated and presented the facts of a case, and a co-worker 
defended the accused. Unlike the larger municipal, judefa and mili- 
tary courts over which professional judges presided, working peo- 
ple's judicial councils could impose only light sentences short of 
prison terms. Nevertheless, whether filled by a professional or an 
ordinary citizen, the judge's bench in Romania was subject to 



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Romania: A Country Study 

virtually irresistible pressure to decide cases according to the PCR's 
political preferences. 

Military Courts 

The civilian prosecutor general appointed the military prosecu- 
tor with concurrence of the minister of national defense. The mili- 
tary Procuratura operated an extensive system of courts, which tried 
military personnel for violations of the military oath and regula- 
tions and held courts-martial for certain offenses. Military courts 
also exercised original jurisdiction over cases involving civilian 
offenses committed by those in the military services. More unusual- 
ly, they heard cases of transgressions against the socialist order or 
the security of the state in both peacetime and wartime regardless 
of whether the accused was military or civilian. Cases brought be- 
fore military courts were tried in closed session with even less con- 
cern for due process and the rights of the accused than was shown 
in civilian courtrooms. The use of secret proceedings reduced the 
chances of negative international publicity for the PCR and the 
Ceau§escu regime that could result from open trials of alleged 
criminals. 

Penal Code 

Romania introduced its new Penal Code in 1978. It was some- 
what less draconian than the two previous penal codes promulgat- 
ed during the early period of communist rule, in 1948 and 1968. 
The new code had a major impact on crime and punishment. It 
reduced the overall number of indictable offenses, introduced lighter 
sentences, and established a more flexible approach toward the treat- 
ment of offenders, juvenile offenders in particular. It mandated 
rehabilitation instead of prison sentences in many cases. 

The greater emphasis on socialist legality, or the rule of law over 
adherence to the political dictates of the PCR evident in the 1978 
penal code, did little to change the PCR's attitude toward the 
phenomenon of political crime. Although officials denied it, esti- 
mates indicated that as many as thirty prisoners remained incar- 
cerated for political "crimes" after the government's January 1988 
amnesty. Human rights groups reported that this estimate 
represented only a fraction of the total number of cases, as many 
more prisoners with political motivation had been convicted of com- 
mon crimes or of attempting to leave the country illegally. Politi- 
cal prisoners were customarily tried and convicted in military courts. 
Articles 166 and 167 of the Penal Code were used to charge Roma- 
nian dissidents as criminals for calling on the regime to respect the 
civil and human rights outlined in the Constitution or for granting 



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interviews to foreign reporters to discuss the regime's repressive 
nature (see Dissidence, this ch.). They could receive sentences of 
from five to fifteen years for disseminating "propaganda against 
the socialist order," for "any action aimed at changing the socialist 
order or from which a danger to the security of the state may result, ' ' 
or for "slandering the state." 

Under the 1978 Penal Code, a system of release on bail for those 
accused of minor crimes was established. Previously bail was grant- 
ed only to foreigners, who were required to post it in hard curren- 
cy. First offenders were punished by disciplinary or administrative 
actions and court-ordered fines. Courts could order corrective labor 
under the supervision of a specific industrial or agricultural enter- 
prise and mandate an automatic 15 to 20 percent reduction in the 
salary of an offender. For other misdemeanors, the courts could 
order an offender to be placed on probation under police (militia) 
supervision for up to five years. Minors between fourteen and 
twenty-one years of age were tried by a collective comprising the 
leaders of the school or enterprise where they studied or worked, 
UTC representatives, and a judge or other representative of the 
local procuratura. As a rule, convicted juveniles served a term of 
supervised labor in correctional homes called ' ' special training in- 
stitutes. ' ' Only minors with a prior record of offenses could be sen- 
tenced to a prison term, and they were supposed to be segregated 
from older inmates. The 1978 Penal Code reduced the number 
of offenses punishable by death from twenty-eight under the 1968 
penal code to just a few serious crimes including first-degree murder, 
air piracy, treason, and espionage. It imposed a maximum sen- 
tence of twenty years in prison for all offenses. Misdemeanors were 
expunged from the 1978 Penal Code and formed into a separate 
Code on Minor Violations of the Law, leaving only felony offenses 
in the Penal Code. 

Beginning in the 1970s, the Council of State announced an am- 
nesty program approximately every other year. Generally, prisoners 
serving less than three years or with less than three years remain- 
ing on longer sentences were freed, and the sentences of prisoners 
serving more than three years were reduced. The government 
reportedly released 90 percent of those in prison or awaiting trial 
through an amnesty announced in January 1988. Amnesties may 
have been intended to alleviate chronic labor shortages or to clear 
prisons crowded by strict law enforcement. 

Crime 

The PCR asserted that the socioeconomic change wrought un- 
der communist rule reduced crime committed against individuals 



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Romania: A Country Study 

and property. According to the PCR, the socialist system elimi- 
nated the root cause of lawlessness — economic inequality — and 
therefore crime was disappearing. Articles in the Romanian press, 
however, indicated that crime remained a significant, if not grow- 
ing, problem in 1989. The phenomenon of economic crime was 
the by-product of Romania's inefficient, overly centralized econ- 
omy. Unrealistic prices and exchange rates led to widespread cor- 
ruption, shortages, a black market, speculation, and hoarding. 
Although the 1978 Penal Code abolished the use of capital punish- 
ment against those convicted of economic crimes such as embez- 
zlement or fraud, it stipulated heavy fines and criminal penalties, 
including a two-year prison term, for failure to conserve resources 
in socialist industrial and agricultural enterprises. In 1987 courts 
sentenced 300 citizens for economic crimes or the "illegal acquisi- 
tion of wealth" and confiscated goods worth 47,000,000 lei (for 
value of the leu — see Glossary). There were indications that ap- 
prehension of economic "criminals" was difficult and that a 
prosecutorial backlog of such cases existed in 1989. 

After the 1988 amnesty, the minister of justice reported that there 
were 7,500 citizens in prison. There had been 75,000 citizens in 
jail prior to the amnesty. Although Romania released few statis- 
tics on crime, press reports indicated that juvenile crime was a par- 
ticular problem. In 1981 the UTC revealed that 25,000 youths 
under the age of twenty-one had been convicted of various offenses. 

Security and Intelligence Services 

The Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security (Depar- 
tamentul Securitajii Statului, popularly known as the Securitate, 
see Glossary) was the PCR's secret political police. The Depart- 
ment of External Information (Departamentul de Informajii 
Externe — DIE) was the principal foreign intelligence service. These 
organizations were shrouded in secrecy, but an increasing num- 
ber of defections from their ranks shed some light on their compo- 
sition and activities. The Securitate and the DIE were responsible 
for guarding the internal and external security of the Ceau§escu 
regime and suppressing any unrest, disturbance, or dissident group 
that criticized or challenged it. They succeeded in repressing most 
organized opposition to the regime. Yet spontaneous outbursts of 
discontent with Ceausescu's "cult of personality," economic austeri- 
ty policy, treatment of ethnic minorities, antireligious campaign, 
and lack of respect for internationally recognized civil and human 
rights occurred with increasing frequency after the mid-1970s. 

Given the deteriorating economic situation and the growth of so- 
cial unrest in the 1980s, the loyalty of the security and intelligence 



298 



National Security 



services was critical to the political future of the Ceau§escu clan. 
Observers believed that the services could play a decisive role in 
the outcome of a future leadership struggle between Ceau§escu, 
his heirs, and other contenders for power. Despite their treatment 
as a privileged caste, Securitate and DIE personnel showed signs 
of dissatisfaction with the regime and the situation in the country 
during the late 1980s. Poor living conditions were so widespread 
that even these individuals were affected, creating the potential for 
sympathy with a largely discontented population. 

Ministry of Interior and Security Forces 

The Ministry of Interior was the primary government organi- 
zation responsible for maintaining order in Romania (see fig. 12). 
It was one of only three ministries represented in the Defense Coun- 
cil, the highest governmental forum for considering national secu- 
rity issues. It controlled the Securitate, special security troops, and 
police throughout the country. The ministry's functions ranged 
widely from identifying and neutralizing foreign espionage and 
domestic political threats to the Ceau§escu regime to supervising 
routine police work and local fire departments. The Ministry of 
Interior was organized into a number of directorates at the national 
level, and it controlled similar activities at the judei and municipal 
levels. There was a ministry inspectorate general in each judef as 
well as in Bucharest. The inspectorates general in the jude$e had 
subordinate offices in fifty major cities. They were accountable only 
to the first secretaries of the judet PCR committees and local peo- 
ple's councils as well as the ministry chain of command. 

In prewar Romania, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the precur- 
sor of the Ministry of Interior) closely supervised the activities of 
local governments and courts. The PCR gained control of the minis- 
try in 1946 and filled its ranks with party activists, enabling the 
party to seize power the next year and consolidate communist rule 
during the following decade. One of the PCR's first actions was 
to increase the strength of the police from 2,000 to 20,000 officers 
who were loyal to the party. Little is known about the activities 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after the late 1940s except that 
it was tightly controlled by the PCR general secretary and directly 
served his interests. In 1972 a deputy minister of internal affairs, 
General Ion Serb, was arrested and executed for spying on behalf 
of the Soviet Union. Serb was allegedly recruited by the Soviet 
Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezo- 
pasnosti — KGB) early in his career during his training in Mos- 
cow. The Serb affair led to a purge within the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, which was renamed the Ministry of Interior, and helped 



299 



Romania: A Country Study 
















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300 



National Security 



Ceau§escu establish control over an important lever of power. In 
a bizarre 1982 affair, Ceau§escu again purged the ministry, dis- 
missing scores of officials who allegedly practiced transcendental 
meditation. Among those who lost their positions was a deputy 
minister of the interior, Major General Vasile Moise. 

In 1989 the directorates of the Securitate were the largest com- 
ponent of the Ministry of Interior. They also comprised Eastern 
Europe's largest secret police establishment in proportion to total 
population. The Directorate for Investigations had agents and in- 
formants placed in virtually every echelon of the party and govern- 
ment, as well as among the public, to report on the antiregime 
activities and opinions of ordinary citizens. It perpetrated illegal 
entries into public offices and private homes and interrogated and 
arrested people opposed to Ceau§escu's rule. Its agents frequently 
used force to make dissidents provide information on their com- 
patriots and their activities. According to some prominent dissi- 
dents, because of the directorate's influence over judges and 
prosecutors, no dissident arrested by it had ever been acquitted 
in court. It worked closely with the Directorate for Surveillance 
and the Directorate for Mail Censorship. The latter monitored the 
correspondence of dissidents and ethnic Hungarians in Transyl- 
vania. Toward this end, it collected handwriting samples from the 
population and supervised the official registration of all typewriters 
and copying machines by the police. 

The General Directorate for Technical Operations (Direcjia 
Generala de Tehnica Operativa — DGTO) was an integral part of 
the Securitate' s activities. Established with the assistance of the KGB 
in the mid-1950s, the DGTO monitored all voice and electronic 
communications in the country. The DGTO intercepted all tele- 
phone, telegraph, and telex communications coming into and go- 
ing out of the country. It secretly implanted microphones in public 
buildings and private residences to record ordinary conversations 
among citizens. 

The Directorate for Counterespionage conducted surveillance 
against foreigners — Soviet nationals in particular — to monitor or 
impede their contacts with Romanians. It enforced a variety of re- 
strictions preventing foreigners from residing with ordinary citizens, 
keeping them from gaining access to foreign embassy compounds 
and requesting asylum, and requiring them to report any contact 
with foreigners to the Securitate within twenty-four hours. Direc- 
torate IV was responsible for similar counterespionage functions 
within the armed forces, and its primary mission was identifying 
and neutralizing Soviet penetrations. 



301 



Romania: A Country Study 

Directorate V and the Directorate for Internal Security focused 
mainly on party and government leadership cadres. Directorate 
V provided protective services and physical security for Romani- 
an officials. With more than 1,000 agents, the Directorate for In- 
ternal Security concentrated on rooting out disloyalty to Ceau§escu 
within the PCR hierarchy, the Council of Ministers, and the Secu- 
ritate itself. It was a small-version Securitate in itself, with indepen- 
dent surveillance, mail censorship, and telephone-monitoring 
capabilities. An additional source of information on attitudes toward 
the regime within the Securitate was one of Ceau§escu's relatives, 
who was a lieutenant general in the Ministry of Interior. 

The Directorate for Penitentiaries operated Romania's prison 
system. In 1989 the prisons had a notorious reputation for mis- 
treating inmates. Major prisons were located in Aiud in Alba. jude$, 
Jilava near Bucharest, Gherla in Gluj judef, Rahova, and Drobeta- 
Turnu Severin, and political prisoners were known to be confined 
in each of these institutions. Others may have been held in psy- 
chiatric hospitals. The Ministry of Interior's Service K exercised 
wide countersub version authority in the prison system, beating dis- 
sidents, denying them medical attention, implanting microphones, 
censoring their mail to obtain incriminating evidence against them 
and their associates, and reportedly even administering lethal doses 
of toxic substances to political prisoners. 

The Directorate for Militia and the Directorate for Security 
Troops controlled the routine police and paramilitary forces of the 
Ministry of Interior respectively. The police and security troops 
selected new recruits from the same annual pool of conscripts that 
the armed services used. The police performed routine law enforce- 
ment functions including traffic control and issuance of internal 
identification cards to citizens. Organized in the late 1940s to 
defend the new regime, in 1989 the security troops had 20,000 sol- 
diers. They were an elite, specially trained paramilitary force 
organized like motorized rifle (infantry) units equipped with small 
arms, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, but their mission 
was considerably different. 

The security troops were directly responsible through the Minister 
of the Interior to PCR General Secretary Ceausescu. They guarded 
important installations including PCR jude$ and central office build- 
ings and radio and television stations. The Ceausescu regime 
presumably could call the security troops into action as a private 
army to defend itself against a military coup d'etat or other domestic 
challenges and to suppress antiregime riots, demonstrations, or 
strikes. To ensure their loyalty, security troops were subject to in- 
tense political indoctrination and had five times as many political 



302 



Old Brasov town hall, site of November 1987 riots 

Courtesy Scott Edelman 



303 



Romania: A Country Study 

officers in their ranks as in the armed services. They adhered to 
stricter discipline than in the regular military, but they were re- 
warded with a better standard of living. 

The National Commission for Visas and Passports controlled 
travel abroad and emigration. In 1989 travel and emigration were 
privileges granted by the regime, not civil rights of citizens. As a 
rule, only trusted party or government officials could travel abroad 
and were required to report to the Securitate for debriefing upon 
their return. Prospective emigrants faced many bureaucratic ob- 
stacles and harassment at the hands of the Securitate. 

Even the Securitate was unable to deter all Romanians from flee- 
ing the country to escape its political repression and economic hard- 
ships. An estimated 40,000 Romanians entered Hungary as refugees 
during 1988 alone (see Ethnic Structure, ch. 2). Romanians who 
applied to emigrate legally were dismissed from their jobs and were 
unable to find work other than manual labor. They were questioned 
and had their residences searched and personal belongings seized 
or were called up for military duty or service in special labor 
brigades. There were no time deadlines for the government to make 
decisions on emigration applications and no right of appeal for nega- 
tive decisions. Even with an exit visa, would-be emigrants con- 
fronted corrupt passport and customs officials demanding bribes 
amounting to US$3,000 to process necessary paperwork. The 
government received payment from West Germany and Israel in 
return for allowing ethnic German and Jewish Romanians to leave 
the country. Emigrants in these categories represented the vast 
majority of the 14,000 allowed to emigrate annually during the 
1980s. 

Dissidence 

There were few signs of widespread organized opposition to the 
Ceau§escu regime in the late 1980s, but scattered and sporadic in- 
dications of social and political unrest were increasing. This oppo- 
sition emanated from political and human rights activists, workers, 
religious believers, ethnic minority groups, and even former mid- 
level officials of the PCR. But the ubiquitous Securitate effective- 
ly suppressed dissidence because activists were few in number and 
isolated from one another and from their potential followers. 

The Securitate had an effective overall strategy and varied tac- 
tics for suppressing dissidence. It relied primarily on extralegal 
reprisals against leading individual dissidents that ranged from petty 
harassment, threats, and intimidation to physical beatings at the 
hands of the plainclothes militia. Dissidents were often fired from 
their jobs and then prosecuted and imprisoned for "parasitism," 



304 



National Security 



even though they were frequently denied all opportunities to work. 
To isolate dissidents from one another and from Western diplo- 
mats and media representatives inside Romania who could bring 
them international attention, the state denied them residence per- 
mits that were required by law before they could live in major cit- 
ies. The state either avoided prosecuting dissidents in open trials 
that would generate publicity for their causes or prosecuted them 
in secret trials before military courts (see Judicial System, this ch.). 

Even if they avoided detention, some well-known dissidents had 
their telephone and mail service interrupted and were jailed without 
warning. Several lived under virtual house arrest and constant sur- 
veillance by plainclothes Securitate agents and the uniformed 
militia, who cordoned off their apartments and intimidated potential 
visitors. Dissidents were often vilified publicly in the media as trai- 
tors, imperialist spies, or servants of the ancien regime. When the 
cases of certain dissidents became known to international human 
rights organizations and the state was unable to act freely against 
them, the Securitate pressured these dissidents to emigrate by mak- 
ing their lives unbearable and granting them exit visas to leave the 
country. Once the dissidents were removed from the domestic po- 
litical scene, the DIE acted against those who continued their criti- 
cism of the Ceau§escu regime while in exile (see Department of 
External Information, this ch.). 

Romania's industrial workers became an important source of 
unrest and a potential threat to the Ceau§escu regime and future 
PCR rule in the 1970s. During the 1980s, the labor force's res- 
tiveness continued, primarily in reaction to the virtual collapse of 
the national economy and the deteriorating standard of living (see 
The Economy, ch. 3). The regime's economic austerity policy and 
attendant food, fuel, and power shortages hurt the working class 
in particular. But Ceau§escu weathered spontaneous, short-lived 
labor protests with the support of the security forces and police, 
who prevented the development of a sustained, independent wor- 
kers' movement in Romania that would be comparable to Poland's 
Solidarity. Although they never failed to subdue protestors, the 
Securitate and police appeared to be strained under the burden 
of monitoring restive workers throughout Romania in the late 
1980s. 

Department of External Information 

The Department of External Information (DIE) was Romania's 
primary foreign intelligence organization (see fig. 13). It worked 
closely with the Ministry of Interior, the Securitate, and the general 
staffs Directorate for Military Intelligence (Direc$ia de Informajii 



305 



Romania: A Country Study 



DEPARTMENT OF 
EXTERNAL INFORMATION 



DIRECTORATE FOR 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 



DIRECTORATE 
FOR OPERATIONS 



DIRECTORATE FOR 
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 



SERVICE Z 



EMIGRE 
BRIGADE 



SERVICE 


D 




i BRIGADE 


SD 



Source: Based on information from Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Com- 
munist Spy Chief, Washington, 1987. 



Figure 13. Organization of the Romanian Intelligence Service, 1980s 

a Armatei — DIA). The defection of the DIE deputy director, Lieu- 
tenant General Ion Pacepa, in 1978 revealed considerable infor- 
mation on its activities abroad for the first time, precipitated a major 
purge of personnel from the DIE, and contributed to the cooling 
of relations between Romania and the United States in the 1980s. 

The DIE was formed with Soviet assistance in the mid-1950s. 
Until the early 1960s, Romania sent its intelligence officers to at- 
tend a two-year KGB training course in espionage tradecraft near 
Moscow. In 1964 Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej curtailed DIE 
cooperation with the KGB and established a DIE training center 
in Bro§teni, in Suceava^W*/. 

The Directorate for Operations conducted clandestine intelligence 
collection and other activities outside Romania. Its officers oper- 
ated under cover throughout the world, collecting political, eco- 
nomic, and technical intelligence for analysis by the Directorate 
for Foreign Intelligence. Brigade SD had 300 intelligence officers 
who were assigned primarily to Western countries to conduct tech- 
nological espionage. It focused on acquiring military-related tech- 
nology for use in the domestic arms industry and armed forces. 
According to Pacepa, however, Romania also transferred illegal- 
ly obtained Western industrial, electronics, nuclear energy, and 



306 



National Security 



data-processing technology to the Soviet Union, under a secret 
bilateral agreement, in exchange for hard currency. 

Within the Directorate for Operations, the Emigre Brigade had 
intelligence officers who contacted and worked among the 600,000 
Romanian emigres living in the United States, France, and West 
Germany. Playing on Romanian nationalism, they encouraged 
former Romanian citizens to cooperate with the DIE in obtaining 
Western high technology and engendering a favorable image of 
Romania abroad. The Emigre Brigade also monitored the activi- 
ties of exiled dissidents who were vocal critics of the Ceau§escu re- 
gime and attempted to assassinate selected emigres in retaliation 
for their opposition to Ceau§escu. 

In 1982 a Romanian agent who was dispatched to kill dissident 
writers Paul Goma and Virgil Tanase in Paris defected to French 
authorities before undertaking his mission. This episode severely 
strained previously close French-Romanian relations. The DIE's 
primary target abroad, however, was the Munich-based staff of Ra- 
dio Free Europe's (RFE) Romanian service, many of whom were 
Romanian emigres. For many years, RFE's Romanian service had 
monitored internal developments in Romania and exposed the re- 
pressive nature of the Ceau§escu regime. The beating and stabbing 
of several RFE staff members by unidentified assailants, several death 
threats, and the deaths from cancer of three successive directors 
of the Romanian service were attributed by some observers to DIE 
operations. 

Also within the Directorate for Operations, Service D conducted 
covert operations, including the dissemination of forgeries and dis- 
information, to promote Romanian national interests and foreign poli- 
cies. According to Pacepa, Service D's forgeries and disinformation 
were designed to influence Western countries to reward Romania 
for its independence of the Soviet Union with economic assistance 
and trading privileges and to generate political support among Third 
World countries. Service Z of the Directorate for Operations report- 
edly maintained ties to non- state entities including guerrilla move- 
ments, terrorist groups, and international organized crime. 

The Directorate for Technical Equipment was responsible for 
designing or obtaining specialized espionage equipment required by 
the DIE. It was reportedly involved in equipping some Romanian 
trucks to conduct espionage operations in Western Europe. The DIE's 
National Center for Enciphered Communications had the mission 
of protecting Romanian government and party communications from 
Western and Soviet electronic monitoring. In 1989 the ministries of 
national defense, interior, foreign affairs, and foreign trade relied on 



307 



Romania: A Country Study 

the center's encryption systems in their daily operations at home 
and abroad. 

* * * 

The best sources of information on Romanian military history, 
doctrine, and strategy are Hie Ceaugescu's Romanian Military Doc- 
trine and Ion Coman's The Romanian National Defense Concept. They 
cover the development of the Romanian military establishment from 
the earliest times until World War II. Romanian writers, however, 
ignore Soviet-Romanian fighting between 1941 and 1944, as well 
as Soviet domination of Romania until the late 1950s. John Erick- 
son's two- volume set, Stalin's War with Germany, fills this gap. Alex 
Alexiev's Romania and the Warsaw Pact and Aurel Braun's Romani- 
an Foreign Policy since 1965 provide the best descriptions and ana- 
lyses of postwar developments in Romania's defense policy and 
armed forces. 

Information on more current developments in the Romanian 
military establishment can be found in several sources. Radio Free 
Europe analysts have written extensively on Romanian arms sales, 
military budget, major command changes, and the professional mili- 
tary establishment's relations with the PCR and General Secre- 
tary Ceau§escu. 

There are few sources of information on Romania's system of 
law and order. Radio Free Europe Research [Munich] produces high- 
ly reliable articles on dissidence in Romania. Lieutenant General 
Ion Pacepa's Red Horizons is a highly interpretive firsthand account 
of the structure and domestic and foreign activities of Romania's 
security and intelligence services. He was deputy director of the 
DIE and a personal adviser to Ceau§escu before defecting in 1978. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



308 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Structure of Investments by Economic Sector, Selected Years, 

1951-80 

3 Projected State Budget Revenues, 1989 

4 Projected State Budget Expenditures, 1989 

5 Structure of the Labor Force by Sector, 1950 and 1982 

6 Trading Partners, 1960, 1970, and 1980 

7 Foreign Trade by Commodity Group, 1950, 1975, and 1985 

8 Planned Changes in the Energy Balance, 1980-90 

9 Growth of the Electric Power Industry, Selected Years, 

1950-90 

10 Membership of the Romanian Communist Party, 1970 and 
1988 



309 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Structure of Investments by Economic Sector, 
Selected Years, 1951-80 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1951-55 


1966-70 


1976-80 


Industry 










46.7 


42.3 


42.1 




7.0 


7.6 


7.1 




53.7 


49.9 


49.2 




3.6 


3.8 


5.9 




11.3 


16.0 


13.7 


Transportation and communications 


10.3 


10.2 


10.6 




10.1 


9.4 


10.2 




11.0 


10.7 


10.4 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1985, 108. 



311 



Romania: A Country Study 



Table 3. Projected State Budget Revenues, 1989 
(in millions of lei)* 



Source of Revenue Amount 



Self-financed state enterprises, cooperatives, and public units 

Profit payments 55,220.2 

Turnover taxes 233,283.0 

Taxes on incomes of public units and cooperatives 2,658.0 

Total 291,161.2 

Income taxes on the wage fund 50,924.0 

State social insurance 47,275.0 

Direct income taxes 5,727.4 

Taxes on agricultural cooperatives 1,590.0 

Unexplained sources of revenue 26,795.9 



TOTAL 423,473.5 



* For value of the leu — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from "Legea planului national unic de dezvoltare economico- 
sociala a Republicii Socialiste Romania pe anul 1989," Scinteia [Bucharest], 
December 2, 1988, 1-2. 



Table 4. Projected State Budget Expenditures, 1989 
(in millions of lei)* 



Sector Amount 



Financing the national economy 183,373.4 

Social and cultural needs 107,041.8 

Defense 11,753.3 

Administration, court system 4,000.7 

Scientific research and development 

and application of new technologies 1,103.0 

Expenditures not itemized 116,201.3 



TOTAL 423,473.5 



* For value of the leu — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from "Legea planului national unic de dezvoltare economico- 
sociala a Republicii Socialiste Romania pe anul 1989," Scinteia [Bucharest], 
December 2, 1988, 1-2. 



312 



Appendix 



Table 5. Structure of the Labor Force by Sector, 1950 and 1982 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1950 


1982 




12.0 

, , , 74.1 
..... 2.2 


36.5 
28.6 
7.7 


Trade 


1 Q 

2.5 




o.z 
5.9 


Municipal services, education, 








2.3 


4.1 


Public health 


1.1 


2.8 


Science and scientific services 


0.2 


1.1 




0.3 


0.8 




1.7 


0.6 


Forestry 

Other 


0.2 

1.5 


0.4 

5.3 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from East European Economic Handbook, London, 1985, 202. 



Table 6. Trading Partners, I960, 1970, and 1980 
(in percentages) 



Type of Partner 


1960 


1970 


1980 




66.8 


49.0 


33.7 




6.2 


6.8 


6.8 




22.1 


35.6 


32.8 




4.6 


8.2 


25.2 




0.3 


0.4 


1.5 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1985, 49. 



313 



Romania: A Country Study 



Table 7. Foreign Trade by Commodity Group, 
1950, 1975, and 1985 
(in percentages) 

1950 1975 1985 

Commodity Group Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 



Fuels, minerals, and metals . . . 


33.8 


23.5 


22.7 


30.4 


24.9 


51.0 




4.2 


38.3 


22.8 


40.3 


34.7 


26.7 




1.3 


10.2 


18.1 


5.5 


16.9 


4.2 




1.7 


4.5 


7.0 


6.7 


9.8 


6.4 


Other nonfood raw materials . . 


28.9 


21.4 


10.2 


10.1 


4.4 


5.6 




14.1 


0.3 


12.1 


3.0 


6.3 


2.3 


Other 


16.0 


1.8 


7.1 


4.0 


3.0 


3.8 


TOTAL 


. 100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from Romania, Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Roma- 
nia, 1986, Bucharest, 1987, 294. 



Table 8. Planned Changes in the Energy 
Balance, 1980 and 1990 
(in percentages) 



Energy Source 



1980 



1990 



Oil and gas 40 5 

Coal 40 44 

Hydroelectric 18 24 

Nuclear 18 

Other 2 9 

TOTAL 100 100 

Source: Based on information from Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 
Stanford, California, 1988, 206. 



314 



Appendix 



Table 9. Growth of the Electric Power Industry, 
Selected Years, 1950-90 



Installed Capacity Output 



Year (in megawatts) (in gigawatt-hours) 



1950 740 2,113 

1960 1,779 7,650 

1970 11,578 53,721 

1980 16,109 67,034 

1990 * 23,018 n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 
* As projected. 

Source: Based on information from "Elektroenergetika Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki 
Rumynii," Elektricheskie stantsii [Moscow], No. 11, 1986, 74-75. 



Table 10. Membership of the Romanian Communist 
Party, 1970 and 1988 



1970 1988 

Group Number Percentage Number Percentage 



Workers 867,290 43.4 2,042,951 55.1 

Peasants 531,447 26.6 575,751 15.5 

Intelligentsia 481,083 24.0 757,157 20.4 

Pensioners and 

housewives 119,900 6.0 333,876 9.0 

TOTAL 1,999,720 100.0 3,709,735 100.0 



Source: Based on information from Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 
Stanford, California, 1988, 196. 



315 



Bibliography 



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Basdevant, Denise. Against Tide and Tempest: The Story of Rumania. 
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Bauer, Yehuda. A History of the Holocaust. New York: Franklin 
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Crankshaw, Edward. Khrushchev: A Career. New York: Viking, 1966. 

Crowther, William E. The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism. New 
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Shafir, Michael. Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder, 
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Chapter 4 

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"Romania: Problems of Independence and Develop- 
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"Romania: The Politics of Autonomy," Current History, 

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Fischer-Gala^i, Stephen. "Romania's Development as a Com- 
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Graham, Lawrence S. Romania: A Developing Socialist State. Boul- 
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Romania: A Country Study 



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Chapter 5 

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"The Romanian Army." Pages 149-68 in Jonathan R. 

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Bacon, Walter M., Jr. "The Military and the Party in Romania." 
Pages 165-80 in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), 
Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1978. 

Braun, Aurel. Romanian Foreign Policy since 1965: The Political and 
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Coman, Ion. The Romanian National Defense Concept. Bucharest: Mili- 
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Crowther, William E. "Romanian Politics and the International 
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Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. (Stalin's War with Germany 
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Eyal, Jonathan. "Ceau§escu's Armed Forces," Armed Forces [Shep- 
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Gilberg, Trond. 4 'Romania's Growing Difficulties," Current His- 
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Holmes, Richard, and David Isby. * 'Romania." Pages 491-93 in 
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Jacobini, H.B. "The Romanian Procuratura, " East European Quar- 
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Kaplan, Stephen S. Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Po- 
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Pacepa, Ion Mihai. Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief. 
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[Bern].) 



335 



Glossary 



Banat — Region bounded by the Tisza River on the west, the Mure§ 
River on the north, the Transylvanian Alps on the east, and 
the Danube on the south. After World War I, it was divided 
between Yugoslavia and Romania. 

Bessarabia — Region between the Dniester and Prut rivers north 
of the Black Sea. Seized by the Soviet Union in 1940, it was 
merged with Bukovina (q. v. ) to form the Moldavian Soviet So- 
cialist Republic. 

Bukovina (var. , Bucovina) — Region in the foothills of the Eastern 
Carpathians at the headwaters of the Prut, Siret, and Dniester 
rivers. The region belonged to Romania between World War 
I and World War II, but was annexed by the Soviet Union 
in 1940. 

central (pi., centrale) — Large industrial associations created by eco- 
nomic reforms in the late 1960s ostensibly to assume some of 
the decision-making authority of the various economic minis- 
tries. They had little real autonomy. 

Comecon — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Founded 
in 1949; headquartered in Moscow. In 1989 members were Bul- 
garia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Viet- 
nam. Purpose was to promote economic development of mem- 
ber states through cooperation and specialization. 

Dobruja (var., Dobrudja and Dobrogea) — Black Sea coastal lands 
lying south of the Danube in southeastern Romania and north- 
eastern Bulgaria. 

Extensive economic development — Expanding production by 
adding resources rather than by improving the efficiency with 
which these resources are exploited. 

Fiscal Year (FY) — One-year financial accounting period; in Roma- 
nia coincides with calendar year. 

GATT — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. An interna- 
tional organization established in 1948 and headquartered in 
Geneva that serves as a forum for international trade negotia- 
tions. GATT members pledge to further multilateral trade by 
reducing import tariffs, quotas, and preferential trade agree- 
ments and promise to extend to each other any favorable trad- 
ing terms offered in subsequent agreements with third parties. 

GNA — Grand National Assembly. Nominally the supreme organ 
of state power, it was essentially a rubber-stamp legislature of 



337 



Romania: A Country Study 



369 deputies elected every five years. It met twice yearly and 
in special sessions as necessary. 
GNP — gross national product. The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced in a nation during a specified period, usually 
one year. 

Greater Romania — Following World War I, Romania incorporated 
Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the eastern Banat, and 
southern Dobruja. It subsequently lost much of this territory. 

IMF — International Monetary Fund. Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 
main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. 
These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- 
ternal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

judei (p\.,jude$e) — Local administrative division corresponding to 
county or district. There are forty such units plus the munici- 
pality of Bucharest and the surrounding Ilfov Agricultural 
District. 

leu (pi., lei) — Standard unit of currency, divided into 100 bani. 
The official exchange rate in January 1989 stood at 14.5 lei 
per US$1 , but the actual rate varied according to type of trans- 
action. 

Moldavia (var., Moldova and Moldau) — Former principality, east 
of Transylvania (q.v.) and north and east of Walachia (q.v.). 

multilateral^ developed socialist state — The proclaimed goal for 
Romania's social and economic development to be achieved 
by the year 2000. The goal envisioned an industrially advanced 
socialist nation with an efficient and productive agriculture and 
a well-educated population enjoying a high standard of living. 

national income — The total value of a nation's material produc- 
tion, excluding depreciation, achieved in one year. 

New Economic and Financial Mechanism — Economic reforms 
introduced in March 1978, the first of numerous efforts to im- 
prove economic management and planning by increasing the 
decision-making powers of individual enterprises and centrale 
{q.v.). The reforms were implemented only half-heartedly. 

PCR — Partidul Comunist Roman (Romanian Communist Party). 
The ruling and only legal political party. Founded in 1921, 
the Communist Party was declared illegal in 1924 and operat- 
ed underground until 1944. The party came to power as a result 
of the Soviet occupation during the final year of World War 
II. In 1948 it merged with one wing of the Social Democratic 



338 



Glossary 



Party to form the Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Mun- 
citoresc Roman — PMR). In 1965 the party assumed its present 
name. 

Polexco — Political Executive Committee. The politburo of the PCR 
(q.v.), the party's primary policy-making body. In 1988 there 
were nineteen members, most of whom held other important 
party and government positions. 

Procuratura — Office of the prosecutor general, established in 1952, 
it operates the court system, decides jurisdictional questions, 
compiles crime statistics, and oversees the central criminology 
institute and forensic science laboratory. 

Securitate — Popular term for the Departmentul Securita$ii Statului 
(Department of State Security), the secret police. On a per capi- 
ta basis, Romania had the largest such service in Eastern Europe. 

socialism (adj., socialist) — In Marxist theory, a stage of historical 
development transitional between capitalism and communism. 
Romania claimed to have attained socialism by 1965. 

Sublime Porte (short form, the Porte) — Term used by Europeans 
to designate the Ottoman court or the government of Ottoman 
Turkey; derived from the gate (port) of the sultan's palace, at 
which justice was administered in ancient times. 

Transylvania (var. , Transilvania) — Region of northwestern and cen- 
tral Romania of triangular shape, bounded on the north, east, 
and south by the Carpathian Mountains and Transylvanian 
Alps. 

UGSR — Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor din Romania (General 
Union of Trade Unions). Official organization incorporating 
all labor unions of blue- and white-collar workers. Member- 
ship in 1985 was 7.3 million. 

UTC — Uniunea Tineretului Comunist (Union of Communist 
Youth). Official organization that functioned as the youth 
branch of the PCR (q.v.). Membership open to young people 
between ages fifteen and twenty-six. Membership in 1984 es- 
timated at 3.7 million. 

voivode — A slavic term designating a military leader, adopted for 
a time by the rulers or princes of Walachia and Moldavia. 

Walachia (var., Wallachia) — Former principality between the 
Danube and Transylvanian Alps in southern Romania. 

Warsaw Treaty Organization — Formal name for Warsaw Pact. 
Military alliance of communist countries founded in 1955, with 
headquarters in Moscow. The Soviet minister of defense was 
traditionally the supreme commander of Warsaw Pact forces. 
Members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. 



339 



Romania: A Country Study 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- 
nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, found- 
ed in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through 
loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 
growth of productive private enterprises in less developed coun- 
tries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD 
hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the IMF (q.v.). 



340 



Index 



abortion policy, 71, 72-74, 109, 157-58 

academies, 120, 279 

acquired immune deficiency syndrone 
(AIDS), 129-30 

Adriatic Sea, 4 

Aegean Sea, 4 

Afghanistan, 59, 239, 292 

African nations, 247 

Agerpres. See Romanian Press Agency 

agrarian reform laws (1917-21) (see also 
land policy), 36 

agreements (see also treaties): for bilater- 
al relations (1977) with Hungary, 241; 
with Germany for resource exploita- 
tion, 40; with Soviet Union, 48 

agricultural sector (see also irrigation): be- 
fore and after World War II, 93; 
agricultural regions in, 180, 182; 
cooperative farms in, 184, 186, 187-88, 
199; employment in, 75-76, 78, 
136-37; farming practices in, 183-84; 
forced collectivization of, xxiii, 51, 54, 
77, 87, 95, 138, 156, 159, 184; govern- 
ment intervention in, 95, 183-84, 

186- 89; impact of land reform on, 
36-37; investment in, 136-37; irrigation 
in, 69, 136, 137; performance of, 137; 
private farms in, 183, 184, 186, 

187- 88, 199; productivity in, 186; self- 
sufficiency program in, 188-89; state 
farms in, 95, 140, 184, 187-88; sys- 
tematization program in, xxviii, 78-80, 
186-87, 199, 242; taxation of, 38; use 
of horses in, 184 

agro-industrial councils, 187 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

aircraft manufacture, 170-71, 286, 288- 
89 

air defense system, 273 
airfields, 179 

air force: air defense system of, 273; or- 
ganization of, 271; reponsibilities relat- 
ed to ground forces of, 271; size and 
equipment of, 270-71, 273 

airlines, 179-80 

airports, 179 

Alba-Iulia, 76 



alcoholism, 128 

Alexander I (tsar of Russia), 23, 253 

Alexander the Great, 6 

Alexandru loan Cuza Naval Secondary 

School, 278 
Algeria, 293 

Allied Control Commission, 43, 257 
aluminum industry, 174 
Andropov, Yuri, 239 
Angola, 293 

Anti-Comintern Pact (1940), 255 
anticommunism, 3 

anti-Semitism, xxv-xxvi, 36, 38-39, 
41-42, 51-52, 124 

Antonescu, Ion, xxvi, 41-43, 45, 47, 257 

Antonescu, Mihai, 42, 47 

Apostol, Gheorghe, 222, 224-25, 230 

apparel industry, 176 

April Declaration (1964), xxvi, 55 

Apuseni Mountains, 66 

Arad, 88, 172, 176, 242 

Arafat, Yasir, 246-47 

Arges. River, 69, 167, 178 

armaments industry, 286-87, 293 

armed forces: government and PCR con- 
trol of, 262; importance of ground 
forces for, 268-70; political indoctrina- 
tion in, 277-78; potential threat to 
Ceau§escu of; 266; role of government 
related to, 262-63; size of, 262 

armistice (1944), 257 

arms control, 244, 261-62 

army ground forces: antitank and air 
defense regiments of, 269-70; artillery 
units and missile battalions of, 269; 
equipment of, 269; losses at Stalingrad 

f (1941), 256; size of, 268-69 

Arpad Dynasty, 10 

Asian, Ana, 128 

Atlantic Ocean, 64 

Aurelian (Roman emperor), 8 

Aurel Vlaicu Military Academy for Avi- 
ation Officers, 279 

Ausgleich (Dual Monarchy), 22, 29, 31 

austerity program, xxv, 58-59, 60, 63, 
74, 139 

Australia, 170, 174 

Austria (see also Habsburg Dynasty): 



341 



Romania: A Country Study 



relations with, 29, 34, 36, 290; sov- 

eignty over Transylvania, 18-22 
Austrian Empire, 20 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (see also Habs- 

burg Dynasty; Ausgleich), 29, 34, 253, 

255 

automation-technology industry, 172-73 
automotive industry, 171-72 
Avars, 8 

Averescu, Alexandru, 36 
Axis Powers, xxvi, 41 



Bacau, 171, 269, 278 
balance of payments, 58, 165 
Balkan Entente (1934), 39 
Balkan Peninsula, 64 
Balkan War, First (1912), 31 
Balkan War, Second (1913), 31, 254 
the Banat, 35; agriculture in, 180; as 

region, 64-65 
banking system, 147-50 
Baptists, 124 

Basarab I (prince of Walachia), 11 

Basta, Giorgio, 16 

Bathory, Gabriel, 16 

Bayezid (sultan), 12 

Bega Canal, 177 

Bela IV (king of Hungary), 10 

Bessarabia, 23, 26, 28, 31, 34, 37; be- 
comes part of Romania (1918), 255; 
loss to Soviet Union of (1940), 40, 65; 
return to Romania of, 41 ; as territory 
of Soviet Union (1947), 48 

Bethlen, Gabor, 16 

Bibescu, Gheorghe (prince of Walachia), 
25 

Birladeanu, Alexandru, 230 

birthrates, 70, 72-75, 109, 136, 157-58 

black market, 127, 151, 278 

Black Sea (see also Danube-Black Sea 
Canal): as physical geographic bound- 
ary, 10, 28; in commerce and trade, 12, 
13, 25; in early settlement of Romania, 
4, 11, 76; navigation and fishing in, 
178, 183; oil exploration in, 154, 168; 
role in national defense, 256, 275 

Black Sea Fleet, 273 

BND. See National Democratic Bloc 

Bocskay, Stephen, 16 

Bodnara§, Emil, 258 

Bogdan, 10 



Border Guards, 275-76 
Bosnia, 30 

Braila, 173, 179, 273 
Brandt, Willi, 244 

Brasov, 9, 66, 76, 101, 160, 170-71, 230, 
278 

Bra§oveneau, Theorghe, 161 
Bratianu, Ion, 27 

Bratianu, Ionel, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37-38 
Brezhnev, Leonid, 59, 238-39, 291-92 
Brezhnev Doctrine, 59, 238 
bridges, 177, 289 

Britain, 25, 26, 31, 32, 40, 43, 44, 47, 
246, 290 

Bucharest Computer Enterprise, 173 
Bucharest-Danube Canal, 289 
Bucharest Declaration of 1966, 243 
Bucharest Electronics Enterprise, 180 
Bucharest Industrial Center for Electron- 
ics and Automation, 172 
Bucharest subway system, 177, 289 
budget, national (see also spending, gov- 
ernment), 146-47 
Bukovina, 23, 65; becomes part of Roma- 
nia (1918), 255; ceded to Soviet Union 
(1940), 40; as territory of Soviet 
Union (1947), 48; in World War II, 
256 

Bulgar Empire, 8 

Bulgaria, 40; attacks Serbia, 32; border 
with, 64, 69; in First Balkan War, 31; 
reclaims Dobruja, 40; relations with, 
240-41 ; in Second Balkan War, 31 , 254 

Burebista, 6 



cadre rotation principle, xxii, 57, 141, 
266 

Caesar, Julius, 6 

Calinescu, Armand, 40 

Calvinism (see also Reformed (Calvinist) 

Church), 14, 82, 124 
Camp David Accords, 246 
Cana, Ionel, 161 
canals, 51, 52, 58, 153, 177-79 
Carol I (see also Charles of Hohenzollern- 

Sigmaringen), 254 
Carol (king of Romania), 38; actions in 

Iron Guard period of, 39; at beginning 

of World War II, 40-41 
Carpathian Basin (see also Transylvanian 

Plateau), 9 



342 



Index 



Carpathian Mountains (see also Transyl- 
vanian Alps), 4, 64, 65, 66, 153, 154, 
155, 182, 255, 256, 261 

Catherine the Great (tsarina of Russia), 
23 

Ceausescu, Elena, 58, 141, 195, 231; cult 
of personality around, 227-28; power 
in government of, xxii; role in Coun- 
cil of Ministers of, 204; role in party- 
state organizations of, xxii, 207; role in 
Polexco Permanent Bureau of, 214 

Ceau§escu, Hie, xxii, 208, 267 

Ceau§escu, Nicolae: administration poli- 
cies of, 3, 56-58; armed forces purges 
initiated by, 266-67; assimilation policy 
of, xxvii-xxviii; consolidates power, 
xxi, xxiii, 57, 222-26; control of armed 
forces by, xxiii, 262-66; control of 
government functions by, xxi-xxii; 
control of state budget by, 146; control 
over military leaders by, 251, 266; as 
creator of military doctrine, 258; cult 
of personality around, 3, 58, 59, 63, 
104, 106, 227-28, 258; economic poli- 
cies of, xxiii-xxiv, xxvii, xxviii-xxix, 
57-58, 138-39; elected president of 
State Council, 202-3; encourages so- 
cialist democracy, 217; execution of, 
xxxi; foreign policy of, 196, 238-41; 
impact on Romania of, xxi; as leader 
of PCR, 195, 211-12; as president, 
195, 203; protege of Gheorghiu-Dej, 
52-54, 56; relations with Soviet lead- 
ers of, 238-41; response to 1989 
uprising, xxx; role in party-state or- 
ganizations of, 207-8; role in Polexco 
Permanent Bureau of, 214 

Ceausescu, Nicu, xxii, 221, 228 

Celts, 6, 89 

Center for Studies and Research in Mili- 
tary History and Theory, 265 

Central Council of Workers' Control over 
Economic and Social Activities, 141, 
207-8 

centrale, 142, 143 

Central Powers, 29, 31, 32, 34, 254 
Cernavoda, 28, 167, 177, 179, 289 
Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 

27-29, 31-32 
Charles Robert (king of Hungary), 11 
chemical agents, 269 
chemical industry (see also petrochemical 

industry), 155-56, 175-76 



Chernenko, Konstantin, 238, 239 

China, People's Republic (PRC): ideo- 
logical conflict with Soviet Union of, 
xxvi, xxxvii, 55, 238; relations with, 53, 
54-55, 57, 231, 238, 239, 287, 290, 291 

Chi§inevschi, Iosif, 54 

Christianity (see also religion): adoption of, 
8-9 

Churchill, Winston, 44 

Civic Alliance, xxxiv-xxxv 

climate, 70, 152, 180 

Cluj (-Napoca) 54, 76, 88, 90, 160, 173, 

241, 242, 269, 302 
coal industry (see also Jiu Valley), 169-70 
coal reserves (see also lignite), 58, 136, 

154-55, 166 
Code on Minor Violations of the Law, 

297 

Codreanu, Corneilu Zelea (Capitanul), 

38-39 
Coman, Ion, 266 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Cooperation 

Cominform: expels Yugoslavia, 52; 
founded 1947, 49 

Communist Party (see also Romanian 
Communist Party), 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 
47, 211 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), 49, 213, 237 

computer industries, 172-73 

concentration camps, 41-42 

Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE). See Helsinki Ac- 
cords (1975) 

Congress of Berlin (1878), 28, 254 

Congress of the Higher Councils of So- 
cialist Agricultural Units and of the 
Whole Peasantry, 187 

Conservative Party, 31, 37 

conservatories, 120 

Constanja, 28, 70, 76, 168, 173, 174, 177, 
179 

Consjanta-Sud port facility, 179 

Constantinescu, Miron, 54 

Constantinople, 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, 31 

constitution (1923), 37 

constitution (1948), 3, 196-97 

constitution (1952): provisions of, 196, 
197-98, 199, 204; revision in govern- 
mental organization under, 198 

Constitution (1965): amendments (1974), 
195, 200, 202, 203; declares socialist 



343 



Romania: A Country Study 



unitary state, 14, 86; provisions for 
electoral system in, 210-11; provisions 
for human rights and civil liberties of, 
294; provisions for State Council un- 
der, 201-3; provisions of, 198; social- 
ism addressed in, 199 

Constitution and Legal Affairs Commis- 
sion, 200-201 

Control Data Corporation, 172-73 

cooperative farms. See agricultural sector 

copper industry, 174 

copper mining, 174 

corn production, 180, 182 

corruption, 12, 22, 27, 36, 37, 38, 41, 64 

Council for Mutual Economic Coopera- 
tion (Comecon), xxvi, 50, 54, 55; role 
in, xxviii-xxix, 87, 108, 140, 159, 162, 
164, 168, 172, 174, 190, 236, 237, 238, 
239, 240 

Council for Social and Economic Organi- 
zations, 141 

Council for Socialist Culture and Educa- 
tion, 231, 234-35 

Council of Forestry, 154 

Council of Ministers: authority over eco- 
nomic policy of, 142; membership in, 
195, 204, 216; reorganization of, 205; 
role in government organization of, 
199-200, 203-5 

Council of Romanian Radio and Televi- 
sion, 231, 233 

Council of State (see also State Council), 
263, 295, 297 

Council of Working People of German 
Nationality, 86, 220 

Council of Working People of Hungari- 
an Nationality, 86, 220 

councils: agro-industrial, 187; economic 
coordinating, 140-41 ; joint party-state, 
xxi-xxii, 207; judicial, 295; local de- 
fense councils, 263; people's, 50, 187, 
197; workers', 86-87, 100-101 

coup d'etat: in 1944, 257; attempted 
(1983), xxii, 267 

court system: jude}e courts in, 206; judi- 
cial reform (1978), 294; lower courts in, 
206; military courts in, 206; under 
Ministry of Justice, 205, 294; role of 
GNA in, 200; Supreme Court in, 202, 
203, 205-6 

CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 

Craiova, 166, 171, 176, 254, 289 



crime, 129, 297-98 

Crimean War (1853-56), 4, 25-26 

Croats, 80 

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 55 

culture (see also agricultural sector; minori- 
ty groups): Greek, 4; Hellenic, 6; Hun- 
garian, 10; Roman, 3; Romanian, 19, 
20, 22, 55; Western, 51; under Ceauses- 
cu regime, 104, 106, 231-35, 236 

currency (see also banking system), 145, 
150-51, 162, 165 

currency reform (1947), 94 

Curtea de Arge§, 177 

Cuza, Alexandru loan, 26; development 
of military capability by, 253-54; re- 
form program of, 26-27 

Cyril (saint), 8 

Czechoslovakia: annexation by Germany 
of Sudetenland, 40; Civic Forum in, 
xxix; liberation by Red Army of, 44; 
in Little Entente and Balkan Entente, 
39, 255; relations with, 56, 240-41; 
Warsaw Pact nations invade (1968), 56, 
291, 238, 258 



Dacia, 3, 7-8, 137, 252 
Dacian people, 3-8, 252 
Danube-Black Sea Canal, xxiv, 51, 52, 

58, 153, 177-79, 289 
Danube Delta, 65, 69, 182, 183 
Danube River, 4, 66, 69, 64 
Darius the Great, 5-6 
debt, external, xxiv-xxv, xxvii, 58-59, 

74, 139, 165 
Decebalus, 6-7 

Defense Council, 203, 207, 216; powers 
related to armed forces of, 262-64; 
structure throughout government of, 
263 

defense policy (see also military doctrine), 
289-90 

de Gaulle, Charles, xxvii, 238, 245 
democratic centralism principle, 139, 143, 
213 

Democratic Federative Moldavian Re- 
public, 34 

Democratic Forum (Hungary), 242 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
See Korea, North 

Democratic Republic of Germany. See 
Germany, East 



344 



Index 



demographic trends: historical, 70-72; 
policy to change, 72-75, 157-58 

Department for Contracting, Acquiring, 
and Storing Farm Produce, 188 

Department of Cults, 120, 121 

Department of External Information 
(Departamentul de Informatii Externe: 
DIE), 298-99, 305-8 

Department of State Security (Depar- 
tamentul Securiatii Statului: Securi- 
tate). See Securitate 

DGTO. See Securitate 

DIA. See Directorate for Military Intel- 
ligence 

DIE. See Department of External Infor- 
mation 
Dinca, Ion, 266 

Directorate for Military Intelligence 
(Direcjia de Informatii a Armatei: 
DIA), 264 

Directorate for Military Publishing, 264 

disease, 128 

disinformation, 231, 307 

divorce: causes of, 110; procedure for and 

rate of, 109; rules for, 72 
Dobruja, 28, 31, 34; agriculture in, 180, 

182; becomes part of Romania (1918), 

255; as Bulgarian territory (1947), 48; 

reclaimed by Bulgaria (1940), 40; as 

region, 64 
Dobrujan Tableland, 66 
Dozsa, Gyorgy, 13 
Draghici, Alexandru, 56, 222, 224 
Drago§, 10 

Drobeta-Turnu Severin, 76, 88, 172, 173, 

179, 287, 302 
Dromichaites, Basileus, 6 
drought, xxiv, 48, 58, 94, 152, 180, 183 
Dual Monarchy (Ausgleich), 22, 29, 31 
Dubcek, Alexander, 56, 291 
Duca, Ion, 39 
dynastic socialism, xxii, 58 

earthquake, xxiv, 58, 139 

Eastern Orthodox Church {see also Roma- 
nian Orthodox Church), 9-10, 11, 14, 
83; capitulation to, 19; pressure to ac- 
cept Uniate Church tenets, 18 

Economic and Social Organization Coun- 
cil, 207 

economic coordinating councils, 140-41 
economic development, 137-38; mul- 
tilateral development policy of, xxi, 



135, 138-39, 165; by Nazi Germany, 
40; under King Charles, 28 

economic performance {see also labor force; 
industrial sector): effect of Allied bom- 
bardment on, 42, 48; in 1980s, 63, 
135-36; impact of energy crisis on, 166; 
in interwar period (1919-39), 38; post- 
Ceau§escu, xxxv-xxxvi; in 1950s to 
1970s, xxiv-xxv, 57, 138-39 

economic planning: administrative hier- 
archy for, 142-44; annual and five- 
year, 138, 139, 143, 148, 157, 159, 168, 
171, 173, 176, 179, 190; state planning 
commission for, 50-51, 141 

economic policy (see also economic de- 
velopment): post-Ceau§escu, xxxv- 
xxxvi; to reduce external debt, 58-59; 
reform for (1969), 57, 143, 145 

education: availability of, 63; historical 
lack of, 11; rise in levels of, 71, 102, 
105-6; technical and vocational, 90, 
116-18 

education, military (Soviet Union) (see abo 

training, military), 258 
educational system: administration of, 

114- 15; compulsory segments of, 117; 
ideological and political training in, 

115- 16; importance of, 116; limits to 
higher education, 120; military second- 
ary schools in, 278; preschool and kin- 
dergarten, 117 

Egypt, 246, 293 

election law (1917), 32 

elections: free (1919), 35; post-Ceau§escu, 
xxxii; rigged (1922-28), 37 

electoral system, 210-11 

electric power generation (see also hydro- 
electric power industry), 58, 69, 136, 
153, 166-67 

electric engineering, 173 

elite class (see abo intelligentsia class): pow- 
er of, 63-64; remnants of old, 93-94; 
in post-World War II era, 105-7, 118 

emigration: of Germans, xxvii, xxxiii, 92, 
243-44; of Gypsies, xxxiii; of Hungari- 
ans, xxviii, xxxiii, 93, 242; of Jews, 52, 
92-93; opposition to minority, 91-93; 
policy for, xxvii, 158; of skilled labor, 

136, 157; from Transylvania (13th cen- 
tury), 10 

energy conservation. See rationing 
energy resources. See coal reserves; elec- 
tric power generation; natural gas 



345 



Romania: A Country Study 



industry and reserves; natural gas 
resources; oil industry; oil reserves 

energy sources, alternative, 168 

Engels, Friedrich, 108 

environmental degradation, 127, 136, 153 

Ethiopia, 293 

ethnic groups (see also nationality groups), 
65; assimiliation policy for, xxvii- 
xxviii; Croats, 80; distribution in popu- 
lation of, 81-85; diversity in, 80; Ger- 
mans, 65, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85; Gypsies, 
80-81; Hungarians, 65, 80; Jews, 80, 
81; Magyars, 82; Serbs, 65, 80; Szek- 
lers, 82; Ukrainians, 80 
European Community (EC), xxxiii-xxiv 
European Economic Community (EEC), 
164 

executions, 13, 16, 20, 47, 54, 57, 267, 
277, 299 

exports: agricultural products in, xxv, 
xxxi, 59, 135, 137-39, 164, 188, 190; 
armaments in, 164, 273, 283, 290, 293; 
automotive products in, 171; electron- 
ic equipment in, 164, 172, 180; for hard 
currency, 135, 139, 145, 162, 283, 293; 
forestry products in, 137, 153; furniture 
in, 176; machine tools in, 136, 164; 
metallurgical products in, 136, 164; oil- 
field equipment in, 136, 164, 170; 
petroleum products in, 168-69; railroad 
rolling stock and locomotives in, 136, 
164, 170, 172; ships in, 164; textiles in, 
176 

family law: provisions for increasing 
family size, 110; Romanian Family 
Code of, 109 

family structure, 110 

famine and starvation, 23, 42, 48, 71, 94, 
123 

fascism (see also Nazi Germany), xxv- 
xxvi, 38-39 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, West 

Ferdinand (king of Romania), 32, 34, 35 

Ferdinand V (emperor of Austria), 21 

fertility rates (see also birthrates), 71 

fertilizer industry, 176 

Filderman, Wilhelm, 42 

film production, 235 

fishing industry, 69, 183 

FND. See National Democratic Front 



food consumption, 189-90 

food-processing industry, 176 

foreign policy: of Ceaugescu regime, xxiii, 
xxvi-xxix, 196, 235, 238-48; under 
Gheorghiu-Dej, xxvi, 3, 237-38; GNA 
responsibility for, 235; Polexco Perma- 
nent Bureau framing of, 235; role of 
Council of Ministers for, 235 

foreign trade 

forestry, 137, 153-54 

forests, 66, 153-54 

France: business dealings with, 149, 171, 
271, 289; influence on military sector 
of, 253; relations with, 25, 26, 32, 39, 
40, 47, 49, 245-46, 254, 255, 290, 307 
Francis I (emperor of Austria), 20 
Franco-Prussian War (1870), 27 
Franz Ferdinand (archduke of Austria), 31 
Franz Joseph (emperor of Austria), 21-22 
Frunze Military Academy, 279 
Fulbright program, 104 
furniture industry, 176 

Galati, 167, 170, 173, 174, 179, 273 
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT), xxvi, 58, 163, 196 
General Directorate for Agriculture and 

Food Industry, 187 
General Military Academy, 279 
General Union of Trade Unions of 

Romania (Uniunea Generala a Sin- 

dicatelor din Romania: UGSR), 161, 

220, 221-22, 223, 232 
Geneva Refugee Convention, 243 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 243 
geographic location, xxv, 3, 64-65, 70, 

252, 292 

Georgescu, Teohari, 46, 47, 52, 53 
Gepids, 8 

German language, 20, 21, 22, 90, 91, 
232, 234 

German people (see also Saxon people; 
Swabian people), 11-12, 22; adopt 
Lutheranism, 14; emigration of, xxvii, 
xxxiii, 92, 243-44; in Transylvania, 
82-85 

German-Soviet armistice, 34 
Germany (see also Nazi Germany): attacks 

Serbia, 32; Romania as ally of, 4 
Germany, East, 240-41 



346 



Index 



Germany, West: recognition of (1967), 
56, 238; relations with, xxvi, 243-44 

Getae people (see also Thraco-Getian peo- 
ple), 4-7, 252 

Getic Tableland, 66 

Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe: administra- 
tion of, 3, 52-56, 222, 237; communist 
party leader, xxiii, 3, 45, 47, 49-50, 52, 
196; criticism of regime of, 224; eco- 
nomic policies of, xxvi, 3, 55, 163, 
237-38; foreign policy of, xxvi, 3; im- 
prisonment of, 39 

glasnost, 240 

GNA. See Grand National Assembly 
Goma, Paul, 104, 161 
Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxix, 107, 238, 240 
Goths, 8 

government administration: judefe or 
county system in, 143, 199, 208, 263, 
295, 299; PCR role at local levels, 
216-17; people's councils in local, 50, 
187, 197, 208-10; territorial reorgani- 
zation of (1968), 199, 208 

government intervention: in agricultural 
sector, 183, 184, 186-89; in church ac- 
tivities, 51; control of media, 231-35; 
in economic and social structure, 63; 
expropriation, 94; in migration pat- 
terns, 77-78 

Grand National Assembly (GNA), 141; 
responsibility for foreign policy of, 235; 
responsibility related to armed forces of, 
263; role and power in government of, 
141, 143, 145, 146, 165, 190, 199-201, 
204, 294-95; standing commissions of, 
200-201 ; supervision of people's coun- 
cils by, 209 

Greater Romania, 4, 36, 37 

Greece, 31; in Balkan Entente, 39; na- 
tionalist occupation of Walachia by, 23; 
trading colonies of, 4-5, 6 

Grosz, Karoly, 242 

Groza, Petru: administration of, 46-48; 

ties to Communist Party of, 49, 52 
guerrilla detachments (see also Patriotic 

Guards), 268 

Habsburg Dynasty (see also Austria), 4, 

14, 18, 253 
Hamsa Pasha, 13 

health care system: abortions in, 71, 72; 
accessibility of, 126-28; funding for, 



126; improvement during Russian Pro- 
tectorate of, 24; prohibition of abortions 
in, 72 

Helsinki Accords (1975), xxviii, 104, 230, 

247-48, 262 
Herodotus, 5 

Higher Political Council of the Army, 

xxii, 265-66 
highway network (see also road system), 

177 

Hider, Adolph, xxvi, 39, 40, 255-56, 257 

Honecker, Erich, 241 

housing, 71, 78, 79, 80, 99, 120, 126 

human rights, xxvii, xxviii, 59, 104, 164, 
195, 196, 230, 242, 244, 245, 294, 296 

Hungarian Autonomous Region (see also 
Mures, Autonomous Hungarian Re- 
gion), 85-86, 197, 199 

Hungarian people, ^emigration; Hun- 
garians in Romania; nationality groups 

Hungarian Revolution (1956), xxvi, 53, 
230, 237 

Hungarians in Romania: attempts to as- 
similate, xxviii, 80, 90-91, 93; discrimi- 
nation against, 56, 59; mistreatment of, 
240-43 

Hungarian Soviet Republic (1919), 35 
Hungary: abolishes serfdom (1848), 21; 
border with, 64, 65; debate over Tran- 
sylvania as part of, 3, 9; dispute with 
Romania over origins, 9; invaded by 
Romania (1919-20), 35; Ministry of 
Culture, 242; reclaims Transylvania 
(1940), 40; relations with, 196, 241-42; 
Soviet army invades (1956), 53; ter- 
ritorial gains: World War I, 34; unifi- 
cation with Transylvania of, 21 
Huns, 8 

Hunyadi, Janos, 12-13 
hydroelectric power industry, 167 
Hymn to Romania campaign (1976), 
xxviii, 80 



Ialomija River, 69 

Ia§i, 24, 26, 32, 39, 70, 172, 179, 254, 

256-57, 269 
Ia§i-Kishinev Operation, 256 
Iliescu, Ion, xxxi-xxxv 
IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
INF. See intermediate nuclear forces 
imports: of Australian and Soviet coking 



347 



Romania: A Country Study 



coal, xxix, 170, 174; of Australian and 
Soviet iron ore, xxix, 155, 174; of elec- 
tricity, xxix; of foreign technology, 
xxix, 58; of natural gas, xxix, 154-55; 
of oil, xxix, 168-69, 240, 293; of Soviet 
arms and military equipment, 286; of 
Soviet rolling mills, 174 

indoctrination (see also educational sys- 
tem), 231, 234 

Indo-European people, 4 

Industria Aeronautica Romana (IAR), 
289 

industrial sector: development of, 51, 57, 
58, 77, 93, 100; distribution of facto- 
ries of, 165; effect of development of, 
71; growth and performance of, xxiii, 
136, 165 

inflation, xxxv, 42, 48 

infrastructure development (see also road 
system; railway system; canals): under 
Ceau§escu regime, xxiv; first roads 
linking principalities, 25 

Inocenjiu Micu Klein, 19 

Institute for Russian Studies, 55 

Institute of Historical and Social-Political 
Studies, 219 

intelligence services. See Department of 
External Information; Securitate 

intelligentsia class, 102-5 

intermediate nuclear forces (INF), 292 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
xxvi, 58, 150, 163-64, 165, 196 

investment (see also joint ventures), foreign 
direct, 38, 168 

Ionita, Ion, 267 

Iorga, Nicolae, 38, 41 

Iran, xxx, 164, 169, 246 

Iraq, xxxiii-xxxiv, xxxv, 164, 169, 293 

Iron Age, 4 

Iron Gates (I/II) on the Danube River, 

66, 69, 167, 289 
Iron Guard, xxv-xxvi, 38-41 
iron ore deposits, 155 
irrigation system, 69, 136, 137 
Israel, xxvi, 56, 196, 238, 246-47 



Jehovah's Witnesses, 125 

Jewish Federation, 124 

Jews (see also anti-Semitism): cliscrimination 
against, 39; emigration of, 92-93; mis- 
treatment and repression of, 29, 41-42; 
population distribution of, 29, 81 



Jiu River, 66, 167 
Jiu Valley, xxxiii, 101, 169, 230 
joint party-state councils, xxi-xxii, 141, 
207 

joint trading companies, 164 
joint ventures, 170, 171, 172 
Joseph II (emperor of Austria), 19-20 
jude{e, or county system. See government 

administration 
judicial commissions, 206 
judicial councils, 295 
judicial system (see also court system), 294 

Kadar, Janos, 53-54, 239, 241 

Karolyi, Mihaly, 35 

Khrushchev, Nikita, xxvi, 53-55, 162, 

174, 237 
Kiraly, Karoly, 93 
Kiselev, Pavel, 24 
Kohl, Helmut, 244 
Komsomol, 220 
Korea, North, 239, 293 
Kun, Bela, 35 

Kutzovlachs (Dacian descendants), 8, 31 



labor force: in agricultural sector, 95, 98; 
military troops employed in, 283, 289; 
productivity in, 58, 136, 158-62; short- 
ages in, xxiv, 136, 156-57, 289; unrest 
in, xxiv-xxv, 101, 230, 305; women in, 
71-72 

labor movement, 37, 161, 305 
lakes, 66 

land policy: appropriation (1949), 51; dis- 
tribution in 19th century, 29; reclama- 
tion program, 137; reform (1917-21), 
32, 36, 93; reform (1945), 48, 94 

languages: compulsory Russian (1948), 
51, 55; Romanian, 3, 8, 55; in techni- 
cal schools, 90; use of Hungarian, 
90-91; use of Romanian, 90-91 

LAR (airline), 179 

Latin America, 236, 293 

Law on National Defense of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania (1972), 259 

Law on the Organization and Operation 
of People's Councils (1968), 209 

Law on the Organization of Justice 
(1952), 206 

Law on the Organization of National 
Defense (1972), 277 



348 



Index 



Law on the Organization of the Army 

(1864), 254 
Law on the Organization of the Court 

System (1968), 205 
Law on the Organization of the Judiciary 

(1947), 295 
Legislative Chamber of the People's 

Councils, 143 
Lenin, Vladimir, 85 
Leopold I (emperor of Austria), 18 
leu. See currency 

Liberal Party, xxxii, 29, 31, 37, 38 
Libya, 293 
lignite, 167 

Little Entente (1920-21), 39-40, 255 
livestock raising, 180, 182-83 
locomotive industry, 172 
Lombards, 8 

Luca, Vasile, 45, 47, 50, 52, 53 
Lutheranism, 14, 83, 124 
Lysimachus, 6 



Macedonians, 252 

machine tool industry, 170, 172 

Magyar people, 3, 9, 11-12, 22, 82-83 

Manescu, Comeliu, 230 

Mangalia, 4, 76, 173, 179, 273, 289 

Maniu, Iuliu, 35-37, 38, 44, 49 

Maramures, region, 64, 155 

Marghiloman, Alexandru, 34 

marriage, 109 

Marshall Plan, 48, 49 

marshland, 182, 183 

Marxism (see also socialism), xxiv, 63; 

concept of family in, 108-9; concept of 

urban development of, 76; position on 

national identity of, 85 
Marxism-Leninism, 93-94 
mass demonstrations (see also labor force), 

101, 230 
mass media, xxi, 104, 231-35 
mass organizations, 101, 219-22, 223 
Matei Basarab, 17 

Matys Corvinus (king of Hungary), 13 
Maurer, Gheorghe, 56, 57, 222, 224, 226 
Mavrocordato, Constantine, 23 
media. See mass media 
medical care (see also health care system), 
128 

Mediterranean Sesa, 11, 64, 70 
Mehmed I (sultan), 12 
metallurgy, 155, 173-75 



methane gas, 66, 168 

Methodius (saint), 8 

Michael the Brave (prince of Walachia), 
xxv, 14, 16, 17, 253 

Michael V (king of Romania), 4, 41, 42-43, 
45, 47, 195; abdication of, xxxv, 49 

migration: of barbarian tribes, 8; patterns 
of, 77-78; to urban areas, xxiv, 95, 99 

Mihalache, Ion, 49 

Milea, Vasile, xxx, 266 

military budget. See spending, government 

military courts, 206, 296 

military doctrine (see also Law on National 
Defense of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania; War of the Entire People), 
xxiii; arms control in, 261-62; differen- 
tiated from Warsaw Pact doctrine, 280; 
evolution of, 258-60; Patriotic Guards 
in, 260, 268; of scorched earth, 261; 
strategy according to, 260-61 

military equipment industry, 286-87 

Military Publishing House, 264-65 

military regions, 269 

military sector (see also armed forces; 
paramilitary forces): employment in 
civilian economy of, 283, 289; impor- 
tance for power of, 252; influence of 
France on, 253; influence of Soviet Red 
Army on, 257-58; organization and 
tactics of, 260-61; ranks, uniforms, and 
insignia of, 281-83; reserves, paramili- 
tary, and guerrillas in, 251, 261-62, 
268, 280; size of, 251 

military service, compulsory, 276-77 

Military Technical Academy, 279 

mineral reserves, 136, 155 

mineral springs, 66 

mining industry (see also coal industry), 

66, 174-75 
Ministry of Agriculture, 187 
Ministry of Education and Training, 114 
Ministry of Food Industry and Procure- 
ment, 189 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 235-36 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation, 235- 
36 

Ministry of Interior, 294; Directorate for 
Penitentiaries of, 302; organization of, 
299; responsibility of, 299; Service K 
of, 302 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (see also Minis- 
try of Interior), 299 



349 



Romania: A Country Study 



Ministry of Justice, 205; Office of the 
Prosecutor General (Procuratura), 207, 
294-95; responsibilities of, 294 
Ministry of Machine Building, 171 
Ministry of National Defense: Border 
Guards subordinate to, 275-76; direc- 
torates of, 264-65; limited power of, 
267-68; role in premilitary training of, 
277 

minority groups (see also nationality 

groups), 89-91 
Mircea the Old (prince of Walachia), 12 
Mitterrand, Francois, 246 
Moise, Vasile, 301 

Moldavia (see also United Principalities), 
3-4; agriculture in, 180, 182; as battle- 
ground, 252-53; decline of, 12; econ- 
omy of, 11; founded by Transylvani- 
an emigres, 10; land distribution in 
(16th century), 17; as region, 64 

Moldavian Tableland, 66 

Moldova River, 10 

Moldoveanu (peak), 66 

Mongols, 9, 10, 11, 12 

Montenegro, 31 

mortality rates, 70-71, 73 

most-favored-nation status, xxvii, xxxiv, 
163, 164, 196, 245 

mountain infantry, 269-70, 282 

mountains (see also Carpathian Moun- 
tains; Transylvanian Alps), 4, 64-66, 
155, 180 

Muhammed (sultan), 13 

Munich Agreement (1938), 40, 255 

Muntenia, 64 

Mures, Autonomous Hungarian Region 

(Mure§ Region), 86 
Mure§ River, 35, 69 
Muslims, 124 
Mussolini, Benito, 39 



Nagy, Imre, 54 

Napoleon III, 26, 27, 254 

National Agricultural Board, 187 

National Center of the Romanian Aircraft 
Industry, 171 

National Council for Agriculture, Food 
Industry, Forestry, and Water Man- 
agement, 184, 187, 207 

National Council for Science and Educa- 
tion, 207, 231 

National Council for Science and Tech- 



nology, xxii, 141, 207 
National Council of Working People, 207, 
219 

National Democratic Bloc (Blocul Nation- 
al Democrat: BND), 42-43, 44 

National Democratic Front (Frontul Na- 
tional Democrat: FND), 45, 47, 50 

nationality groups: emigration of Ger- 
mans, 243-44; mistreatment of 
Hungarians, 56, 59, 240, 240-43; 
nationality councils for, 220, 242; 
newspapers of, 232; policy for, 85 

nationalism: under Gheorghe Gheorghiu- 
Dej, 3; under Michael the Brave, xxv, 
16; Romanian, xxv, xxxii, 19, 20, 29, 
106-7 

nationality councils. See nationality groups 
nationalization, xxiii, 50, 138 
National Liberal Party, xxxii, 42, 45, 49 
National Minorities Statute (1945), 84 
National Party (Transylvania), 29, 34, 
35-36 

National Peasant Party, xxxii, 37, 38, 42, 
44-45, 49 

National Salvation Front (NSF), xxxi- 
xxxiv 

National Union of Agricultural Produc- 
tion Cooperatives, 223 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 

natural gas industry and reserves, 58, 

136, 154, 166, 169 

natural resources, 66, 151-56; agreement 
with Germany to exploit, 40; land as, 

137, 151; used for industrial growth, 136 
naval bases, 273 

naval shipyards, 173, 273 

navy: Coastal Defense unit of, 273, 275; 
Danube Squadron of, 273, 275; equip- 
ment and ships of, 273-74; organiza- 
tion and mission of, 273; personnel in 
Border Guards, 275-76 

Nazi Germany: attacks Soviet Union 
(1941), 256; controls oil industry in 
World War II, 138; forces Romania to 
cede territory, 255; funds Iron Guard, 
39; invades Poland, 40; nonaggression 
pact with Soviet Union (1939), 40; oc- 
cupies Romanian territory, 255; rela- 
tions during World War II with, 40-44; 
Romania declares war against (1944), 
257; trade with and supplies from 
Romania, 40, 42 



350 



Index 



Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1939), 
40, 255 

Negoiu (peak), 66 

Negru-Voda, 10 

Neolithic Age, 4 

nepotism, xxii, 228, 240 

New Economic and Financial Mechan- 
ism, 143, 145 

newspapers, 89, 91, 115, 122, 231-32 

Nicholas I (tsar of Russia), 25 

Nicolae Balcescu Military Officers Col- 
lege, 278 

Nixon, Richard M., xxvii, 238, 244 

Nonaligned Movement, xxvii 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 239, 292 
NSF. See National Salvation Front 
nuclear power, 166, 167, 168 

Octavius (Roman emperor), 6 
Odessa, 41 

officer corps: attitude toward Ceau§escu 
and PCR of, 267-68; education of, 
278-80; Soviet influence in, 266 

oil-drilling (offshore) rig manufacture, 168 

oil-field equipment manufacture, 170, 240 

oil industry, 48, 58, 138, 166, 168, 256 

oil price shocks, xxiv, 58, 169 

oil refining, 168-69 

oil reserves, 136, 154 

Old Kingdom, or Regat, 36-37, 65, 81 

Olteanu, Constantin, 266 

Oltenia, 64 

Olt River, 64, 66, 69 

Operation Barbarossa, 256 

Oradea, 88, 155, 174, 176 

ore deposits, 66, 155, 174-75 

Ostrogoths, 8 

Ottoman Empire (see also Sublime Porte): 
decline of, 23; domination by, 3-4, 14, 
252-53; expansion of (14th century), 
12; in First Balkan War, 31; forces in- 
vade Hungary, 13; pressure of, 13 

Ovid, 5 



Palace of the Republic, 289 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 

236, 246-47 
paramilitary forces, 251, 260-62 
Paraschiv, Vasile, 161 
Party Academy for Social and Political 



Training, 218-19 
Party Academy's Center for the Educa- 
tion and Training of Party and Mass 
Organization Cadres, 219 
Party and State Cadres Commission, xxii 
party-state councils. See joint party-state 
councils 

Patra§canu, Lucretiu, 43, 45, 52 
Patriotic Guards, xxxiv, 260, 268, 277, 

280-81, 291 
Pauker, Ana, 45, 47, 50, 52, 53, 54 
PCR. See Romanian Communist Party 
Peace of Bucharest (1812), 23 
Peace Unified Power System, 168 
Peasant Party, 37 
Penal Code (1978), 296-97, 298 
Pentacostalists, 124 

people's councils. See government ad- 
ministration 
People's Democratic Front, 210 
perestroika, xxix, 240-41 
periodicals (see also newspapers), 231-32 
Persians, 5, 252 

Peter the Great (tsar of Russia), 22 

petrochemical industry, 58, 154, 169, 175 

Phanariot rule, 22-23, 24 

Philip of Macedonia, 6 

Pioneers (youth organization), 115, 221 

pipeline, gas, 169 

Pirvulescu, Constantin, 230 

Pitesti, 171, 175, 177 

plains, 65, 69, 151, 154 

Pleistocene Epoch, 4 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation 

Ploiesti, 28, 175, 256 

Plowmen's Front, 45 

PMR. See Romanian Workers' Party 

Poarta Alba-Midia-Navodari Canal, 178 

Poland, 22; birthrate in, 157; defeats Ot- 
toman army (1683), 18; defiance in 
1956 of, 53; invaded by Nazi Germa- 
ny, 40; private agriculture in, 186; re- 
lations with, 240; Solidarity movement 
in, xxix 

Polexco Permanent Bureau. See Romani- 
an Communist Party 

political circumstances: communist man- 
ipulation of (1945), 47-48; of Iron 
Guard activities, 38-40 

political crime, 296-97 

political indoctrination (see also indoctri- 
nation), 277-78 



351 



Romania: A Country Study 



Pompey, 6 

Popular Democratic Front, 50 

population (see also demographic trends; 
urban settlement): geographic distribu- 
tion of, 75-78; levels of, 70-73; in Old 
Kingdom, 81 

port facilities, 177-79, 273 

ports, 136, 273 

Potsdam Conference (1945), 47 

precipitation, 70, 152 

president of the republic: position creat- 
ed by constitutional amendment (1974), 
203; powers of, 203 

price mechanism: control of, 144-46; sup- 
port for agricultural products in, 38 

private farms. See agricultural sector 

private ownerships of economic assets, 
140, 150, 183, 184, 186, 197 

Procuratura. See Ministry of Justice 

propaganda, xxviii, 52, 121, 124, 231, 
234 

Protestants (see also Calvinism; Lutheran- 
ism), 14, 16, 18, 124 
Protocol of St. Petersburg (1913), 31 
Provisional Council of National Unity, 
xxxi 

Prut River, 64, 66, 69, 153, 177 
public health (see also abortion; mortality 

rates), 126 
publishing industry, 234-35 

Raceneau, Grigore, 230 

Radescu, Nicolae, 46 

Radio Bucharest, 234 

Radio Budapest, 241 

radio receivers, 180, 233 

railroad freight and passenger car manu- 
facture, 170, 172 

railway system (see also Bucharest subway 
system), 66, 176-77, 289 

Rakoczi, Gyorgy, 16-17 

rationing: of energy-related products, 
xxv, 166; of food, xxv, 74, 189-90 

Reagan administration, 245 

rebellion: in Timisoara (1989), xxx; of 
Hungarian nobles and serfs (1711), 19; 
of serfs (1784) in Transylvania, 20 

Red Army: influence on armed forces de- 
velopment of, 257; invades and oc- 
cupies Romania (1944), xxvi, 42-44, 
256-57; on Romanian border, 40; Ro- 
manian troops under command of 



(1944), 257; at Stalingrad, 256 
Reformed (Calvinist) Church, 124 
regional divisions (historical), 64 
Reglement Organique, 24, 25 
religion (see also Calvinism; Lutheranism; 
Muslims; Roman Catholicism; Roma- 
nian Orthodox Church; Uniate 
Church; Unitarian Church), 82-83; 
destruction of churches, 121; impact of 
family law on, 109; restrictions on prac- 
tice of, 120-21; state support for some 
religious groups, 120 
reparations to Soviet Union, xxvi, 44, 48, 
138 

reserves, military. See military sector 

revolt: at Ploiesti (1870), 28; peasant 
(1437), 11; peasant (1514), 13; peasant 
(1599), 16; peasant (1907), 29; rumors 
of military (1980s), 267 

Revolution in Europe (1848), 21 

riots in 1987, 101 

river systems, 65, 66, 69, 136, 183 

road system (see also infrastructure de- 
velopment), 66 

Roman, Petre, xxxi, xxxvi 

Roman Catholic Church: government 
control of, 51, 121-22; under Habsburg 
rule, 18; in Hungary (9th century 
A.D.), 9-10; Latin Rite Church in, 
121; in Transylvania, 14, 82-83; Uni- 
ate, or Eastern Rite Church in, 18-19, 
121, 122-23 

Roman Empire: colony in Dacia of, 3, 
7-8, 9, 137, 252; relations with Getae 
people of, 6-7, 52; settlements of, 76 

Romania (see also Greater Romania): 
economy under Charles, 28; history to 
World War II of, 4; independence of, 
xxv; joins World War I (1916), 32; as 
kingdom (1881), 28; official designa- 
tion (1861), 26; territorial claims of 
(1918-19), 35; territorial gains of (post- 
World War II), 36 

Romanian Army (see also armed forces; 
army): move to lessen Soviet influence 
on (1960s), 258; nucleus of (1945), 
257-58 

Romanian Communist Party (Partidul 
Comunist Roman: PCR), 56; basic 
party organizations of, 216-17; Ceau- 
sescu as leader of, 195, 203, 222- 
24; Central Auditing Commission of, 
213, 216; Central Collegium of, 216; 



352 



Index 



Central Committee and commissions 
of, xxi, 213-14, 219, 221, 222-26, 
231-33, 235, 265-66; control of armed 
forces by, 251, 262-66; control of 
government by, 50, 196-97; control of 
mass media by, 231; control over cul- 
tural life by, 217-18; controls judicial 
system, 294; dominance in economy of, 
140-46; Executive Committee of, 222; 
function of mass organizations in, 
219-22; governs people's councils, 209; 
ideological program of, 218; member- 
ship and social composition in, 105-6, 
211-13; National Conference (1967), 
223-24; organization of, 213-17; Patri- 
otic Guard subordination to, 280-81; 
Polexco Permanent Bureau of, xxi, 
213-14, 216, 226; Political Executive 
Committee (Polexco) of, xxi, 106, 
213-14, 216, 226, 266; provisions un- 
der 1965 Constitution for, 199; rep- 
resentation in State Council of, 202; 
role in economy of, 135; role in trade 
unions of, 221-22; Secretariat of, 214, 
216; Standing Presidium of, xxi, 222, 
223; Thirteenth Party Congress of, 227; 
training by, 218-19; Twelfth Party 
Congress of, 226-27 
Romanian Intelligence Service, xxxiv 
Romanian language: Slavic vocabulary 

of, 8; source of, 3, 8 
Romanian National Central Council, 34 
Romanian Navy (see also navy), 273-75 
Romanian Orthodox Church, xxxii, 22, 
27, 37, 121; government control of 
(1948), 51; Uniate or Eastern Rite Cath- 
olics in, 122-23 
Romanian People's Republic (see also So- 
cialist Republic of Romania), xxiii, 50, 
195 

Romanian Press Agency (Agenda Ro- 
mana de Presa: Agerpres), 233 

Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Mun- 
itoresc Roman: PMR) (see also Roma- 
nian Communist Party), 49-50, 211; 
control of government by, 52-55; role 
under 1952 constitution, 197 

Romtehnica, 293 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 44 

Rudolph II (Holy Roman Emperor), 16 

rural resettlement strategy (systematiza- 
tion), 78-80, 186-87, 199, 242 

Russia (see also Soviet Union): coup d'etat 



in (1917), 32; influence in Moldavia 
and Walachia of, 22-23; invades Wal- 
achia, 25; occupation of Moldavia and 
Walachia (1829), 24; protects Walachia 
and Moldavia, 4; revolution in (1917), 
32; role in revolution of 1848 of, 21 
Russo-Turkish War: in 1828, 24; in 
1877-78, 28, 254 



Sachsenboden (Saxon Land), 82 

Sadat, Anwar as, 246 

salt deposits, 66, 156 

Sanatescu, Constantin, 43, 45-46 

Sarmatians, 6, 8 

Satu Mare, 179 

Saxon people, 82-83 

Schmidt, Helmut, xxvii, 243 

Scientific Research and Technological En- 
gineering Institute for Machine Tools, 
172 

Scythia, 5-6 

secret police. See Securitate 

Securitate, xxii-xxiii, xxvii, xxxiv, 50, 89, 
195, 230, 266, 298; control by Minis- 
try of Interior of, 299; Directorate for 
Counterespionage of, 301; Directorate 
for Internal Security of, 302; Direc- 
torate for Investigations of, 301; Direc- 
torate for Mail Censorship of, 301; 
Directorate for Surveillance of, 301; 
Directorate IV of, 301; Directorate V 
of, 302 ; General Directorate for Tech- 
nical Operations (Direcjia Generala de 
Tehnica Operativa: DGTO), 301; in 
1989 uprising, xxx-xxxi 

Serb, Ion, 299 

Serbia, 30, 31, 254 

Serbs, 12, 65, 80, 86 

serfs: bondage laws for, 13; in Transyl- 
vania, 10, 12, 19-20; in Walachia and 
Moldavia, 17 

Seventh Day Adventists, 124 

Shamir, Yitzhak, 247 

shipbuilding industry, 173, 286-88 

shipping industry, 179 

Shultz, George, 245 

Sibiu, 76, 177 

Sigismund (king of Hungary), 12 
Silistra, 28, 31 
Silviculture Council, 207 
Siret River, 69 



353 



Romania: A Country Study 



Sixtus IV (pope), 13 
Slavs, 8, 9 
Sobieski, Jan, 18 

Social Democratic Party, xxxii, 37, 42, 
44-45, 211 

socialism: Brezhnev Doctrine of protection 
of, 59, 238; completion of transition to, 
198-99; establishment of, xxiv, 63; in 
Romania, 217; transition from capital- 
ism to, 195 

socialist democracy, 217 

Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, 86, 
201, 203; directs election organization, 
210-11; membership in, 210 

Socialist Republic of Romania, xxiii, 3, 
198-99 

Socialist Unity Front, 210, 232 

social structure: changing role of peasant in, 
95, 98-99; declining mobility in, 107-8; 
education for upward mobility in, 116; 
elite in, 63; intelligentsia in, 102-5; po- 
litical elite in, 105-7; upheaval in, 63-64; 
working class, or proletariat in, 99-101 

social unrest (see also labor force), 230, 304-5 

Somes, River, 69 

South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station, 168 
Soviet General Staff Academy, 279 
Soviet-Romanian economic agreement 
(1945), 48 

Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance, 50, 
238 

Soviet Union (see also Red Army): army in- 
vades Hungary, 53; attack by German 
and Romanian forces of, 41 ; border with, 
64, 65; buys Romanian armaments, 293; 
control of country by, 3; control of 
Romanian army by, 257-58; control of 
Romanian government by, 45-46; de- 
pendence on, 273; exports coking coal 
and crude oil, 169-70; expropriates finan- 
cial and industrial firms, 138; ideologi- 
cal conflict with China (PRC), 55, 238; 
military presence (1956), 53; Red Army 
in Romania, 42; relations during World 
War II with, 40-44; relations with, xxvi, 
3, 40, 251; relations with (1953-65), xxix, 
52-56, 237-38; relations with 
(1965-1980s), 56-59, 262; reparations to, 
xxvi, 138; response to Romania's in- 
dependent attitude by, 268; role in War- 
saw Treaty Organization of, xxix, 
290-92; Romanian independence from, 



292; as supplier of arms and equipment, 
286; trade relations with, 162; withdraws 
occupying forces (1958), 258 

Sovroms, 48, 53 

special security troops, xxiii 

spending, government: budget for 1989, 
147; for military sector, 283, 286 

Stalin, Joseph, 44, 47, 49, 52, 237; denun- 
ciation of, 53; encourages anti-Semitism, 
51-52 

Stalingrad, 4, 41, 42, 256-57 

Stalinist ideology, 135, 138, 139, 147, 156, 
187, 228, 240 

Stanculescu, Victor, xxxiii 

standard of living, 74, 99, 106-7, 135-36, 
139, 160, 165, 191 

State Council: under 1952 constitution, 198; 
under 1965 Constitution, 199, 216; pow- 
er of, 201-3; powers of GNA devolving 
to, 202 

state farms. See agricultural sector 
State Planning Committee, 141, 145, 148 
steel industry (see also metallurgy), 173 
Stefan Gheorghiu Academy for Social- 
Political Education and the Training of 
Leading Cadres, 218 
Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy, 218 
Stephen I (king of Hungary), 9 
Stephen the Great (prince of Moldavia), 13, 
252 

Stoica, Chivu, 56, 222, 224-25 

Strauss, Franz Joseph, 243 

strikes (see also Jiu Valley), xxiv; of miners, 

101, 230; of railroad workers, 39 
Sturdza, Mihai (prince of Moldavia), 25 
Sublime Porte, 14, 16, 17-18, 22-26 
subsidies, 145, 149 
Suceava, 13, 179 
Sudetenland. See Czechoslovakia 
Supreme Council for Economic and Social 

Development, 141, 207-8 
Supreme Court, 202, 203, 205, 295 
Swabian people, 82-83, 85 
Switzerland, 290 

systematization program. See agricultural 

sector; rural resettlement strategy 
Szekler people, 9, 11-12, 22, 82-83 



Tamerlane, 12 

Tanase, Virgil, 246 

tara Romaneasca, 10 

TAROM (national airline), 179, 271 



354 



Index 



tax system: people with or without chil- 
dren, 72; revenues from, 146-47 

technical colleges, 118, 120 

technocrats, 103, 105-6 

telecommunications system, 180 

telephone system, 180 

television, xxviii, xxx, xxxi, xxxiii, 89, 91, 
95, 180, 217, 231, 233-34 

territorial boundaries: changes in 1940 
for, 40; changes in 1947 for, 257; set 
at Treaty of Paris (1947), 48 

territorial defense concept, 259-60 

Teutonic Knights, 9 

textile industry, 176 

Thirty Years' War (1618-48), 16 

Thracian tribes, 4 

Thraco-Getian people, 4-5 

timber industry, 136, 153 

Timi§oara, xxix-xxx, 13, 171, 173, 179 

Tisza River, 35, 69 

titanium mining, 174, 187 

Tito, Josip Broz, 52, 55, 56, 291 

Tokes, Laslo, xxix-xxx 

topography, 65-69 

trade policy, 58, 162, 196, 289-90 

trade unions: communist party controlled, 
47, 221; role of, 100, 161 

training, military: in armed forces, 277; 
for officers, 278-79; for pilots, 271, 273; 
premilitary requirement of, 277; in 
Soviet Union, 258, 279-80, 290 

Trajan (Roman emperor), 7 

Trajan's Column, 7 

transportation system (see also infrastruc- 
ture development): gas pipelines in, 
169; railroads in, 176-77 

Transylvania, 3; accepts Austrian protec- 
tion (1688), 18; agriculture in, 180; as 
autonomous principality, 14-17; be- 
comes part of Romania (1918), 255; 
economy of (15th century), 11; ethnic 
group diversity and conflict in, 82-84; 
freedom of worship in, 14; integration 
into Hungary of, 3, 9; Magyar as offi- 
cial language (1843), 20; peasant up- 
rising (1848), 25; Protestantism in, 14; 
as region, 64, 65; Romanians in, 18, 
19; as Romanian territory (1947), 48; 
settlement of, 9-10; settlement of Hun- 
garians in, 9-10 

Transylvanian Alps, 64, 66, 153, 155 

Transylvanian Plateau, 66, 154 

treaty, Soviet-Romanian (1948), 50, 238 



Treaty of Adrianople (1829), 24, 29 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 34 
Treaty of Bucharest: in 1913, 31; in 1918, 
34 

Treaty of Paris: in 1856, 26; in 1947, 
48-49, 257 

Treaty of St. Germain, 36 

Treaty of Trianon, 36 

Triple Entente, 31-32, 255 

Turkey (see also Ottoman Empire; Con- 
stantinople): in Balkan Entente, 39 

Turks, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 28, 
81, 82, 124 



UGSR. See General Union of Trade Un- 
ions of Romania 
Ulfilas (bishop), 8 

UNESCO. See United Nations (UN) 

Uniate Church. See Eastern Orthodox 
Church; Roman Catholic Church 

unification pressure, 30 

Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea 
Tineretului Comunist: UTC), xxii, 
115-16, 212, 220-21, 223; Patriotic 
Guard subordination to, 280; role in 
premilitary training of, 277 

Union of Three Nations, 11-12, 14, 16; 
abolition of (1849), 21; dissolution of, 
20 

Unitarianism, 14, 82, 124 

Unitary National Socioeconomic Plan, 
142, 143, 204 

United Nations (UN): Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), 231; Human Rights 
Commission, xxviii, 242-43; member- 
ship in, 237 

United Principalities (see also Romania), 
26, 253-54 

United States: bombs Romanian oil fields 
(1943), 256; Ceausescu's criticism of, 
230; relations with, xxvii, xxxiii, 244-45, 
290; trade relations with, 163, 164 

universities, 26, 54, 102, 118 

uranium industry, 48 

urban development, 76-77, 138, 152 

Ursu, Ion, 20 

UTC. See Union of Communist Youth 



Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru, 36 
vanadium mining, 174 



355 



Romania: A Country Study 



Vasile Lupu (prince of Moldavia), 17-18 
Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Cradle), 

xxxii-xxxiii 
Vietnam, 293 
Visigoths, 8 

Vladimirescu, Tudor, 23, 253 
Vlad Jepe§, 13 
Vyshinsky, Andrei, 46 

Walachia (see also United Principalities), 
3-4; agricultural sector of, 180; as bat- 
deground, 252-53; decline of, 12; econ- 
omy of, 25; founded by Transylvani- 
an emigres, 10; independence of (1380), 
1 1 ; invaded by Russia (1848), 25; Jews 
in, 25; land distribution in (16th cen- 
tury), 17; as region, 64; self-govern- 
ment of, 25 

War of Independence (1877-78), 254 

War of the Entire People (Lupta In- 
tregului Popor), 259, 268, 278 

Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw 
Pact), 53, 196, 237, 239-41; establish- 
ment of Council of Foreign Ministers 
in, 292; independence from, xxvi, 
xxvii, xxviii, 262, 286, 290-92; mem- 
bers threaten Romania, 291-92; Ro- 
mania as member of, xxvi, 251, 258 

waterways, inland (see also canals; river 
systems), 69, 136, 177 



wheat production, 180, 182 

Whitehead, John, 245 

women: effect of demographic policy on, 
72-75, 109; in agriculture, 96, 98; in 
armed forces, 276; in education, 112; 
in military secondary schools, 278; in 
Patriotic Guards, 277; rights under so- 
cialism of, 112; in Romanian Com- 
munist Party, 113, 212; in the 
workplace, 71, 78, 110, 113 

workers' councils, 86-87, 100-101 

working class or proletariat (see also labor 
force), 99-101 

World Bank, xxvi, 58, 163, 196 

World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
220 

World Federation of Trade Unions, 220 
World War I, 31-34, 254-55 
World War II, 40-44, 256-57 
Writers' Union, 104 

Yalta declaration (1945), 44, 46, 47 
Youth Homeland Defense detachments, 
277 

Ypsilanti, Alexander, 24 

Yugoslavia: border with, 64, 65, 69; ex- 
pelled from Cominform, 52; in Little 
Entente and Balkan Entenete, 39, 255; 
relations with, 55, 56-57 

Zhivkov, Todor, 240 



356 



PIN: 006972-000 



